EN BANC
|
DATU OMAR
S. SINSUAT and MARIANO H. PAPS, Complainants, - versus - JUDGE
VICENTE A. HIDALGO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Respondent. |
A.M. No.
RTJ-08-2133 (Formerly A.M.
OCA IPI No. 05-2165-RTJ) Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CARPIO
MORALES, AZCUNA,* TINGA,* CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA,
REYES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, & BRION, JJ. Promulgated: August 6, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO
MORALES, J.:
The administrative case against Judge
Vicente A. Hidalgo (respondent) who, during the pendency of this case, retired[1] as
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Manila has its
beginnings from the receipt on November 17, 2003 by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) of a copy of a “Motion to Resolve Defendants’ Motion for
Reconsideration” filed by counsels for the defendants in Civil Case No.
03106921, "Nerwin Industries Corp.
v. PNOC-Energy Development Corporation, et al.,” herein complainants Attys. Datu Omar S.
Sinsuat and Mariano H. Paps.
In their “Motion to Resolve
Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration”[2]
(the Motion), complainants questioned, among other things, the authority of
respondent to issue in the above-said civil case a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the therein defendant Philippine
National Oil Company - Energy Development Corporation (PNOC-EDC) from holding a
bidding for wooden poles required for the government’s Accelerated Rural
Electrification Program, otherwise known as the “O-Ilaw” Project.
Complainants claimed that
in issuing the TRO and injunction, respondent disregarded the clear
proscription of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1818[3]
and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8975[4]
and this Court’s Administrative Circular No. 11-2000[5]
of
By letter dated April 24, 2004 to the
OCA,[6] Atty.
Paps, who was required by the OCA upon receipt of a copy of the Motion to
expound on his and Atty. Sinsuat’s allegations therein,
contended that respondent issued the TRO despite a clear showing that the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 03106921 did not have a cause of action against the
PNOC- EDC,[7]
and that a critical government infrastructure project was involved.
Atty. Paps cited instances
which, to him, indicated respondent’s bias against the PNOC-EDC, including respondent’s
declaring PNOC-EDC and its co-defendants in default despite their reservation
to file a Motion to Dismiss and/or appropriate responsive pleading pending
resolution of the incidents in the case, and respondent’s disqualifying him as
PNOC-EDC’s counsel despite grant of express authority to him to act as such from
the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel.
In compliance with the directive of
the OCA for him to comment[8] on
Atty. Paps’ letter, respondent informed the OCA by
his Comment submitted on July 15, 2004[9] that,
inter alia, he denied PNOC-EDC’s motions
for reconsideration to set aside order of default and to admit answer on December
29, 2003 as they were the subject of a petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals (CA).
By letter dated
Complainants sent the OCA
yet another letter dated December 9, 2004[11]
in which they formally requested that respondent be held liable for “grave
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law,”
informing that their above-mentioned petition for certiorari, docketed
as CA-G.R. No. 83144, was granted by the
CA by Decision of October 22, 2004.[12] Complainants
highlighted the CA’s finding that respondent gravely abused his discretion in
issuing the TRO/preliminary injunction, “a palpable violation of RA 8975 which
was x x x already existing at the time respondent Judge issued the assailed
Orders” and “in blatant disregard of a ‘simple, comprehensible and unequivocal
mandate (of PD 1818) prohibiting the issuance of injunctive writs relative to
government infrastructure projects.’”
By letter of July 6, 2005,[13] the
OCA informed complainants, however, that the complaint against respondent could
not be given due course as it failed to comply with Section 1 of Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court,[14]
as amended by A.M. No. 01-08-10-SC.[15] Complainants countered that the complaint
against respondent had been set in motion as early as 2003 as the record of
exchanges between them, the OCA and respondent would show.[16] These exchanges substantially instituted the
complaint against respondent, they argued.
Respondent thereafter sought the
dismissal of the complaint firstly on the basis of the OCA’s denial thereof of due
course.[17] Adverting to the Court’s Resolution of
October 15, 2003 in A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC,[18]
respondent moreover submitted that the complaint against him should be
dismissed as it must be considered filed only on November 8, 2006 when Atty.
Sinsuat complied with the resolution of the OCA requiring the submission of a
copy of the October 22, 2004 Decision of the CA. As such, the filing of the complaint was made
after his compulsory retirement on
At the same time, respondent argued
that to allow the complaint to prosper would amount to a denial of due process
as he was never informed of the nature of and the specific violations he was
alleged to have committed, hence, his inability to intelligently answer them.
Respondent particularly lamented not
having received any further communication after the
By Resolution of
By
Memorandum dated October 1, 2007, the OCA to which the complaint was referred for
evaluation, report and recommendation[21]
narrowed down the issues to whether: (1) the complaint may be given due course
despite non-compliance with Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court; (2) the
resolution of the complaint, if it be given due course, would amount to a
denial of due process on the part of respondent; and (3) respondent was administratively
liable for gross ignorance of the law.
The OCA found sufficient allegations
of administrative wrongdoing in complainants’ motions and letters. The letters and motions not having been
verified, the OCA treated them as anonymous complaint, hence, their directive
for complainants to expound on their allegations and to furnish the OCA with a
certified copy of the October 22, 2004 Decision of the CA.
Debunking respondent’s claim of denial
of due process, the OCA emphasized that he was informed of the allegations
against him and did not deny issuing the assailed TRO; he merely stated that
the matter had already been raised on certiorari to the CA.
The
OCA found respondent to have displayed gross ignorance of the law in issuing
the questioned TRO in light of the provisions of P.D. No. 1818 and R.A. No.
8975.
Noting that respondent was previously fined in
A.M. Nos. RTJ-03-1756[22]
and RTJ-05-1959[23] in the
amount of P11,000 and P20,000, respectively, and warned that a
repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with severely, the OCA
recommended that he be found liable for gross
ignorance of the law, a serious
charge under Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.[24] As respondent had, however, retired from
the service, the OCA recommended that he be fined in the amount of P40,000.
The
report cum recommendation of the OCA is
well-taken.
Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court provides:
SECTION 1. How instituted. — Proceedings for the discipline of Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations, or upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity. The complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Under the above-quoted Rule, there
are three ways by which administrative proceedings against judges may be
instituted: (1) motu proprio by the
Supreme Court; (2) upon verified
complaint with affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts
alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations; or (3)
upon an anonymous complaint supported
by public records of indubitable integrity.
While the copy
of the Motion which complainants furnished the OCA was unverified as were their subsequent
letters, the OCA correctly treated them as anonymous complaint. The Court has, on several occasions, been entertaining complaints of this nature[25]
especially where respondents admitted the material allegations of the complainants[26] as
in respondent’s case.
Anonymous
complaints, as a rule, are received with caution. They should not be dismissed outright,
however, where their averments may be easily verified
and may, without much difficulty, be substantiated and established by other
competent evidence.[27]
Here, the
motion and letters sufficiently averred the specific acts upon which
respondent’s alleged administrative liability was anchored. And the averments are verifiable from the
records of the trial court and the CA’s Decision.
Respondent’s challenge against this
Court’s jurisdiction over the present case is unavailing. Indeed, the pleadings of the parties and the
communications of the OCA clearly show that the disciplinary proceeding against
him was set in motion in November 2003 when the OCA received a copy of
complainants’ Motion.
Respondent’s retirement in the
interim does not per se warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint.[28]
The Court finds that, indeed,
respondent is liable for gross misconduct. As the
CA explained in its above-stated Decision in the petition for certiorari, respondent
failed to heed the mandatory ban imposed by P.D. No. 1818 and R.A. No. 8975
against a government infrastructure project,[29]
which the rural electrification project certainly was. He thereby likewise obstinately
disregarded this Court’s various circulars[30] enjoining courts from issuing TROs and
injunctions against government infrastructure projects in line with the
proscription under R.A. No. 8975. Apropos
are Gov. Garcia v. Hon. Burgos[31]
and National Housing Authority v. Hon.
Allarde[32] wherein
this Court stressed that P.D. No. 1818 expressly deprives courts of
jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against the implementation or execution
of a government infrastructure project.
Reiterating the prohibitory mandate
of P.D. No. 1818, the Court in Atty. Caguioa v. Judge Laviña[33] faulted a judge for grave misconduct
for issuing a TRO against a government infrastructure project thus:
x x x It appears that respondent is either feigning a misunderstanding of the law or openly manifesting a contumacious indifference thereto. In any case, his disregard of the clear mandate of PD 1818, as well as of the Supreme Court Circulars enjoining strict compliance therewith, constitutes grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice. His claim that the said statute is inapplicable to his January 21, 1997 Order extending the dubious TRO is but a contrived subterfuge to evade administrative liability.
In resolving matters in litigation, judges should endeavor assiduously to ascertain the facts and the applicable laws. Moreover, they should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Also, they are expected to keep abreast of and be conversant with the rules and the circulars which the Supreme Court has adopted and which affect the disposition of cases before them.
Although judges have in their favor the presumption of regularity and good faith in the performance of their judicial functions, a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable terms of the law obviates this presumption and renders them susceptible to administrative sanctions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The
pronouncements in Caguioa apply as
well to respondent.
The questioned acts of respondent
also constitute gross ignorance of the law for being patently in
disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules[34]
which judges are expected to know and apply properly.
IN FINE, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the
law, which are serious charges under Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court. He having retired from the
service, a fine in the amount of P40,000 is imposed upon him, the
maximum amount fixed under Section 11 of Rule 140 as an alternative sanction to
dismissal or suspension.
WHEREFORE, the
Court finds respondent, then Judge Vicente A. Hidalgo, GUILTY of gross
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law and imposes upon him a fine of P40,000,
to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
|
LEONARDO A. QUISU Associate Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES- Associate Justice MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
|
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
(ON LEAVE) ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
|
(ON
LEAVE) DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
|
RUBEN T. REYES Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
ARTURO D.
BRION
Associate
Justice
* On Leave.
[1] Judge
[2] Rollo, pp. 1-3.
[3] Prohibiting
Courts from Issuing Restraining Orders or Preliminary Injunctions in Cases
Involving Infrastructure and Natural Resource Development Projects of, and
Public Utilities Operated by, the Government.
[4] An
Act to Ensure the Expeditious Implementation and Completion of Government
Infrastructure Projects by Prohibiting Lower Courts from Issuing Temporary
Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions or Preliminary Mandatory
Injunctions, Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for Other
Purposes.
[5] Re: Ban on
the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders or Writs of Preliminary
Prohibitory or Mandatory Injunctions in Cases Involving Government
Infrastructure Projects.
[6] Rollo, p. 5.
[7] Atty. Paps claimed that while Nerwin failed to prove its allegations of conspiracy between the National Electrification Administration (NEA) and the PNOC-EDC, the latter was able to show that there was no valid and factual basis for Nerwin’s allegations that: (1) there was a contract between NEA and Nerwin; (2) NEA channeled the fund for the rural electrification project to PNOC-EDC; (3) NEA and PNOC-EDC illegally tried to invalidate the award to Nerwin or otherwise render it ineffective; (4) the bidding to be conducted by the PNOC-EDC is the same as IPB 80 of NEA in circumvention of the injunction issued against NEA in another case in another court; and (5) PNOC-EDC should be considered as illegally dealing in the rural electrification project.
[8] Rollo, p. 9. The 1st
endorsement dated
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Entitled PNOC-Energy Development Corporation and Ester Guerzon (Chairman, Bids and Awards Committee) v. Nerwin Industries Corporation and Hon. Vicente A. Hidalgo, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila-Branch 37.
[13] Rollo, p. 36. The letter from OCA was signed by then Court Administrator, now Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
[14] Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court states:
SECTION 1. How
instituted. - Proceedings for the
discipline of Judges or regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be
instituted motu proprio by the
Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of persons
who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which
may substantiate said allegations, or upon an anonymous complaint, supported by
public records of indubitable integrity.
The complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely
the acts and omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct
prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
[15] Dated
[16] Rollo, pp. 29-30. Letter of
[17]
[18] RESOLUTION PRESCRIBING MEASURES TO PROTECT MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY FROM BASELESS AND UNFOUNDED ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS. Respondent specifically underscored the following provision of A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC:
2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the compulsory retirement of a Justice
or Judge; (b) for an alleged cause of action that occurred at least a year
before such filing; and (c) shown prima facie that it is intended to harass the
respondent, it must forthwith be recommended for dismissal. x x x.
[19] Rollo, p. 66.
[20]
[21]
[22] Gonzales
v. Judge P11,000 with a stern warning against
repetition of the same or
similar act.
[23] Republic
v. P20,000 and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar
act will be dealt with more severely.
[24] SEC. 11. Sanctions. – If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3.
A fine of more than P20,000.00 but
not exceeding P40,000.00.
[25] Vide Re: Anonymous Complaint dated
[26] Atty. Macalintal v. Judge Teh, supra at 876.
[27]
Anonymous
Complaint against Pershing T. Yared, Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities,
[28] Liguid v. Judge Camano, Jr., 435 Phil. 695,
705 (2002); Cabañero v. Judge Cañon,
417 Phil. 754, 757 (2001); Cabarloc v.
Cabusora, 401 Phil. 376, 385 (2000).
[29] Republic of the Philippines v. Silerio,
338 Phil. 784, 791 (1997) held that the term “infrastructure projects” means
“construction, improvement and rehabilitation of roads, and bridges, railways,
airports, seaports, communication facilities, irrigation, flood control and
drainage, water supply and sewerage systems, shore protection, power
facilities, national buildings, school buildings, hospital buildings, and other
related construction projects that form part of the government capital
investment.”
[30] Administrative Circular (A.C.) Nos. 13-93
dated
[31] 353 Phil. 740, 763 (1998).
[32] 376 Phil. 147, 155 (1999).
[33] 398 Phil. 845, 858-859 (2000).
[34] Lagcao v. Gako, Jr.,
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1840,