CONRADO Y. LADIGNON,
Complainant, -
versus - JUDGE RIXON M. GARONG, Municipal Trial Court
(MTC), San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija.
Respondent. |
A.M. No.
MTJ-08-1712
(Formerly OCA
IPI NO. 08-2020-MTJ)
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
carpio MORALES, TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: August 20, 2008 |
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R E S O L U T I O N
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BRION, J.: |
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The present administrative case has
its roots in the letter dated July 17, 2006 of Judge Rixon M. Garong, Municipal
Trial Court, San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija (respondent
Judge), addressed to the Chairman, Administrative Council, First United
Methodist Church, 28400 Evergreen, Flat Rock, Michigan, USA 48134. Judge Garong forwarded, through his letter, a
copy of the letter-complaint of one Rolando G. Gustilo of the
The respondent Judge’s letter prompted
Ladignon to complain to the Justices of this Court against the respondent Judge’s
improper conduct as a member of the Judiciary, for his use in a private
communication of his official court stationery and his title as a judge.
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
through a 1st indorsement dated
The respondent Judge admitted using
the letterhead of his court and signing his letter using the word “judge.” He claimed, however, that he merely used an
ordinary bond paper where he typed his court’s station “to indicate the return
or inside address” from where he wrote the letter. He further alleged that he “did not see any
harm or abuse in using the word ‘judge’ on the honest belief that he is entitled
to use such appellation,” and that “[t]he practice of using papers in whatever
sizes with the address of their office printed on it is a very regular
occurrence among government offices, be it a personal or official one.”
On
The
court’s heading or letterhead serves as a primary identifier of the
office. Written correspondence bearing
the court’s heading gives the impression that it has the imprimatur of the
court, and that the signatory carries such representation. Considering this important implication,
scrupulous use of the court’s heading must be observed at all times.
Respondent’s
use of the court’s heading in his personal letter to the First United Methodist
Church (FUMC) in
We agree with the Report that what is
involved here is the rule that “Judges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities”.[1] Indeed, members of the Judiciary should be
beyond reproach and suspicion in their conduct, and should be free from any
appearance of impropriety in the discharge of their official duties as well as
in their personal behavior and everyday life. No position exacts a greater
demand for moral righteousness and uprightness on the individual than a seat in
the Judiciary. Where we significantly
differ with the Report is in its sweeping implication that any use of a court’s
letterhead for non-official transactions would necessarily expose the user to
liability for “impropriety” or giving the “appearance of impropriety”.
The Judge’s claim that he used an ordinary
bond papers and placed thereon his official station as return address is not
totally without merit. For, indeed, this
is not an unusual practice and it would be hypocritical to deny its occurrence
at all levels of the Judiciary. For
example, some members of the Judiciary may use a social card with the
letterhead of their office to indicate their address as well as their station
within the judicial hierarchy; some also use notepads bearing their names,
designation and station.
A thin line, however, exists between
what is proper and what is improper in such use, and this was the line that the
respondent Judge crossed when he used his letterhead and title the way he did. As the Report stated, his use of the
letterhead and his designation as a Judge in a situation of potential dispute
gave “the appearance that there is an implied or assured consent of the court
to his cause.” This circumstance, to our
mind, was what marked the respondent Judge’s use of his letterhead and title as
improper. In other words, the respondent
Judge’s transgression was not per se
in the use of the letterhead, but in not being very careful and discerning in
considering the circumstances surrounding the use of his letterhead and his
title.
To be sure, this is not the first
case relating to the use of a letterhead that this Court has encountered and
passed upon. In Rosauro v. Kallos,[2]
we found the respondent Judge liable for violating Rule 2.03 of the Code of
the Judicial Conduct when he used his stationery for his correspondence on a
private transaction with the complainant and his counsel – parties with a pending case in his
court. The Court held:
By using his sala’s stationery other than for
official purposes, respondent Judge evidently used the prestige of his office x
x x in violation of Rule 2.03 of the Code.
We do not depart from this rule on
the use of official stationary. We
clarify, however, that the use of a letterhead should not be considered independently of the surrounding
circumstances of the use – the underlying reason that marks the use with the element
of “impropriety” or “appearance of impropriety”. In the present case, the respondent Judge crossed
the line of propriety when he used his letterhead to report a complaint involving an alleged violation
of church rules and, possibly, of Philippine laws. Coming from a judge with the letter addressed
to a foreign reader, such report could indeed have conveyed the impression of
official recognition or notice of the reported violation.
The
same problem that the use of letterhead poses, occurs in the use of the title
of “Judge” or “Justice” in the correspondence of a member of the
Judiciary. While the use of the title is
an official designation as well as an honor that an incumbent has earned, a
line still has to be drawn based on the circumstances of the use of the
appellation. While the title can be used
for social and other identification purposes, it cannot be used with the intent
to use the prestige of his judicial office to gainfully advance his personal,
family or other pecuniary interests. Nor
can the prestige of a judicial office be used or lent to advance the private
interests of others, or to convey or permit others to convey the impression
that they are in a special position to influence the judge.[3] To do any of these is to cross into the
prohibited field of impropriety.
Time and
again, this Court has reminded the members of the Judiciary that one who
occupies an exalted position in the administration of justice must pay a high
price for the honor bestowed upon him; his private as well as his official
conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety. Because appearance is as important as reality
in the performance of judicial functions, a judge – like Ceasar’s wife – must
not only be pure and faithful but must be above suspicion.[4]
The respondent Judge, even if he did not intend to take undue advantage of the
use of his letterhead and his title, at least gave the appearance of
impropriety when he did so under the circumstances of his use. To this extent, we find him sufficiently
liable to merit the admonition and warning of this Court regarding any future
inappropriate use of his letterhead and title.
We limit ourselves to an admonition and warning since this is the
respondent’s first brush with our ethical rules and no bad faith or ill motive
attended his actions.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Rixon M. Garong of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija, liable under Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Ethics and Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. We accordingly ADMONISH him to be ever mindful of the standards he has to
observe in his use of his letterhead and title, and WARN
him that a repetition of this transgression shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES DANTE
O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice