Republic of the
Supreme Court
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DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, |
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G.R. No. 169013 |
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represented by
its Officer-in-Charge |
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and
Undersecretary, RAMON C. |
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Present: |
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BACANI, |
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Petitioner, |
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PUNO, C.J., |
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QUISUMBING, |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, |
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CARPIO, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CARPIO MORALES, |
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AZCUNA, |
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versus - |
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TINGA, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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VELASCO, Jr., |
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NACHURA, |
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REYES, |
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DE CASTRO, and |
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BRION, JJ. |
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GODOFREDO G.
CUANAN, |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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December 16, 2008 |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1]
dated May 16, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87499 which
set aside Resolution No. 041147 dated October 22, 2004 of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) finding respondent Godofredo G. Cuanan (Cuanan) guilty of sexual
harassment and dismissing him from service, and the CA Resolution[2]
dated July 18, 2005 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Department of Education (DepEd).
The factual background of the case
is as follows:
On
Acting on the complaints, DECS-RO
No. III Regional Director Vilma L. Labrador
constituted an Investigating Committee, composed of three DepEd
officials from the province, to conduct a formal investigation. Following the
investigation, the Investigating Committee submitted its Investigation Report[4]
dated
In an Order[6]
dated
Cuanan
elevated his case to the CSC. On
In a Letter dated
Sometime in March 2003, DepEd Undersecretary Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon sent a letter to the CSC requesting a copy of CSC
Resolution No. 030069 dated
On
Petition for
Review/Reconsideration[18]
with the CSC. No copy of the pleading
was served upon Cuanan.
On
Subsequently, pursuant to Division
Special Order No. 001 series of 2003 dated
However, on
Thirteen days later, or on November
22, 2004, Cuanan filed a petition for certiorari[25]
with the CA seeking to annul Resolution No. 041147, alleging that the CSC
should not have entertained the petition for review/reconsideration since the DepEd was not the complainant or the party adversely
affected by the resolution; that the petition for review/reconsideration was
filed out of time; and that Cuanan was not furnished
copies of the pleadings filed by the DepEd in
violation of procedural due process.
The DepEd
sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper remedy, the mode
of review from a decision of the CSC being a petition for review under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court.
On
DepEd
filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[27]
but the CA denied the same in its Resolution[28]
dated
Hence, the present petition on the
following grounds:
I
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION
IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 87499, THE SAME NOT BEING THE PROPER REMEDY IN ASSAILING CSC
RESOLUTION NO. 041147 DATED
II
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN ADJUDGING CSC AS HAVING COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING RESOLUTION NO. 041147 DATED
DepEd
contends that the CA should have dismissed outright the petition for certiorari
because CSC decisions are appealable to the CA
by petition for review under Rule 43;
that the filing of a motion for reconsideration was a precondition to the
filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65; that the DepEd, even if not the complainant, may question the
resolution of the CSC; that Cuanan failed to prove
that the CSC's petition for review/reconsideration
was not seasonably filed; that even if Cuanan was not
served a copy of the pleadings filed by the DepEd,
the CSC was not bound by procedural
rules.
Cuanan, on
the other hand, contends that the DepEd cannot file a
motion for reconsideration from the CSC Resolution exonerating him, since it is
not the complainant in the administrative case and therefore not a party adversely
affected by the decision therein; that even if DepEd
may seek reconsideration of the CSC Resolution, the petition for
review/reconsideration was filed out of time; and that Cuanan’s
right to due process was violated when he was not given a copy of the pleadings
filed by the DepEd or given the opportunity to
comment thereon.
The Court finds it necessary, before delving
on the grounds relied upon by the DepEd in support of
the petition, to first resolve the question of whether the DepEd
can seek reconsideration of the CSC Resolution exonerating Cuanan.
In a long line
of cases, beginning with Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy,[30] and reiterated in Philippine
National Bank v. Garcia, Jr.,[31] the Court has maintained that the
disciplining authority qualifies as a party adversely affected by the judgment,
who can file an appeal of a judgment of exoneration in an administrative case. CSC Resolution No.
021600[32] allows the disciplining authority to appeal from a decision exonerating
an erring employee, thus:
Section
2. Coverage and Definition of Terms.
– x x x (l) PARTY ADVERSELY
AFFECTED refers to the respondent against whom a decision in a disciplinary
case has been rendered or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a
decision exonerating the said employee. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, Cuanan's exoneration under CSC Resolution No. 030069 may be subject to a motion for reconsideration by the DepEd which, as the appointing and disciplining authority,
is a real party in interest.
Now, as to the merits of DepEd's arguments, the Court finds none.
The remedy
of an aggrieved party from a resolution issued by the CSC is to file a petition for review
thereof under Rule 43[33]
of the Rules of Court within fifteen days from
notice of the resolution. Recourse to a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 renders the petition dismissible
for being the wrong remedy. Nonetheless,
there are exceptions to this rule, to wit: (a) when public welfare and the
advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice
so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when
the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.[34] As will be
shown forthwith, exception (c) applies to the present case.
Furthermore, while a motion
for reconsideration is a condition precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari,
immediate recourse to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is
warranted where the order is a patent nullity, as
where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief; where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for
lack of due process; where the proceeding was ex parte or one in which the petitioner
had no opportunity to object.[35] These exceptions find application to Cuanan's petition for certiorari in the CA.
At any rate, Cuanan's petition for certiorari
before the CA could be treated as a petition for review, the petition having
been filed on November 22, 2004, or thirteen (13) days from receipt on November
9, 2004 of CSC Resolution No. 041147, clearly within the 15-day reglementary period for the filing of a petition for
review.[36]
Such move would be in accordance with the liberal
spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice.[37]
Furthermore, CSC Resolution No.
030069 has long become final and executory. It must
be noted that the records show that copies of CSC Resolution No. 030069 were
duly sent to the parties, including DepEd, on
Consequently, the burden of proving the irregularity in official conduct
-- that is, non-receipt of the duly sent copy of CSC Resolution No. 030069 --
is on the part of the DepEd, which in the present
case clearly failed to discharge the same.[41] Thus, the presumption stands that CSC Resolution
No. 030069 dated
It is elementary that once judgment has become final
and executory, it becomes immutable and can no longer be amended or
modified. In Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo,[42] this Court held:
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a
judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and
unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the
land. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy
the finality of the resolution of his case. The doctrine of finality of
judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound
practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments or orders
of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law; otherwise,
there would be no end to litigations, thus setting to naught the main role of
courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and
the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable
controversies with finality.[43]
Moreover, while it is true that
administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions are free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements, they are bound by law and practice to observe the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in justiciable
cases presented before them.[44] The
relative freedom of the CSC from the rigidities of procedure cannot be invoked
to evade what was clearly emphasized in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations:[45]
that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process.
Furthermore, Section 43.A.[46]
of the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service provides:
Section
43.A. Filing of Supplemental Pleadings.
- All pleadings filed by the parties with the Commission, shall be copy
furnished the other party with proof of service filed with the Commission.
Any
supplemental pleading to supply deficiencies in aid of an original pleading but
which should not entirely substitute the latter can be filed only upon a
favorable action by the Commission on the motion of a party to the case. The
said motion should be submitted within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of
the original pleading and it is discretionary upon the Commission to allow the
same or not or even to consider the averments therein.(Emphasis supplied)
Cuanan
undoubtedly was denied procedural due process. He had no opportunity to participate in the
proceedings for the petition for review/ reconsideration filed by the DepEd, since no copy of the pleadings filed by the DepEd were served upon him or his counsel; nor was he even
required by the CSC to file his comments thereon. Considering that pleadings filed by the DepEd were not served upon Cuanan,
they may be treated as mere scraps of paper which should not have merited the
attention or consideration of the CSC.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87499 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate
Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
(On official leave)
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
(On
official leave)
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
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DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
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RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria
and concurred in by Associate Justices Eliezer R. de
Los
[2] CA
rollo, p. 161.
[3] CSC
records, p. 407-A, 501.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] CA
rollo, p. 50.
[10] CSC
records, p. 1440.
[11] CA
rollo, p. 49.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] CSC
records, p. 1480.
[17]
[18] CSC
records, p. 1482.
[19]
[20] CA
rollo, p. 72.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] Supra,
note 1.
[27] CA
rollo, p. 143.
[28] Supra,
note 2.
[29] Rollo, p. 13.
[30] 366
Phil. 86 (1999).
[31] 437
Phil. 289 (2002).
[32] Published
on
[33] SECTION
1. Scope. – This Rule shall apply to
appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from
awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any
quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among
these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the
President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil
Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer,
National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act
No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation
Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine
Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.
x
x x x
SECTION
4. Period of appeal. – The appeal
shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date
of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for
new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of
the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall
be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket
fee before the expiration of the reglementary period,
the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only
within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be
granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen
(15) days. (Emphasis supplied)
[34] Tanenglian, v. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 173415, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 348, 367; AMA Computer
College-Santiago City, Inc. v. Nacino, G.R. No. 162739, February 12, 2008,
544 SCRA 502, 509; Hanjin
Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd. v.
Court of Appeals, ibid; Chua v.
Santos, G.R. No. 132467, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 365, 374-375; Metropolitan
Manila Development
Authority v. Jancom Environmental Corporation,
425 Phil. 961, 974 (2002).
[35] Aguilar
v. Manila Banking Corporation,
G.R. No.157911, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 354, 373; Tan, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 354 Phil. 463,
469-470 (1998); Tan v. Court of Appeals,
341 Phil. 570, 576-577 (1997).
[36] See
Philippine Journalists, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 166421, September 5, 2006, 501 SCRA 75-87; De los
Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147912, April 26, 2006, 488 SCRA 351,
356.
[37] Verde v. Macapagal,
G.R. No. 151342,
[38] Supra
note 10.
[39] CA
rollo, p. 49.
[40] Section
3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec.
3. Disputable Presumptions. – The
following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted,
but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
x
x x
(m)
That official duty has been regularly performed.
[41] See
Forever Security & General Services v. Flores, G.R. No. 147961,
September 7, 2007, 532 SCRA 454, 467; Masagana
Concrete Products v. National Labor Relations Commission, 372 Phil. 459,
473 (1999).
[42] 403
Phil. 498 (2001).
[43]
[44] Octava
v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 166105, March 22, 2007, 518 SCRA 759, 763; Busuego
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95326, March 11, 1999, 304 SCRA 473, 480; Adamson & Adamson, Inc. v. Amores, G.R. No.
L-58292,
[45] 69
Phil. 635 (1940).
[46] As added by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 2003, dated April 21, 2003; Michael Anthony M. Clemente, Handbook on Offenses, Penalties and Procedure in the URACCS, 2007 Ed., p. 283.