Republic of
the
Supreme Court
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HEUNGHWA INDUSTRY
CO., |
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G.R. No. 169095 |
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LTD., |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., |
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Chairperson, |
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- versus - |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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NACHURA, and |
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REYES, JJ. |
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DJ Builders Corporation, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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December 8, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the August 20, 2004
Decision[2]
and August 1, 2005 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
Nos. 70001 and 71621.
The facts of the case, as aptly
presented by the CA, are as follows:
Heunghwa
Industry Co., Ltd. (petitioner) is a Korean corporation doing business in the
Petitioner entered into a
subcontract agreement with respondent to do earthwork, sub base course and box
culvert of said project in the amount of Php113, 228, 918.00. The agreement contained an arbitration clause.
The agreed price was not fully paid; hence,
on
Petitioner's Amended Answer[5]
averred that it was not obliged to pay respondent because the latter caused the
stoppage of work. Petitioner further
claimed that it failed to collect from the DPWH due to respondent's poor
equipment performance. The Amended Answer also contained a counterclaim for
Php24,293,878.60.
On
5. Parties would submit only specific issues to the CIAC for
arbitration, leaving other claims to this Honorable Court for further hearing
and adjudication. Specifically, the issues to be submitted to the CIAC are as
follows:
a. Manpower and equipment standby time;
b. Unrecouped
mobilization expenses;
c. Retention;
d. Discrepancy of billings; and
e.
Price escalation for fuel and oil usage.[7]
On the same day,
the RTC issued an Order[8]
granting the motion.
On
1.
Additional
mobilization costs incurred by [petitioner] for work abandoned by [respondent];
2.
Propriety
of liquidated damages in favor of [petitioner] for delay incurred by
[respondent];
3.
Propriety
of downtime costs on a daily basis during the period of the existence of the
previous temporary restraining order against [petitioner].[10]
On
CIAC then issued an Order[12]
dated
Respondent filed a Motion for
Partial Reconsideration of the
On
On
Petitioner filed in the CIAC its
opposition to the second motion to declare it in default, with a motion to
dismiss informing the CIAC that it was abandoning the submission of the case to
it and asserting that the RTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over
Civil Case No. 3421, including the five issues referred to the CIAC.
On
On
On
For clarity, the succeeding
proceedings before the RTC and CIAC are presented in graph form in
chronological order.
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On the same day, the RTC
granted the motion without prejudice to petitioner's counterclaim.[24] |
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March 13, 2002 – the RTC issued
a Resolution[28]
declaring the July 16, 2001 Order which dismissed the case “without force and
effect” and set the case for hearing on |
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The parties, without waiting for the
reply required by the CIAC,[32]
filed two separate petitions for certiorari: petitioner, on
In
CA-G.R. SP No. 70001, petitioner assailed the denial by the CIAC of its motion
to dismiss and sought to enjoin the CIAC from proceeding with the case.
In CA-G.R. SP No. 71621, respondent
questioned the March 13, 2002 Order of
the RTC which reinstated Civil Case No. 3421 as well as the Order dated
June 17, 2002 which denied respondent's motion for reconsideration. Respondent also sought to restrain the RTC
from further proceeding with the civil case.
In other words, petitioner is
questioning the jurisdiction of the CIAC; while respondent is questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC over the case.
Both cases were consolidated by the
CA.
The CA ruled against petitioner on
procedural and substantive grounds.
On matters of procedure, the CA took
note of the fact that petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration of
the March 22, 2002 Order of the CIAC and held that it is in violation of the
well-settled rule that a motion for reconsideration should be filed to allow
the respondent tribunal to correct its error before a petition can be
entertained.[33] Moreover, the CA ruled that it is well-settled
that a denial of a motion to dismiss, being an interlocutory order, is not the
proper subject for a petition for certiorari.[34]
Moreover, the CA ruled against
petitioner's main argument that the arbitration clause found in the subcontract
agreement between the parties did not refer to CIAC as the arbitral body. The CA held that the CIAC had jurisdiction
over the controversy because the construction agreement contained a provision
to submit any dispute for arbitration, and there was a joint motion to submit
certain issues to the CIAC for arbitration.[35]
Anent
petitioner's argument that its previous lawyer was not authorized to submit the
case for arbitration, the CA held that what is required for a dispute to fall
under the jurisdiction of the CIAC is for the parties to agree to submit to
voluntary arbitration. Since the parties agreed to submit to voluntary arbitration
in the construction contract, the authorization insisted upon by petitioner was
a mere superfluity.[36]
The
CA further cited National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals[37]
(NIA), where this Court ruled that active participation in the arbitration
proceedings serves to estop a party from denying that
it had in fact agreed to submit the dispute for arbitration.
Lastly,
the CA found no merit in petitioner's prayer to remand the case to the CIAC.
Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the CA.
Hence, herein petition raising the following assignment of errors:
A.
THE
COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PETITION
SUFFERED FROM PROCEDURAL INFIRMITIES WHEN PETITIONER
B.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE JURISDICTION OF
THE CIAC OVER THE CASE. ITS RELIANCE ON THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION AUTHORITY VS.
COURT OF APPEALS (“NIA VS. CA”) WAS MISPLACED AS THE FACTS OF THE INSTANT CASE
ARE SERIOUSLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF NIA VS. CA.
C.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING PETITIONER'S REQUEST
TO AT LEAST REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIAC FOR FURTHER RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE IN
THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY AS PETITIONER COULD NOT HAVE AVAILED OF ITS
OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ITS SIDE ON ACCOUNT OF ITS JURISDICTIONAL OBJECTION.[38]
The petition is devoid of merit.
The first assignment of error raises
two issues: first, whether or not the non-filing of a motion for
reconsideration was fatal to the petition for certiorari filed before
the CA; and second, whether or not a petition for certiorari is the
proper remedy to assail an order denying a motion to dismiss as in the case at
bar .
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari
before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been
given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors
imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue
raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case
of urgency. As a fourth exception, it has been held that the filing of a motion
for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of
certiorari is not a condition sine qua non when the
questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued
and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court.[39]
The
Court agrees with petitioner that the main issue of the petition for certiorari
filed before the CA undoubtedly involved a question of jurisdiction as to which
between the RTC and the CIAC had authority to hear the case. Whether the subject matter falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of a quasi-judicial agency is a question of law.[40]
Thus, given the circumstances present in
the case at bar, the non-filing of a motion for reconsideration by petitioner
to the CIAC Order should have been recognized as an exception to the rule.
Anent the second issue, petitioner
argues that when its motion to dismiss was denied by the CIAC, the latter acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; thus, the same is the proper subject of a petition for certiorari.
As a general rule, an order denying a
motion to dismiss cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari. However, this Court has provided exceptions
thereto:
Under certain situations,
recourse to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate,
i.e., (a) when the trial court issued the order without or in excess of
jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave abuse of discretion by the trial
court; or (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy as
when appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant from the injurious effects
of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiff's baseless action and
compelling the defendant needlessly to go through a protracted trial and
clogging the court dockets by another futile case.”[41] (Emphasis supplied)
The term “grave abuse of discretion”
in its judicial sense connotes a capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The word “capricious,” usually used in tandem
with the term “arbitrary,” conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action.[42]
The question then is: “Did the
denial by the CIAC of the motion to dismiss constitute a patent grave abuse of
discretion?”
Records
show that the CIAC acted within its jurisdiction and it did not commit patent
grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed Order denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss. Thus,
this Court rules in the negative.
Based
on law and jurisprudence, the CIAC has jurisdiction over the present dispute.
The CIAC, in its assailed Order, correctly
applied the doctrine laid down in Philrock,
Inc. v. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission[43]
(Philrock) where this Court held that what
vested in the CIAC original and exclusive jurisdiction over the construction
dispute was the agreement of the parties and not the Court's referral order. The CIAC aptly ruled that the recall of the
referral order by the RTC did not deprive the CIAC of the jurisdiction it had
already acquired,[44]
thus:
x
x x The position of CIAC is
anchored on Executive Order No. 1008 (1985) which created CIAC and vested in it
“original and exclusive jurisdiction” over construction disputes in
construction projects in the
In the case at
bar, the RTC was indecisive of its authority and capacity to hear the
case. Respondent first sought redress from
the RTC for its claim against petitioner. Thereafter, upon motion by both counsels for
petitioner and respondent, the RTC allowed the referral of five specific issues
to the CIAC. However, the RTC later
recalled the case from the CIAC because of the alleged lack of authority of the
counsel for petitioner to submit the case for arbitration. The RTC recalled the case even if it already
admitted its lack of expertise to deal with the intricacies of the construction
business.[46]
Afterwards, the RTC issued a
Resolution recommending that respondent file a motion to dismiss without
prejudice to the counterclaim of petitioner, so that it could pursue
arbitration proceedings under the CIAC.[47]
Respondent complied with the
recommendation of the RTC and filed a motion to dismiss which was granted by
the said court.[48] Later, however, the RTC again asserted
jurisdiction over the dispute because it apparently made a mistake in granting
respondent’s motion to dismiss without conducting any hearing on the motion.[49]
On the other hand, the CIAC's assertion of its jurisdiction over the dispute was
consistent from the moment the RTC allowed the referral of specific issues to
it.
Executive Order 1008[50]
grants to the CIAC original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising
from, or connected with, contracts entered into by parties involved in
construction in the
1.
Manpower and equipment standby time;
2.
Unrecouped mobilization expenses;
3.
Retention;
4.
Discrepancy of billings; and
5.
Price escalation for fuel and oil usage.[51]
x x
x x
The Court notes that the Subcontract
Agreement[52]
between the parties provides an arbitration clause, to wit:
Article 7
Arbitration
7.
Any
controversy or claim between the Contractor and the Subcontractor arising out
of or related to this Subcontract, or the breach thereof, shall be settled
by arbitration, which shall be conducted in the same manner and under
the same procedure as provided in the Prime Contract with Respect to claims
between the Owner and the Contractor, except that a decision by the Owner or
Consultant shall not be a condition precedent to arbitration. If the Prime
Contract does not provide for arbitration or fails to specify the manner and
procedure for arbitration, it shall be conducted in accordance with the law of
the
However, petitioner insists that the
General Conditions which form part of the Prime Contract provide for a specific
venue for arbitration, to wit:
5.19.3. Any
dispute shall be settled under the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce by one or more arbitrators appointed under
such Rules.[54]
The claim of petitioner is not plausible.
In National Irrigation
Administration v. Court of Appeals[55]
this Court recognized the new procedure in the arbitration of disputes before
the CIAC, in this wise:
It is undisputed that the contracts between HYDRO
and NIA contained an arbitration clause wherein they agreed to submit to
arbitration any dispute between them that may arise before or after the
termination of the agreement. Consequently, the claim of HYDRO having arisen
from the contract is arbitrable. NIA's reliance with
the ruling on the case of Tesco Services
Incorporated v. Vera, is misplaced.
The
1988 CIAC Rules of Procedure which were applied by this Court in Tesco case had been duly amended by CIAC Resolutions No.
2-91 and 3-93, Section 1 of Article III of which reads as follows:
Submission to CIAC Jurisdiction - An arbitration
clause in a construction contract or a submission to arbitration of a
construction dispute shall be deemed an agreement to submit an existing or
future controversy to CIAC jurisdiction, notwithstanding the reference to a
different arbitration institution or arbitral body in such contract or
submission. When a contract contains a clause for the
submission of a future controversy to arbitration, it is not necessary for the parties to
enter into a submission agreement before the claimant may invoke the
jurisdiction of CIAC.
Under the present Rules of Procedure, for a
particular construction contract to fall within the jurisdiction of CIAC, it is
merely required that the parties agree to submit the same to voluntary
arbitration. Unlike in the original version of Section 1, as applied in
the Tesco
case, the law as it now stands does not provide that the parties should agree
to submit disputes arising from their agreement specifically to the CIAC for
the latter to acquire jurisdiction over the same. Rather, it is plain and clear that as long as the parties agree to
submit to voluntary arbitration, regardless of what forum they may choose,
their agreement will fall within the jurisdiction of the CIAC, such that, even
if they specifically choose another forum, the parties will not be precluded
from electing to submit their dispute before the CIAC because this right has
been vested upon each party by law, i.e.,
E.O. No. 1008.[56]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Based on the foregoing, there are
two acts which may vest the CIAC with jurisdiction over a construction
dispute. One is the presence of an
arbitration clause in a construction contract, and the other is the agreement
by the parties to submit the dispute to the CIAC.
The first act is
applicable to the case at bar. The bare fact that the parties
incorporated an arbitration clause in their contract is sufficient to vest the
CIAC with jurisdiction over any construction controversy or claim between the
parties. The rule is explicit that the
CIAC has jurisdiction notwithstanding any reference made to another arbitral
body.
It is well-settled that jurisdiction is
conferred by law and cannot be waived by agreement or acts of the parties. Thus, the contention of petitioner that it
never authorized its lawyer to submit the case for arbitration must likewise
fail. Petitioner argues that
notwithstanding the presence of an arbitration clause, there must be a
subsequent consent by the parties to submit the case for arbitration. To stress, the CIAC was already vested with
jurisdiction the moment both parties agreed to incorporate an arbitration
clause in the sub-contract agreement. Thus, a subsequent consent by the parties
would be superfluous and unnecessary.
It must be noted however that the
reliance of the CIAC in it's assailed Order on Philrock[57]
is inaccurate. In Philrock, the Court ruled that the CIAC had
jurisdiction over the case because of the agreement of the parties to refer the
case to arbitration. In the case at bar,
the agreement to refer specific issues to the CIAC is disputed by petitioner on
the ground that such agreement was entered into by its counsel who was not
authorized to do so. In addition, in Philrock, the petitioner therein had actively
participated in the arbitration proceedings, while in the case at bar there
where only two instances wherein petitioner participated, to wit: 1) the referral of five specific issues to
the CIAC; and 2) the subsequent manifestation that
additional matters be referred to the CIAC.
The foregoing notwithstanding, CIAC
has jurisdiction over the construction dispute because of the mere presence of
the arbitration clause in the subcontract agreement.
Thus, the CIAC did not commit any
patent grave abuse of discretion, nor did it act without jurisdiction when it
issued the assailed Order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, there is no compelling reason
for this Court to deviate from the rule that a denial of a motion to dismiss,
absent a showing of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of or excess jurisdiction, being an interlocutory order, is not the
proper subject of a petition for certiorari.
Anent the second assigned error, the
Court notes that the reliance of the CA on NIA is inaccurate. In NIA,[58]
this Court observed:
Moreover, it is undeniable that NIA agreed to
submit the dispute for arbitration to the CIAC.
NIA through its counsel actively participated in the arbitration
proceedings by filing an answer with counterclaim, as well as its compliance
wherein it nominated arbitrators to the proposed panel, participating in the
deliberations on, and the formulation of the Terms of Reference of the
arbitration proceeding, and examining the documents submitted by HYDRO after
NIA asked for originals of the said documents.”[59]
In the case at bar, the only
participation that can be attributed to petitioner is the joint referral of
specific issues to the CIAC and the manifestation praying that additional
matters be referred to the CIAC. Both
acts, however, have been disputed by petitioner because said acts were
performed by their lawyer who was not authorized to submit the case for
arbitration. And even if these were duly
authorized, this would still not change the correct finding of the CA that the
CIAC had jurisdiction over the dispute because, as has been earlier stressed,
the arbitration clause in the subcontract agreement ipso facto vested
the CIAC with jurisdiction.
In passing, even the RTC in its
Resolution recognized the authority of the CIAC to hear the case, to wit:
Courts cannot and will not
resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of
an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise
of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience
and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact. And undoubtedly in this case, the CIAC it cannot
be denied, is that administrative tribunal.[60] (Emphasis supplied)
It puzzles this Court why petitioner would
insist that the RTC should hear the case when the CIAC has the required skill
and expertise in addressing construction disputes. Records will bear out the fact that petitioner
refused to and did not participate in the CIAC proceedings. In its defense,
petitioner cited jurisprudence to the effect that active participation before a
quasi-judicial body would be tantamount to an invocation of the latter bodies'
jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case.[61]
Pursuant to such doctrine, petitioner
argued that had it participated in the CIAC proceedings, it would have been
barred from impugning the jurisdiction of the CIAC.
Petitioner cannot presume that it
would have been estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the CIAC had it participated in the proceedings. In fact, estoppel
is a matter for the court to consider.
The doctrine of laches or of stale demands is
based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society,
the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is
not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.[62] The Court always looks into the attendant
circumstances of the case so as not to subvert public policy.[63]
Given
that petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the CIAC from the beginning, it
was not remiss in enforcing its right.
Hence, petitioner's claim that it would have been estopped
is premature.
The Court finds the last assigned
error to be without merit.
It is well to note that in its
petition for certiorari[64]
filed with the CA on
The
Court notes that had the CA performed its duty promptly, then this present
petition could have been avoided as the CIAC rules allow for the reopening of
hearings, to wit:
SECTION 13.14 Reopening of hearing - The hearing
may be reopened by the Arbitral Tribunal on their own motion or upon the
request of any party, upon good cause shown, at any time before the award is
rendered. When hearings are thus reopened, the effective date for the
closing of the hearing shall be the date of closing of the reopened hearing. (Emphasis supplied)
But because of the belated action of the CA, the CIAC had
to proceed with the hearing notwithstanding the non-participation of
petitioner.
Under the CIAC rules, even without
the participation of petitioner in the proceedings, the CIAC was still required
to proceed with the hearing of the construction dispute. Section 4.2 of the
CIAC rules provides:
SECTION 4.2 Failure or refusal to arbitrate - Where
the jurisdiction of CIAC is properly invoked by the filing of a Request for
Arbitration in accordance with these Rules, the failure despite due notice
which amounts to a refusal of the Respondent to arbitrate, shall not stay the
proceedings notwithstanding the absence or lack of participation of the
Respondent. In such case, CIAC shall appoint the arbitrator/s in
accordance with these Rules. Arbitration proceedings shall continue, and the
award shall be made after receiving the evidence of the Claimant. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
This Court finds that the CIAC
simply followed its rules when it proceeded with the hearing of the dispute
notwithstanding that petitioner refused to participate therein.
To reiterate, the proceedings before the CIAC
were valid, for the same had been conducted within its authority and
jurisdiction and in accordance with the rules of procedure provided by Section
4.2 of the CIAC Rules.
The ruling
of the Supreme Court in Lastimoso v. Asayo[67] is
instructive:
x x x x
In
addition, it is also understandable why respondent immediately resorted to the
remedy of certiorari instead of pursuing his motion for reconsideration
of the PNP Chief's decision as an appeal before the National Appellate Board
(NAB). It was quite easy to get confused as to which body had jurisdiction
over his case. The complaint filed against
respondent could fall under both Sections 41 and 42 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6975 or the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990.
Section 41 states that citizens' complaints should be brought before the
People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB), while Section 42 states that it is the
PNP Chief who has authority to immediately remove or dismiss a PNP member who
is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police officer.
It was only in Quiambao v. Court of Appeals, promulgated in
2005 or after respondent had already filed the petition for certiorari
with the trial court, when the Court resolved the issue of which body has
jurisdiction over cases that fall under both Sections 41 and 42 of R.A. No.
6975. x x x
With the foregoing peculiar circumstances
in this case, respondent should not be deprived of the opportunity to fully
ventilate his arguments against the factual findings of the PNP Chief. x x x
x x x x
Thus, the opportunity to pursue
an appeal before the NAB should be deemed available to respondent in the higher
interest of substantial justice.[68] (Emphasis supplied)
In Lastimoso,
this Court allowed respondent to appeal his case before the proper agency
because of the confusion as to which agency had jurisdiction over the case. In
the case at bar, law and supporting jurisprudence are clear and leave no room
for interpretation that the CIAC has jurisdiction over the present controversy.
The
proceedings cannot then be voided merely because of the non-participation of
petitioner. Section 4.2 of the CIAC Rules
is clear and it leaves no room for interpretation. Therefore, petitioner’s prayer that the case
be remanded to CIAC in order that it may be given an opportunity to present
evidence is untenable. Petitioner had
its chance and lost it, more importantly so, by its own choice. This Court will not afford a relief that is
apparently inconsistent with the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
denied for lack of merit. The
Double costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-40.
[2] Penned
by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices
Rosmari D. Carandang and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa; id. at 51-65.
[3]
[4] Rollo, pp. 131-145.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Rollo, p. 163.
[9] CA
rollo, CA-G..R. SP No. 71621, p. 126.
[10]
[11]
[12] CA
rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 70001, pp. 120-121.
[13] CA rollo,
CA-G.R. SP No. 71621, pp. 164-165.
[14] Rollo, pp. 169-179.
[15] CA rollo,
CA-G.R. SP No. 71621, pp. 166-171.
[16] CA rollo,
CA-G.R. SP No. 70001, pp. 136-137; CA rollo, CA-G.R.
SP No. 71621, pp. 164-165.
[17]
[18] CA rollo,
CA-G.R. SP No. 71621, pp. 172-176.
[19] CA rollo,
CA-G.R. SP No. 70001, pp. 142-146.
[20] CA rollo,
CA-G.R. SP No. 71621, pp. 177-181.
[21]
[22]
[23] CA rollo,
CA-G.R. SP No. 70001, pp.149-150.
[24] CA rollo,
CA-G.R. SP No 71621, p. 193; CA rollo, CA-G.R.
SP No. 70001, pp. 149-150.
[25] CA rollo,
CA-G.R. SP No. 71621, pp. 194-198.
[26] CA rollo,
CA-G.R. SP No. 70001, pp. 153-160.
[27] On
[28] CA rollo,
CA-G.R. SP No. 70001, pp. 170-172.
[29] CA rollo,
CA-G.R. SP No. 70001, pp. 181-186.
[30]
[31] CA
rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 71621, pp. 211-216.
[32] Not raised as an issue by any of the parties.
[33] Rollo, p. 61.
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37] 376 Phil. 362 (1999).
[38] Rollo, pp. 22-23.
[39] Philippine
International Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit, 461 Phil. 737,
745 (2003).
[40] Javellana v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 30,
[41] Far
East Bank and Trust Company v. Court of Appeals, 395 Phil. 701, 709-710
(2000).
[42] Olanolan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
165491,
[43] 412
Phil. 236 (2001).
[44] Rollo p. 221.
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48]
[49]
[50] An
Act Creating an Arbitration Machinery for the Philippine Construction Industry,
[51] Rollo, p. 163.
[52]
[53]
[54]
[55] Supra
note 37.
[56]
[57] Supra
note 43.
[58] Supra note 37.
[59]
[60] Rollo, p. 185.
[61] Rollo, p. 35.
[62] Oscar
M. Herrera, Remedial Law: Civil
Procedure, 2000 edition, p. 67.
[63] Parco
v. Court of Appeals, 197 Phil. 240 (1982).
[64] CA
rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 70001, pp. 2-46.
[65] CA
rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 70001, Vol. II, pp.
368-370.
[66]
[67] G.R.
No. 154243,
[68]