EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 162335 and 162605 (SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN M.
MANOTOK, FERNANDO M. MANOTOK, FAUSTO M. MANOTOK III, MA. MAMERTA M. MANOTOK,
PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA L. GO, ROBERTO LAPERAL III, MICHAEL MARSHALL V.
MANOTOK, MARY ANN V. MANOTOK, FELISA MYLENE MANOTOK, IGNACIO V. MANOTOK, JR.,
MILAGROS V. MANOTOK, SEVERINO MANOTOK III, ROSA R. MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B. SISON,
GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, MA. CRISTINA E. SISON, PHILIPP L. MANOTOK, JOSE CLEMENTE
L. MANOTOK, RAMON SEVERINO L. MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK, JOSE MARIA MANOTOK,
JESUS JUDE MANOTOK, JR., and MA. THERESA L. MANOTOK, represented by their
Attorney-in-fact, ROSA R. MANOTOK v. HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE, represented by TERESITA BARQUE-HERNANDEZ)
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is to express my dissent in the majority opinion which set aside the final and executory Decision dated 12 December 2005 of the First Division of this Court, recalled the Entry of Judgment recorded on 2 May 2006 in the present cases, and remanded the same to the Court of Appeals for reception of further evidence.
I emphatically call attention to the fact that the Decision, dated 12 December 2005, the fallo of which reads –
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. In G.R. No. 162335, the February 24,
2004 Amended Decision of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel
petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority to
reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. 210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the
November 7, 2003 Amended Decision of the Special Division of Five of the Former
Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481, and the Land Registration
Authority to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. T-210177 and the March 12, 2004
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED[,]
had become FINAL AND EXECUTORY. The two Motions for Reconsideration of the petitioners were both denied in Resolutions dated 19 April 2006 and 19 June 2006. The Entry of Judgment was already made on 2 May 2006.
Nothing is more settled in law than that when a final judgment is executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time.[1]
Litigation must at some time be terminated, even at the risk of occasional errors. Public policy dictates that once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable, the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party. Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable controversies with finality.[2]
Apparent from the foregoing are the two-fold purposes
for the doctrine of the immutability and inalterability of a final judgment: first,
to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make
orderly the discharge of judicial business; and, second, to put an end
to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely
why courts exist. Obviously, the first
purpose is in line with the dictum
that justice delayed is justice denied. But said dictum presupposes that the court properly appreciates the facts
and the applicable law to arrive at a judicious decision. The end should always be the meting out of
justice. As to the second purpose,
controversies cannot drag on indefinitely.
The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense
for an indefinite period of time. It
must be adjudicated properly and seasonably to better serve the ends of justice
and to place everything in proper perspective. In the process, the possibility
that errors may be committed in the rendition of a decision cannot be
discounted.[3]
The only recognized exceptions to the foregoing doctrine are the corrections of clerical errors or the making of the so-called nunc pro tunc entries, which cause no prejudice to any party, and, where the judgment is void.[4] Void judgments may be classified into two groups: those rendered by a court without jurisdiction to do so and those obtained by fraud or collusion.[5] Petitioners assert, and the majority opinion effectively sustains, that the Decision dated 12 December 2005 of the First Division of this Court, affirming the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the LRA rendered without jurisdiction, may be set aside for belonging to the first group of void judgments. I cannot subscribe to such a view.
It is argued that the Land Registration Authority (LRA) has no jurisdiction to reconstitute administratively the respondents’ title because such reconstitution supposedly constitutes an indirect or collateral attack on the petitioners’ pre-existing Torrens title over the same property.
It is worthy to note that the LRA itself, despite finding clear and convincing evidence that respondents’ title was valid, genuine, authentic, and effective, while concluding that petitioners’ title was fraudulently reconstituted, held back from actually canceling the petitioners’ title. According to the dispositive portion of the LRA Decision –
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby
ordered that reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of [herein
respondents’ predecessor] Homer L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after cancellation
of TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of [herein petitioners] Manotoks upon
order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
From the said LRA Decision, the parties filed separate appeals with the Court of Appeals.
Respondents’ petition for review was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, which the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division of the Court of Appeals, in its Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2003, resolved as follows –
WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is
hereby reconsidered. Accordingly, the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-22481
of [herein petitioners] and the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute
forthwith [herein respondents’] valid, genuine and existing Certificate of
Title No. T-210177.
Petitioners’ petition for review, on the other hand, was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, disposed by the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in its Amended Decision, dated 24 February 2004, in the following manner –
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision of this Court
dated 29 October 2003 is RECONSIDERED and a new one entered ordering the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel [herein petitioners’] TCT No.
RT-22481 and directing the LRA to reconstitute forthwith [herein respondents’]
TCT No. T-210177.
It was not the LRA which ordered the cancellation of petitioners’ title but the two Divisions of the Court of Appeals which separately decided CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66642. Petitioners contend, however, that even the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to order the cancellation of their title. They maintain that their title can only be attacked in a direct action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Decision, dated 12 December 2005, of the First Division of the Court already addressed the said arguments, thus –
Indeed, it would be needlessly circuitous to remand
the case to the RTC to determine anew which of the two titles is sham or
spurious and thereafter appeal the trial court’s ruling to the Court of
Appeals. After all, the LRA and the two
divisions of the appellate court have already declared that petitioners’ title
is forged. x x x
x x x x
No useful purpose will be served if a case or the
determination of an issue in a case is remanded to the trial court only to have
its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme
Court. The remand of the case or of an
issue to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary
where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records
before it and particularly where the ends of justice would not be subserved by
the remand thereof.
While the Court, when it finds that a lower court or quasi-judicial body is in error, may simply and conveniently nullify the challenged decision, resolution or order and remand the case thereto for further appropriate action, it is well within the conscientious exercise of its broad review powers to refrain from doing so and instead choose to render judgment on the merits when all material facts have been duly laid before it as would buttress its ultimate conclusion, in the public interest and for the expeditious administration of justice, such as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case.[6]
Such a course of action is not without precedent for "it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and from there to this Court."[7] Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and expense, both to the parties and the government, not to speak of delay in the disposal of the case. A marked characteristic of the judicial set-up in this country is that where the dictates of justice so demand, the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality.[8]
The decisions of the LRA, the two Divisions of the Court of Appeals, as well as the First Division of the Court, consistently finding that it is respondents’ title to the land which is authentic and genuine, and that of the petitioners is false and fraudulent, are sufficiently supported by the evidence on record. Petitioners’ evidence to prove their title to the land was already considered and weighed by the LRA and the courts as against the respondents’ evidence. There is no showing that petitioners had any other significant evidence that they can only present before the RTC in another proceeding directly attacking their title. Thus, although the proceedings canceling petitioners’ title to the land did not follow the ordinary course, which should have been initiated with the RTC, the Court of Appeals and the First Division of the Court had all the material facts before them and evidence on record to already render judgment on the merits in the instant cases.
Moreover, when petitioners opposed respondents’ petition for reconstitution of title, on the basis of their prior existing title to the same piece of land, petitioners submitted their title to the scrutiny of the LRA. The LRA could not dismiss respondents’ petition for reconstitution of title on the mere presentation by petitioners of their supposed title. It was still incumbent upon the LRA to determine the existence, genuineness and authenticity of petitioners’ title, so as to preclude the reconstitution of respondents’ title over the same piece of land. To make such a determination, the LRA had to examine and weigh the evidence of both the respondents and the petitioners in support of their own respective titles; and as a result thereof, the LRA came to the conclusion that petitioners’ title was fraudulently reconstituted.
Given the foregoing, it cannot be simply said that the issuance by the LRA of reconstituted titles is a purely executive function. Before the LRA can issue a decision, either granting or denying petitions for reconstitution of title, it must consider and weigh the arguments and evidence presented by those seeking and those opposing the reconstitution; irrefragably, a quasi-judicial function. An act by an executive agency or officer becomes quasi-judicial in nature when the parties involved are given the opportunity to be heard and to produce evidence, and such evidence is weighed before a decision is rendered thereon.[9] The fact that the LRA is a quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial function becomes incontestable especially considering that its decisions are among those explicitly identified in the Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 as appealable to the Court of Appeals.[10]
Again, it must be stressed that, despite its finding that petitioners’ title was fraudulent, the LRA left the cancellation of their title to a court of competent jurisdiction. While under ordinary circumstances, such a court of competent jurisdiction would have been the RTC, the First Division of the Court properly found, in accordance with public policy and the dictates of justice, that the instant cases need no longer be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. The two Divisions of the Court of Appeals, in promulgating their respective Amended Decisions, already had all the material facts and evidence before it to render judgment on the validity of petitioners’ title. Hence, the Decision, dated 12 December 2005, of the First Division of the Court, declining to remand the instant cases to the RTC and affirming the Amended Decisions of the Court of Appeals therein, is a valid decision which could and had, in fact, attained finality.
It is time that the Court finally put an end to the controversies between petitioners and respondents in these cases, and thwart further attempts by any party to still prolong the same. Unfortunately, the Resolution of the majority opinion has the contrary effect. It not only protracts the litigation, but also complicates the same by giving undue consideration to the evidence and points raised by Felicitas and Resendo Manahan (Manahans) in their much delayed petition-in-intervention.
When the Court en banc reopened the present cases, it expressly delineated the four issues to be resolved and upon which the parties were to be heard in the oral arguments. These issues were:
1. Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 without a trial before the proper Regional Trial Court in the proceeding directly assailing the validity of petitioners’ title?
2. Does the Land Registration Authority [LRA] have jurisdiction to administratively reconstitute the allegedly lost TCT No. 210177 in the name of respondents despite the previously reconstituted TCT No. RT-22481 of the petitioners over the same property?
3. Does the LRA have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the validity of petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 in the administrative reconstitution case filed by respondents with the LRA?
4. Does the Court of Appeals or the LRA have jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the disputed property in the administrative reconstitution of title filed by respondents?
Even just a cursory reading of the foregoing issues would readily reveal that these are mainly legal and jurisdictional issues. The parties, namely, the petitioners and the respondents, have the right to rely on the adherence by the Court en banc to the said issues in its determination of whether or not to still subject the said parties to more litigation proceedings. For the Court en banc to consider and rule upon issues which are outside of the four afore-stated and on which the parties were heard during the oral arguments is a denial of due process.
The matter of whether or not the factual issues in the instant cases should again be relitigated cannot be anchored on the factual allegations of the parties, moreso, when such allegations were made by the Manahans. The Manahans were not even allowed to intervene in the oral arguments nor submit issues for the oral arguments. Thus, the majority opinion palpably erred in remanding the cases to the Court of Appeals for further reception of evidence on the basis of the assertions of the Manahans, which contradict the claims of both the petitioners and the respondents, the original parties in the cases at bar. The courts are bound to look no further than the record and cannot even consider contrary evidence to determine where the preponderance thereof lies.[11] These cases must be resolved upon the evidence submitted to the LRA, since a judicial review of executive decisions does not import a trial de novo, but only an ascertainment of whether the executive findings are not in violation of the Constitution or of the laws, and are free from fraud or imposition, and whether they find reasonable support in the evidence.[12] Further proceedings before the Court of Appeals following the remand of the instant cases thereto, would undoubtedly be tantamount to a new trial and investigation.
Wherefore, I vote to DENY all motions and prayers of the petitioners for the setting aside of the Decision dated 12 December 2005 of the First Division of this Court and the remand of the present cases to the Court of Appeals for the reception of further evidence, in my firm belief that the said Decision must stand and be honored for already being final and executory. I also vote to GRANT the motions for execution and possession filed by the respondents pursuant to the same Decision.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
[1] Mayon Estate Corporation v. Altura, G.R. No. 134462, 18 October 2004, 440 SCRA 377, 386.
[2] Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 394 Phil. 22, 28 (2000).
[3] Ginete v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 36, 55 (1998).
[4] Mayon Estate Corporation v. Altura, supra note 1 at 386.
[5] Legarda v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 890, 910 (1997).
[6] CAPANELA v. National Labor Relations Commission, 311 Phil. 744, 765 (1995).
[7] Board of Commissioners v. Hon. dela Rosa, 274 Phil. 1156, 1194 (1991).
[8] Tejones v. Gironella, G.R. No. L-35506, 21 March 1988, 159 SCRA 100, 106.
[9] See Cruz, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 110436, 27 June 1994, 233 SCRA 439, 450.
[10] Relevant provisions of Supreme Court Revised Administrative Order No. 1-95 read –
1. Scope. – These rules shall apply from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Office of the President, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments and Construction Industry Arbitration Commission.
[11] Mauleon v. Court of Appeals, 160 Phil.
794, 801 (1975).
[12] Lovina v. Moreno, 118 Phil. 1401, 1410
(1963).