EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605--- Severino
M. Manotok IV, et al., Petitioners, versus
Heirs of Homer L. Barque, et al., Respondents.
x
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x
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
I
maintain that the December 12, 2005 Decision[1] of
the Court’s First Division in G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605 became final and
executory. The same had been
recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments in a Resolution dated
Despite
the Entry of Judgment, the Court en banc took cognizance of the cases when
counsel for petitioners, Ret. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano wrote the Court
and prayed for the suspension of the effects of the Entry of Judgment. Thereafter, the cases were set for Oral
Argument.
From
the presentations made by the parties and the questions propounded by the
members of the Court during the oral argument held on July 24, 2007, two main factual
issues emerged, to wit: 1) Whether or not Plan Fls-3168-D which is
reflected in the technical description of respondents’ TCT No. 210177 duly
exists in the official records of the Lands Management Bureau (LMB); and 2) Whether
or not Barrio Payong, which is indicated in petitioners’ various documentary
exhibits as location of the property allegedly covered by their TCT No. RT-22481
(372302) exists as a barrio in
Re Plan
Fls-3168-D:
During the Oral Argument, the
following discussion took place on the issue of whether Plan Fls-3168-D duly
exists, to wit:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
When
the Barques filed their petition for reconstitution, on
RET. JUSTICE FELICIANO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
So,
Atty. Bustos wrote the two offices, the national office and the regional office
asking for their comment on whether this FLS-3168D exist in their files. Now, it looks like Atty. Bustos was zeroing
in on the authenticity of FLS-3168D. Of
course, the national office said, we don’t have this on file. The regional office said, we have this on
file but they could not give a copy to Atty. Bustos and they refused to answer
Atty. Bustos despite several demands or request for the copy. They never replied to Atty. Bustos. My question is this, why did Atty. Bustos
think or consider the authenticity of FLS-3168D important for the purposes of
the reconstitution of the Barques title.
RET. JUSTICE FELICIANO:
Yes, Your Honor. If the division or subdivision of lot 823
were genuinely and truly, honestly undertaken they should have applied for two
certificates of title, they applied only for one certificate of title and it is
for that reason that Atty. Bustos wanted to determine the correctness or
authenticity of that subdivision plan because the same piece of land or
substantially the same piece of land was covered only, constituted only one lot
per the title already reconstituted of the Manotoks. So the …
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Atty.
Bustos was of the mind that if FLS-3168-D is not authentic, is not on file,
then there could have been no subdivision of lot 823 and therefore the title of
the Manotoks specifying only one lot 823 would seem to be in order.
RET. JUSTICE FELICIANO:
Correct,
sir.
JUSTICE
CARPIO:
But if there is on file FLS-3168-D
then it will be the title of Barque that would seem to be in order rather than
the title of the Manotok because the approved subdivision is on file, is that
correct?
RET.
JUSTICE FELICIANO:
I would think
so, sir. I would think so.
JUSTICE
CARPIO: Okay, thank you.[2]
Thereafter,
the Court required counsel for respondents to submit a certified copy of plan Fls-3168-D
from the LMB, National Office. This is
in addition to the certified photocopy of the Tracing Cloth plan[3] and
certified photocopy (microfilm) of Plan Fls-3168-D[4] which respondents obtained from the LMB, Department
of Environment and Natural Resources-National Capital Region (DENR-NCR) and
already submitted before the Court.
In
compliance with the directive, respondents submitted a copy of a letter[5]
furnished them by the LMB, National Office, explaining why it could not issue a
certified copy of Fls-3168-D, thus:
In
reply to your letter dated April 24, 2006, please be informed that according to
the verification made by the Survey Records Section, Records Management
Division from their Lists of Transmittal of Survey Records, plan FLS-3168-D
covering parcel/s of land situated in Caloocan, Rizal was among those survey
records already turned-over/decentralized to DENR-National Capital Region (NCR), Roxas Boulevard, Manila on April
5, 1979 as recorded in our file no. NCR-199, for their reference/file purposes.
It is therefore suggested that you
address your letter-request to the Chief, Surveys Division, DENR-National
Capital Region (NCR), L & S
Bldg.,
Thus, as expressly mentioned in the
above-quoted letter, “plan FLS-3168-D covering parcel/s of land situated in
Pursuant
to Executive Order No. 192[6]
dated
However, they were able to obtain a
Certification dated
This is to certify that according to the verification of the Records Management Division, Lands Management Bureau, Binondo, Manila, EDP’s Listing has available record with Fls-3168-D, Lot 823, xerox copy of which is herewith attached, situated in Caloocan, Rizal (now Quezon City), in the name of Survey Claimant Emiliano Setosta.
x x x x
The
certification by the Records Management Division of the DENR-Head Office also confirmed
the authenticity of the other computer print-outs submitted by respondents
showing Fls-3168-D as among those listed, namely:
1.
A certified true photocopy of a computer
print out earlier issued by the Land Management Bureau, Head Office, showing
that Plan Fls-3168-D is listed in its EDP listing of approved plans and Official
Receipt #8994774 issued in payment for the Certification.[9]
2.
The same computer print out, as that
attached as Annex F, which shows Fls-3168-D of E. Setosta as one of those
listed therein duly certified by Melchor Magsanoc, Asst. Regional Exec.
Director for Operation, LMB, DENR-NCR.[10]
The
computer print-outs show that Plan Fls-3168-D
is the second plan in said list, followed by Fls-3169-D of Chua, then Fls-3170-D
of Loyola. Said official list is a
credible piece of evidence proving the existence of Setosta’s Plan Fls-3168-D.
Respondents
also furnished the Court photo copies of Plan Fls-3168-D issued by the Land
Management Bureau-National Capital Region (LMB-NCR) and certified by different
officials:
1.
A photo copy of Plan Fls-3168-D
(microfilm) issued on
2.
A photocopy of a File Copy of the Tracing
Cloth Plan of Fls-3168-D, duly certified on July 9, 1999 by Teofilo R.
Laguardia, Chief, Technical Records and Statistics Section, LMB, Regional
Office, NCR.
Notwithstanding the above certifications which clearly show
the existence of Plan Fls-3168-D, the Majority Opinion chose to lend credence
to petitioners’ claim that Fls-3168-D does not exist in the government files based
solely on Engr. Dalire’s allegations in his
Based on the documents presented,
petitioners (Barques) have established by clear and convincing evidence that
TCT NO. 210177 was, at the time of the destruction thereof, valid, genuine,
authentic and effective. Petitioners duly presented the original of
the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177 .... The logbook of the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City lists TCT No. 210177 as among the titles lost .... The
Register of Deeds of Quezon City himself acknowledged the existence and
authenticity of TCT No. 210177 when he issued a certification to the effect
that TCT No. 210177 was one of the titles destroyed and not salvaged from the
fire that gutted the
It
is likewise noteworthy that the technical description and boundaries of the lot
reflected in TCT No. 210177 absolutely conform to the technical description and
boundaries of Lot 823 Piedad Estate ... as indicated in the B. L. Form No.
28-37-R dated
It therefore becomes evident that the existence, validity, authenticity and effectivity of TCT No. 210177 was established indubitably and irrefutably by the petitioners. Under such circumstances, the reconstitution thereof should be given due course and the same is mandatory.
….
It would be necessary to underscore that
the certified copy of Plan FLS 3168 D was duly issued by the office of Engr.
Ernesto Erive, Chief, Surveys Division LMS-DENR-NCR whose office is the lawful
repository of survey plans for lots situated within the National Capital Region
including the property in question. Said plan was duly signed by the
custodian thereof, Carmelito Soriano, Chief Technical Records and Statistics Section,
DENR-NCR. Said plan is likewise duly supported by Republic of the
.…
The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter
dated 19 February 1997 that his office has no records or information about Plan
FLS 3168-D is belied by the certified copy of the computer print-out duly
issued by the Bureau of Lands indicating therein that FLS 3168D is duly entered
into the microfilm records of the Bureau of Lands and has been assigned
Accession Number 410436 appearing on Page 79, Preliminary Report No. 1, List of
Locator Cards and Box Number 0400 and said computer print-out is duly supported
by an Offical Receipt ….
The
said Plan FLS 3168D is indeed authentic and valid coming as it does from the
legal repository and duly signed by the custodian thereof. The
documentary evidence presented is much too overwhelming to be simply brushed
aside and be defeated by the fabricated statements and concoctions made by
Engr. Dalire in his
In
his letter dated
Dalire
next claimed that plan Fls-3168-D was not included in their computer list of
plans available for decentralization.
However, this claim was categorically debunked by the LRA, thus:
The
claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February 1997 that his office has
no records or information about Plan FLS 3168-D is belied by a certified copy of the computer print-out issued by the
Bureau of Lands indicating therein that FLS 3168D is duly entered in the
microfilm records of the Bureau of Lands and has been assigned Accession Number
410436 appearing on Page 79, Preliminary Report No. 1, List of Locator Cards
and Box Number 0400 x x x.
In light of the evidence on record, I
completely agree with the conclusion reached by the LRA that the “evidence
presented is much too overwhelming to be simply brushed aside and be defeated
by the fabricated statements and concoctions made by Engr. Dalire in his
Therefore, on the issue of due existence of Fls-3168-D, I
find no justifiable basis to disturb the LRA finding that Plan FLS-3168-D
indeed exists in the official files of LMB, DENR. Accordingly, I find respondents’ title, TCT
No. 210177, which describes Lot 823 as subdivided into Lots 823-A and 823-B in
accordance with Fls-3168-D, in order.
Moreover,
the LRA correctly found that petitioners’ reconstituted title TCT No. RT-22481
(372302) is spurious, considering petitioners’ failure to prove facts contrary
to the LRA findings. The long-settled
rule is that factual findings of an administrative agency which are not shown
to be unsupported by substantial evidence can be validly sustained and, in
fact, are oftentimes binding on the court,[13]
especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,[14]
as in this case.
Re Location of the Property:
Petitioners’
documentary exhibits simultaneously and/or alternately referred to Barrio
Payong and Barrio Culiat as the location of the property covered by their
title. However, as noted by the LRA,
after the fire that burned the records of the Quezon City Register of Deeds on
Petitioners’
counsel failed to give any explanation for this seemingly anomalous situation. However, he readily agreed with the possible
rationalization provided during the Oral Argument:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Counsel, can you flash
on the screen again the 1940 Tax Declaration of the Manotoks? It says there, what barrio is that now?
RET. JUSTICE FELICIANO:
Payong, that’s
1933, Sir.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
That’s 1933. The 1940.
1941 is okay. What is the barrio
there?
RET. JUSTICE FELICIANO:
Barrio Culiat.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
So, it started as
Barrio Payong became Barrio Culiat later on it became Matandang Balara the
present name.
RET. JUSTICE FELICIANO:
Yes, Sir.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Because the themes[15] of
barrios changed overtime and we’re talking of eighty-five (85) years, is that
correct?
RET. JUSTICE FELICIANO:
That’s right, Sir.[16]
This
is pure speculation which deserves no credence at all, especially in the light of evidence in the form of
official certifications from relevant government offices in
The
map of Quezon City,[19] as
prepared by NAMRIA, the official mapping agency of the
government, also shows that both Barangay Culiat and Barangay Matandang Balara
are existing Barangays of Quezon City but are clearly far away from each other.
Payong does not exist in the map.
Moreover,
Barangays Culiat and Matandang Balara were almost simultaneously created as
barangays. Culiat was created on
Significantly,
it also appears from Intervenors Manahans’ Memorandum that the property covered
by their alleged Deed of Conveyance dated
A parcel of land (
Intervenors Manahan also alleged that petitioners Manotoks’
TCT No. RT-22481 is fake and spurious for not being based on authentic
documents.[22]
I do not agree with the claim that Spouses Tiongson v. Court of Appeals[23] which
mentioned the
Similarly, the Court in the case of People v. Siguin,[24] did not make a finding as to the existence
and location of Sitio Payong but merely referred to the Information filed which
alleged that the crime was committed in Sitio Payong, Matandang Balara.
In any event, petitioners are bound
by their own documentary evidence and verbal admission during the Oral Argument
that the property is located in Payong, Culiat or simply Barrio Payong or Barrio
Culiat. Since petitioners presented the
said documentary evidence to prove their ownership of the property and the
source of their title, they have thereby judicially admitted that the location
of the property covered by their title, as shown in said exhibits, is Payong, Culiat, or Barrio
Payong, or simply Barrio Culiat,
It is also important to note that, except for Tax Declarations
and realty tax payments that were issued after the fire that gutted the records
of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, petitioners did not present any credible
evidence showing that the property they are occupying and covered by their
reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) is located in Barrio Matandang Balara.
Consequently, since the property covered by petitioners’
reconstituted title is not the property in Matandang Balara that they are
occupying as clearly shown by their own documentary evidence, it necessarily follows
that they are not the owners of such property.
The Court’s ruling in Santiago v.
Court of Appeals,[27] is pertinent. Thus:
Documents proving ownership such as
transfer and original certificates of title are the legs on which petitioners’
case stands. Premised on the relevance of these documents, the trial court
ruled in favor of petitioners. However, the proverbial legs of evidence are broken.
While the titles presented by petitioners
show ownership, such ownership is not of the land claimed, but over the
adjoining parcels of land. The technical descriptions in the titles
presented by petitioners betray them as adjacent and adjoining owners of the
land claimed by MWSS for registration. x x x
The Deed of
Petitioners
alleged that the deed of sale between Emiliano Setosta and Homer Barque, Sr.
was not a public document because the document does not appear to be recorded
in the Notarial Register Records of Atty. Eliseo Razon.
Granting
that the Notarial Register of Atty. Eliseo Razon does not reflect the said Deed
of Sale executed by Emiliano Setosta in favor of Homer Barque, Sr., nonetheless,
applying the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, I
find that the Deed of Sale was duly notarized as otherwise the instrument would
not have been registrable and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City would not
have issued TCT No. 210177 to Homer Barque, Sr. on the basis of said Deed of
Sale.
Such
presumption cannot be overcome by the mere failure, even if true, of Atty.
Razon to record the deed in his Notarial Register since said failure does not
make the notarization less genuine. Neither
could the respondents be faulted for said failure. In any event, respondents
submitted a Certification under oath of Mr. Gregorio B. Faraon[28] attesting
to the existence of said Deed of Sale in the records of the Clerk of Court of
the Manila Regional Trial Court.
Jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481.
The
Decisions of the two Divisions of the Court of Appeals both affirmed the LRA
findings that petitioners’ reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481 was spurious and a
sham and that respondents’ TCT No. 210177 sought to be reconstituted is genuine,
valid and existing.
The
Court of Appeals, being the tribunal to which the appeal was elevated pursuant to Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
which provides that final Orders or Resolutions of the LRA may be appealed to
the Court of Appeals, has the corresponding authority and jurisdiction to
decide the appealed case on the basis of the uncontroverted facts and
admissions contained in the petition, comment, reply, rejoinder, and memoranda,
filed by the parties,[29]
and to apply the law applicable in administrative reconstitution proceeding
which is Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6732.[30]
Section
10, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court specifically mandates that “the findings of fact of the court or agency
concerned, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals.” Since petitioners were not
able to show that the LRA findings of fact were unsupported by evidence,[31]
the Court of Appeals committed no error of jurisdiction when it confirmed such
findings.
Moreover, Section 11 of R.A. No. 6732 provides that:
SEC.
11. A reconstituted title obtained by
means of fraud, deceit or other machination is void ab intio as against the party obtaining the same and all persons
having knowledge thereof.
Thus, the Court of
Appeals had the authority to order the cancellation of petitioners’ reconstituted
TCT No. RT-22481 after it affirmed the findings of the LRA that petitioners’
TCT No. RT-22481 is spurious and void ab
initio. Having also affirmed the LRA
finding that respondents’ title, TCT No. 210177, is genuine, valid and
existing, the Court of Appeals likewise had the authority to order its
reconstitution since this was the final step in the administrative reconstitution
process.
It must be noted that Section 48 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1529 (or The Property Registration Decree) does not expressly provide for
the specific court that can order the cancellation
of a certificate of title. On the
other hand, Section 108 thereof clearly provides that only the Court of First
Instance (now RTC) can order an erasure,
alteration or amendment in a
certificate of title.
The variance is a clear indication of the intent to
distinguish between these two actions. Thus, under Section 48, courts other than the Regional Trial Court,
such as the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, are possessed with
authority and jurisdiction to order the cancellation of a
Moreover, there has been a change in the traditional
concept of “original jurisdiction” on account of Rule 43, Rules of Court, where
the Court of Appeals has the power to take judicial cognizance of a case for
the first time through its review powers. Thus, this Court said in Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation[32] that:
Original jurisdiction is the power of the Court to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time under conditions provided by law. Appellate jurisdiction is the authority of a Court higher in rank to re-examine the final order or judgment of a lower court which tried the case now elevated for review.
x x x x
The stringent
concept of original jurisdiction may seemingly be neutered by Rule 43 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 of which lists a slew of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial
tribunals or their officers whose decisions may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. However, the basic law of jurisdiction, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129),
ineluctably confers appellate jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals over final
rulings of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission, by
explicitly using the phrase “appellate jurisdiction.” x x x
Consequently,
when an administrative reconstitution
proceeding is appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the Court of
Appeals would be acting as a court of original jurisdiction with regard to said
appealed cases, hence, BP 129 would not apply.
In
view of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals correctly acted within its
jurisdiction when it ordered the cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) of petitioners
after it confirmed the LRA finding that said title is fake and spurious.
Significantly,
the Court has ruled in Rexlon Realty
Group, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[33] that
it has jurisdiction to declare the title void even if the appealed case was not
originally filed with the Regional Trial Court for nullification of title. We held that the Court can rule on the validity or nullity of the title issued in the name of
Paramount in the light of the facts of this case, and that:
[I]n order for a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the case, we must decide on the effect of void duplicate copies of a
certificate of title that served as a basis for the sale of the property it
represents and the eventual issuance of title in the name of respondent
Paramount. To require another proceeding
only for the purpose of annulling the said new titles when the same could be
decided in this very petition would promote judicial bureaucracy, a practice
abhorred by our legal system. As
we have ruled in Gayos v. Gayos, it
is a cherished rule of procedure that a court should always strive to settle
the entire controversy in a single
proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.[34]
More
pertinently, the Court ruled in Rexlon,
thus:
On
whether this Court can rule on the validity or nullity of the titles issued in
the name of respondent
x x x x
Secondly, respondent Paramount has duly
consented to put in issue the validity of its titles by invoking in this appeal
the reasons espoused by the appellate court and respondent David for the
dismissal of the petition to annul the decision of the trial court. In its Memorandum and respondent David’s comment
that it adopted, respondent Paramount has not made any jurisdictional objection
as regards its inclusion in the appeal to the petition for annulment of
judgment, and even participated in the discussion of the merits of the case. Based on the principle of estoppel,
respondent
Jurisdiction
of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to administratively reconstitute the
allegedly lost TCT No. 210177 in the name of respondents despite the previously
reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481 of the petitioners over the same property.
To resolve this issue, it is relevant to first consider
whether petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481, in fact, covers the same property
identified and described in respondents’ TCT No. 210177.
Respondents’ title, TCT No. 210177, indicates Barrio
Matandang Balara as location of the property.
On the other hand, the reconstituted title of petitioners, TCT No.
RT-22481, does not indicate the barrio where the property described therein is
located. As shown by petitioners’ documentary
evidence, the property which they claim to be covered by their TCT No. RT-22481
is located in Barrio Payong, or Barrio Culiat,
More importantly, the technical description in respondents’
title, TCT No. 210177, indicates boundaries totally different from those stated
in petitioners’ title, TCT No. RT-22481.
Furthermore, the technical description of respondents’ title shows that it
covers two lots while petitioners’ title covers only one lot.
The claim that the LRA has no authority to pass upon the
genuineness of a certificate of title in an administrative reconstitution proceeding
is an absurdity. Will the LRA just
accept any title and order its reconstitution although it is facially
void? Such an absurd interpretation
would necessarily result in the reconstitution of a patently fake and spurious
title and the consequent proliferation of fake titles, a situation that the
legislature could not have contemplated when it enacted R.A. No. 6732
authorizing the administrative reconstitution of titles.
It is, therefore, misleading and baseless for petitioners to
assert that their previously reconstituted title, TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) covers
the same property as that identified and described in respondents’ TCT No.
210177 so as to deprive the LRA of jurisdiction over respondents’ petition for
reconstitution.
However, even assuming that both petitioners’ and respondents’
titles cover the same property, the LRA would still have jurisdiction over respondents’
petition for reconstitution.
As petitioners
themselves admit, they caused the administrative reconstitution of their TCT
No. RT 22481 in 1991 under R.A. No. 6732.
On the other hand, respondents’ TCT No. 210177 shows that it was issued
on
Respondents’
TCT No. 210177 was, therefore, in
existence at the time petitioners filed their petition for reconstitution.
In Alipoon
v. Court of Appeals,[36] the
Court ruled that:
[I]nasmuch as TCT No. T-17224 has been in existence as early as
It,
therefore, follows that petitioners’ reconstituted title, even assuming the
same to have been duly reconstituted, was deemed nullified by the mere
existence of respondents’ title at the time of the administrative
reconstitution of petitioners’ title.[37] Pertinently, the Court held in Alabang Development Corp. v. Hon. Valenzuela[38]
that:
The
Court stresses once more that lands already covered by duly issued existing
Torrens Titles (which become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year
from their issuance under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act) cannot be
the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed
titles filed by third parties without first securing by final judgment the
cancellation of such existing titles. x x x
Moreover,
since petitioners recognized the jurisdiction of the LRA when they filed their
opposition to respondents’ petition for reconstitution and submitting evidence
therein, they cannot thereafter turn around and impugn such jurisdiction after
the LRA ruled against their prayer for the denial of the petition for
reconstitution. We ruled in Salva v. Court of Appeals:[39]
In a long line of decisions, this Court
has consistently held that while an order or decision rendered without
jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at any stage, a party’s active participation in the
proceedings in the tribunal which rendered the order or decision will bar such
party from attacking its jurisdiction. x x x
In
the instant cases, it is undisputed that petitioners actively participated in
the proceedings and submitted evidence in support of their claim. Estoppel does not apply only as against
plaintiffs who sought affirmative reliefs.
It equally applies to defendants who actively participate in the
proceedings, thus:
Public
policy dictates that this Court must strongly condemn any double-dealing by
parties who are disposed to trifle with the courts by taking inconsistent positions,
in utter disregard of elementary principles of right dealing and good
faith. This applies not only to parties who are plaintiffs, complainants or
others who initiated the case by actually filing the action, but also to
parties who are defendants or respondents, if the latter fail to timely raise
the jurisdictional issue and instead actively participate in the proceedings.[40]
There
is, therefore, no further need to require another proceeding for the cancellation
of petitioners’ reconstituted title before the LRA can proceed to reconstitute respondents’
TCT No. 210177.
Jurisdiction
of the LRA to adjudicate on the validity of petitioners’ reconstituted TCT No.
RT-22481 (372302) in the administrative reconstitution case filed by respondents.
In its comment dated
While
it is true that the Register of Deeds and the Administrator of the LRA, in the exercise of their quasi-judicial
powers over petitions for administrative reconstitution, have the authority to
receive evidence, it is limited for
the purpose of determining whether or not the certificates of title sought to
be reconstituted are valid, authentic, genuine and in force at the time they
were lost or destroyed, and to the end of either granting or denying the prayer
of the petition. Also, their jurisdiction to hear administrative petitions
for reconstitution does not encompass any other title except that which is the
subject matter of the petition.
Otherwise, they exceed their jurisdiction.[41]
Furthermore, the technical expertise of the LRA with regard
to reconstitution of titles is such that the Court has long directed the lower courts
to strictly observe the LRA circulars on reconstitution and land registration
cases. It said:
In recognition of these developments that have placed under a cloud the integrity of the once unassailable Torrens Title, spawned the proliferation of fake land titles and encouraged the mushrooming of land grabbers and squatters on legitimately-titled lands, Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa issued on July 15, this year, Administrative Circular No. 7-96 addressed to all judges of all court levels and their Clerks of Court enjoining the strict observance of Land Registration Authority (LRA) circulars on reconstitution and land registration cases.[42]
Since the LRA had the duty to resolve the petition for
reconstitution as well as petitioners’ opposition thereto, it necessarily had
to examine the title of the parties, using its technical expertise, to
determine if the petition for reconstitution should be given due course, or
denied as prayed for by the petitioners. Thus:
[W]hen an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial
functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its
specialization are deemed to be included within the jurisdiction of said
administrative agency or body.
Moreover, even assuming that petitioners are correct in
claiming that the LRA had no jurisdiction to resolve the issue of validity of
title in a petition for reconstitution, nonetheless, since petitioners opposed respondents’
petition for reconstitution and, in fact, ventilated before the LRA the issue
of validity or genuineness of their title and submitted evidence in support
thereof, instead of going to the courts to enjoin the LRA proceedings on
account of their possession of a purported reconstituted title over the same
property covered by respondents’ TCT No. 210177, petitioners are estopped from
raising the issue of jurisdiction. We ruled
in Laxina, Sr. v. Office of the Ombudsman,[44] that:
Petitioner is also estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. A perusal of the records shows that he
participated in the proceedings by filing his counter-affidavit with supporting
evidence. x x x Thus, it has been held that participation in the administrative
proceedings without raising any objection thereto bars the parties from raising
any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered against
them.[45]
Again,
even assuming that the Regional Trial Court should have had a first chance at
resolving the issue of validity of the title, nonetheless, under the
circumstances, this Court, upon elevation of the issue before it, had the
unquestionable jurisdiction to declare petitioners’ reconstituted title void
and order its cancellation, under the same rationale relied upon by this Court
in Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela
Rosa:[46]
Ordinarily,
the case would then be remanded to the Regional Trial Court. But not in the
case at bar. Considering the voluminous
pleadings submitted by the parties and the evidence presented, We deem it
proper to decide the controversy right at this instance. And this course of
action is not without precedent for “it is a cherished rule of procedure for
this Court to always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single
proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this
case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to
the Court of Appeals and from there to this Court x x x.
The ruling in Islamic
Directorate of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals[47] is likewise applicable, to wit:
The resolution of the question as to
whether or not the SEC had jurisdiction to declare the subject sale null and
void is rendered moot and academic by the inherent
nullity of the highly dubious sale due to lack of consent of the IDP, owner
of the subject property. No end of substantial
justice will be served if we reverse the SEC’s conclusion on the matter, and
remand the case to the regular courts for further litigation over an issue
which is already determinable based on what we have in the records.
Beyond all that, however, is the unalterable fact that this
Court’s First Division had already resolved in its Decision of
Jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals or the LRA to decide the ownership of the disputed property
in the administrative reconstitution of title filed by respondents.
Petitioners
raised the issue of ownership before the LRA when they presented evidence in
the form of a Deed of Sale, five (5) Unilateral Deeds of Conveyance, tax
declarations, and realty tax receipts to prove their ownership of the property
allegedly covered by their reconstituted TCT RT No. 22481. Petitioners supported their claim of
genuineness of their reconstituted title with documentary evidence showing their
supposed acquisition of ownership of the land.
However, the LRA gave no credence to the evidence of
ownership submitted by the petitioners, mainly because the property described
therein appears to be located in a barrio different and far from the barrio
where the property in dispute is actually located.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioners again
adverted to the same documentary evidence they presented before the LRA in
support of their claim of ownership of the property covered by their TCT No. RT
22481 and to buttress their contention that their title is genuine and
authentic.
However,
the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto
the Resolution of the LRA which found their reconstituted title a sham and
spurious and respondents’ title, genuine, authentic and existing. In addition, the Court of Appeals also ordered
the cancellation of petitioners’ TCT No. RT22481 and the reconstitution of respondents’
TCT No. 210177.
In short, since petitioners themselves laid before the LRA
and the Court of Appeals all their evidence to prove the genuineness of their
reconstituted title and their ownership of the property in dispute, the Court
of Appeals had the corresponding authority and jurisdiction to pass upon these
issues.
In Yusingco v. Ong
Hing Lian,[48] the Court ruled, thus:
Therefore,
it appearing from the records that in the previous petition for reconstitution
of certificates of title, the parties acquiesced in submitting the issue of
ownership for determination in the said petition, that they were given the full
opportunity to present their respective sides of the issues and evidence in
support thereof, and that the evidence presented was sufficient and adequate
for rendering a proper decision upon the issue, the adjudication of the issue
of ownership was valid and binding. It being a valid judgment, res judicata applies.
Indeed, petitioners are barred from thereafter impugning
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to rule on these issues. In the leading case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,[49] it
was stressed that:
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question the same jurisdiction x x x.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or the power of the court. x x x [I]t is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
x x x [W]e frown upon the “undesirable practice” of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse x x x.
In
the light of all the foregoing, I find no compelling reason or overriding
consideration to further require the referral of these cases to the Regional
Trial Court or the Court of Appeals for a re-litigation of the issues already
raised and resolved by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals and affirmed
by the Court’s First Division in its final and executory Decision dated December
12, 2005.
More
importantly, the doctrine of immutability of final and executory decisions
which became part of our legal system almost a century ago and reiterated time
and again by this Court precludes the Court from taking this unprecedented
action.
As
held in Anuran v. Aquino and Ortiz,[50]
every consideration of expediency and justice is opposed to the uncontrolled
exercise of discretion by the courts in opening up cases after judgments
entered therein have become final.[51] The interest of the individual, as well as of the
community, demands there should be a definite end to every litigation; and nothing could be more impolitic than to leave
it to the discretion of every court to revise and review and reconsider its
judgments without limit.[52]
Furthermore,
the question of whether the Court can reopen a final and executory judgment has
constitutional implications since a reopening of the final and executory
December 12, 2005 Decision would violate the prevailing parties’ right to due
process. As the Court said in Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees’
Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong:[53]
A
final judgment vests in the prevailing party a right recognized and protected
by law under the due process clause of the Constitution. x x x.
Thereafter,
in Fortich v. Corona,[54] the
Court ruled against a reopening of a final and executory judgment since this is
not a mere question of technicality but that of substance and merit, thus:
It should be stressed that when the March 2, 1996 OP Decision was
declared final and executory, vested
rights were acquired by the herein petitioners x x x. Thus, we repeat, the issue here is not a
question of technicality but that of substance and merit. x x x
Considering
all the foregoing and the fact that these cases do not involve an issue of transcendental
importance, such as life, liberty or the security of the state, no compelling
reason exists to depart from this well-settled doctrine, nor to ignore the
fundamental public policy behind it.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote that these cases be
referred back to the Court’s Special First Division for final disposition in
accordance with its Decision of
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago and concurred in by Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and Associate Justices Leonardo A. Quisumbing
and Adolfo S. Azcuna; Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio dissented.
[2]
TSN,
[3]
Annex G, Respondents’ Memorandum.
[4]
Annex H, Respondents’ Memorandum.
[5]
Annex J, Respondents’ Memorandum.
[6]
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 192. PROVIDING FOR
THE REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY AND NATURAL
RESOURCES; RENAMING IT AS THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES;
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
[7]
See Sec. 24 (c).
[8]
Annex I-1, Respondents’ Memorandum.
[9]
Annexes F and F-1, respectively, Respondents’ Memorandum.
[10]
Annex I, Respondents’ Memorandum.
[11]
Annex H, Respondents’ Memorandum.
[12] Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque,
G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605, December 12, 2005, 477 SCRA 339, 346-348.
[13] Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development
Corporation v. Factoran, Jr., No. L-75501,
[14] Miralles v. Go, G.R. No. 139943,
[15]
Should be names.
[16]
TSN,
[17]
Annex D, Respondents’ Memorandum.
[18]
Annex E, Respondents’ Memorandum.
[19]
Annex B of Respondents’ Memorandum.
[20]
Page 4.
[21]
Annex B, Intervenor Manahans’ Memorandum.
[22]
Intervenors Manahans’ Memorandum, p. 9.
[23]
215 Phil. 430 (1984).
[24]
G.R. No. 126517,
[25]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Sec. 4.
[26]
[27]
G.R. No. 109111,
[28]
Annex N, Respondents’ Memorandum.
[29]
See Torres, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 120138,
[30]
AN ACT ALLOWING ADMINISTRATIVE RECONSTITUTION OF ORIGINAL COPIES OF
CERTIFICATES OF TITLES LOST OR DESTROYED DUE TO FIRE, FLOOD AND OTHER FORCE MAJEURE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
SECTION ONE HUNDRED TEN OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NUMBERED
[31] Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development
Corporation v. Factoran, Jr., supra
note 17.
[32]
G.R. No. 154993,
[33]
G.R. No. 128412,
[34]
[35]
[36]
364 Phil. 591 (1999).
[37]
See also Republic v. Court of Appeals,
Nos. L-46626-27,
[38]
201 Phil. 727, 744 (1982).
[39]
G.R. No. 132250,
[40]
[41]
Comment, Office of the Solicitor General, pp. 21-22; Temporary rollo, no. 3.
[42] Sandoval v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
106657,
[43] Tejada v. Homestead Property Corporation,
G.R. No. 79622,
[44]
G.R. No. 153155,
[45]
[46]
G.R. Nos. 95612-13,
[47]
G.R. No. 117897,
[48]
No. L-26523,
[49]
No. L-21450,
[50]
38 Phil. 29 (1918).
[51]
[52]
[53]
No. L-52415,
[54]
G.R. No. 131457,