SECOND DIVISION
|
JOSE C. SABERON,
Complainant, - versus - ATTY. FERNANDO T. LARONG,
Respondent. |
A.C. No.
6567 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO
MORALES, VELASCO,
JR., BRION, JJ. Promulgated: August 11, 2008 |
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R E S O L U T I ON
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
From this Court’s Decision[1] of
Complainant’s Motion for
Reconsideration[2] asks this Court to hold respondent
guilty of gross misconduct, instead of simple misconduct, for ascribing
blackmail to him in pleadings filed before the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
Respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration,[3]
while it takes no exception to the P2,000 fine imposed on him and which
he has paid,[4] seeks
this Court to declare that the questioned allegations that the case before the BSP was part of blackmailing suits
against his clients for financial gain - albeit couched in intemperate language
- were privileged communication.
As
to complainant’s Motion, his arguments therein were amply discussed and ruled
upon in the Decision sought to be reconsidered.
The Court thus finds no ground to set the Decision aside.
On the other hand, respondent’s
submission that the Answer containing the allegations of blackmail is protected
by the mantle of absolute privilege was already pleaded in his Comment
to Petition for Review[5] that
the allegations were absolutely privileged, like allegations made in any
complaint or initiatory pleading.[6] There, he also proffered, as he now maintains
in his motion, the relevancy or pertinency of the questioned statements to the
issues being litigated before the BSP.
To respondent’s contentions, the Court
ruled that the ascription of “blackmail” in the Answer was not legitimately
related or pertinent to the subject matters of inquiry before the BSP, which were the alleged alien
citizenship and majority stockholding of Alfredo Tan Bonpin in the Surigaonon
Rural Bank. And it reminded respondent
that lawyers, though allowed latitude in making a remark or comment in their
pleadings, should not trench beyond the bounds of relevancy and propriety.
This Court’s ruling stands whether the
statements are in the nature of a counter-complaint or a counterclaim embodied
in the Answer as respondent presently maintains.
Respondent
alternatively contends that the questioned allegations fall within the ambit of
a conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communication under Article 354 (1)[7] of
the Revised Penal Code. He submits that the statements, while opening up a
lawyer to possible administrative sanction for the use of intemperate language
under the Canons of Professional Responsibility, should not strip the pleadings
in which they made their privileged nature.
Respondent’s invocation of the rule
of privileged communication in the present administrative matter is
misplaced. It behooves to state that
this defense is peculiar to the criminal case for libel that respondent faces,
which depends on a totally different and evidently higher quantum of evidence
than is required in this administrative case.
Needless to say, this Court’s ruling as to the administrative liability
of respondent is not conclusive of his guilt or innocence in the libel case.
WHEREFORE, complainant’s
and respondent’s respective Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
RENATO C.
CORONA Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Additional
member in lieu of Justice Dante O. Tinga per Special Order No. 512 dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 283-293.
[2]
[3]
[4] P2,000 payable to the Supreme Court was attached to
respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration to show compliance with the Court’s
order for the payment of the fine.
[5]
[6]
[7] Art. 354(1) of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 354. Requirement
of publicity. – Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it
is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private
communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral or social duty; x x x.