Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD
DIVISION
|
JESUS G. CRISOLOGO, Complainant, - versus - JUDGE MARIVIC TRABAJO DARAY,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Respondent. |
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2036
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 07-2543-RTJ) Present: CARPIO, J.* AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. Acting
Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: August 20, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
In a Complaint[1]
dated September 1, 2006, complainant Jesus G. Crisologo charged respondent
Judge Marivic Trabajo Daray, in her capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Digos City, Branch 19, with Gross Misconduct, Undue Delay
in Rendering a Decision or Order and Gross Ignorance of the Law of Procedure
relative to the denial of the Motion for Intervention filed by complainant in Civil
Case Nos. 3220 and 3387 respectively entitled “Marina Crisologo, Jr. vs. Victor Callao and Rural Bank of Tagum, Inc.”
and “Salvador Crisologo vs. Marina
Crisologo, Jr. and Rural Bank of Tagum, Inc.”
As found by the Report of the
Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA), the following circumstances
prompted the complainant to file this administrative complaint:
On
Afterward, on
On
On February 13, 2004, soon after being informed of the existence of the compromise agreement, complainant Jesus G. Crisologo and his sister Carolina C. Abrina, represented by Atty. Rodolfo Ta-asan, moved to intervene in the civil cases alleging among others that: [a] the property in litigation involves the Crisologo family’s ancestral home; [b] they are co-owners of the subject property together with Marina, Jr. and their other siblings; [c] while the subject property is registered in the name of Marina, Jr., she merely holds said property in trust for them and their other siblings; and [d] they seek to intervene in the civil cases to protect their proprietary right and legal interest over the subject property.
Meanwhile, on
In an Order dated
FOR
RESOLUTION IS THE Motion for Intervention filed by movants-intervenors
Jesus G. Crisologo and Carolina C. Abrina through counsel, seeking permission
from this Court to intervene in the cases above-mentioned, so as to protect
their proprietary rights and legal interest over the subject property.
AFTER A CAREFUL ASSESSMENT of the
instant motion vis-à-vis the Comment/Opposition thereto, this Court holds and
is of the view that the Motion for Intervention could not be entertained
anymore considering that the Compromise Agreement had already been entered into
and to allow the intervention will unduly delay the adjudication of the rights
of the original parties, particularly so that the instant cases began almost a
decade ago in 1995. Moreover, whatever
claims and rights that Jesus G. Crisologo may have over the subject property
may and should be the subject of a separate case between and among his
siblings. (Magat, et al. vs. Delizo, et
al., G.R. No. 135199,
WHEREFORE,
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Motion for Intervention is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
On
On
In an Order dated
Subsequently, on
WHEREFORE,
finding the afore-quoted Compromise Agreement to be not contrary to law, public
morals, good customs and public policy, this Court hereby APPROVES the
same. The parties in this case are
hereby ordered to strictly comply with all the terms and conditions set forth
in said agreement. By virtue of the
approval of the compromise agreement, this case is now deemed TERMINATED.
SO
ORDERED.
Again, a copy of the decision was sent to Atty. Ta-asan instead of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Crisologo. Thus, complainant was left unaware that his motion for reconsideration was denied and that a decision approving the compromise agreement has already been rendered by respondent Judge in the civil cases.
On November 3, 2004, RBTI moved for the execution of the decision on compromise agreement and prayed, among other things, for RTC-Branch 19: [a] to order the immediate ejectment of the plaintiffs, including all other persons claming rights under them, from the subject property; [b] to place RBTI in complete possession, control and enjoyment of the subject property, including all improvements thereon; and [c] to order the cancellation the notice of lis pendens in the certificate of title of the subject property.
On
Immediately thereafter, on November 8, 2004, complainant filed an Urgent Manifestation and Notice of Appeal decrying the lack of notice to him of the trial court’s [October] 15, 2004 Order and appealing the denial of his motion for intervention to the Court of Appeals. On the same date, complainant also filed an Urgent Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of respondent Judge in the civil cases on the ground of lack of impartiality.
On
On
On
In her Comment[3]
dated
Likewise,
respondent denounced the charge of undue delay in passing upon complainant’s
notice of appeal in light of her voluntary inhibition from hearing the civil
cases. She pointed out that she could no longer be expected to pass upon
complainant’s notice of appeal after she had voluntarily inhibited herself.
Lastly,
respondent asserted that the denial of complainant’s motion for intervention
was prompted by the prevailing factual circumstances of the civil cases. She
reasoned out that while the denial of the motion for intervention was made
prior to a rendition of judgment in the civil cases, such denial was proper in
view of the Compromise Agreement between the original parties to the case. Respondent insisted that the civil cases had been
pending for almost a decade; thus, when presented with a compromise agreement
between the original parties, she felt it proper, in the interest of justice,
to deny complainant’s motion for intervention and promulgate a decision based
on said compromise agreement.
Respondent
underscored that the administrative case is purely harassment, designed to
malign her for denying complainant’s motion for intervention.
On
In the Report dated P10,000.00 for undue delay in
rendering a decision or order, and P20,000.00 for gross ignorance of the
law or procedure.
On the failure to furnish the
complainant’s new counsel of record with copies of the court’s processes, the Investigating
Justice found that this omission does not amount to gross misconduct. He then recommended that respondent be
absolved from administrative liability on this ground.
As for the charge of undue delay in
resolving complainant’s notice of appeal, the Investigating Justice brushed
aside respondent’s excuse that she could no longer act on the notice of appeal
since she already inhibited herself from the case. The Investigating Justice
noted that the notice of appeal was filed simultaneously with the motion for
inhibition and that respondent inhibited herself only after complainant filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA
assailing the denial of his motion for intervention. The Investigating Justice
opined that respondent’s inhibition was a mere afterthought to escape liability
for her negligence to act on the notice of appeal.
Finally, the Investigating Justice held
that respondent displayed gross ignorance of the rule on intervention in
denying complainant’s motion for intervention and in ruling that the
complainant’s interest would be better protected in a separate civil action.
While we concur with the Investigating
Justice’s finding that respondent is not guilty of gross misconduct, we are not
in agreement with his recommendation that respondent be held administratively
liable for undue delay in rendering a decision or order and gross ignorance of
the law or procedure.
It is settled that as a matter of policy, the acts
of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability – civil,
criminal or administrative – for any of his official acts, no matter how
erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith.[5]
To hold otherwise would be to render
judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret
the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment.[6]
However, the judges’ inexcusable
failure to observe the basic laws and rules will render them administratively
liable. When the law is so simple and
elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of the
law.[7] In any case,
to constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject
decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official
duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, such
decision, order or act must be attended by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or
corruption. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper
considerations, are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance
of the law can find refuge.[8]
The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. The permissive tenor of the rules shows the
intention to give to the court the full measure of discretion
in permitting or disallowing the intervention.[9]
There is no doubt that respondent was cognizant of
the rule on intervention, and she complied with it in good faith. In fact, respondent has explained that she
denied the motion for intervention because it would only delay, to the
prejudice of the original parties, the civil cases which had already been
pending for almost a decade. Respondent
maintains that she sincerely believed that the rights of the complainant would
be better protected in a separate action. Under the rule on intervention, these are valid
considerations in deciding whether or not to grant a motion to intervene. There
is no showing that respondent judge was motivated by any ill-will in denying
the complainant’s motion for intervention; hence, she cannot be sanctioned therefor.
The filing
of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for the correction of
actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where
a sufficient judicial remedy exists.[10]
Complainant
erroneously thought that when respondent failed to act on his notice of appeal,
he lost his right to appeal the court’s order denying his motion for
intervention and that his only remedy was to file a petition for certiorari with the CA which he, in
fact, filed. He failed to consider that
a party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him, upon the filing
of the notice of appeal
in due time and upon payment of the docket fees. The notice of appeal does not
require the approval of the court. The function of the notice of appeal is
merely to notify the trial court that the appellant was availing of the right
to appeal, and not to seek the court’s permission that he be allowed to pose an
appeal.[11]
The trial court’s only duty with respect to a timely
appeal by notice of appeal is to transmit the original record of the case to
the appellate court. The court is given thirty (30) days from the perfection of
the appeal within which to transmit the record.[12]
We note, however, that complainant also filed a
motion for inhibition on the same day that he filed the notice of appeal. On the 30th day since the notice of
appeal was filed, respondent inhibited herself from the case. It goes without saying that from that time on,
respondent could no longer perform any act pertaining to the complainant’s
appeal. That duty would then devolve upon the judge who will replace the
respondent. Hence, respondent should not be sanctioned for her failure to act
on the notice of appeal after she had inhibited herself from the case.
WHEREFORE, this administrative case against Judge Marivic
Trabajo Daray is DISMISSED.
SO
ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice Acting
Chairperson |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
* Additional
member replacing Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago per raffle dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 7-34.
[2]
Report dated
[3]
Rollo, pp. 195-207
[4]
[5] Maylas, Jr. v. Judge Sese, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2012,
[6]
[7] Enriquez v. Judge Caminade, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1966,
[8]
[9] San Miguel Corporation v. Sandiganbayan, 394 Phil. 608, 651-652
(2000).
[10]
Supra note 5, at 606.
[11]
Victory Liner, Inc. v. Malinias, G.R. No. 151170,
[12]
Rules of Court, Rule 41,
Section 12.