PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, -
versus - ARIEL JACOB y ZUÑEGA, Accused-Appellant. |
G.R. No. 177151
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairman, carpio MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO, JR., and
BRION,
JJ. Promulgated: August 22, 2008 |
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D E C
I S I O N
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BRION, J.: |
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This is an appeal from the
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The
prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with the crime of rape under
an Information that states:
That on or about 1:00 in the afternoon of
August 7, 2000 at Barangay Gaboc, municipality of Mercedes, province of
Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design and by means of force and
intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had
carnal knowledge of his cousin [AAA],[3] a
minor, against her will and prejudicial to her development as a child, to her
damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
On
arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. The prosecution
presented the following witnesses in the trial on the merits that followed: BBB;
AAA; and Dr. Virginia Barrameda-Mazo. The appellant took the witness stand for
the defense and did not present any other witness.
BBB,
mother of AAA, narrated that at around
BBB testified further that she knows
the appellant because he is the nephew of her present husband, DDD.[9]
She also disclosed that her first husband, EEE, is the natural father of AAA.[10]
On
She is the private complainant in this case
and testified that on
That [sic] her mother brought her to Dr.
Virginia Mazo for genital examination and also to the Police Station of
Mercedes. She filed a complaint for rape against the accused.[16]
On cross examination, she testified that she did not report for school on
August 7, 2000 because she was not permitted by her mother;[17]
that her cousin FFF told her to file rape case against the accused;[18]
that there was misunderstanding between the parents of Ariel Jacob and her
parents.[19] [Footnotes referring to the pertinent parts
of the record supplied]
Dr.
Virginia Barrameda-Mazo (Dr. Mazo), the
Municipal Health Officer of Paracale, Camarines Norte, narrated that she
conducted a physical examination of AAA on
GENITAL EXAMINATION
Pubic hair, no growth. Labia majora,
coaptated, with elongated, semi-oblong reddish contusions on both sides,
extending downwards up to the fourchette area, beginning at the clitoris area.
Labia minora, gaping. Fourchette, tense. Vestibular mucosa, pinkish. Hymen,
short, thin intact. Hymenal orifice measures 1.0 cm. in diameter. Vaginal walls
and rugosities cannot be reached by examining finger.[21]
The appellant was the sole defense witness
and gave a different version of events. He testified that he was in
The
appellant denied knowing AAA[25]
when so asked on cross-examination. He
also claimed that he had asked for permission from the pilot of the fishing
vessel to go on board in order to earn a living. He did not ask his companions in the vessel
to execute affidavits to confirm that he was indeed on board the vessel on
The
RTC primarily considered the testimonies and documentary evidence relevant to
the elements of the crime of rape. It
did not “find it necessary to inquire into the defense of alibi put up by the
defense, it being an established doctrine that the accused [sic] conviction must rest on the
strength of the evidence of the prosecution.” Its decision of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as
moral damages.[26]
The
records of this case were originally transmitted to this Court on appeal. Pursuant to People v. Mateo,[27]
however, we transferred the records to the CA for intermediate review and disposition.[28]
The CA, in a decision[29]
dated
In his Brief,[31] the
appellant argues that the appellate court erred –
1.
in giving full faith
and credence to the incredible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses; and
2.
in convicting him of
the crime charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
THE COURT’S RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to deny
the appeal but modify the amount of the awarded moral damages.
Sufficiency of the
Prosecution Evidence
The Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 8353,[32]
defines and penalizes Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1, as follows:
ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed
-
1) By
a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through
force, threat or intimidation;
b) When
the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By
means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When
the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
x
x x x
Thus, for the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished such
act through force or intimidation, or
when she was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or when she
was under 12 years of age or was demented.[33]
Central in the determination of guilt
for the crime of rape is the credibility of the complainant’s testimony. Rape is a crime largely committed in private
where no witness other than the victim is available.[34] For this reason, jurisprudence has recognized
that the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim,
provided the testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things.[35]
AAA, while recounting her unfortunate
ordeal, positively identified the appellant as the one who raped her. Her
testimony dated
FISCAL FERRER:
Q: You know the accused Ariel Jacob alias
Kitot?
[AAA]:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you know him?
A: Because he undressed me and he put out his penis and showed
it to me.
Q: Your surname is Jacob and the surname of Ariel is also Jacob,
is it not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Are you related to him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In what capacity?
A: He is my cousin.
Q: And you know him by his nickname Kitot?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And the accused alias Kitot you know him for quite some time
already?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And this accused alias
Kitot is inside the courtroom, will you please point him out?
A: That one, Sir.
(Witness
pointing to the accused who gave his name as Ariel Jacob)
COURT:
How
are you commonly called?
ACCUSED:
Kitot,
your Honor.
x x x x
FISCAL
FERRER:
Q: A while ago, you said that Kitot showed to you his penis?
[AAA]:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How did he do it?
A: He inserted his penis
into my vagina.
Q: You mean to say he
placed his penis inside your vagina which according to you his penis was
still wet?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did he remove your panty?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was he able to insert
his penis inside your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what did you feel
when his penis was inside your vagina?
A: It was painful.
Q: When he was inserting
his penis inside your vagina were you lying down?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
A: On the floor.
Q: And for how long was
his penis inside your vagina?
A: For a long time.
Q: More than 2 minutes?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x x
Q: And after Kitot raped
you he gave you P2.00?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you accepted it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why did you accept the P2.00 given by Kitot after raping you?
A: He claimed it back.
Q: After you were raped
he retrieved the P2.00 from you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you claim in your affidavit that your private organ was
painful?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you complain to Kitot? Did you ask him why he was placing his penis inside your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was the answer of Kitot?
A: He told me not to make noise [sic] because it might heard
[sic] by our neighbors.
Q: Did you fight back to Kitot when he was inserting his penis inside your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you do?
A: I boxed him and he
placed my hands on my back.
Q: And because he was strong you were not able to fight him
[sic] back?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After raping you,
where did he go?
A: He went home.
x x x x[36] [Emphasis ours]
The trial court had this to say on this testimony:
X x x This court was impressed by the
testimony (TSN Sept. 18, 2001, pp. 5, 6,
7, 8, 9 & 10) of the complainant as straightforward and “bore the hallmarks of truth.” Moreover,
complainant withstood a punishing cross-examination without wavering despite
some inconsistencies brought about by the minority (10 years old). Imagine a Grade 2 Pupil of Gaboc Elementary
School testifying. She recounted vivid
details of the said incident that could not have been concocted by a girl of
tender age. She was able to establish
that at about
Even
the failure of a rape victim to relate certain details [of] the things done to
her does not lessen her credibility – instead, it indicates her sincerity,
candor and lack of outside suggestion. (People
vs. Pamor, 237 SCRA 22).
The complainant’s testimony similarly
strikes us to be clear, convincing and credible, corroborated as it is in a
major way by witnesses BBB and Dr. Mazo.
Thus, to us, the prosecution positively established the elements of rape
required under Article 266-A. First,
the appellant succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with the victim; AAA was steadfast in her assertion that the
appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. Second, the appellant employed
force in satisfying his lustful desires. AAA categorically stated that she
boxed the appellant while the later was inserting his penis into her vagina;
the appellant however placed AAA’s hand on her back, indicating resistance on
the part of the victim that the appellant overpowered.
The appellant’s defenses
In stark contrast with the
prosecution’s case is the appellant’s weak and uncorroborated defense.
The appellant’s bald claim that he did
not know AAA borders on the incredible as they have common relations and they
lived in the same rural community. It is
likewise disproved by the defense’s own claim that there was a misunderstanding
between their parents that motivated the charge of rape.[37] If their families were close enough to have a
misunderstanding and the victim and her kin knew “Kitot,” it is unlikely that
the latter would not personally know the victim. Related to this is the glaring gap in the
defense - its failure to effectively rebut the positive identification by the
victim that “Kitot” raped her.
The appellant’s defense of alibi –
i.e., that he was on board a fishing vessel going to Lucena City on the date of
the rape incident – comes with all the inherent weaknesses that jurisprudence
has identified with this defense. It is an inherently weak defense that is
viewed with suspicion because it is easy to fabricate.[38] There is likewise the settled rule that a
categorical and positive identification of an accused by an eyewitness who is
not shown to have any ill-motive, prevails over alibi and denial.[39] In sum, alibi and denial must be supported by strong
corroborative evidence in order to merit
credibility.
In the present case, we find no
evidence in the record to corroborate the appellant’s claim that he went on board
a fishing boat to
The appellant also insists that no
carnal knowledge took place because AAA’s hymen is still intact, as the results
of Dr. Mazo’s genital examination showed. The condition of the woman’s hymen,
however, is not conclusive on the question of whether rape has or has not been
committed as the mere introduction of the male organ into the labia majora of the
pudendum[40] is sufficient to consummate rape.[41]
AAA, being a child, would have
difficulty testifying on the particular part of her vagina that was actually
touched. What is certain, however, is that there was touching of the labia as
AAA testified that the appellant’s penis was inserted into her vagina, as a result of which she felt pain. She also
testified that the penis of the appellant was inside her vagina for a long time. Several hours after
the incident, AAA’s vagina was still aching, as testified to by her
mother, BBB. More importantly, Dr. Mazo testified that there were reddish
contusions on the labia majora of the victim’s private part, thus:
PROSECUTOR FERRER:
Q: What was the result of the physical and
genital examination?
DR.
MAZO:
A: There was only one pertinent findings [sic], the contusions on the labia majora.
Q: And that was contained in this medical certificate?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you kindly pinpoint it?
A: The genital examination: “Pubic hair, no growth. Labia
majora, coaptated, with elongated, semi-oblong reddish contusions on both
sides, extending downwards up to the fourchette area, beginning at the clitoris
area.”
x x x x
Q: Did you make a diagram on this findings that there’s a semi-oblong reddish contusions on
both sides of the labia majora, extending downwards, beginning at the
clitoris area?
A: At the bottom of the police report.
x x x x
Q: The color of the contusion was still reddish?
A: It was already in the healing period.
Q: But considering your impression that it was reddish contusion, it was recently inflicted on her labia majora?
A: Yes, sir.
Incidentally, we regard with extreme
disapproval the appellant’s attempt to mislead this Court by citing the case of
People v. Bali-balita[42]
to support his claim that “mere touching
of the labia will not constitute
consummated rape.”[43]
We carefully read this cited case and found nothing therein that supports the appellant’s
contention. On the contrary, the case states in clear and categorical terms
that complete penetration of the penis is
not essential to consummate rape; what is material is that there is the
introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum, no matter how
slight.[44]
Our rulings on this point have been clear and consistent.
In People vs. Dalisay,[45]
we held that full penetration is not required to consummate carnal knowledge,
as proof of entrance showing slightest penetration of the male organ within the
labia or pudendum of the female organ is sufficient. People
v. Bascugin[46] is
likewise a noteworthy case on the present issue as we categorically ruled there
that for rape to be consummated, the hymen of the private complainant need not
be penetrated or ruptured. It is enough that the penis reaches the pudendum, or, at the very least, the labia. The briefest of contacts under
circumstances of force, intimidation or unconsciousness, even without laceration
of the hymen, is deemed to be rape in our jurisprudence.
An apparently desperation move by the
appellant was his attempt to impute ill motive on the part of the victim by
claiming that AAA’s testimony could have been instigated by her parents.
We cannot give weight to this bare
assertion in the absence of sufficient corroborative evidence. We note, too,
that not a few offenders in rape cases attribute the charges against them to
family feuds, resentment or revenge.
These alleged motives, however, cannot prevail over the positive and
credible testimonies of complainants who remain steadfast throughout the trial.[47]
Moreover, it is unnatural for a parent to use his or her offspring as an instrument
of malice, since the ensuing case may subject a daughter to embarrassment and
even to the mark of disgrace that a rape victim may undeservedly carry.[48]
Time and again, we have consistently
held that when a woman states that she has been raped, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that rape was committed. For no woman, least of all a
child, would weave a tale of sexual assault on her person, would open herself
to examination of her private parts, and would risk a public trial and possible
ridicule if she had not, in truth, been raped.
That she came out in the open to complain clearly signals that she
wanted to seek justice for the wrong done to her.[49]
The Proper Penalty
The applicable provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 (effective
Article 266-A. Rape;
When and How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By
a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a)
Through force, threat, or intimidation;
x x x x
Article 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under
paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
x x x x
The lower courts therefore are
correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua on the appellant.
Proper Indemnity
The
award of civil indemnity to the rape victim is mandatory upon
the finding of the fact of rape. Thus, this Court affirms the award of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity based on prevailing jurisprudence.[50]
Moral damages are awarded to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape under
the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she
underwent. This award is separate and
distinct from the awarded civil indemnity.[51] In
light of current jurisprudence that pegs the award at P50,000.00, we
increase the lower court’s award of P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, in view of these
considerations, we AFFIRM the September
21, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01372 in all respects, except for the award of moral damages which we INCREASE from P30,000.00 to
P50,000,00. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D.
BRION
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice Chairperson |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid and concurred in by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo; rollo, pp. 3-13.
[2] Penned
by Judge Sancho Dames II; CA rollo,
pp. 47-51.
[3] This appellation is pursuant to our ruling in People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419, wherein this Court has resolved to withhold the real name of the victim-survivor and to use fictitious initials instead to represent her in its decisions. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victims-survivors or any other information tending to establish or compromise their identities, as well as those of their immediate family or household members, shall not be disclosed.
[4] Records, p. 1.
[5] TSN,
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] TSN,
[11] TSN,
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] TSN,
[21] Records,
p. 7.
[22] TSN,
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] CA rollo, pp. 12-16.
[27] G.R.
Nos. 147678-87,
[28] Per
our Resolution dated
[29] Rollo, pp. 3-13.
[30]
[31] CA rollo, pp. 35-45.
[32] The
Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
[33] People v. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 177294,
[34] People v. Umayam, G.R. No. 147033,
[35] People v Glivano, G.R. No. 177565,
[36] TSN,
[37] Records, p. 120.
[38] See
People v. Glodo, G.R. No. 136085,
July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 535, citing People
v. Carinaga, 409 SCRA 614 (2003).
[39] People v. Bon, G.R No. 166401,
[40] The
pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are
visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons
pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris,
and the vaginal orifice. The mons pubis
is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly
visible from the outside. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the
outer convex surface and the inner surface. See: People v. Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433,
[41] People v. Villarama, G.R. No. 139211,
[42] People v. Bali-balita, G.R. No. 134266,
[43] The
appellant, in his brief, quoted the separate opinion of Justice Bellosillo;
however, it was taken out of context. We quote the pertinent portions of the said
separate opinion: The ponencia also
ruled that “as correctly pointed out by the trial court, hymenal lacerations
which are usually inflicted when there is complete penetration are not
essential in establishing the crime of rape as
it is enough that a slight penetration or entry of the penis into the lips of
the vagina takes place. To dispel any possible misunderstanding or
confusion, this statement must be properly viewed in light of People v. Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433,
[44] People v. Bali-balita, supra note
42.
[45] G.R.
No. 133926
[46] G.R.
No. 144195,
[47] People v. Dalisay, G.R. No. 133926,
[48] People v. Tuazon, G.R. No. 168650,
[49] People v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 168101,
[50] See People v. Resuma, G.R. No. 179189, February 26, 2008; People v. Malicsi, G.R. No. 175833, January 29, 2008.
[51] People v. Nieto, G.R. No. 177756,