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ROBERTO BARBASA, Petitioner, |
G.R. No. 163898
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-versus- HON. ARTEMIO G. TUQUERO, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Justice,
GRACE GUARIN, NESTOR SANGALANG, VICTOR CALLUENG, Respondents. |
Present: Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, Carpio
Morales, Tinga,
VELASCO, JR., and BRION,
JJ. Promulgated: December
23, 2008 |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner assails the
Decision[1] dated
Petitioner avers that he is the
president of Push-Thru Marketing, Inc., which leases commercial stalls CS-PL
05, 19 and 30 in
Petitioner settled the
charges for CUSA, utilities and electricity, which payment was accepted by private
respondent Guarin, but petitioner failed to pay the
back rentals. Thus, on
Aggrieved, petitioner filed
a criminal complaint for Grave Coercion against TPI and its officers, David Go,
Robert Castanares, Buddy Mariano, Art Brondial, and herein private respondents before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Manila.[4] The complaint dated
The respondents in the
criminal complaint filed separate counter-affidavits[7] which presented a common defense: that
the July 1, 1999 cutting off of electrical supply was done peacefully; that it
was an act performed in the lawful performance of their assigned duties, and in
accordance with the covenants set forth in the written agreements previously
executed between petitioner and TPI;
that petitioner was not present when the alleged acts were committed; and that
petitioner had outstanding accumulated
unpaid rentals, CUSA billings, electrical and water bills, unpaid interest and
penalty charges (from June 1998 to May 1999) in the amount of P267,513.39 for all his
rented stalls, as reflected in three Interest-Penalty Reports[8]
duly sent to him. Petitioner was
likewise given demand letter-notices in writing at least three times wherein it
was stated that if he did not settle his arrears in full, electricity would be
cut.[9] Of the
total amount due from him, petitioner paid only P127,272.18 after receipt of
the third notice. Accordingly, private respondents proceeded with the power
cut-off, but only after sending a “Notice of Disconnection of Utilities”[10]
to petitioner’s stalls informing him of the impending act.
Private respondents also
pointed out that aside from the above arrears, petitioner has outstanding
accountabilities with respect to “Priority Premium Fees” in the amount of P5,907,013.10.[11]
They likewise stressed that
their Agreement[12] with petitioner contains the
following stipulations:
CONTRACT
OF LEASE
Prime
Block Cluster Stall
x x x x
PRIORITY PREMIUM : P *2,367,750.00
x x x x
RENT PER MONTH : P *******378.00 per sq. m
(Plus
P*******37.80 10% VAT)
x x x x
OTHER FEES AND EXPENSES CHARGEABLE
TO THE LESSEE:
x x x x
B.
COMMON USAGE AND SERVICE AREA (CUSA) CHARGES
Minimum rate of P190.00/sq. m./mo. to cover expenses stipulated in
Section 6 hereof, subject to periodic review and adjustment to reflect actual
expenses.
C.
INDIVIDUAL UTILITIES
ELECTRIC CONSUMPTION : metered + reasonable service
charge (meter to be provided by the LESSOR, for the account of the
LESSEE)
OTHER SERVICES :
metered and/or reasonable
service charge
x x
x x
7.
PAYMENTS
x x x
x
In cases where payments made by the LESSEE
for any given month is not sufficient to cover all outstanding obligations for
said period, the order of priority in the application of the payments made is
as follows:
a.
Penalties
b.
Interests
c.
Insurance
d.
CUSA Charges
e.
Rent
f.
Priority Premium
x x x x
21. PENALTY CLAUSE
x x x x
It is also expressly agreed
that in case the LESSEE fails to pay at any time the installments on the
priority premium, lease rentals or CUSA and utility charges corresponding to a
total of three (3) months, even if not consecutively incurred, the LESSOR is
hereby granted the option to cut off power and other utility services to the
LESSEE until full payment of said charges, expenses, penalty and interest is
made, without prejudice to any other remedies provided under this Contract,
including the termination of this Contract.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner filed his Reply
Affidavit,[13] claiming
that Go, Castanares, Mariano, Brondial,
Guarin and Sangalang, while
not personally present at the scene at the time, were to be held liable as the
authors of the criminal design since they were the ones who ordered the cutting
off of petitioner’s electricity. Petitioner admitted that none of the armed
personnel drew his gun, much more aimed or fired it, but insisted that he was
unduly prevented from using electricity to the detriment of his business and
his person. He claimed that the officers of TPI were unable to show the amount
and extent of his unpaid bills; that as to the electric bills, the same were
paid; and that there was an ongoing negotiation with respect to the matter of
rentals and for reformation of the lease agreements.[14]
The Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila, through Prosecutor Venus D. Marzan,
dismissed the complaint against David Go, Roberto Castanares,
Buddy Mariano and Art Brondial but found probable
cause against private respondents Grace Guarin,
Nestor Sangalang and Victor Callueng.
On
On
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor is directed to move, with leave of
court, for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 336630 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila and to report the action taken within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.[16]
His motion for
reconsideration having been denied, petitioner assailed the Resolution of the
Secretary of Justice before the Court of Appeals through a petition for
certiorari, which was, however, dismissed by the appellate court for lack of
merit. The appellate court likewise denied his motion for reconsideration.
Hence this petition.
Petitioner raises the sole
issue of whether private respondents’ act of disconnecting the supply of
electricity to petitioner’s stalls and the manner by which it was carried out
constitute grave coercion.
After carefully considering
petitioner’s appeal, we are in agreement to deny it for utter lack of merit.
The crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a)
that a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by
law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or
wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by
material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and,
consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the
person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so; in
other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the
exercise of any lawful right.[17]
Petitioner’s appeal gives us
no sufficient reason to deviate from what has already been found by the
Secretary of Justice and the Court of Appeals.
The
records show that there was no violence, force or the display of it as would
produce intimidation upon petitioner’s employees when the cutting off of
petitioner’s electricity was effected. On the contrary, it was done peacefully
and after written notice to petitioner was sent. We do not subscribe to
petitioner’s claim that the presence of armed guards were calculated to
intimidate him or his employees. Rather, we are more inclined to believe that
the guards were there to prevent any untoward or violent event from occurring
in the exercise of TPI’s rights under the lease
agreements. If the respondents desired a violent result, they would have gone
there unannounced or cut petitioner’s electricity through less desirable and
conspicuous means.
It is
likewise clear from the penalty clause in the Contracts of Lease entered into
by the parties that TPI is given the option to cut off power and other utility
services in petitioner’s stalls in case petitioner fails to pay at any time the
installments on the priority premium, lease rentals or CUSA and utility charges
corresponding to a total of three months until full payment of said charges,
expenses, penalty and interest is made.[18] The
stipulation under said clause is clear; there is no ambiguity in what is
stated. There could be no grave coercion in the private respondents’ act of
exercising in behalf of TPI a right afforded to TPI under the solemn and
unequivocal covenants of a contract to which petitioner had agreed and which he
did execute and sign.
As held by this Court in a
previous case which we find instructive:
Contracts constitute the law between the
parties. They must be read together and interpreted in a manner that reconciles
and gives life to all of them. The intent of the parties, as shown by the clear
language used, prevails over post facto
explanations that find no support from the words employed by the parties or
from their contemporary and subsequent acts showing their understanding of such
contracts.[19]
We could not see how the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, through Prosecutor Venus D. Marzan, could have made a finding of probable cause to file
a criminal case for grave coercion against private respondents, in light of the
evidence then and now prevailing, which will show that there was a mutual
agreement, in a contract of lease, that provided for the cutting off of
electricity as an acceptable penalty for failure to abide faithfully with what
has been covenanted. Although the propriety of its exercise may be the subject
of controversy, mere resort to it may not so readily expose the lessor TPI to a
charge of grave coercion. Considering that petitioner owed TPI the total amount
of more than P5 million,
which was undisputed, we find that the resort to the penalty clause under the
lease agreements was
justified. As held in Pryce
Corporation v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation:
A penal clause is “an
accessory obligation which the parties attach to a principal obligation for the
purpose of insuring the performance thereof by imposing on the debtor a special
prestation (generally consisting in the payment of a
sum of money) in case the obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or
inadequately fulfilled.”
Quite common
in lease contracts, this clause functions to strengthen the coercive force of the
obligation
and to provide, in effect, for what could be the liquidated damages resulting
from a breach. There is nothing immoral or illegal in such indemnity/penalty
clause, absent any showing that it was forced upon or fraudulently foisted on
the obligor.[20]
(Emphasis supplied.)
In this
connection, counsels must be reminded that equally important, as their duty to
clients, is their duty as officers of the court to see to it that the orderly
administration of justice is not unduly impeded or delayed. Counsel needs to
advise a client, ordinarily a layman unaccustomed to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, concerning
the objective merit of his case. If counsel finds that his client’s cause lacks
merit, then it is his bounden duty to advise accordingly. Indeed a lawyer’s oath to uphold the cause of
justice may supersede his duty to his client’s cause; for such fealty to
ethical concerns is indispensable to the success of the rule of law.[21]
WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
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DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
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ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section
13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 32-38. Penned by Associate Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, with Associate Justices Perlita J. Tria Tirona and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Records, Vol. I, p. 436.
[12] Rollo, pp. 326-384.
[13]
[14] A civil case was ultimately filed by the petitioner against the private respondents with respect to the matter of rentals, but the status of the same is unclear. As far as the records reveal, an injunction against the private respondents was issued, but only after the petitioner’s electricity was already cut. The determination of the legality or illegality, therefore, of the cutting off of petitioner’s electricity could not be made to rest on the subsequent issuance of the injunction.
[15] CA rollo, p. 100.
[16]
[17] People v. De Lara, G.R. No. 124703,
[18] Rollo, pp. 340-341.
[19] Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
126713,
[20] G.R. No. 157480,
[21] Cf. Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin, No. L-22320,