G.R. Nos. 162335 and 162605 —
SEVE
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
The
Antecedents
On 22 October 1996, Homer L. Barque,
Sr. (Barque, Sr.) represented by Teresita Barque-Hernandez filed a petition for
administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 of the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. TCT
No. 210177 was allegedly destroyed when a fire gutted the Quezon City Hall on
11 June 1988. In support of the petition,
Barque, Sr. submitted the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, Real Estate
Tax Receipts and Tax Declaration.
Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos (Atty.
Bustos), Reconstituting Officer and Chief of the Reconstitution Division, Land
Registration Authority (LRA) wrote a letter dated 29 October 1996,[1]
addressed to Engineer Privadi J. Dalire (Engineer Dalire), Chief of the
Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau, Binondo, Manila. Atty. Bustos requested Engineer Dalire to
furnish him with a certified copy of Subdivision Plan Fls-3168-D
(Fls-3168-D). Atty. Bustos wrote a
similar but undated letter addressed to the Chief of the Surveys Division of
the Lands Management Services, Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
National Capital Region (LMS-DENR-NCR).[2]
In his
reply dated 7 November 1996,[3]
Engineer Dalire informed Atty. Bustos that the Lands Management Bureau has
no record of Fls-3168-D. In a letter
dated 28 November 1996,[4]
Engineer Ernesto S. Erive (Engineer Erive), Chief of the Surveys Division of
the LMS-DENR-NCR, informed Atty. Bustos that a microfilm copy of Fls-3168-D is
on file in the Technical Records and Statistical Section of their office.
The letter
of Engineer Erive confirming the existence of a microfilm copy of Fls-3168-D
conflicted with the letter of Engineer Dalire that his office has no record of
Fls-3168-D. Thus, Atty. Bustos sent
another letter dated 2 December 1996[5]
to Engineer Dalire requesting for clarification. In a letter dated 5 December 1996,[6]
Engineer Dalire requested the Regional Technical Director of
In connection with the letter of clarification dated
December 2, 1996 of the Reconstituting Officer and Chief Reconstitution Division
of LRA relative to the certified reproduction plan FLS-3168-D (microfilm)
issued by the Chief, Technical Records & Statistical Section on September
23, 1996 and our letter dated November 7, 1996 that we have no record of
Fls-3168-D. In this regards (sic),
please forward to us the copy on file in that office (DENR-NCR) from where the
Chief of Technical Records and Statistical Section reproduced a copy he issued
to LRA for our evaluation.
In the
machine copy of Fls-3168-D (furnished to us by LRA) from the copy of that
office issued to LRA, the said copy on file in your office did not emanate from
this Office. The stamp, particularly,
bearing the name of this office and the Chief of Geodetic Surveys is not the
same stamp we are using.
Please forward to us the said plan for evaluation and
comment.
A letter
dated 2 January 1997,[7]
purportedly from Engineer Dalire, addressed to the LRA Administrator, was
handcarried to, and received by the LRA General Records Section on 7 January
1997. The letter states:
SUBJECT: Copy of Plan FLS-3168-D
Caloocan, M.M.
02 January 1997
The Administrator
Attn: The Reconstituting Officer &
Chief, Reconstitution Division
Land Registration Authority
East Avenue, Quezon City
Sir:
In reply to your letter dated December 2, 1996, please be informed that the copy of the subject plan was forwarded to this office by the Chief, Technical Records and Statistical Section of the National Capital Region Lands Management Sector for our evaluation. As per verification and comparison made in our microfilm records, it was found out that they are identical and bore the same stamps and initials used in this office.
In view hereof, it is further informed that in our reply letter dated Nov. 7, 1996 we indicated the status thereof because we failed to verify from our index cards then for our last result, hence, this case be given due course for Administrative reconstitution (sic).
Very truly yours,
For the Director,
Lands Management Bureau
(SGD.)
PRIVADI J. G. DAL
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division
Interestingly,
Engineer Dalire wrote another letter dated 5 January 1997[8]
addressed to the Regional Technical Director,
This is a follow-up to our previous request dated 05 December 1996 to that Office in connection with the letter of clarification dated December 2, 1996 of the Reconstituting Officer and Chief Reconstitution Division of the Land Registration Authority relative to the certified reproduction of plan Fls-3168-D (microfilm) issued by that office (signed by Carmelita A. Soriano, Chief of Technical Records and Statistics Section) on September 23, 1996 to Teresita Hernandez and our letter dated November 7, 1996 to the LRA that we have no records of Fls-3168-D.
The Land Registration Authority however, furnished us with machine copy
of Fls-3168-D reproduced from the copy issued by that Office and we found out
that the copy of Fls-3168-D file (sic) in your office did not emanate from this
Office. We reiterate that we have no
records (sic) of Fls-3168-D.
May we request you again to please forward to us the said copy of plan Fls-3168-D on file in your office for our evaluation and comment.
Engineer Dalire sent another letter
dated 31 January 1997[9]
to the LRA Administrator. The letter
states:
31 January 1997
The Administrator
Attn: The Reconstituting Officer
and Chief, Reconstitution Division
Land Registration Authority
East Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City
Sir:
In your letter dated December 2, 1996 (IN RE: Administrative Reconstitution of the Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. 210177 in the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, Homer L. Barque, Sr., Represented by Teresita Barque-Hernandez, Petitioner) you requested us to clarify the fact that the Regional Office has a microfilm copy of plan Fls-3168-D, while our office does not have a record of the same. In that letter, you attached for our reference the following:
1. Xerox copy of a certified true copy of plan Fls-3168-D, issued by the TRSS, NCR;
2. Reply letter of Engineer Ernesto S. Erive, dated Nov. 28, 1996;
3. Our reply letter dated November 7, 1996 to your letter dated October 29, 1996
In this connection, please be informed that we wrote on December 5, 1996 the DENR-NCR about your letter dated December 2, 1996 informing them that the plan Fls-3168-D filed in that Office from where the reproduced copy furnished to LRA did not emanate from our office. We requested them to forward to us the said plan for our evaluation and comment. Likewise, on January 5, 1997, we made a follow-up, reiterating that we have no records (sic) of Fls-3168-D and requesting them to forward the plan for our evaluation and comment. It is regretted, they did not respond.
Upon examination of the copy of Fls-3168-D allegedly issued by DENR-NCR, it is certain that the source of the copy is a spurious plan which may have been inserted in the file. We requested for the copy in their file last 05 December 1996 and 05 January 1997 but until this writing, NCR has not sent us the copy for authentication as required by DENR Administrative Order. We are sure that the copy did not come from this Office. The reasons are:
a. Our inventory of approved plans enrolled in our file, our Microfilm Computer list of plans available for decentralization all show that we do not have this plan Fls-3168-D, logically we cannot issue any copy.
b. The copy of the plan Fls-3168-D shows visible signs that it is a spurious copy.
1) The certification (rubber stamp) serves a two piece stamp. The certification and the signing official are separate. Ours is one-piece.
2) The alignment of: Lands, GEODETIC, this, Privadi, and Chief in the syndicates (sic) stamp differ from our stamp. Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division is our stamp, their (sic) is Survey without the “s” plural.
3) We do not stamp the plan twice as the syndicate did on the copy.
4) The size of the lettering in the rubber stamp “Not for Registration/Titling For Reference Only” is smaller than our stamp. It is also incomplete as an (sic) Stamp, in addition to [the] above is “of _________”.
5)
The copy bears forged initials of my action officer and myself. I sign completely certification.
6) The name of the claimant is very visible to have been tampered in the master copy.
7) Again, it is certified that this Bureau does not have copy of Fls-3168-D.
In view of the foregoing, the copy of Fls-3168-D furnished your Office as well as the alleged letter authenticating it should be disregarded or rejected as they come from spurious sources. This involves the reconstitution of title allegedly lot 823-A of Fls-3168-D with an area of 171,473 Sq. M. Surely, the use of the spurious copy of Fls-3168-D for the reconstitution of title will create land problem involving prime lots in that area.
Meanwhile, we requested our Records Division to find out to whom lot 823 (or portion thereof) Piedad Estate was conveyed.
Very truly yours,
For the Director,
Lands Management Bureau:
(SGD.)
PRIVADI J.G. DALIRE
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division
In a letter dated 13 February 1997[10]
to the LRA Administrator, Engineer Dalire explained that the 2 January 1997
letter was forged. Thus:
13 February 1997
The Administrator
Land Registration Authority
East Avenue, NIA Road
Quezon City
ATTN: Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos
Reconstituting Officer
Sir:
In reply to your letter dated January 28, 1997 which we received today, please be informed that as per the inventory of approved surveys which are officially enrolled in our file, the locator cards, the microfilm, list of plans on file which were decentralized to our regions, that are on file in this Bureau show that plan Fls-3168-D is not among the plans in our file. The non-existence of plan Fls-3168-D in our file, hence there is none to decentralize to our National Capital Region, is the subject of our reply to you dated 07 November 1996 (copy attached).
With respect to the letter dated 02 January 1997, xerox copy attached to your letter, this letter definitely did not come from this office; it is a forged document. The statement that the subject plan was forwarded to us by the Chief, Technical Records Statistics Section of the NCR-LMS is not true. Until now the NCR has not turned over the plan they reproduced in compliance with our urgent requests dated 03 January 1996 and followed up by our letters 03 January 1997 and 06 February 1997 (copies attached).
With respect to the questioned plan of Fls-3168-D, xerox copy attached to your letter of December 2, 1996, our detailed findings tending to prove it is a spurious copy have been discussed in our letter-reply dated 31 January 1997.
Meanwhile, we are retrieving the plan allegedly in the file of NCR for investigation and/or validation under DENR Administrative Order No. 40, s. 1991.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.)
PRIVADI J.G. DAL
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division
Finally, in a letter dated
19 February 1997,[11]
Engineer Dalire requested Atty. Bustos to disregard Fls-3168-D for being
spurious, thus:
19 February 1997
Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos
Reconstituting Officer
Land Registration Authority
East Avenue, Quezon City
Dear Atty. Bustos:
In reply to your query whether or not
a) the copy of plan Fls-3168-D submitted to you involving lot 823, Piedad Estate as surveyed for Emiliano Setosta;
b) the letter dated 07 November 1996, and
c) the letter dated 02 January 1997
are authentic and really coming from this office.
The letter dated 07 November 1996 (copy attached) stating that this Bureau has no records of Fls-3168-D is authentic. Our Inventory Record of Approved Surveys, our computerized list of plans officially filed in this Bureau, the Locator Cards, and the microfilm all show that we have no records or information about Plan Fls-3168-D.
The copy of Fls-3168-D attached to your letter dated December 2, 1996 is not issued by this Office. There are many markings on the copy to prove it did not come from LMB. Reasons, among others, are:
1) We have no copy of Fls-3168-D on file so how can we issue a copy of plan that is non-existing?
2) The copy of plan bears two “Certifications” at the top and at lower half. This is not our practice;
3) The rubber-stamp shows there are two pieces; one for the certification and another for the signing official. We use one piece rubber stamp. The alignment of the letters/words of one rubber stamp is different from this marking on this spurious plan;
4) The plan shows only initial. I sign in full copies of plans with the initials of my action officers and their codings below my signature. These are not present in the spurious copy of plan;
5) The letter size of the rubber stamp “NOT FOR REGISTRATION/TITLING, FOR REFERENCE ONLY” is smaller than our rubber stamp;
6)
The spurious copy of plan you
furnished us does not carry our rubber stamp “GOVERNMENT PROPERTY NOT TO BE
SOLD: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OF
___________________ “This is stamped on all microfilm copies we issue because
all microfilm copies are for official use only of our
I firmly deny having
prepared and issued the letter dated 02 January 1997 stating that copy of
subject plan (Fls-3168-D) was forwarded to us by the Chief Technical Records
and Statistics Section of the NCR and that as per verification, the plan is
identical to the microfilm and that the case be given due course for
administrative reconstitution. Certainly
this is not true. This is the handiwork
of forgers. How can this be when NCR has
never given us the alleged copy in their file for validation. The forwarding of the copy to us is mandatory
under DAO No. 49 for our validation.
This is the subject of our letters to NCR dated 05 December 1996, 03
January 1997 and 06 February 1997 (copies attached). Definitely this letter was never prepared and
issued by this Office. Our record books
and file attest to this. We do not use
letterheads for letters involving this topic.
Apparently our letter
of 31 January 1997 (copy attached) was intercepted and did not reach you.
For
all intent and purposes, please disregard the plan Fls-3168-D and the letter
dated 02 January 1997 as they are proven to be spurious documents.
Very truly yours,
For the Director of Lands:
(SGD.)
PRIVADI J.G. DAL
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division
The Ruling
of the Reconstituting Officer
In an Order dated 30 June 1997,[12]
Atty. Bustos denied the petition for administrative reconstitution of TCT No.
210177 on the following grounds:
1.
Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq.
Mtrs. and 171,472, respectively, covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate
Lot 823 Piedad Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered
by TCT No. 372302 registered in the name of Severino M. Manotok, et al.,
reconstituted under Adm. Reconstitution No. Q-213 dated February 01, 1991;
2. The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is
a spurious document as categorically stated by Engineer Privadi J.G.
Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, Lands Management Bureau, in his
letter dated February 19, 1997.[13]
(Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Barque,
Sr. moved for reconsideration of the Order.
In an Order dated 10 February 1998,[14]
Atty. Bustos denied the motion for lack of merit.
The
Heirs of Barque (Barques) filed an appeal with the LRA, docketed as Admin.
Recons. No. Q-547-A [97].
The Ruling of the Land Registration Authority
In a Resolution dated 24 June 1998,[15]
the LRA gave due course to the appeal.
The LRA ruled that under LRA Circular No. 13,[16]
only the owner’s or co-owner’s duplicate of an original or transfer certificate
of title may be used as a source of administrative reconstitution. Hence, Atty. Bustos erred in requiring the
submission of documents other than the owner’s duplicate TCT. The LRA further ruled that Engineer Dalire
failed to deny or question the genuineness of his signature in the letter of 2
January 1997. The LRA held that the 2
January 1997 letter is an official communication from Engineer Dalire. The LRA Administrator personally opined
that the Manotoks’ TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] is sham and spurious. Thus:
It is undisputed that Lot 823 of the
Piedad Estate, the property in question, is located at Barrio Matandang Balara,
Quezon City. Several documents submitted
by oppositors particularly the several Deeds of Sale and Unilateral Deed of
Conveyance including the real estate tax receipts would show that Lot 823 of
the Piedad Estate is located at Barrio Payong, and/or Barrio Culiat [Annexes
“2” to “77” inclusive “79”, “84” and “85” of Opposition] which is grossly
inaccurate. The map of Quezon City [Annex
“N” of Petitioners’ Position Paper] would show that there is no such barrio as
Payong. It must likewise be noted that
there is a Barrio Culiat but the same is separate and distinct from Barrio
Matandang Balara and they do not adjoin each other. Quite perplexing though is the fact that the
real estate tax receipts for payments made after the Quezon City Hall was
gutted by fire on 11 June 1988 would show that the property covered thereby is
already situated at Barrio Matandang Balara [Annexes “91” to “104” inclusive of
Opposition], while in other tax payment receipts [Annexes “103” to “114”
inclusive of Opposition], Barrio Capitol is indicated as the location of the
property in question. This is highly
questionable and likewise highly irregular.
The said real estate tax receipts also reflect the tax declaration of
the property covered thereby. It is
highly irregular that the tax declaration numbers indicated therein would vary
and those tax declarations which appear to have been canceled would again be
revived.
The claim of the oppositors that the
property in question per TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] covers only one [1] lot is
also inaccurate and without any basis.
Plan FLS 3168D shows that the property in question indeed consists of
two [2] lots, Lot 823-A and Lot 823-B.
The same is being buttressed and corroborated by the certified copy of
the tax map over the property in question issued by the Quezon City Assessor’s
Office [annex “H” of Petitioners Position Paper]. Said tax map shows that similar to TCT No.
210177 and Plan FLS 3168D, the property in question covers two [2] lots, Lot
823-A and Lot 823-B. Granting arguendo
that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate has not yet been subdivided into two [2] lots
from the date of original survey in 1907, it is highly irregular that TCT No.
RT-22481 [372302] would have Lot 822-A Psd 2498, Lot 818-A and Lot 818-C Psd
2507 as boundaries when at the time of the original survey, there were no such Psd’s yet.
Examination of the technical decription
and boundaries appearing in TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] would show that the same
do not, in all respects, conform to the certified technical description and
boundaries of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate [property in question] which are the
B. L. Form No. 28-37-R and B. L. Form No. 31-10 issued by the Bureau of Lands
[Annexes “I” and “J” of Petitioners’ Position Paper]. There was never any mention of Payatas Estate
nor Tuazon Estate as the boundaries of the lot in question. The lot in question does not at all adjoin
the Payatas Estate which was surveyed only on January 12, 1923 as per
certification issued by the LMS-DENR-NCR [Annex “L” Petitioners’ Position
Paper]. As correctly pointed out by
petitioners, Lot 822 was mentioned as one of the boundaries of TCT No. RT-22481
[372302]. It was not, however, indicated
whether or not it was Lot 822 of the Piedad Estate.[17]
However,
the LRA ruled that TCT No. 210177 may only be reconstituted after a court of
competent jurisdiction cancelled TCT
No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of the Manotoks. The dispositive portion of the LRA Resolution
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it
is hereby ordered that reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L.
Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481
(372302) in the name of the Manotoks upon order of a court of competent
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.[18]
(Emphasis supplied)
The
Manotoks filed a motion for reconsideration.
In an Order dated 14 June 2001,[19]
the LRA denied the motion.
The Manotoks filed a petition for
review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 before the Court of Appeals challenging
the 24 June 1998 Resolution and 14 June 2001 Order of the LRA.
The Barques filed a petition for review
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 praying for the modification of 24 June 1998
Resolution and 14 June 2001 Order of the LRA.
The Barques prayed for the immediate reconstitution of TCT No. 210177
without prior cancellation of TCT
No. RT-22481 (372302) by a court of competent jurisdiction.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
CA-G.R. No. 66642
CA-G.R. No. 66642 was initially dismissed in the Resolution of 23 October 2001[20] for failure to show that Rosa Manotok was authorized to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping in behalf of the other petitioners. Upon motion for reconsideration filed by the Manotoks, the petition was reinstated in the Resolution of 27 November 2001.[21]
In its Decision of 29 October 2003,[22]
the Court of Appeals denied the Manotoks’ petition and affirmed the LRA
Resolution of 24 June 1998. However,
upon motion for reconsideration of the Barques, the Court of Appeals
promulgated an Amended Decision on 24 February 2004,[23]
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated 29 October
2003 is RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered ordering the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the LRA to
reconstitute forthwith respondents’ TCT No. T-210177.
SO ORDERED.[24]
The Manotoks came to this Court for
relief. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No. 162335.
CA-G.R. SP No. 66700
In a Decision promulgated on 13
September 2002,[25]
the Court of Appeals dismissed the Barques’ petition and affirmed the LRA
Resolution of 24 June 1998. The Barques
moved for reconsideration of the Decision.
In an Amended Decision promulgated on 7
November 2003,[26]
the Court of Appeals reconsidered its 13 September 2002 Decision, as follows:
WHEREFORE, our
decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby reconsidered. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 of private respondents and
the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute forthwith petitioners’ valid,
genuine and existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[27]
The Manotoks filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Amended Decision.
In its Resolution of 12 March 2004,[28]
the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
The Manotoks filed a
petition for review with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 162605.
The cases were consolidated in the
Court’s Resolution of 2 August 2004.
In a Decision dated 12 December 2005,[29]
the First Division of this Court denied the petitions and affirmed the Amended
Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 and CA-G.R. SP No.
66700. In its 19 April 2006 Resolution,[30]
the Special First Division of this Court denied the Manotoks’ motion for reconsideration.
No proceeding of any kind took
place before any trial court assailing the validity of the Torrens title of the
Manotoks. Yet, as the final
resolution of the Barques’ simple petition for administrative reconstitution,
the First Division of this Court cancelled
the Torrens title of the Manotoks and declared the title of the Barques not
only reconstituted, but also valid.
In a Resolution dated 12 September
2006, this Court, among others, granted the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed
by Felicitas B. Manahan and Rosendo Manahan (Manahans).
In a Resolution dated 19 July 2006,
the Special First Division of this Court referred the cases to the Court en
banc. In its 26 July 2006
Resolution, the Court en banc accepted the cases. In the Oral Argument on 24 July 2007, the
Court en banc considered the following issues:
1.
Does
the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481
without a trial before the proper regional trial court in a proceeding directly
assailing the validity of petitioners’ title?
2.
Does
the LRA have jurisdiction to administratively reconstitute the allegedly lost
TCT No. 210177 in the name of respondents despite the previously reconstituted
TCT No. RT-22481 of the petitioners over the same property?
3.
Does
the LRA have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the validity of petitioners’ TCT No.
RT-22481 in the administrative reconstitution case filed by respondents with
the LRA?
4.
Does
the Court of Appeals or the LRA have jurisdiction to decide the ownership of
the disputed property in the administrative reconstitution of title filed by
respondents?
The Ruling of This Court
We set aside the 12 December 2005
Decision of the First Division of this Court.
First, the 12
December 2005 Decision of the First Division of this Court overturns well-entrenched doctrines of this
Court, such as the decision in Sps. Antonio and Genoveva Balanon-Anicete, et al. v. Pedro Balanon.[31] Second, the LRA has no jurisdiction to
reconstitute the Barques’ title because of the pre-existing Torrens title of
the Manotoks. Third, a Torrens title can only be cancelled if a direct proceeding
assailing its validity is filed before the proper Regional Trial Court. Fourth,
the Barques submitted patently
forged documents in the administrative reconstitution of their title, and
even in the attachments to their Memorandum of 23 August 2007.
FOUR FIRSTS IN PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE
The 12 December 2005
Decision of the First Division made four “firsts.” First, it is the first decision in Philippine jurisprudence where an administrative reconstitution of title
resulted in the cancellation of the Torrens title of another person without a
direct attack of the cancelled title in any trial court. Second, it is the first decision in Philippine jurisprudence authorizing the LRA to
reconstitute administratively a Torrens title despite the existence of a previously issued Torrens title over
the same property in the name of another person. Third, it is the first decision in Philippine jurisprudence where the issue of
ownership of land is decided with finality in a petition for administrative reconstitution of
title. And fourth, it is the first decision in Philippine
jurisprudence where the petitioner in an administrative petition praying for a
simple reconstitution of title received an unexpected and undeserved windfall —
the declaration of validity of his reconstituted title and the cancellation of
a previously issued Torrens title in the name of another person over the same
property.
LANDMARK DOCTRINES OVERTURNED
The Decision of the First
Division overturns three doctrines
firmly established in numerous decisions of this Court, both en banc and in division, many of them
landmark rulings. To name a few of
these decisions starting in the year
1915: Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby,[32]
Magay, etc. v. Estiandan,[33]
Republic v. Court of Appeals,[34]
Alabang Development Corporation, et al.
v. Valenzuela, etc., et al.,[35] MWSS v.
Hon. Sison, etc., et al.,[36]
Liwag v. Court of Appeals,[37]
Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[38] Serra
Serra v. Court of Appeals,[39]
Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership
v. Velasco,[40] Heirs
of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago,[41] and Alonso
v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.[42]
The three
well-established doctrines that the Decision of the First Division has
overturned are:
1. A
Torrens title can be cancelled only in a proceeding directly attacking the
title’s validity before the proper regional trial court.[43] This is the bedrock principle that provides
enduring stability to Torrens titles.
2. A
reconstitution of Torrens title, whether judicial or administrative, cannot proceed
once it is shown that another Torrens title has already been issued to another
person over the same property. The reconstituting body or court has no
jurisdiction to issue another Torrens title over the same property to the
petitioner.[44] The existence of a prior title ipso facto nullifies the reconstitution
proceedings.[45]
The proper recourse is to assail directly in a proceeding before the regional
trial court the validity of the Torrens title already issued to the other
person.
3. The
reconstituting officer or court has no jurisdiction to decide the issue of
ownership over the property or the validity of the title.[46] The purpose of reconstitution is solely to
replace a certificate of title that was lost or destroyed in the same legal
status it existed at the time of the loss or destruction. The validity of a
Torrens title, reconstituted or not, is a separate issue from the
reconstitution of title.
DOCTRINE OF
IMMUTABILITY NOT APPLICABLE
The
dissenting opinion asserts that the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First
Division has already become final and executory, and thus has become immutable
and unalterable. The dissenting opinion
states that there is no compelling reason to depart from the doctrine of immutability
and unalterability of decisions.
On
the contrary, the 12 December 2005 Decision never became final and
executory. The doctrine of immutability
and unalterability of decisions necessarily
applies only to final and executory
decisions. If the decision never
became final and executory, the doctrine of immutability and unalterability of
decisions has no application. Before
finality of a decision, a court has “plenary power to alter, modify or even set aside, its
own decisions, and even order a new trial, at any time before the decision
becomes final.”[47]
There are two compelling jurisdictional reasons
why the 12 December 2005 Decision of the First Division never became final and
executory. First, the First Division has
no jurisdiction to overturn a doctrine laid down by the Court en banc or in division. The Court en
banc has ruled in Group
Commander, Intelligence and Security Group, Philippine Army v. Dr. Malvar[48]
that a decision of a division is void if it overturns a doctrine established by
the en banc or another division.
There, the Court held:
Section 4, sub-paragraph (3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,
provides:
“x x x no doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the (Supreme) Court en banc or its Divisions may be modified or
reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.”
A Decision rendered by a
Division of this Court in violation of the above constitutional provision would
be in excess of jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid.[49] (Emphasis supplied)
A void decision vests no
right, creates no obligation, grants no title, and settles no issue. A void decision protects no one and is
subject to attack, directly or collaterally,[50]
at any time. A void decision has no existence in law. Therefore, a void decision cannot become
final and executory against, or in favor of, any one.
Second,
the doctrine of immutability and unalterability of decisions applies only if
the trial court or hearing officer has jurisdiction over the subject
matter. A decision rendered by a trial
court or hearing officer without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void
and cannot become final and executory.
Such decision cannot even become res
judicata because there can be no conclusiveness of judgment if the trial
court or hearing officer has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.[51]
In these cases, the LRA
has no jurisdiction to reconstitute administratively the title of the Barques
because such reconstitution constitutes an indirect or collateral attack on the
pre-existing Torrens title of the
Manotoks over the same property. Section
48 of the Property Registration Decree[52]
states that a “certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral
attack.” The LRA, or even any court
for that matter, has no jurisdiction to entertain a collateral attack[53]
on a Torrens title. The Manotoks’ prior
title must be deemed valid and subsisting as it cannot be assailed through
collateral attack in the reconstitution proceedings.[54]
THE
MANOTOKS’ PRIOR TITLE NULLIFIES RECONSTITUTION PROCEEDINGS OF BARQUES
In fact, the existence of
a prior Torrens title over the same property in the name of another person ipso facto nullifies the reconstitution
proceedings and renders the reconstituted title void.[55] Demetriou
v. Court of Appeals,[56] penned by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,
is instructive and summarizes the law on this matter:
But a judgment otherwise final may be annulled not only on the ground of extrinsic fraud but also because of lack of jurisdiction of the court which rendered it. In Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, on facts analogous to those involved in this case, this Court already held that if a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction. Consequently, the decision may be attacked any time. Indeed, Rep. Act No. 26, § 18 provides that “in case a certificate of title, considered lost or destroyed be found or recovered, the same shall prevail over the reconstituted certificate of title.” It was, therefore, error for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition for annulment of judgment of the petitioners.[57] (Emphasis supplied)
Even before Demetriou, this Court had already ruled
in Republic v. Court of Appeals[58]
that the existence of a prior Torrens title ipso
facto nullifies the reconstitution proceedings, thus:
The existence of the two titles of the Government for Lots Nos. 915 and 918 ipso facto nullified the reconstitution proceedings and signified that the evidence in the said proceedings as to the alleged ownership of Laborada and Bombasi cannot be given any credence. The two proceedings were sham and deceitful and were filed in bad faith. Such humbuggery or imposture cannot be countenanced and cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits.
Republic Act No. 26 provides for a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens certificates of title that are missing and not fictitious titles or titles which are existing. It is a patent absurdity to reconstitute existing certificates of title that are on file and available in the registry of deeds.
The reconstitution proceedings in Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C-763 are void because they are contrary to Republic Act No. 26 and beyond the purview of that law since the titles reconstituted are actually subsisting in the registry of deeds and do not require reconstitution at all. As a rule, acts executed against the provisions of mandatory laws are void (Art. 5, Civil Code).
To sustain the validity of the reconstituted titles in these cases would be to allow Republic Act No. 26 to be utilized as an instrument for landgrabbing (See Republic vs. Court of Appeals, Ocampo and Anglo, L-31303-04, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 453, 480, per J. G.S. Santos) or to sanction fraudulent machinations for depriving a registered owner of his land, to undermine the stability and security of Torrens titles and to impair the Torrens system of registration.[59] (Emphasis supplied)
These rulings of the Court are so
essential in providing stability to land titles that overturning them now would
be catastrophic to our Torrens system of land registration.
A
TORRENS TITLE CAN ONLY BE CANCELLED IN A DIRECT ACTION ASSAILING ITS
VALIDITY BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
The LRA has also no
jurisdiction to cancel the Torrens title of the Manotoks because the exclusive original jurisdiction to
cancel a Torrens title belongs to the Regional Trial Court. The LRA, moreover, has no jurisdiction to
decide the ownership dispute over a parcel of land[60]
between the Barques and the Manotoks because jurisdiction to adjudicate
ownership of disputed real properties belongs to courts of justice.
Two
specific provisions of law confer exclusive original jurisdiction on Regional
Trial Courts to cancel a Torrens title. Section
48 of the Property Registration Decree provides:
Section 48. Certificate
not subject to collateral attack. -
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 19 of the
Judiciary Act[61]
provides that the “Regional Trial Court shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction x x x in
all civil actions, which involve the title to
x x x real property.”
That
the proper Regional Trial Court has exclusive
original jurisdiction to entertain
any action to cancel a Torrens title is reinforced by Section 108 of the
Property Registration Decree. Section
108 states that “no erasure, alteration or amendment shall be made upon the
registration book after the entry of a certificate of title x x x, except by order of the proper Court of
First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court).”
LRA DECISION ON RECONSTITUTION DOES NOT
BECOME
FINAL AND EXECUTORY
The doctrine of
immutability and unalterability of decisions applies only to decisions that are
capable of becoming final and executory.
Decisions of the LRA on administrative reconstitutions of title never
become final and executory. An
administrative reconstitution of title is merely a restoration or replacement
of a lost or destroyed title in its original form at the time of the loss or
destruction.[62] The issuance of a reconstituted title vests
no new rights and determines no ownership issues.[63] At
any time, the LRA can revoke its issuance of a reconstituted title if the lost
or destroyed title is subsequently found.[64] The issuance by the LRA of a reconstituted
title is an executive function, not a judicial or quasi-judicial function. Only
judicial or quasi-judicial decisions can become res judicata. This Court stated in A.G. Development Corp. v. Court
of Appeals:[65]
“[T]he doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings
and not to the exercise of administrative powers or to legislative,
executive or ministerial determination.”[66]
The 12 December 2005
Decision of the First Division grants to the Barques much more than what the
Barques prayed for in their petition for administrative reconstitution of
title. In their petition before the LRA,
the Barques only prayed for the reconstitution of their allegedly destroyed
title. The Decision of the First
Division grants the reconstitution, declares the reconstituted title valid,
awards ownership over the disputed property to the Barques, and cancels the
Torrens title of the Manotoks. This
violates the “cardinal principle that (a court) cannot grant anything more than
what is prayed for”[67]
in the petition.
A SURFEIT OF FORGERIES AND BADGES OF
FRAUD
Equally disturbing, there
are patent forgeries, badges of fraud, and
other dubious circumstances that the First Division inexplicably brushed
aside in its Decision. These forgeries
alone are more than sufficient grounds to deny the reconstitution of the
Barques’ title. These forgeries
provide compelling reasons for this
Court to require compliance with Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree
in determining the validity of the Manotoks’ title. Section 48 requires a proceeding before the
proper Regional Trial Court directly assailing the validity of the Torrens title
before such title can be cancelled.
First: Forged Plan Fls-3168-D
The Barques submitted to
the LRA reconstituting officer patently
forged documents in support of their petition. On 31 January 1997, Engineer Dalire wrote the
LRA reconstituting officer that the copy of the Barques’ plan Fls-3168-D
submitted to the LRA “bears forged
initials of my section officer and myself,”[68]
and that the Lands Management Bureau National Office “does not have copy of Fls-3168-D.”[69] Engineer Dalire urged the LRA that plan
Fls-3168-D and the accompanying authentication letter “be disregarded or rejected as they come from spurious sources.”[70]
Plan Fls-3168-D is vital
in establishing the authenticity of the Barques’ Torrens title, which contains
two lots as subdivided by plan Fls-3168-D from the original Lot 823. The Manotoks’ title covers only one lot, Lot
823, without subdivision. Both the
Manotoks and the Barques claim the same original Lot 823. If there is no record in the Lands
Management Bureau National Office of plan Fls-3168-D showing the subdivision of
Lot 823 into two lots, then the Barques’ title is spurious.
During the oral argument
of these cases, counsel for the Barques was asked if the Barques have ever
secured a copy of plan Fls-3168-D as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau National Office. Counsel for the Barques showed the Court a
copy of what purported to be plan Fls-3168-D but on closer examination the copy
was certified not by the Lands
Management Bureau National Office but by the NCR Regional Office. What counsel
for the Barques showed was the same copy of plan Fls-3168-D that Engineer
Privadi Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management
Bureau National Office, had rejected as a forgery in his 31 January 1997 and 19 February 1997 letters
to Atty. Bustos. In his letters,
Engineer Dalire stated that there is no plan Fls-3168-D in the files of the
Lands Management Bureau National Office.
Second: Forged 2 January 1997 Letter
On 13 February 1997,
Engineer Privadi J. Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands
Management Bureau National Office, wrote the LRA reconstituting officer that
the 2 January 1997 letter, purportedly coming from Engineer Dalire, “definitely did not come from this office; it
is a forged document.”[71]
In his 19 February 1997
letter, Engineer Dalire also informed the LRA reconstituting officer that the 2
January 1997 letter purportedly coming from him was the “handiwork of forgers.”[72] In the questioned 2 January 1997 letter[73]
addressed to the LRA reconstituting officer, Engineer Dalire allegedly stated
that the Chief of the Technical Records and Statistics of the National Capital
Region-Lands Management Bureau (NCR Regional Office) had forwarded a copy of
Fls-3168-D to Engineer Dalire’s office. Engineer Dalire has repeatedly denounced
this 2 January 1997 letter as a forgery, not only because he never signed this
letter, but also because his office never received a copy of Fls-3168-D from
the NCR Regional Office.
Third: Plan Fls-3168-D
Is Void Unless Validated by the Geodetic Surveys Division
During the oral argument,
counsel for the Barques then undertook to present to the Court a copy of plan
Fls-3168-D as certified by the Lands Management Bureau National Office. In their Memorandum dated 6 September 2007,
counsel for the Barques explained why they could not present a copy of plan Fls-3168-D as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau National Office:
Following the order of the Honorable Justice Carpio
for respondents to secure a certified true copy of Fls-3168-D from the Land
Management Bureau, National Office, they
went to said National Office to secure said certified true copy of Fls-33168-D
but were instead given a copy of a form letter (Annex “J”) issued in reply to a
prior request for transmittal of Plan FLS-3168-D with the information that
records of said plan had already been turned over to the National Capital
Region.
The form letter (Annex “J”) from the Records Management Division of the
Lands Management Bureau National Office, that the Barques attached to their
Memorandum, states –
x x x plan FLS-3168-D covering parcel/s of and situated in Caloocan Rizal was among those survey records already turned-over/decentralized to DENR-National Capital Region (NCR), Roxas Boulevard, Manila on April 5, 1979 as recorded in our file no. NCR-199, for their reference/file purposes.
The form letter bears the printed
name of Rainier D. Balbuena, OIC, Records Management Division, Lands Management
Bureau National Office although someone whose signature is not legible signed
for Rainier D. Balbuena.
The
Barques also submitted a Certification dated 19 June 2007 (Annex “E-I”) signed
by Rainier D. Balbuena,OIC, Records Management Division, Lands Management
Bureau National Office, stating:
This is to certify that according to the verification of the Records
Management Division, Lands Management Bureau, Binondo, Manila,
In sharp contrast, the Manotoks attached to their Memorandum
dated 23 August 2007 a certification signed by three persons from the Lands
Management Bureau National Office, namely, Bienvenido F. Cruz, Chief, Geodetic
Surveys Division; Rodel Collantes, Chief, Technical Services & Survey
Records Documentation Section; and Teodoro A. de Castro, researcher. This
certification, dated 2 August 2007, states:
August 2, 2007
LUISA T. PADORA
2830 Juan Luna St. Tondo
Manila
S i r /M a d a m:
This is in connection with your request on the verification of survey plan. As per our inventory we found out the following:
Survey No. Accession No.
Location
Fls-3168-D Not listed in EDP
listing.
Verified By:
(Sgd)
RODEL COLLANTES
Chief, Technical Services & Survey
Records Documentation Section
Researched
by:
(Sgd)
TEODORO A. DE CASTRO Very truly yours,
(Sgd)
BIENVENIDO
F. CRUZ
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division
OR#: 3041650
Date: 08/02/07
Amt. Php 40.00
The certification of the Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division
prevails over the certification of the OIC, Records Management Division. Under
paragraph 2.4 of Lands Memorandum Order No. 368-92 dated 17 August 1992, “no
copies of white print, blue prints or photographic copies of plans shall be
issued unless said secondary copies have been validated by the Geodetic Surveys
Division.” The same paragraph 2.4 further states that unless validated by
the Geodetic Surveys Divisions, copies of such plans “should be temporarily
expunged from the records of the Records Division until they are
validated and returned for official file.”
Thus, no secondary copies of plans, like the Barques’
Fls-3168-D plan, can have any evidentiary value unless validated by the
Geodetics Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau National Office. More importantly, copies of plans, like the
Barques’ Fls-3168-D plan, which have not been validated by the Geodetic Surveys
Division, are deemed “expunged from the Records of the Records Division.” The inescapable conclusion is that the
form letter (Annex “J”) issued by the Records Management Division of the Lands
Management Bureau National Office, and the Certification dated 19 June 2007
(Annex “E-I”) signed by Rainier D. Balbuena, OIC, Records Management Division,
Lands Management Bureau National Office, both of which refer to the existence
of the Barques’ Fls-3168-D plan, are absolutely worthless and are mere scraps
of paper.
The Barques’ explanation is further
belied by the 19 February 1997 letter of Engineer Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic
Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau National Office, that:
x x x Our Inventory Record of Approved Surveys, our computerized list of plans officially filed in this Bureau, the Locator Cards, and the microfilm all show that we have no records or information about Plan Fls-3168-D.
x x x
x x x How can this be when NCR has never given us the alleged copy in their file for validation. The forwarding of the copy to us is mandatory under DAO No. 49 for our validation. This is the subject of our letters to NCR dated 05 December 1996, 03 January 1997 and 06 February 1997 (copies attached). x x x.[74] (Emphasis supplied)
As pointed out by
Engineer Dalire, under DENR Administrative Order No. 49, series of 1991, the copy of plan Fls-3168-D must be
forwarded by the NCR Regional Office for validation by the Geodetic Surveys
Division of the Lands Management Bureau National Office. No copy of the survey plan can be issued by
the NCR Regional Office without the validation of the Geodetic Surveys
Division. Sections 4.3 and 4.5 of DENR
Administrative Order No. 49 states:
Section 4. Preparation of Certified True Copies of Approved Plans. The following considerations on the preparation of Certified True Copies of Approved Plans shall be observed:
x x x
4.3 Decentralized whiteprints or photographic copies of plans especially those marked “SGD” (i.e. SIGNED) shall not be used for the issuance of patent or certified true copy or titling purposes, EXCEPT, upon or prior authentication by the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) after diligent comparison with the records of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) and other depository of surveys records.
x x x
4.5 The Chief of the Regional Surveys Division of the Lands Management Service in the concerned Regional Office shall certify all copies for land registration and for other purposes as true, correct and exact replica of the original plan. (Emphasis supplied)
The requirement of
validation by the Geodetic Surveys Division is reiterated and amplified in
Lands Memorandum Order No. 368-92 dated 17 August 1992, thus:
2.4 No copies of white print, blue prints or photographic copies of plans shall be issued unless said secondary copies have been validated by the Geodetic Surveys Division (see paragraph 4.3, DENR A.O. 49, s-1991). The Survey Records Section shall turn over all print (white, blue, xerox) copies and photographic copies in its file to the Geodetic Surveys Division for examination, investigation and/or validation. These copies should temporarily be expunged from the records of the Records Division until they are validated and returned for official file. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Unless validated by the Geodetic
Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau National Office, secondary
copies of survey plans, such as the
Barques’ plan Fls-3168-D, have no evidentiary value because they are “temporarily x x x expunged from the records
of the Records Division.”
The
Geodetic Surveys Division validates the survey plans based on the “back-up file in the Central Records Office.” Despite the decentralization of the records
of survey plans, the Lands Management Bureau National Office retained “back-up
files” of the decentralized records.
Lands Memorandum Order No. 368-92 states:
1. General Policy
1.1 It is the general policy that all isolated survey plans and other survey records be decentralized immediately to the Lands Management Sector for their reference and file after establishing a back-up file in the Central office for records preservation. The latter can be done thru microfilming or reproduction of the original records. (Emphasis supplied)
The
NCR Regional Office failed to submit to the Geodetics Survey Division a copy of
plan Fls-3168-D despite repeated requests from Engineer Dalire. In his 31 January 1997 letter to the
reconstituting officer, Atty. Bustos,
Engineer Dalire stated:
x x x please be informed that we wrote on December 5, 1996 the DENR-NCR about your letter dated December 2, 1996 informing them that the plan Fls-3168-D filed in that Office from where the reproduced copy furnished to LRA (sic) did not emanate from our office. We requested them to forward to us the said plan for our evaluation and comment. Likewise, on January 5, 1997, we made a follow-up, reiterating that we have no records (sic) of Fls-3168-D and requesting them to forward the plan for our evaluation and comment. It is regretted, they did not respond.[75] (Emphasis supplied)
This repeated and manifest failure by
the NCR Regional Office is echoed by the glaring failure of the Barques to
submit, as they had promised to the Court during the oral argument, a copy
of plan Fls-3168-D as certified by the Lands Management Bureau National Office.
This
Court has already recognized that copies of survey plans are void unless
validated by the Geodetic Surveys Division in accordance with DENR
Administrative Order No. 49, series of 1991.
In Fil-Estate Golf and
Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[76] the Court held:
Finally, private respondents’ cause of action against petitioner is defeated by the findings of Mr. Privadi Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Bureau of Lands, contained in his letters to the Regional Technical Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region IV dated 12 November 1992 and 15 December 1992, respectively:
12 November 1992
x x x
MEMORANDUM:
15 December 1992
FOR: The Regional Technical Director of Lands
The Chief, Regional Surveys Division
DENR, Region IV
L & S Building, Roxas Boulevard
Manila
FROM: L M B
SUBJECT: Psu-201
Records show that the region furnished us a white print copy certified by Engineer Robert Pangyarihan to have been “prepared from a tracing cloth plan on file in the NCR” for validation. We returned the white print plan prepared by Engineer Pangyarihan because we should examine the “tracing cloth plan” and it is the tracing cloth plan, white prints and photographic copies sent by the Central Records Division to be returned to LMB for validation by this Division.
In the letter dated
27 November 1992, Engineer Pangyarihan explained that he prepared the copy
which he certified from a white print plan on file in the region as the
applicant claims to have lost the tracing cloth. While the explanation may be
considered, yet the preparation of the
plan is not yet in accordance with Sections 1.3 and 4.3 of DENR Administrative
Order No. 49, s-1991 which requires that the white prints or photographic print
of the plan other than the original
plan which have been decentralized must first be authenticated by this Bureau
before a certified true copy is issued by the region. It is evident therefore that the issuance of a certified true copy of
Psu-201 from a white print is premature, and considered void ab initio.
Consider also that if the record of the Bureau is different from the print copy is subjected to field ocular inspection of the land and on the basis of the findings, the region may reconstruct the plan to be approved as usual. Certified copies may now be issued based on the reconstructed and approved plan. The white print of Psu-201 should therefore be subjected to ocular inspection.
Our records of inventory of approved plans show Psu-201 as a survey of J. Reed covering a piece of land in Malate, Manila. That plan was heavily damaged and its reconstruction was not finalized. This should be included in the investigation.
For the Director of Lands:
(SGD.) PRIVADI J.G. DALIRE
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division.[77] (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, in the present
cases the copy of the Barques’ plan Fls-3168-D issued by the NCR Regional
Office is likewise void unless validated by the Geodetic Surveys Division in
accordance with DENR Administrative Order No. 49, series of 1991, as amplified
in Lands Memorandum Order No. 368-92. Up to this time, the Barques have failed to
submit a copy of their plan Fls-3168-D as certified by the Geodetic Surveys
Division. The inescapable
conclusion is that the Barques’ plan Fls-3168-D is void ab initio.
In their Memorandum dated
6 September 2007, the Barques submitted to the Court a copy of plan Fls-3168-D,
certified by the NCR Regional Office,
to support the authenticity of the plan Fls-3168-D that the Barques had earlier
submitted to the reconstituting officer, Atty. Bustos, thus:
c. Photo Copy of Plan FLS-3168 (microfilm) duly certified by Carmelito A. Soriano for the Chief, Regional Technical Director, NCR, Annex “H” hereof. This microfilm copy is exactly the same as the Tracing Cloth Plan copy, Annex G.
First, there does not appear in Annex “H” a signature over the printed name
Carmelito A. Soriano, Chief, Regional Technical Director, NCR National Office.
Second, Annex “H” is not certified by the Chief of the Regional Surveys
Division, Lands Management Service of the NCR Regional Office as required by
Section 4.5 of DENR Administrative Order No. 49.
Third, Annex “H” is the same copy of Fls-3168-D that purportedly originated
from the office of Engineer Privadi Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys
Division of the Lands Management Bureau.
Annex “H” is also the same copy of plan Fls-3168-D that counsel for the
Barques showed to the Court during the oral argument. Engineer
Privadi Dalire has categorically declared this copy of Fls-3168-D as “spurious”
in his 19 February 1997 letter to Atty. Bustos, thus:
The copy of Fls-3168-D attached to your letter dated December 2, 1996 is not issued by this Office. There are many markings on the copy to prove it did not come from LMB. Reasons, among others, are:
1. We have no copy of Fls-3168-D on file so how can we issue a copy of plan that is non-existing?
2. The copy of plan bears two “Certifications” at the top and at lower half. This is not our practice;
3. The rubber-stamp shows there are two pieces; one for th certification and another for the signing official. We use one piece rubber stamp. The alignment of the letters/words of one rubber stamp is different from this marking on this spurious plan;
4. The plan shows only initial. I sign in full copies of plans with the initials of my action officers and their codings below my signature. These are not present in the spurious copy of plan;
5. The letter size of the rubber stamp “NOT FOR REGISTRATION/TITLING, FOR REFERENCE ONLY” is smaller than our rubber stamp;
6.
The spurious copy of plan you
furnished us does not carry our rubber stamp “GOVERNMENT PROPERTY NOT TO BE
SOLD: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OF ___________________ “This is stamped on all
microfilm copies we issue because all microfilm copies are for official use
only of our
Engineer Dalire ended his letter by
advising Atty. Bustos to “disregard the
plan Fls-3168-D and the letter dated 02 January 1997 as they are proven to be
spurious documents.”[79]
Again, in his 31 January
1997 letter to Atty. Bustos, Engineer Dalire reiterated that plan Fls-3168-D,
which purportedly was certified by him, did not come from his office. Engineer Dalire stated in his 31 January 1997
letter:
x x x We are sure that the copy did not come from this Office. The reasons are:
a. Our inventory of approved plans enrolled in our file, our Microfilm Computer list of plans available for decentralization all show that we do not have this plan Fls-3168-D, logically we cannot issue any copy.
b. The copy of the plan Fls-3168-D shows visible signs that it is a spurious copy.
1) The certification (rubber stamp) serves a two piece stamp. The certification and the signing official are separate. Ours is one-piece.
2) The alignment of: Lands, GEODETIC, this, Privadi, and Chief in the syndicates (sic) stamp differ from our stamp. Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division is our stamp, their (sic) is Survey without the “s” plural.
3) We do not stamp the plan twice as the syndicate did on the copy.
4) The size of the lettering in the rubber stamp “Not for Registration/Titling For Reference Only” is smaller than our stamp. It is also incomplete as an (sic) Stamp, in addition to [the] above is “of _________”.
5)
The copy bears forged initials of my action officer and myself. I sign completely certification.
6) The name of the claimant is very visible to have been tampered in the master copy.
7) Again, it is certified that this Bureau does not have copy of Fls-3168-D.
In view of the foregoing, the copy of Fls-3168-D furnished your Office as well as the alleged letter authenticating it should be disregarded or rejected as they come from spurious sources. This involves the reconstitution of title allegedly lot 823-A of Fls-3168-D with an area of 171,473 Sq. M. Surely, the use of the spurious copy of Fls-3168-D for the reconstitution of title will create land problem involving prime lots in that area.[80] (Emphasis supplied)
The Barques have the
temerity to foist on this Court their copy of plan Fls-3168-D which has been repeatedly denounced as a forgery by
Engineer Dalire, the very person whom the Barques claim certified their
copy of Fls-3168-D. Engineer Dalire
is the best person to determine the authenticity of Fls-3168-D not only because
he allegedly signed it as claimed by the Barques, but also because he is the
Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau National
Office, the office that has the “inventory of approved plans x x x (and)
Microfilm Computer list of plans available for decentralization.”
Fourth: The Barques Submitted a Tampered Copy of
Administrative Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96)
On 7 February 1997, the
Barques had written the LRA Administrator complaining against the LRA
reconstituting officer’s alleged “pattern of effort to delay the administrative
reconstitution.”[81] The Barques attached to their 7 February
1997 letter an alleged order of
reconstitution signed by Atty. Bustos approving the reconstitution of the
Barques’ TCT No. 210177. In his 14
February 1997 reply to the LRA Administrator, Atty. Bustos exposed the alleged
order of reconstitution submitted by the Barques as a “tampered document.”
The Barques also informed the LRA Administrator that there
was a “recommendation dated January 2, 1997 by the Chief, Geodetic Surveys,
Lands Management Bureau, DENR, Manila, to give due course to the said
reconstitution.” However, in his 13 February 1997 letter[82]
to the LRA reconstituting officer, Engineer
Dalire, the Chief, Geodetic Surveys, Lands Management Bureau, disowned this 2 January 1997 letter as a forgery.
On 14 February 1997, the
LRA reconstituting officer wrote the LRA Administrator that:[83]
1. There is no effort to delay the administrative reconstitution of the aforesaid title. What we are doing is a thorough check of the authenticity of the submitted documents;
2. The order of reconstitution containing TCT No. 210177 and the name of Homer L. Barque, attached to the aforesaid letter is a tampered document. For your comparison, herewith is a copy of the genuine order of reconstitution, marked as annex “A”;
3. The alleged letter-recommendation dated January 2, 1997, by the Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, LMB-DENR, is also a forged document. Attached for your reference is a copy of the letter which is self-explanatory, together with its enclosures, directly received by the undersigned from Engineer Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, LMB-DENR, marked as annex “B”;
4. Lots 823-A & 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. m. & 171, 472 Sq. m., respectively, purportedly covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823, Piedad Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq. m. covered by TCT No. 372302, registered in the name of Severino M. Manotok, et al., copy of which is hereto attached as annex “C.” (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
In
his 14 February 1997 letter, the LRA reconstituting officer complained to the
LRA Administrator that “there is an
attempt to mislead us into favorable action by submitting forged documents.”
The tampering refers to the insertion
of (1) the name of “Homer L. Barque,”
and (2) the title number “210177” in
Administrative Reconstitution No.
Q-535(96). The Barques justified the
authenticity of the copy they presented by claiming that their copy was
“initialed in each and every page.”[84] However, the Barques’ copy of Administrative
Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) differed from the original of Administrative
Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) that the LRA reconstituting officer himself signed
on 27 January 1997. To repeat, the
original of Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) was an order issued and
signed by the LRA reconstituting officer, Atty. Bustos. Indeed, the Barques’ copy[85]
of Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) shows that it was signed by the
same LRA reconstituting officer, Atty. Bustos, handling the Barques’ then
pending petition for administrative reconstitution.
The Barques also failed
to explain why they still pursued their petition for administrative
reconstitution of their title if indeed they had already obtained an approved
reconstitution on 27 January 1997 under their copy of Administrative
Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96). On
13 August 1998, the LRA reconstituting officer filed before the LRA
Administrator the following Comment:
2. That we maintain our position denying the
reconstitution of TCT No. 210177, on the grounds stated in our Order dated June
30, 1997, and on the following additional grounds, to wit:
2.1 If the late Homer L. Barque, really purchased
the subject property in the year 1975, why did he not take possession of it
upon purchase, and up to now his descendants, the Petitioners, are not in
possession of the property, but the Oppositors?;
2.2 Why was the property
declared, and realty taxes were paid in the name of Barque, only in the year
1996? Whereas, the Oppositors and their predecessors have been paying realty
taxes on the property since the year 1965;
2.3
Why did the Petitioner try to mislead us by submitting a tampered copy of Adm.
Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96)?[86] (Emphasis
supplied)
The LRA reconstituting officer ended
his Comment by urging the LRA Administrator that “this case be referred to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime
Commission for investigation.”
In their Memorandum dated
6 September 2007, the Barques explained the circumstances of the order of
reconstitution they submitted to the LRA in this manner:
The said resolution was issued on January 27, 1997 when there was, as yet, no opposition from anyone to the Barques’ petition for reconstitution and after the Barque had already submitted their Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 210177 which entitled them, like the several other petitioners listed in Mr. Bustos’ aforesaid Resolution, to a reconstitution thereof under R.A. 6732.
In his letter, Atty. Turgano surmised that:
“The animosity and bias of Mr. Bustos against petitioners may be explained by the fact that he was responsible in giving due course and approving with dispatch the administrative reconstitution of the Manotok title which is TCT No. RT-22481 (372302).
Mr. Bustos’ bias was likewise shown when he alerted the Manotoks of the Barques’ Petition for Reconstitution which prompted them to file their opposition to the Barques’ petition on April 14, 1997. He, therefore, apparently had the motive to delete the title and name of the Barques from his resolution.
At any rate, said resolution of Bustos was completely irrelevant to the LRA proceedings since it is his Order denying Barques’ petition for reconstitution that was raised on appeal before the LRA Administrator. (Emphasis supplied)
In
short, the Barques represent to this Court that their copy of Administrative
Reconstitution No. Q-535(96), listing their TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer
L. Barque, Sr. as one of the titles approved for reconstitution by Atty.
Bustos, is authentic, genuine and untampered.
This is contrary to the categorical declaration of Atty. Bustos that the
copy of Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) submitted by the Barques is
a “tampered document,” and that
the original Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) that Atty. Bustos himself
signed, which original is on file in his office in the LRA, does not include
TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr.
Ironically, the Barques
put the blame on Atty. Bustos for “delet(ing)
the title and name of the Barques from the resolution.” The Barques are now accusing Atty. Bustos of
falsification by deleting the Barques’ name and title in Administrative
Reconstitution No. Q-535(96). Before
such deletion, the Barques insist that Administrative Reconstitution No.
Q-535(96) included the Barques’ name and title, which is the copy that the
Barques submitted to the LRA Administrator.
In the first place, there
was no reason whatsoever for Atty. Bustos to include the Barques’ title and
name in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96). When Atty. Bustos signed the order on 27
January 1997, he was still corresponding with Engineer Dalire on the forgery
found in the Barques’ plan Fls-3168-D.
The last letter of Engineer Dalire to Atty. Bustos was on 31 January
1997. On 14 February 1997, Atty. Bustos
even wrote the LRA Administrator about the “attempt to mislead us (LRA) into
favorable action by submitting forged documents.” Clearly, Atty. Bustos could not have
included the Barques’ title and name in Administrative Reconstitution No. Q-535(96).
In their Memorandum dated
6 September 2007, the Barques gave the lame excuse that Administrative
Reconstitution No. Q-535(96) is now “completely irrelevant” because what was
raised on appeal to the LRA was the order of Atty. Bustos denying the Barques’
petition for reconstitution. If their
copy of Administrative Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96) is truly authentic
and untampered, the Barques should insist that their petition for
administrative reconstitution was in fact approved by the reconstituting
officer Atty. Bustos. The Barques do not
claim or even mention this now, instead they agree that Atty. Bustos denied
their petition, contrary to their claim that Atty. Bustos granted their
petition by including the Barques’ title and name in Administrative
Reconstitution No. Q-535(96).
The Barques cannot simply
brush aside their submission of tampered or forged documents. These patent forgeries are grounds to render
the Barques’ reconstituted title void ab initio. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6732 (RA
6732),[87]
the law allowing administrative reconstitution of titles, provides:
SEC. 11. A reconstituted title obtained by means of fraud, deceit or other machination is void ab initio as against the party obtaining the same and all persons having knowledge thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
This Court would never countenance
these blatant and glaring forgeries. The
present cases involve 34 hectares of prime land located beside the Ayala
Heights Subdivision in Quezon City. Its value is estimated conservatively at P1.7
billion.
Fifth:
The Barques’ Title Surfaced Eight Years after the Quezon City Hall Fire
The Barques filed their
petition for administrative reconstitution on 22 October 1996, eight years after the original of their
Torrens title was allegedly burned in the 11 June 1988 fire that destroyed the
records of the Quezon City Register of Deeds.
In contrast, the Manotoks administratively reconstituted their Torrens
title on 1 February 1991, three years
after the fire and just one year after
the effectivity on 17 July 1989 of RA 6732 allowing again administrative
reconstitution of titles under certain circumstances.
Sixth:
The Barques Cannot Explain Erasure of Notation on their Tax Declarations
The Manotoks claim that
the Barques erased the following
notation in the tax declarations they submitted to the LRA reconstituting
officer: “Memo: This property appear
(sic) to duplicate the property of Manotok Realty, Inc., declared under TD No.
B-067-02136 with area of 343,945 sq.m./P.I. no. 21-4202.”[88] In their Petition For Review dated 30 March
2004, the Manotoks submitted certified true copies of the Barques’ Tax
Declarations 06892[89]
and 06895[90]
containing this notation. In their Memorandum of 23 August 2007, the Manotoks
again submitted copies of the Barques’ tax declarations containing the same
notation.
During the oral argument,
counsel for the Barques denied the erasure of the notation on the Barques’ tax
declarations. However, counsel for the Barques admitted that he has not seen the
original tax declarations on file with the Assessor’s Office, thus:
Justice Carpio:
x x x The Manotoks are claiming that the Barques erased, removed annotation in the tax declaration of the Barques that in the tax declaration on file with the Assessor’s Office the tax declaration of the Barques is supposed to contain annotation that this property appears to be registered in the name of Manotok Realty Inc., is that correct?
Atty. Flaminiano:
Well, that is a serious accusation, Your honor and I have no knowledge about that.
Justice Carpio:
But does the tax declaration of the Barques contain that notation?
Atty. Flaminiano:
There is none that I know, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio:
How about the tax declaration on file with the Assessor’s Office?
Atty. Flaminiano:
I have not seen those, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio:
You have not seen those?
Atty. Flaminiano:
I have not seen those. [91]
In their Memorandum dated 6 September
2007, the Barques ignored completely the Manotoks’ claim that the Barques erased
the notation.
Seventh: The Barques Paid Realty Tax
only for 1987 to 1996
The Barques first paid real estate tax on the property only in 1996,[92] for realty taxes for the years 1987 to
1996, because the Barques were required to pay the current and preceding years’
realty taxes before they could file their petition for administrative
reconstitution. The Barques have not
paid any realty tax after 1996, or before 1987.[93] In contrast, the LRA reconstituting officer
found that the Manotoks have been paying realty taxes on the property since
1965. In their Memorandum dated 23
August 2007, the Manotoks claim that they paid their realty taxes on the
property from 1933 until the present, attaching to their Memorandum representative
copies of their realty tax payments.
Eighth:
The Barques Have Never Set Foot on the Property
The Barques have never
set foot on the property since the time Homer L. Barque, Sr. allegedly
purchased the property in 1975. Counsel
for the Barques admitted this when he stated during the oral argument that the
Barques merely “went around” the
walled property. On the other hand, the
Manotoks assert that the property is publicly known in their neighborhood as
the Manotok Compound. The Manotoks
further claim:
[A]s owners of said Lot 823, oppositors (Manotoks) had introduced substantial improvements, amounting to several millions, thereon consisting of, among others, high wall hollow block fence; their respective houses, apartments; offices and employees quarters, as early as in 1960, photographs of which are hereto attached as Annexes “115” to “134”;[94] (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral argument, the
Manotoks showed on the projector screen the pictures of the various houses,
buildings and concrete perimeter fence that the Manotoks constructed on the
property since 1960.
Ninth:
LRA Administrator Relied only on Map Submitted by Barques
In
calling the Manotoks’ title “sham and spurious,” the LRA Administrator cited
the non-existence of Barrio Payong in Quezon City. The LRA Administrator stated: “The map of Quezon City [Annex “N” of
Petitioners’ Position paper] would show that there is no such barrio as Payong.”[95] This is a finding of fact that is based not
only on self-serving and suspect evidence, but also on a patently erroneous claim.
The LRA Administrator
relied on Annex “N” of “Petitioners,”
that is, the map of the Barques who
were the petitioners before the LRA Administrator assailing the LRA
reconstituting officer’s denial of their reconstitution on the ground of
pre-existence of the Manotoks’ title and the
submission of a spurious document by the Barques. Obviously, this Court should not rely on the
LRA Administrator’s findings which were admittedly
based on the map of the Barques, who had earlier submitted forged documents
to the LRA reconstituting officer.
The existence of Barrio Payong in Quezon City has been
judicially acknowledged almost three decades ago in the Decision of the
Court of Agrarian Relations, the court of origin in Spouses Tiongson, et al. v. Court of Appeals and Macaya,[96] involving the same property under dispute in
these cases. In Spouses Tiongson, the Court of Agrarian Relations made an ocular
inspection of Barrio Payong in Quezon City, thus:
On June 20, 1978, the
Court issued an Order directing the Clerk of Court to conduct an ocular
inspection of the landholding in question, which is as follows:
“Conformably
with ‘Urgent Motion For An Ocular Inspection’ filed with this Court on even
date and as stated in paragraph 2 thereof, the Clerk of Court is hereby
directed to conduct an ocular inspection of the landholding in question
situated at Payong, Quezon City, which as agreed upon
between them is set on June 23, 1978 at 8:30 o’clock A.M. (sic), wherein the
parties shall meet at the site of said landholding and to determine:
(a) Portions of the property planted to rice
(sic) by the plaintiff and/or his children;
(b) Portions of the property where the rice
paddies are located;
(c) Portions of the property planted to (sic)
corn and vegetables;
(d) Portions of the property where the houses of
the plaintiff and/or his children are built and located;
(e) Portion of the property which, according to
the defendants, had been, before the filing of the complaint in this case,
worked on by Victorino Macaya and returned by him to the defendants, through
Atty. Perpetua Bocanegra, with an area of more or less one hectare;
(f) Portions burned by the plaintiff.”
Upon accomplishment thereof, said
Clerk of Court is hereby directed to submit his report as well as his sketch
plan for further disposition of the Court.
On June 27, 197[8], the Clerk of Court submitted his “REPORT”, which
is as follows:
“In
compliance with the Order of the Honorable Court dated June 20, 1978,
undersigned together with Mr. Victor Flores of this Branch, proceeded to Barrio Payong, Quezon City on June 23, 1978, to conduct an ocular inspection
of the landholding involved in this case. x x x”[97] (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
The
recognition of the Court of Agrarian Relations that Barrio Payong exists in
Quezon City is based on the ocular
inspection conducted on 23 June 1978
by the Clerk of Court of the Court of Agrarian Relations. In contrast, the statement of the LRA
Administrator that there is no Barrio Payong in Quezon City is based merely on the map that the Barques
submitted in their petition for administrative reconstitution, which was
filed only on 22 October 1996.
In Spouses Tiongson, there were 28 petitioners.[98] Of these 28 petitioners, at least sixteen are petitioners composing part of the Manotoks in
these cases. Of these sixteen
petitioners, eight — Miguel A.B. Sison,
Ma. Cristina E. Sison, George M. Bocanegra, Philipp Manotok, Maria Theresa
Manotok, Ramon Severino Manotok, Jesus Jude Manotok, Jr., and Jose Maria
Manotok — were then minors at the time of Spouses
Tiongson and were thus represented by judicial guardians. These eight are now of age in these cases.
Tenth:
The Barques Bought the Property Knowing the Manotoks Had Constructed Buildings
and Perimeter Wall on the Property
During the oral argument,
the Manotoks showed on the projector screen a picture of the 34-hectare Manotok
compound completely surrounded by a high
concrete perimeter wall. When
counsel for the Barques was asked if his clients made an ocular inspection of
the property at the time his clients purchased it in 1975, Barques’ counsel
answered as follows:
Justice
Velasco:
Did your client prior to buying the lot from Mr. Setosta go to the land to investigate the ownership of Mr. Setosta?
Atty. Flaminiano:
The one who bought the property was the father of Barques now.
Justice Velasco:
Would you know if the father of respondent visit and inspect and investigate the ownership of Mr. Setosta?
Atty. Flaminiano:
I was told that he visited the property because the father of the Barques used to work for Mr. Antonio Florendo. I think he was the manager of one of the businesses of Mr. Florendo in Davao City having to do with accessory parts of cars and trucks and he was at one time also the operator of a public transportation company.
Justice Velasco:
Okay. Did the father of Mr. Barque find any building or structures on the land now subject of this dispute?
Atty. Flaminiano:
We would not know because Mr. Barque died already, Your Honor.[99]
x x x x
Justice Carpio:
Now, when did they take possession of the property since Mr. Homer L. Barque purchased it in 1975, when did he take possession of the property?
Atty. Flaminiano:
The reason why they could not take really possession of the property because they were trying to get some papers from an Aunt of Mr. Barque to whom the property was mortgaged before he died. I understand that the property was mortgaged for something like One Million to Two Million Pesos.
Justice Carpio:
So, from 1975 to the present they have not taken possession of the property?
Atty. Flaminiano:
There were attempts to take possession, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio:
What kind of attempts, did they file ejectment suit?
Atty. Flaminiano:
In fact Your Honor I understand that some of the Barque girls even went around the property.
Justice Carpio:
Went around the property (interrupted)
Atty. Flaminiano:
Went around the property to take a look at the property but after that they left for the United States and for one reason or another they have not been able to take the proper steps (interrupted)
Justice Carpio:
So, they never filed any suit to recover possession of the property, is that right?
Atty. Flaminiano:
None that I know, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio:
Did they send any demand letter to the Manotoks to vacate the property since they were the owners?
Atty. Flaminiano:
None that I know, Your Honor.
Clearly, the Barques have
never set foot on the property from 1975 up to the present. The Barques merely “went around” the fully fenced property. The Barques never sent a demand letter to the
Manotoks to vacate the property. The Barques never filed an ejectment or any
action to recover possession of the property.
Eleventh:
The Barques’ Chain of Title Stops in 1975
The Manotoks can trace
their Torrens title to the purchase by their predecessors-in-interest of the
property from the Government in 1919. In their Memorandum
dated 23 August 2007, the Manotoks state:
9.5 The Manotok chain of titles began with the purchase by Zacarias Modesto, Regina Geronimo and Feliciano Villanueva of Lot 823 from the Philippine government on March 10, 1919. Attached hereto as Annex E is a Land Management Bureau-certified xerox copy of Sale Certificate No. 1054 issued by the Friar Lands Division, Bureau of Lands, to Modesto, Geronimo and Villanueva. Ownership over Lot 823 was later consolidated in Modesto, who in 1920 assigned his interests thereon to M. Teodoro and Severino Manotok. Attached hereto as Annexes F and G are Land Management Bureau-certified xerox copies of Assignments of Certificate of Sale No. 1054 dated March 11, 1919 and June 7, 1920.
9.6 In 1923, M. Teodoro assigned his share and interests over Lot 823 to Severino Manotok, making him the sole and exclusive owner of Lot 823. A certified xerox copy of Assignment of Certificate of Sale No. 1054 dated May 4, 1923 is attached hereto as Annex H.
9.7 Through a series of transfers within the Manotok family and the Manotok Realty, Inc., a company owned by petitioners, Lot 823 was titled under TCT No. 372302 on October 16, 1987 in the names of all of the Manotoks. The Manotok’s chain of titles to the property, with deeds of conveyances, are attached hereto as Annex I, with sub-annexes.
9.8 Fire gutted the Quezon City ROD on June 11, 1988, and shortly thereafter (i.e., on August 31, 1988) the Manotoks filed reconstitution proceedings before the LRA, and were issued a reconstituted certificate of title, TCT No. RT-22841 (372302), by the ROD of Quezon city in 1991. A xerox copy of the petition for reconstitution filed by the Manotoks with the ROD, with attachments, is attached hereto as Annex J, while a certified true copy of TCT No. 372302 (the title sought to be reconstituted in this petition) is attached hereto as Annex J-1.
On the other hand, the
Barques can trace their chain of title only up to 1975 when Homer Barque, Sr.
purchased the property from Emiliano Setosta, who the Barques claim bought the
property directly from the Government in the 1940s. The Barques have not presented the deed of conveyance by the Government to Setosta. The claim of the Barques that Setosta
purchased the property directly from the Government in the 1940s is belied by
the 1927 Annual Report of the Director of Lands, stating that:
With the exception of the estates of Calamba, Imus, Isabela, Lolomboy, Naic, San Francisco de Malabon, Santa Cruz de Malabon, Santa Maria de Pandi, and Talisay-Minglanilla, where there are still some vacant lands, all the others of the 23 Friar land estates had already been entirely disposed of. x x x.[100] (Emphasis supplied)
At the end of 1927, the Government
had already sold all of the Piedad Estate, a Friar land. Thus, the Government could not have sold
directly to Setosta the disputed property in the 1940s.
Twelfth: Lands Management Bureau Relocation Survey
Shows Barques’ Property Located 5.6 Kilometers from Piedad Estate
Intervenors Felicitas and
Rosendo Manahan (Manahans) have submitted a relocation survey made by
the Lands Management Bureau NCR Regional Office of the Barques’ plan Fls-3168-D
showing that the Barques’ property is located “some 5.6 kilometers away from Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate, outside
of Quezon City.”[101] The relocation survey plan is signed by
Ludivina L. Aromin, Chief of the Technical Services Division, and Engineer III
Evelyn G. Celzo. In their Memorandum
dated 22 August 2007, the Manahans attached as Annex “M” a copy of the Lands
Management Bureau relocation survey of plan Fls-3168-D.
A DULY
ISSUED TORRENS TITLE IS
BY THE
This Court ruled in Alabang Development Corporation, et al. v.
Valenzuela, etc., et al.[102]
that courts have no jurisdiction over petitions for reconstitution of title
involving a property already covered by an existing Torrens title in the name
of another person. The dissenting
opinion claims that the Barques’ title was already existing at the time of the
reconstitution of the Manotoks’ title in 1991.
This is an egregious error. When
the Manotoks’ title was reconstituted in 1991, the Barques’ title had not been
reconstituted, and even up to now the reconstitution of the Barques’ title is
still pending resolution in the instant case.
In contrast, when the Barques filed their reconstitution in 1996, the
Manotoks’ title had already been finally reconstituted and existing. Clearly, it is the Barques’ still pending
reconstitution that can no longer proceed because of the existing title of the
Manotoks.
In Alabang, the Court held that a “duly issued existing Torrens title x x x cannot be the subject of
petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles by third
parties without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such
existing titles.” The phrase “duly
issued existing Torrens title” simply means a title verifiably issued by the
proper Register of Deeds. The
validity or invalidity of the title is not material at that point. What is material is whether the Register of
Deeds actually issued the title as part of his regular functions.
Clearly, at the time of
the reconstitution of the Manotoks’ title, the Barques had no “duly issued
existing Torrens title” from the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. When the Barques
filed the reconstitution of their title, the Manotoks already had a prior
title, which was the only “duly issued existing Torrens title” over the
property issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. The Manotoks’ title could be verified against
the reconstituted original title on file with the Register of Deeds. In fact,
the LRA Administrator has admitted that the Manotoks’ title “is existing as a
reconstituted title at the Office of the Register of Deeds.”[103]
The Barques could not
produce even up to now a “duly issued existing Torrens title” from the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City. The Barques’ owner’s duplicate certificate of title
could not be verified with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City because the
Barques’ title has no corresponding original title, whether reconstituted or
not, on file with the Register of Deeds.
Thus, the reconstitution of the Barques’ title, which is still pending
in this case, can no longer proceed.
Once the reconstituting
court or officer establishes that the Register of Deeds has in fact issued an
existing title in the name of another person, the proper step is to file an
action before the Regional Trial Court to annul such title. It is
in such proceeding before the regional trial court that the validity or invalidity
of the title is determined. In such
proceeding, any party may introduce in evidence the LRA Administrator or the
NBI’s findings. In
the meantime, no reconstitution proceeding can prosper until after the
cancellation by final judgment of such existing title.
The Alabang ruling necessarily involves a situation where there is an
existing title issued by the Register of Deeds at the time of filing of a
petition to reconstitute another title
over the same property in the name of another person. The Alabang
ruling states that in such a situation the reconstituting authority has no
jurisdiction to proceed with the reconstitution until a final judgment cancels
the other title. This is clear from the
Court’s ruling in Alabang:
The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens titles (which become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from their issuance under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act) cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles. (And as the Court reiterated in the recent case of Silvestre vs. Court of Appeals, “in cases of annulment and/or reconveyance of title, a party seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his.”) The courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners. The very concept of stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System of registration rules out as anathema the issuance of two certificates of title over the same land to two different holders thereof. A fortiori, such proceedings for “reconstitution” without actual notice to the duly registered owners and holders of Torrens Titles to the land are null and void. Applicants, land officials and judges who disregard these basic and fundamental principles will be held duly accountable therefor.[104] (Emphasis supplied)
The Decision of the First
Division misapplies the Alabang
ruling by holding that the LRA Administrator can adjudicate on the validity of
a Torrens title by a finding that the title was not “duly issued.” Even the Register of Deeds, who physically
issues a Torrens title as part of his regular functions, cannot adjudicate on
the validity of a title. The Decision
states that the “function of the (LRA) is adjudicatory in nature — it can
properly deliberate on the validity of the titles submitted for
reconstitution.” This is grave error.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that reconstitution, even judicial reconstitution, does not confirm or adjudicate ownership over a property.[105] Reconstitution merely restores a missing certificate of title in the same condition that it was when lost or destroyed, nothing more. If the original title had a legal defect at the time of the loss or destruction, as when the land covered is part of the public forest,[106] the reconstituted title does not cure such defect. As this Court held in Director of Lands v. Gan Tan:[107]
But the lower court claims that petitioner, even if he complied with all the requirements of the law, is not entitled to have his title reconstituted for the reason that, being an alien, he is not qualified to acquire the land covered by said title under our Constitution. However, we find this claim untenable in the light of the theory that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The rule on this matter is that this issue can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose (Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil., 590). Moreover, it is a well known doctrine that a Torrens title, as a rule, is irrevocable and indefeasible (Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Kane, 61 Phil., 504), and our duty is to see to it that this title is maintained and respected unless challenged in a direct proceeding.
To our mind, the only issue here is whether there is a title to be reconstituted. That is the only purpose of the law (Rep. Act No. 26). If there is, then it is the duty of the court to comply with its mandate. Whether the petitioner has the right to acquire the land or not, is beyond the province of this proceeding. That should be threshed out in a proper action. The two proceedings are distinct and should not be confused.[108] (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
The fallacy in the
dissenting opinion’s argument is that it assumes that the LRA Administrator can
adjudicate on the validity of a
Torrens title. The original jurisdiction to adjudicate or to decide the
validity of a Torrens title is vested by law exclusively in the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 48 of
the Property Registration Decree.
Section 19 of the Judiciary Act vests in the Regional Trial Court the “exclusive original jurisdiction” to
decide factual and legal issues “which
involve the title to x x x real property.”
This means the Regional Trial Court first
decides the validity of the Torrens title, and this power to first decide
is to the exclusion of all other organs of the State. Not even the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court can usurp this exclusive original power of the Regional Trial Court. Any judgment resulting from such usurpation
is void.
What the LRA Administrator or agencies like the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) can issue are administrative, non-adjudicatory findings
on whether a Torrens title is spurious or authentic. These findings are mere evidences that must
be submitted to the Regional Trial Court, which alone has the power to
adjudicate whether the title is void.
Findings by the LRA or the NBI that a title is spurious are merely
administrative opinions, not a judicial determination that settles rights and
obligations between parties over a disputed property. These findings are merely evidences, not the
judgment itself of validity or invalidity which can only come from the Regional
Trial Court. These findings do not
become res judicata, while the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court can become res judicata.
Clearly, the grant of a reconstituted title is not an
adjudication of the title’s validity. The Barques received
an undeserved windfall when the First Division declared their reconstituted
title valid when the only relief they sought in the administrative
reconstitution was the restoration of their title in its condition at the time
of the alleged loss or destruction. This
Court has ruled in Alonso v. Cebu Country
Club, Inc.:[109]
Respondent relies solely on its reconstituted title which, by itself, does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. The reconstitution of a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition. It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest ownership of the land or estate covered thereby.[110] (Emphasis in original)
Thus, the LRA has no
jurisdiction, in administrative reconstitution proceedings, to rule which
between two titles over the same property is valid, or who between two
claimants over the same property is the lawful owner. Section 19 of the Judiciary Act vests in
courts of justice the “exclusive
original jurisdiction” to decide factual and legal issues involving “the title to x x x real property.”
EQUITY JURISDICTION DOES NOT APPLY
The dissenting opinion
further argues that the Manotoks are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction
of the LRA Administrator or the LRA reconstituting officer. The dissenting opinion asserts that the
Manotoks failed to question in the proceedings before these LRA officials their
jurisdiction to reconstitute administratively the Barques’ title. This invocation of equity jurisdiction in
favor of the LRA Administrator and the LRA reconstituting officer — for the benefit of
the Barques - is grossly erroneous.
First, the settled doctrine is “he who seeks equity must come to court with clean hands.”[111] The Barques have submitted patently forged documents to the LRA reconstituting officer. In the development of equity jurisdiction through the ages, the constant principle from which there was no deviation was that equity could never be used to reward those who commit fraud. This Court should not depart from the noble intention that motivated the development and use of equity jurisdiction. As this Court aptly stated in Pagasa Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al.:[112]
Pagasa cannot rely on equity because he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Equity refuses to lend its aid in any manner to one seeking its active interposition who has been guilty of unlawful or inequitable conduct in the matter with relation to which he seeks relief[113] (30 C.J.S. 1009). (Emphasis supplied)
Second, the principle of jurisdiction by estoppel applies only to those who
have sought affirmative relief in the wrong court, lost there, and
then assail the adverse decision of that court.
This estoppel applies against a party “who has invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to
secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to
escape an adverse decision.”[114] However, it was the Barques, not the
Manotoks, who sought the affirmative
relief of a reconstituted title. In
their Opposition[115]
before the LRA reconstituting officer, the Manotoks sought a defensive, negative relief - that
the Barques’ petition “be dismissed for lack of merit.” It was also the Barques, not the Manotoks,
who invoked the jurisdiction of the LRA, which had no jurisdiction over the
Barques’ petition because of the pre-existing title of the Manotoks. Moreover, it was the Barques, not the
Manotoks, who lost before the LRA reconstituting officer and who assailed the
adverse decision before the LRA Administrator.
The Barques even lost before the LRA Administrator who refused to
reconstitute the Barques’ title without the intervention of a “court of
competent jurisdiction.” Clearly,
jurisdiction by estoppel cannot apply to the Manotoks.
Third, the LRA Administrator and the LRA reconstituting officer refused to
assume jurisdiction to reconstitute administratively the Barques’ title. The LRA Administrator denied the Barques’
petition because of the existence of the Manotoks’ title, which in the words of
the LRA Administrator must first be cancelled by “a court of competent
jurisdiction” before the Barques’ petition may be given due course. The LRA reconstituting officer also denied
the Barques’ petition because of the existence of the Manotoks’ title which the
LRA had already reconstituted. In short,
these LRA officials admitted that they had no jurisdiction over the Barques’
petition. Since these LRA officials
refused to assume jurisdiction, there was no assumption of equity jurisdiction
that the Manotoks could have questioned.
For the same reason, there is no assumption of jurisdiction that this
Court can now recognize and validate through equity principles.
Fourth, the principle of equity
jurisdiction arising from estoppel or any other reason applies only to courts of justice.
The jurisdiction of courts of justice arises from either statute or
equity, or both. In legal systems which
recognize equity jurisdiction, equity is
an inherent power of courts by virtue of their duty to dispense justice to
the full extent possible. Equity jurisdiction is a judicial power. Administrative agencies or officers
exercising administrative, executive, or ministerial functions cannot assume
equity jurisdiction because they do not exercise judicial functions. Thus, it is gross error to invest on the LRA
Administrator and the LRA reconstituting officer equity jurisdiction because
these LRA officers perform administrative or executive functions in petitions
for administrative reconstitution of
titles.
Fifth, the Manotoks did in fact raise the issue of the LRA Administrator’s
jurisdiction in relation to the LRA Administrator’s opinion that the Manotoks’
title was “sham and spurious.” In their
Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 August 1998 before the LRA Administrator,[116]
the Manotoks stated:
Moreover,
it is not disputed that herein oppositors are the holder of an existing valid
and effective TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) covering the same land embraced by TCT
No. 210177 in question found which, as stated, is non-existing and spurious. Given said fact, no administrative
reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 should proceed. As held by the Supreme
Court, to wit:
So too, this Court has stressed “that lands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens titles (which become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from their issuance under section 38 of the Land Registration Act) cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles.” (Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco, 234 SCRA 458 [1994])[117] (Emphasis supplied)
Sixth, the principle of estoppel applies only if the LRA had in fact jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the Torrens title of the Manotoks, so as to bar the Manotoks, who previously claimed that the LRA had no jurisdiction, from later taking a contrary position. Thus, the Court declared in People v. Casiano:[118]
4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same “must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel” (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position — that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. x x x[119] (Emphasis supplied)
The LRA never had jurisdiction to
rule on the validity of the Torrens title of the Manotoks. Jurisdiction, as ruled in People v.
Casiano, “must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by
consent of the parties or by estoppel.”
It is axiomatic that only the law can confer jurisdiction. No amount of
estoppel can vest jurisdiction on an officer or court that the law has not
conferred jurisdiction.
The
LRA Administrator expressly admitted that only the proper Regional Trial Court
has the jurisdiction to cancel the Torrens title of the Manotoks. Only the Barques insist that the LRA has
jurisdiction to cancel a Torrens title of a third party in an administrative
reconstitution proceedings filed by another party, a contention that is patently
baseless.
Seventh, and most important of all, equity
jurisdiction can never be used to violate the law. Equity jurisdiction aims to attain complete
justice in cases where a court of law is unable to render judgment to meet the
special circumstances of a case because of the limitations of its statutory
jurisdiction.[120] However,
equity follows the law, and courts
exercising equity jurisdiction must still apply the law and have no discretion
to disregard the law.[121] Where the law prescribes a particular remedy
with fixed and limited boundaries, the court cannot, by exercising equity
jurisdiction, extend the boundaries further than the law allows.[122] Thus, this Court has ruled:
As for equity, which has been aptly described as ‘a justice outside legality,’ this is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas nunquam contravenit legis. The pertinent positive rules being present here, they should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity.[123] (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, no court can extend equity jurisdiction to the LRA where the law
has expressly reserved exclusive original
jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Court. No court,
invoking equity jurisdiction, can also
allow a collateral attack on a Torrens title, either before the LRA or before
itself, in gross violation of Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree expressly prohibiting collateral attacks on
Torrens titles.
This rule has special
application to Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree, enacted specifically to foreclose any
possible collateral attack on a Torrens title, as well as any possible
cancellation or modification of a Torrens title without a proceeding in the
Regional Trial Court directly assailing the validity of the title. Strict compliance with Section 48 is what
gives Torrens titles enduring stability, preventing confusion and fraud in land
ownership. To extend equity
jurisdiction to LRA officers to allow them to entertain collateral attacks on a
Torrens title is a gross and blatant violation of the clear and express command
of a positive law. Any extension of
equity jurisdiction that operates to negate Section 48 will destroy the most
basic safeguard in the Property Registration Decree. Certainly, equity jurisdiction cannot be
used for this purpose.
WHETHER
ASSAILED AS FRAUDULENTLY ISSUED OR NOT, A TORRENS TITLE CAN ONLY BE CANCELLED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 48 OF THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE
In cancelling the
Manotoks’ Torrens title without any trial before any court, the First Division
of this Court completely disregarded Section 48 of the Property Registration
Decree and Section 19 of the Judiciary Act.
Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree provides that a Torrens
title “cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.”
That law is Section 19 of
the Judiciary Act which states that the “Regional
Trial Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction x x x in all civil actions, which involve the
title to x x x real property.” These
two provisions mandate that no Torrens title can be cancelled unless there is a
proceeding in the proper Regional Trial Court directly assailing the validity
of such title.
Thus, the Court of Appeals committed a gross violation of Section 48 of the Property
Registration Decree and Section 19 of the Judiciary Act when it ordered the
cancellation of the Torrens title of the Manotoks without a prior proceeding
before the proper Regional Trial Court directly assailing the validity of the
Manotoks’ title. Likewise, the First
Division of this Court committed the same violation — totally disregarding
Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree and Section 19 of the Judiciary
Act, and in the process overturning
well-entrenched doctrines of this Court.
The validity of a Torrens
title, whether fraudulently issued or
not, can be assailed only in a direct proceeding before the proper Regional
Trial Court in accordance with Section 48.
In Ladignon v. Court of Appeals,[124] the Court declared:
What is worse, in ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383675, respondent Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction. After all, it is hornbook law that a torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue of validity of a torrens title, whether fraudulently issued or not, may be posed only in an action brought to impugn or annul it. Unmistakable, and cannot be ignored, is the germane provision of Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, that a certificate of title can never be the subject of a collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding instituted in accordance with law. x x x.[125] (Emphasis supplied)
The LRA Administrator has
admitted that the Torrens title of the Manotoks “is thus presumed valid.”[126] The law recognizes that the Manotoks’ Torrens
title is “evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein.”[127] Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that
the prior title of the Manotoks is spurious, still under Ladignon v. Court of Appeals,[128] such title can only cancelled by the proper Regional Trial Court in a
direct proceeding assailing its validity.
The dissenting opinion cites Rexlon
Realty Group, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al.[129] as authority that the Court of Appeals
and this Court “have jurisdiction to declare the title void even if the
appealed case was not originally filed with the Regional Trial Court for
nullification of title” under Section 48 of the Property Registration
Decree. The ponente has obviously
misread Rexlon Realty. Rexlon
Realty was a petition filed with the Court of Appeals for annulment
of judgment of the Regional Trial Court on the ground that the
trial court had no jurisdiction to grant the reconstitution of lost owner’s
duplicates of titles to respondent Alex David.
Rexlon Realty proved that the titles were not lost but were in its possession
as the first buyer of the properties from Alex David who had later sold again
the properties to Paramount Development Corporation. Rexlon Realty also proved that Alex David
delivered the titles to Rexlon Realty pursuant to the sale.
Rexlon
Realty does not involve two conflicting titles over the same property,
which is the situation in the present case.
In Rexlon Realty, the opposing parties agreed that there was only
one set of titles covering the same properties.
The only issue in Rexlon Realty was whether the titles were lost,
and if so, the trial court had jurisdiction to grant the reconstitution of the
titles; but if the titles were not lost, then the trial court had no
jurisdiction to grant the reconstitution of titles.
Rexlon
Realty did not question the validity of the titles of Alex David, which covered
properties that Rexlon Realty had purchased from Alex David. Rexlon Realty’s obvious interest was to
maintain the validity of the titles to the properties it had purchased, the
titles to which were in Rexlon Realty’s possession. Thus, Rexlon Realty did not invoke Section 48
of the Property Registration Decree, the law requiring a direct proceeding in
the proper regional trial court in any attack assailing the validity of a
Torrens title. To reiterate, the validity of a Torrens title, which is at
issue in direct proceedings under Section 48, is a separate and distinct issue
from the propriety of a reconstitution of title.
What
Rexlon Realty questioned was the jurisdiction of the trial court in issuing replacement
titles to the properties in the name
of Alex David who claimed that he lost the titles. In assailing as void the trial court’s
judgment, Rexlon Realty invoked, as
stated by the Court, “Section 2, of Rule 47 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure,” which provides “the grounds to annul a judgment of a lower court x
x x [based on] fraud and lack of jurisdiction.”
Thus, the Court in Rexlon Realty ruled:
x x x In the Strait Times case and in Demetriou v. Court of Appeals, also on facts analogous to those involved in this case, we held that if an owner’s duplicate copy of a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction. Consequently, the decision may be attacked any time. In the case at bar, the authenticity and genuineness of the owner’s duplicate of TCT Nos. T-52537 and T-52538 in the possession of petitioner Rexlon and the Absolute Deed of Sale in its favor have not been disputed. As there is no proof to support actual loss of the said owner’s duplicate copies of said certificates of title, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction and the new titles issued in replacement thereof are void.
x x x
In this case at bar, we simply
annulled the decision of the
Indeed, Rexlon Realty supports
the Manotoks’ contention that once it is shown that there is a pre-existing
title duly issued by the Register of Deeds over the same property which is the
subject of reconstitution proceedings,
the reconstitution cannot proceed for either of two reasons. First, the reconstituting officer or court
has no jurisdiction to reconstitute a title that has never been lost or
destroyed. Second, the reconstituting officer or court has no authority to
decide which of two conflicting titles is valid. Thus, Rexlon Realty
categorically ruled that in reconstitution proceedings, whether administrative
or judicial, the reconstituting officer or court has no jurisdiction “to
pass upon the question of actual ownership of the land” covered by the lost
title because the “certificate of title, by itself, does not vest
ownership.”
GUARANTY OF
STABILITY OF THE TORRENS SYSTEM
Section 48 of the
Property Registration Decree is the cornerstone of our land registration system
providing stability to land titles.
Without Section 48, our land registration system will crumble. Section
48 guarantees every landowner with a Torrens title that his title can never be
cancelled unless the validity of his title is first directly assailed in court
where he can adduce evidence in his favor.
The Decision of the First Division erases this guarantee. In one stroke, the Decision of the First
Division has overturned over a century of jurisprudence fortifying a guarantee
essential to the stability of our land registration system.
In 1915, after the
introduction in 1903[131]
of the Torrens system in this country, this Court waxed poetic in Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby[132]
in describing the cornerstone of the then new system of land registration. Declared the Court:
x x x The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the “mirador de su casa,” to avoid the possibility of losing his land. x x x
x x x The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost. x x x[133] (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
This Court has reiterated the doctrine in Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, now
embodied in Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree, in innumerable
decisions. In the 2003 case of Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago,[134]
a decision penned by Justice Consuelo
Ynares-Santiago, this Court declared:
Section 48 of P.D. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack and can not be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding. An action is an attack on a title when the object of the action is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment or proceeding pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment or proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.[135] (Emphasis supplied)
The Decision of the First
Division cancels a Torrens title without any proceeding in a trial court
directly attacking the title as required by law. What this Court warned against
in Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby is
now before us — a situation where “all
security in registered titles [is] lost.”
Every landowner holding a Torrens title will now have to camp in the
corridors of the courts, or constantly watch in the balcony of his house, just
to avoid losing his titled land. The
Decision of the First Division, by destroying the stability of land titles,
will usher in an era of land disputes, which before the advent of the Torrens
system were often violent and bloody.
The Decision of the First
Division denies to the Manotoks a basic guarantee under the Constitution — that
no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.[136] The Decision deprives the Manotoks of their P1.7
billion property without any trial in any court contrary to the clear and express mandate of Section 48 of the Property
Registration Decree. This Court
should never allow such blatant, gross and shocking violation of a fundamental
constitutional right.
A FINAL WORD ON RECONSTITUTION OF TITLES
This Court has often
warned of the pitfalls of reconstitutions of titles, which have resulted in
innocent landowners losing their titled lands to crime syndicates specializing
in forged titles and documents. The patently forged documents presented in
these cases remind us of what this Court stated in Heirs of Pedro Pinote v. Dulay:[137]
There is no gainsaying the need for courts to proceed with extreme caution in proceedings for
reconstitution of titles to land under R.A. 26. Experience has shown that this
proceeding has many times been misused as a means of divesting a property owner
of the title to his property. Through
fraudulent reconstitution proceedings, he wakes up one day to discover that his
certificate of title has been cancelled and replaced by a reconstituted title
in someone else’s name.[138] (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, I vote to
(1) GRANT petitioners’ letter motion for reconsideration dated 19 July
2006, (2) REVERSE the Court’s First
Division Decision dated 12 December 2005 and Resolution dated 19 April 2006, (3)
RECALL the Entry of Judgment dated 2 May 2006, and (4) DENY the petition for administrative
reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 filed by respondents Heirs of Homer L. Barque,
Sr.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
[1] Rollo, (G.R. No. 162335), p. 131. The letter states:
In connection with the examination/verification of the petition for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177, supposedly registered in the name of Homer L. Barque Sr., please furnish us with a certified copy of subdivision plan Fls-3168-D, for our record and reference.
Attached is a xerox copy of TCT No. 210177 for your reference.
[2] Id. at 133. The letter states:
In connection with the examination/verification of the above-entitled petition, please furnish us with a certification as to the existence and authenticity of plan Fls-3168-D, supposedly covered by TCT No. 210177, for our record and reference.
Attached is a xerox copy of TCT No. 210177 for your reference.
[3] Id. at 132. The letter states:
In reply to your letter dated October 29, 1996 requesting for certified copy of plan Fls- 3168-D for reference in connection with administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177. Relative to the plan Fls-3168-D, please be informed that we have no records (sic) of Fls-3168- D.
[4] Id. at 134. The letter states:
In reply to your undated letter, please be informed that a microfilm copy of Plan FLS- 3168-D is on file in the Technical Records and Statistical Section of this Office.
[5] Id. at 135. The letter states:
Relative to the above-entitled petition, we would like to clarify the fact that the Regional Office has a microfilm copy of Plan Fls-3168-D, while your Office does not have a record of the same.
Attached for your reference are the following:
a. Xerox copy of a certified true copy of plan Fls-3168-D, issued by the TRSS, NCR;
b. Reply letter of Engineer Ernesto S. Erive, dated Nov. 28, 1996;
c. Your reply letter dated November 7, 1996.
Your clarification is of utmost importance in the resolution of the instant case.
[6] Id. at 136.
[7] Id. at 137. Emphasis supplied.
[8] Id. at 138. Emphasis supplied.
[9] Id. at 139-140. Emphasis supplied.
[10] Id. at 142. Emphasis supplied.
[11] Id. at 144-145. Emphasis supplied.
[12] Id. at 146.
[13] Id.
[14] Id. at 147.
[15] Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), pp. 88-95. Penned by Administrator Reynaldo Y. Maulit.
[16] Re: Administrative Reconstitution of Original Copies of Lost or Destroyed Certificates of Title Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6732.
[17] Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), pp. 93-94.
[18] Id. at 95.
[19] Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), pp. 96-97. Penned by Administrator Senecio O. Ortile.
[20] CA rollo, pp. 78-79.
[21] Id. at 90-91.
[22] Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), pp. 106-111. Penned by Justice Eubulo G. Verzola, with Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring.
[23] Id. at 113-118.
[24] Id. at 117.
[25] CA rollo, pp. 244-248. Penned by Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Eloy R. Bello, Jr., concurring.
[26] Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), pp. 56-69. Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero with Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr., Edgardo P. Cruz and Danilo B. Pine, concurring and Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., dissenting.
[27] Id. at 65.
[28] Id. at 71-73.
[29] Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), pp. 667-683.
[30] Id. at 830-832.
[31] 450 Phil. 615 (2003).
[32] 31
Phil. 590 (1915).
[33] 161 Phil. 586 (1976).
[34] 183 Phil. 426 (1979).
[35] 201
Phil. 727 (1982).
[36] 209 Phil. 325 (1983).
[37] G.R. No. 86074, 20 December 1989, 180 SCRA 420.
[38] G.R. No. 68291, 6 March 1991, 194 SCRA 743.
[39] G.R. No. 34080, 22 March 1991, 195 SCRA 482.
[40] G.R. No. 109645, 25 July 1994, 234 SCRA 455.
[41] 452 Phil. 238 (2003).
[42] Resolution, 462 Phil. 546 (2003).
[43] Section 48, PD 1529; Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, supra
note 32; Magay, etc. v. Estiandan, supra note 33; Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 38; Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago, supra note 41.
[44] Alabang Development Corporation, et al. v. Valenzuela, etc. et al., supra note 35; MWSS v. Hon. Sison, etc., et al., supra note 36; Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, supra note 39; Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, supra note 40.
[45] Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34.
[46] Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, supra note 39; Liwag v. Court of Appeals, supra note 37; Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., supra note 42.
[47] Francisco v. Bautista, G.R. No. 44167, 19 December 1990, 192 SCRA 388.
[48] 438 Phil. 252 (2002); Vir-Jen
Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v.
NLRC, et al., 210 Phil. 482 (1983).
[49] Id. at 278-279.
[50] Estoesta,
Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 74817, 8 November 1989, 179
[51] Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, G.R. No. 76265, 11 March 1994, 231 SCRA 88.
[52] Presidential Decree No. 1529.
[53] A direct attack on a Torrens title is an action whose principal purpose is to alter or annul the title. Such direct attack can be filed only before the proper regional trial court. An indirect or collateral attack is an action whose principal purpose is other than to alter or annul a title but its indirect consequence is at the very least to put doubt on the validity of the title. A petition for reconstitution of title over property that is already covered by a pre-existing Torrens title is an indirect attack on such Torrens title. See Leyson v. Bontuyan, et al., G.R. No. 156357, 18 February 2005, 452 SCRA 94.
[54] Caraan v. Court of Appeals, G.R No. 140752, 11 November 2005, 474 SCRA 543.
[55] Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34; Demetriou v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115595, 14 November 1994, 238 SCRA 158; Alipoon v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 591, 597-598 (1999). In Alipoon, the Court ruled:
We are
convinced that based on the evidence presented, the Court of Appeals correctly
upheld the genuineness of TCT No. T-17224 issued by the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental on March 16, 1933 covering Lot No. 663 in the name of
Marcelina P. Alvarez, predecessor of private respondents herein. Inasmuch
as TCT No. T-17224 has been in existence as early as March 16, 1933, the
issuance in 1989 of a reconstituted original certificate of title bearing the
number OCT No. RO-12890 (N.A.) over Lot No. 663 in the name of petitioners’
parents Fausto Alipoon and Silveria Duria is rendered legally doubtful, and
the reconstituted title is void. (Emphasis supplied)
[56] G.R. No. 115595, 14 November 1994, 238 SCRA 158.
[57] Id. at 161-162.
[58] Supra note 34.
[59] Id. at 432-433.
[60] See note 46.
[61] Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
[62] Zafra v. Caballes, 93 Phil. 875 (1953); Bunagan v. Branch VI CFI of Cebu, 186 Phil. 31 (1980).
[63] Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, supra note 39.
[64] Section 18 of RA No. 26 allows the Register of Deeds to cancel the reconstituted title if the lost title is subsequently found and both titles are still in the name of the same registered owner. Section 18 states:
SECTION 18. In case
a certificate of title, considered lost or destroyed, be found or recovered,
the same shall prevail over the reconstituted certificate of title, and, if
both titles appear in the name of the same registered owner, all memoranda
of new liens or encumbrances, if any, made on the latter, after its
reconstitution, except the memorandum of the reservation referred to in section
seven of this Act, shall be transferred to the recovered certificate of title. Thereupon, the register of deeds shall
cancel the reconstituted certificate of title and spread upon the owner’s
duplicate, as well as on the co-owner’s, mortgagee’s or lessee’s duplicate, if
any has been issued, such annotations of subsisting liens or encumbrances as
may appear on the recovered certificate of title, cancelling at the same time
the memorandum of the reservation referred to in section seven hereof: Provided, however, That if the reconstituted certificate of title has been
cancelled by virtue of any deed or instrument, whether voluntary or
involuntary, or by an order of the court, and a new certificate of title has
been issued, the recovered certificate of title shall be likewise cancelled,
but all subsisting liens or encumbrances, if any, appearing thereon shall be
transferred to the new certificate of title and to its owner’s duplicate, as
well as to any co-owner’s mortgagee’s or lessee’s duplicate that may have been
issued, the memorandum of the reservation referred to in section seven of this
Act, if any, being thereby ipso facto
cancelled. (Emphasis supplied)
[65] 346 Phil. 136 (1997).
[66] Emphasis supplied.
[67] Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 (1958).
[68] Supra note 9.
[69] Id.
[70] Id.
[71] Supra note 10.
[72] Supra note 11.
[73] Supra
note 7.
[74] Supra, note 11.
[75] Supra, note 9.
[76] G.R. No. 120958, 16 December 1996, 265 SCRA 614.
[77] Id. at 642-643.
[78] Supra, note 11.
[79] Id.
[80] Supra, note 9.
[81] Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), p. 141. The Barques’ 7 February 1997 letter states in full:
February 7, 1997
Hon. Reynaldo Y. Maulit
Administrator
Land Registration Authority
Sir:
Re: Administrative Reconstitution of TCT
No. 210177
of the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City
We
write in behalf of our clients, the Heirs of the late Homer L. Barque, Sr., the
registered owner of the properties covered by TCT No. 210177.
We
are constrained to bring to your immediate attention a pattern of effort to
delay the administrative reconstitution of the above title in accordance with
the provisions of R.A. No. 6732 and LRA Circular No. 13 dated July 26, 1989 SR
[sic] notwithstanding the recommendation dated January 2, 1997 by the Chief,
Geodetic Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, D
We
respectfully request that this matter be looked into in order to expedite the
long overdue reconstitution of the title to the said properties.
With
our highest esteem.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.)
BENJAMIN
D. TURGANO
Counsel
of the Heirs of Homer L. Barque
Lot 9, Blk 11, Don Jose Avenue
Don Jose Heights, Fairview, Quezon City
[82] Supra note 10.
[83] Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), p. 143. The 14 February 1997 letter of the LRA reconstituting officer states in full:
February
14, 1997
Hon. Reynaldo Y. Maulit
Administrator
This Authority
Sir:
In
connection with the letter dated February 7, 1997, of Benjamin D. Turgano,
counsel of the Heirs of Homer L. Barque, petitioners in the Administrative
Reconstitution of TCT No. 210177, please be informed of the following:
1. There is no effort to delay the
administrative reconstitution of the aforesaid title. What we are doing is a thorough check of the
authenticity of the submitted documents;
2. The order of reconstitution containing TCT
No. 210177 and the name of Homer L. Barque, attached to the aforesaid letter is
a tampered document. For your
comparison, herewith is a copy of the genuine order of reconstitution, marked
as annex “A”;
3. The alleged letter-recommendation dated
January 2, 1997, by the Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, LMB-DENR, is also a
forged document. Attached for your
reference is a copy of the letter which is self-explanatory, together with its
enclosures, directly received by the undersigned from Engineer Privadi J.G.
Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, LMB-DENR, marked as annex “B”;
4. Lots 823-A & 823-B, Fls-3168-D,
containing areas of 171,473 Sq. m. & 171, 472 Sq. m., respectively,
purportedly covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823, Piedad
Estate, containing an area of 342,945 Sq. m. covered by TCT No. 372302, registered in the
name of Severino M. Manotok, et al., copy of which is hereto attached as annex
“C”.
From
the foregoing, it is evident that there is an attempt to mislead us into
favorable action by submitting forged documents, hence it is recommended that
this case be referred to the PARAC for investigation and filing of charges
against perpetrators as envisioned by this office under your administration.
Very
truly yours,
(SGD.)
BENJAMIN M. BUSTOS
Reconstituting Officer
and Chief, Reconstitution Division
[84] LRA Records, p. 204.
[85] Id. at 357-360.
[86] Id.
at 253. The LRA reconstituting officer’s
Comment reads in full:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Justice
QUEZON
IN THE
HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE,
Petitioner.
ADMIN. RECONS. NO. Q-547(97)
COMMENT
ON OPPOSITOR’S
MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION
dated July 27, 1998
COMES
1. That we support the Oppositor’s prayer that the
challenged Resolution dated June 24, 1998, be reconsidered, reversed, and set
aside for lack of factual and legal basis;
2. That we
maintain our position denying the reconstitution of TCT No. 210177, on the grounds stated in our Order
dated June 30, 1997, and on the following additional grounds, to wit:
2.1 If the late Homer L.
Barque, really purchased the subject property in the year 1975, why did he not
take possession of it upon purchase, and up to now his descendants, the
Petitioners, are not in possession of the property, but the Oppositors?;
2.2 Why was the property
declared, and realty taxes were paid in the name of Barque, only in the year
1996? Whereas, the Oppositors and their predecessors have been paying realty
taxes on the property since the year 1965;
2.3 Why did the Petitioner
try to mislead us by submitting a tampered copy of Adm. Reconstitution Order
No. Q-535(96)? (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the
Oppositor’s Motion for Reconsideration be given due course; the challenged
Resolution be set aside; and the Order dated June 30, 1997 be upheld.
It is further prayed
that this case be referred to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Commision
for investigation.
Quezon City, Philippines,
August 13, 1998.
(SGD.) BENJAMIN M. BUSTOS
Reconstituting Officer
& Chief, Reconstitution Division
Enclosure:
Xerox Copy of tampered Adm.
Reconstitution Order No. Q-535(96)
[87] An Act Allowing the Administrative Reconstitution of Original Copies of Certificates of Titles Lost or Destroyed Due to Fire, Flood and other Force Majeure, Amending for the Purpose Section One Hundred Ten of Presidential Decree Numbered Fifteen Twenty-Nine and Section Five of Republic Act Numbered Twenty-Six.
[88] Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), p. 438.
[89] Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), p. 213. Annex “BB,” Manotoks’ Petition for Review dated 30 March 2004.
[90] Id. at 214. Annex “BB-1,” Manotoks’ Petition for Review dated 30 March 2004.
[91]
[92] Supra note 86.
[93] Annex “M-21,” Petitioners’ Memorandum dated 23 August 2007.
[94] LRA Records, p. 412, Opposition dated 8 April 1997.
[95] Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), p. 99.
[96] 215 Phil. 430 (1984).
[97] Rollo (G.R. No. 162335), pp. 174-175.
[98] SPOUSES
CAYETANO and PATRICIA TIONGSON, SPOUSES EDWARD and PACITA GO, SPOUSES ROBERTO
and MYRNA LAPERAL III, ELISA R. MANOTOK, SPOUSES IGNACIO and PACITA MANOTOK,
SEVERINO MANOTOK, JR., SPOUSES FAUSTO and MILAGROS MANOTOK, ROSA R. MANOTOK,
Minors MIGUEL A. B. SISON and MA. CRISTINA E. SISON, represented by their
judicial guardian FILOMENA M. SISON, SPOUSES MAMERTO and PERPETUA M. BOCANEGRA,
GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, represented by his judicial guardian MAMERTO BOCANEGRA,
SPOUSES FRANCISCO and FILOMENA SISON, JOSE CLEMENTE MANOTOK, SPOUSES JESUS and
THELMA MANOTOK, Minors PHILIP MANOTOK, MARIA TERESA MANOTOK and RAMON SEVERINO
MANOTOK, represented by their judicial guardian SEVERINO MANOTOK, JR., Minors JESUS
JUDE MANOTOK, JR. and JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, represented by their judicial
guardian JESUS MANOTOK, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO
S. MACAYA, respondents. Supra note 96.
[99]
[100] Annual Report of the Director of Lands For the Fiscal Year Ending December 31, 1927, p. 106, Annex “M-22,” Petitioners’ Memorandum dated 23 August 2007.
[101] Intervenors’ Memorandum dated 22 August 2007, p. 22. In its 12 September 2006 Resolution, this Court granted the Motion for Leave to Intervene of Felicitas B. Manahan and Rosendo Manahan
[102]
Supra note 35.
[103] Rollo (G.R. No. 162605), p. 94. LRA Resolution dated 24 June 1998.
[104] Supra note 35 at 744.
[105] Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, supra note 39.
[106] Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 235 Phil. 680 (1987).
[107] 89 Phil. 184 (1951).
[108] Id. at 186-187.
[109] Supra note 42.
[110] Id. at 565.
[111] Catingub v. Court of Appeals, et al., 206 Phil. 83 (1983); Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Maritime Building Co., Inc., 175 Phil. 476 (1978).
[112] 216
Phil. 533 (1984).
[113] Id. at 535.
[114] The
dissenting opinion cited Tijam v.
Sibonghanay, et al., 131 Phil. 556 (1968).
[115] Supra, note 94.
[116] LRA
Records, pp. 254-277.
[117] Id. at 273.
[118] 111 Phil. 73 (1961).
[119] Id. at 93-94.
[120] Reyes v. Lim, 456 Phil. 1 (2003).
[121] Arsenal v. IAC, 227 Phil. 36 (1986).
[122] Alvendia v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72138, 22 January 1990, 181 SCRA 252.
[123] Imperial Victory Shipping Agency v. NLRC, G.R. No. 84672, 5 August 1991, 200 SCRA 178, 184 citing Zabat, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 226 Phil. 489 (1986).
[124] 390 Phil. 1161 (2000).
[125] Id. at 1174.
[126] See note 15.
[127] Tirado v. Sevilla, G.R. No. 84201, 3 August 1990, 788 SCRA 321; Eduarte v. Court of Appeals, 370 Phil. 18 (1999).
[128] Supra.
[129] 429 Phil. 31 (2002).
[130] Id. at 44-46.
[131] Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, was approved by the Philippine Commission on 6 November 1902 and took effect on 1 February 1903. See Sotto v. Sotto, 43 Phil. 688 (1922).
[132] Supra note 32.
[133] Id. at 593-594.
[134] Supra
note 41.
[135] Id. at 252-253.
[136] Section 1, Article III, 1987 Constitution.
[137] G.R. No. 56694, 2 July 1990, 187 S
[138] Id. at 20.