SECOND DIVISION
THE
PEOPLE OF THE
Appellee,
Present:
QUISUMBING,
J.,
- versus
- Chairperson,
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
JAIME
Appellant.
Promulgated:
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
Tinga,
J.:
This
Court is called upon to review the Decision[1]
rendered by the Court of Appeals on
In
an Information dated
That at about
ACTS
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Upon
arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits
ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution is as
follows:
Sixteen-year
old AAA was living with her parents and siblings in a house at Sabang,
Calabanga, Camarines
After committing the dastardly act,
appellant told AAA that he would take her to
On
PPE:
Hematoma
on the right cheek.
Abrasions
on the neck, left side
External Genitalia:
Well
distributed pubic hair
Hematoma
noted on the perineal area
Fresh lacerations,
hymenal at 4, 8, 10 and
Introitus
admits 1 finger with ease
(+)
vaginal bleeding (4th day of menses)[8]
Appellant set up the defense of alibi. He claimed that at
Egay
corroborated the alibi that on
Arnel
Rosco (Arnel) was presented to rebut the testimonies of Egay and Vargas. He stated that on
On
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, accused Jaime del Castillo is found guilty of the crime of
rape as charged. He is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Accused is likewise ordered to pay the private complainant [AAA]
the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as
moral damages and to pay the cost. He is
likewise meted the accessory penalties as provided for under Article 41 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Considering that the accused has undergone preventive imprisonment, he shall be credited in the service of his sentence with the time he has undergone preventive imprisonment subject to the conditions provided for in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO
ORDERED.[13]
The
trial court found the testimony of the victim to be credible, and disregarded
appellant’s defenses of alibi and denial.
The trial court pointed out that the
veracity of the rape accusation was manifested by the following facts: (1) the
spontaneous identification of appellant as the one who raped her; (2) the
immediate revelation of her predicament to her aunt the following day; (3) the
immediate reporting of the incident to the barangay captain; (4) the immediate
reporting thereof to the police; (5) the immediate submission to a medical
examination; and (6) the corroboration between finding of the medico-legal expert
and AAA’s testimony.[14]
The case was directly elevated to
this Court for automatic review. However, pursuant to our decision in People v. Mateo,[15]
this case was transferred to the Court of Appeals which affirmed with
modification the decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated P25,000.00 in addition to
the award of P50,000.00 in civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral
damages.[16]
Appellant filed a notice of appeal on
In the Resolution of
Appellant maintains his innocence and
casts doubt on AAA’s credibility because of the alleged inconsistencies in her
testimony.
In a prosecution for rape, the
victim’s credibility becomes the single most important issue. For, when a woman says she was raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed; thus, if
her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on
the basis thereof.[20]
In this case, the test of credibility of the rape victim was more than
sufficiently met.
AAA’s account of the rape was
spontaneous, categorical and detailed.[21] As
observed by the trial court, she testified in a straightforward manner on the
rape incident from its start until its consummation.[22]
Moreover, the trial court noted that the
inconsistencies adverted to by appellant were “not that substantial which would
lead to discredit her testimony.”[23]
AAA’s apparent conflicting testimonies with respect to the order of injuries
inflicted on her, as well as the time she claimed she told a friend about her
plight are not material to the identification of appellant as the
perpetrator. The failure of a witness to
recall each and every detail of an occurrence may even serve to strengthen
rather than weaken his or her credibility because it erases any suspicion of a coached
or rehearsed testimony.[24]
Appellant
argues that it was improbable for AAA to identify the perpetrator because the
house was without electricity and that it was dark. We are not persuaded. As correctly observed by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), AAA testified that appellant’s face was illuminated by
the light coming from the neighbor’s house.
Besides, AAA was familiar with appellant as the latter had been known to
her for quite some time.[25]
Furthermore, while it is
true that AAA was lying down and thus could
not have seen the face of her assailant at the first instance, she nevertheless
was able to identify him when the latter mounted her.[26]
Appellant’s contention that AAA could not have seen the face of her assailant
as she admitted that she never glanced at him after the assault was
consummated, should likewise fail because at the time appellant supposedly
ordered AAA to turn her back on him, AAA
had already seen and identified his face and the rape had already been
consummated.
Appellant
also questions the failure of AAA to resist the alleged advances considering
that the latter is taller and bigger than him.[27] Against this question, the OSG argues that
appellant, a male, is more powerful than AAA in terms of physical strength
despite the fact that they are of the same height.[28]
It bears stressing that the absence of struggle on the part of the rape victim
does not necessarily negate the commission of the offense. Failure to shout for
help or fight back cannot be equated to voluntary submission to the criminal
intent of the accused. It should be
remembered that AAA was first threatened by appellant with a spoon which the
latter poked at her neck. Fear, in lieu
of force or violence, is subjective. Addressed to the mind of the victim of
rape, its presence cannot be tested by any hard-and-fast rule but must instead
be viewed in the light of the perception and judgment of the victim at the time
of the commission of the crime. In addition, as the Court has repeatedly
observed, people act differently to a given stimulus or type of situation, and
there is no standard form of behavioral response that can be expected from
those who are confronted with a strange, startling or frightening experience.[29]
Appellant
claims that his non-flight is an indication of his innocence. We do not agree. Non-flight is not proof of innocence. The
culprit of a crime may choose to remain within the area of the crime scene
because he lives there and flight may only raise suspicions against him. No
case law exists to support appellant's claim that his non-flight precludes the
possibility that he is guilty of the crime. To accept the defense offered by
appellant would allow people to commit a crime and avoid liability by simply
choosing to stay in the crime scene afterwards.[30]
Appellant’s
alibi was properly rejected by the lower courts. For alibi to prosper, appellant must not only
prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must also
convincingly demonstrate the physical impossibility of his presence at the locus criminis at the time of the
incident.[31] In the instant case, appellant failed to show
that it would have been physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime on the occasion of the rape.
All
told, there is no cogent reason to deviate from the jurisprudential precept
that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are accorded with great respect.
As
a final point, the Court observes that the appellate court erred in awarding
exemplary damages. There is no showing
that any aggravating or qualifying circumstance attended the commission of the rape;
hence, the award of exemplary damages has no factual and legal basis.[32]
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding
appellant Jaime del Castillo guilty of
rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
appellant is ordered to pay AAA (to be identified through the Information) P50,000.00
as civil indemnity and, in addition, P50,000.00 as moral damages. The
award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is DELETED.
SO
ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]Rollo, pp. 2-11; penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe and concurred in by Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Lucas P. Bersamin.
[2]CA rollo, pp. 17-39.
[3]Pursuant
to Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004" and its implementing rules, the real
name of the victim, together with that of her immediate family members, is withheld
and fictitious initials instead are used to represent her, both to protect her
privacy. People v. Cabalquinto, G.R.
No. 167693,
[20]People v. Capareda, G.R. No. 128363,