Republic
of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
SPS. CARLOS MUNSALUD and G.R. No. 167181
WINNIE MUNSALUD,
Petitioners, Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus
- AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
NATIONAL HOUSING Promulgated:
AUTHORITY,
Respondent. December 23, 2008
x - -
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D E C I S I O N
REYES, R.T., J.:
INSUFFICIENCY in form and substance, as a ground for
dismissal of the complaint, should not be based on the title or caption, especially
when the allegations of the pleading support an action.
In pursuit of a reversal of the
Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the order of dismissal[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (
The Facts
Laid bare from the
records are the following facts:
Petitioner Winnie Munsalud is the
daughter and one of the compulsory heirs of the late Lourdes Bulado (Bulado)
who died on
When Bulado died, petitioner Winnie assumed the obligation
to pay the monthly amortizations. Respondent NHA recognized petitioner spouses’ assumption
of obligations as their names were reflected in the receipts. They were allowed to occupy the lot up to the
present. To prove their occupancy over
the lot, petitioners offered as evidence the following documents, viz.:
1. Tag Card No.
77-02830-03 issued by then Pasay City Mayor Pablo Cuneta and then NHA General
Manager Gaudencio Tobias;
2. Application and
Contract for Water Services No. 295319 in the name of Bulado but the same was
signed by petitioner Winnie;
3. Tax Declaration
No. B-007-27566 over the land issued by the Assessor’s Office of Pasay City in
the name of defendant recognizing its beneficial
use in favor of petitioners;
4. Tax Declaration
No. B-007-27667 over the residential structure erected on the land and issued
by the Assessor’s Office of Pasay City in the names of petitioners;
5. ‘Pagpapatunay’ dated
6. Deposit Receipt
No. 286444 dated
On
On
Left with no recourse,
petitioners instituted a complaint for mandamus before the court a quo.
On
Considering that the petition is insufficient in form and
substance, there being no reference to any law which the respondent by reason
of its office, trust or station is especially enjoined as a duty to perform or
any allegation that respondent is unlawfully excluding petitioners from using
or enjoying any right or office which said petitioners are entitled to, the
above-entitled petition is hereby DISMISSED, pursuant to Section 3 Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioners
moved for reconsideration but they did not succeed. Thus,
petitioners seasonably appealed to the CA.
CA Disposition
On
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the
assailed Order of Dismissal is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[6]
In agreeing with the court
a quo, the appellate court
rationalized as follows:
It is essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus that
the petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it
must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It is a command to exercise a power already
possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.
It
well settled that the legal right of petitioner to the performance of the
particular act which is sought to be compelled must be clear and complete. A clear legal right within the meaning of the
rule means a right which is clearly founded in, or granted by law; a right
which is inferable as a matter of law. Likewise, mandamus refers only to acts
enjoined by law to be done.
The duties to be enforced must be such
as are clearly peremptorily enjoined by law or by reason of official station. However, appellants failed to point out in
their petition the specific law by which defendant is duty bound to perform the
act sought to be performed, as well as the law which would grant them the clear
legal right to the issuance of the writ of mandamus.
Foregoing discussed, we find no error on the part of the
court a quo in dismissing the
petition for mandamus filed by plaintiffs-appellants.
On
Issues
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE ORDERS OF THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DENYING PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ITS DECISION DATED
Poring over the arguments presented, the focal issue is
whether in giving due course to an action, the court is fenced within the
parameters of the title given by plaintiff to the case without regard to the
averments of the pleading.
Elsewise stated, does the trial
court have absolute
discretion to dismiss an action on the ground that it is insufficient in form
and substance based alone on its
designation when, from the body and the relief prayed for, it could stand as an
action sufficient in form and substance?
Our
Ruling
Petitioners’ action
designated as mandamus was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that it
is insufficient in form and substance. This
begs
the question: when is an action
sufficient in form and when is it sufficient in substance?
To begin with, form is the methodology
used to express rules of practice and procedure.[8] It is the order or method of legal
proceedings.[9] It relates to technical details.[10] It is ordinarily the antithesis of substance.[11] It is an established method of expression or
practice. It is a fixed or formal way of
proceeding.[12]
A pleading is sufficient in form when
it contains the following:
1.
A Caption, setting forth the name of the court,
the title of the action indicating the names of the parties, and the docket
number which is usually left in blank, as the Clerk of Court has to assign yet
a docket number;
2.
The Body,
reflecting the designation, the allegations of the party’s claims or defenses,
the relief prayed for, and the date of the pleading;
3.
The Signature
and Address of the party or counsel;[13]
4.
Verification. This is required to secure an assurance that the
allegations have been made in good faith, or are true and correct and not
merely speculative;[14]
5.
A Certificate
of Non-forum Shopping, which although not jurisdictional, the same is
obligatory;[15]
6. An Explanation
in case the pleading is not filed personally to the Court. Likewise, for pleading subsequent to the
complaint, if the same is not served personally to the parties affected, there
must also be an explanation why service was not done personally.[16]
Likewise, for all other pleadings, not initiatory in
nature, there must be:
A Proof of Service, which consists in the written
admission of the party served, or the official return of the server, or the
affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place
and manner of service. If the service is
by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person
mailing. If service is by registered
mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by
the mailing office.[17]
In case a party is represented by
counsel de parte, additional
requirements that go into the form of the pleading should be incorporated, viz.:
1. The Roll of
Attorney’s Number;
2. The Current
Professional Tax Receipt Number; and
3. The
4. MCLE Compliance
or Exemption Certificate Number and Date of Issue (effective
In
the case at
bench, a naked perusal of the complaint
docketed as Civil Case No. Q03- 49278 designated
by petitioners as mandamus reveals that it is
sufficient in form. It has the
caption with the name of the court, the
name of the parties, and the docket number.
The complaint contains allegations of petitioners’ claims. It has a prayer and the date when it was
prepared. The signature page shows the
signature and name of petitioners’ counsel, the counsel’s
Now,
is the petition insufficient in substance?
Substance
is that which is essential and is used in opposition to form.[20] It is the most important element in any existence,
the characteristic and essential components of anything, the main part, the essential import, and the purport.[21] It means not merely subject of act, but an
intelligible abstract or synopsis of its material and substantial elements,
though it may be stated without recital of any details.[22] It goes into matters which do not sufficiently
appear or prejudicially affect the substantial rights of parties who may be
interested therein and not to mere informalities.[23]
As
used in reference to substance of common-law actions, substance comprehends all
of the essential or material elements necessary to sufficiently state a good
cause of action invulnerable to attack by
general demurrer.[24]
Substance
is one which relates to the material allegations in the pleading. It is determinative of whether or not a cause
of action exists. It is the central
piece, the core, and the heart constituting the controversy addressed to the
court for its consideration. It is the
embodiment of the essential facts necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the
court.
The
court a quo anchored the dismissal of
petitioners’ complaint on the basis of Rule 65, Section 3[25]
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It
found that there was no reference to any law
which respondent NHA, by reason of its office, trust
or station, is specifically enjoined as a duty to perform. It declared that there was no allegation in
the petition below that respondent is unlawfully excluding petitioners from
using or enjoying any right or office which said petitioners are entitled to.
Although the complaint was captioned
as Mandamus, petitioners’ averments, as well as the relief sought, called for
an action for specific performance. Pertinent
portions of the complaint for mandamus
provide:
3. Plaintiff
Winnie Munsalud is the daughter of the late
4. During
the lifetime of Bulado, she was awarded a parcel of land at a “land for
the landless” program of the defendant;
x x x x
6. When
Bulado died in 1985, Plaintiffs assumed her obligations over the aforesaid
property, particularly the payment of the amortizations therein;
7. Defendant recognized this
assumption of Bulado’s obligations by the Plaintiffs considering that in the receipts
covering the amortizations, the names of the Plaintiffs as the ones paying the
Defendant were indicated therein;
8. In fact, Defendant also allowed
Plaintiffs to move into, and occupy,
as they continue to occupy up to now, the above described premises;
x x x
x
10. On
x x x x
12. Significantly, that receipt
contained the annotation appearing on the left side thereof, that the
amount paid thereon constituted “full payment”;
13. Since then, Plaintiffs have been
demanding from the Defendant the issuance of the deed of sale and the title
over the property in question, but, inexplicably, and without any legal
justification whatsoever, Defendant has refused to issue that deed of sale and
title;
14. On
x x
x x
20. At this point that the lot in
question had already been fully paid for by the Plaintiffs, there is now a need
to compel the Defendant to comply with its duty to issue a deed of sale in
favor of the heirs of the deceased Lourdes Bulado, particularly Plaintiffs
Carlos and Winnie Munsalud, as well to issue a title over the same property in
favor of the same heirs.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that judgment be
rendered commanding the Defendant, after due notice and hearing, to issue a deed of sale
and/or a title,
in favor of the heirs of the deceased Lourdes Bulado, particularly Plaintiffs
Carlos and Winnie Munsalud, over the property subject of this action.[26] (Underscoring
supplied)
A
plain reading of the allegations of the complaint reveals that petitioner
Winnie Munsalud assumed the obligations of her deceased mother, the original
awardee of respondent’s “Land for the Landless
Program.” One of the obligations of an
awardee is to pay the monthly
amortizations. Petitioners complied with
said obligation and religiously paid the amortizations until these were fully
paid.
Indeed,
petitioners have complied with what is incumbent upon them under the program. Hence, it is now the turn of respondent to comply
with what is
incumbent upon it.
In
a letter dated
In view of the contents of that letter, we would like to
notify you that Ms. Munsalud is actually representing her deceased
mother, Lourdes Bulado,
who, on
In
view thereof, may we reiterate our request for the issuance of the
title over the aforesaid property in the name of
The letter was received by respondent on
Evidently,
the action commenced by petitioners before the trial court, although designated
as mandamus, is in reality an action to perform a specific act. The averments of the complaint are clear. The essential facts are sufficiently alleged
as to apprise the court of the nature of the case. The relief sought to be obtained aims to
compel respondent to issue a deed of sale and the corresponding title over the
property awarded to Bulado. Thus, the
Court finds the complaint sufficient in substance.
The
designation or caption is not controlling, more than the allegations in the
complaint, for it is not even an indispensable part of the complaint.
Instead of focusing on what an action for mandamus should
contain, the court a quo should have
proceeded to examine the essential facts alleged in petitioners’ complaint. For what determines the nature of the action
and which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought.[30]
The
cause of action in a complaint is not determined by the designation given to it
by the parties. The allegations in the body of
the complaint define or describe it. The designation or caption is not controlling
more than the allegations in the complaint.
It is not even an indispensable part of the complaint.[31]
There
is no need to make reference to any law which respondent by reason of its
office is enjoined as a duty to perform. Respondent’s duty arose from its contractual
obligation under the “Land for the Landless Program.”
The
trial court is
reminded that the
caption of the complaint is not
determinative of the nature of the action.[32] The caption of the pleading should not be the
governing factor, but rather the allegations in it should
determine the nature of the action, because even without
the prayer for
a specific remedy, the courts may
nevertheless grant the proper relief as may be warranted by the facts alleged
in the complaint and the evidence introduced.[33]
All told, whether or not petitioner Winnie, in her capacity
as a compulsory heir of the awardee, becomes a beneficiary of the program is a
question best ventilated during trial on the merits. The conditions, terms, and provisions of the
program in case an awardee dies are evidentiary and should be presented for
determination of the court. Even the
effect and the consequence of the assumption of obligation of the awardee as
well as the presence of other compulsory heirs are issues that should be
addressed for the court’s evaluation on the basis of the evidence to be laid
down before its eyes.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED
No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 19-30. Dated
[2] Records,
p. 19. Dated
[3]
[4] Rollo,
p. 5.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Words and Phrases, Vol. 17, permanent ed., p.
546, citing Juneau Spruce Corporation v.
International Longshoremen’s and
Warehousemen’s Union, D.C. Hawaii, 131 F. Supp. 866, 869.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary (1993), unabridged.
[13]
See Rules of Civil Procedure (1997), Rule 7, Secs. 1-3.
[14] Clavecilla v. Quitain, G.R. No. 147989,
[15] See
Torres v. Specialized Packaging
Development Corporation, supra.
[16] See
Rules of Civil Procedure (1997), Rule 13, Secs. 4 & 11.
[17]
[18]
See
[19] Bar Matter No. 1922, as amended.
[20] Words
and Phrases, Vol. 40, permanent ed., p. 754, citing United States v. Johnston, D.C. Wash., 292 F. 491, 495; State v. Burgdoerfer, 17 SW 646, 649,
107 Mo. 1, 14 L.R.A. 846.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] Rules
of Civil Procedure (1997), Rule 65.
Sec. 3. Petition
for mandamus. – When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some
other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to
protect the right of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
[26]
Records, pp. 2-4.
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30] Villena v. Payoyo, G.R. No. 163021,
[31] Hernudd v. Lofgren, G.R. No. 140337,
[32] Bokingo v. The Honorable Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 161739,
[33] Evangelista v.