NICORP MANAGEMENT AND G.R. No. 176942
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Petitioner, Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Chico-Nazario,
Nachura, and
Reyes, JJ.
LEONIDA DE LEON,
Respondent.
x
------------------------------------------------------ x
SALVADOR R. LIM, G.R. No. 177125
Petitioner,
- versus -
Promulgated:
LEONIDA DE LEON,
Respondent. August 28, 2008
x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
These consolidated petitions assail
the November 8, 2006 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92316, finding respondent Leonida de
Leon as a bonafide tenant of the subject property, thereby reversing and setting
aside the Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 13502[2]
which affirmed the Decision[3]
of the Regional Adjudicator in DARAB Case No. 0402-031-03. Also assailed is the March 1, 2007 Resolution[4]
denying the motions for reconsideration.
On
August 26, 2004, respondent filed a complaint before the Office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Region IV- Province of Cavite,
praying that petitioners Salvador R. Lim and/or NICORP Management and
Development Corporation (NICORP) be ordered to respect her tenancy rights over
a parcel of land located in Barangay Mambog III, Bacoor, Cavite, registered
under TCT No. T-72669 in the name of Leoncia De Leon and Susana De Leon
Loppacher (De Leon sisters), who were likewise impleaded as parties-defendants
in the suit.
Respondent
alleged that she was the actual tiller and cultivator of the land since time
immemorial with full knowledge and consent of the owners, who were her
sisters-in-law; that sometime in 2004, petitioners circulated rumors that they have
purchased the property from the De Leon sisters; that petitioners ignored
respondent’s requests to show proof of their alleged ownership; that on August
12, 2004, petitioners entered the land and uprooted and destroyed the rice
planted on the land and graded portions of the land with the use of heavy
equipment; that the incident was reported to the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office (MARO) which issued a Cease and Desist Order[5] but to no avail.
Respondent
thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to respect her tenancy rights over the
land; restore the land to its original condition and not to convert the same to
non-agricultural use; that any act of disposition of the land to any other
person be declared null and void because as a tenant, she allegedly had a right
of pre-emption or redemption over the land; and for actual damages and attorney’s
fees.[6]
Petitioner
Lim denied that respondent was a tenant of the subject property under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
He alleged that respondent is a septuagenarian who is no longer
physically capable of tilling the land; that the MARO issued a certification[7]
that the land had no registered tenant; that respondent could not be regarded
as a landless tiller under the CARP because she owns and resides in the
property adjacent to the subject land which she acquired through inheritance;
that an Affidavit of Non-Tenancy[8]
was executed by the De Leon sisters when they sold the property to him.
Moreover,
Lim claimed that respondent and her family surreptitiously entered the subject
land and planted a few crops to pass themselves off as cultivators thereof;
that respondent tried to negotiate with petitioner Lim for the sale of the land
to her, as the latter was interested in entering into a joint venture with
another residential developer, which shows that respondent has sufficient
resources and cannot be a beneficiary under the CARP; that the land is no
longer classified as agricultural and could not thus be covered by the CARP. Per certification issued by the Office of the
Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of Bacoor, Cavite, the land is
classified as residential pursuant to a Comprehensive Land Use Plan approved by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.[9]
For its
part, petitioner NICORP asserted that it was not a proper party to the suit
because it has not actually acquired ownership of the property as it is still
negotiating with the owners. However, it
joined in petitioner Lim’s assertion that respondent is not a qualified tenant;
and that the subject land could not be covered by the CARP since it is below
the minimum retention area of five hectares allowed under the program.[10] Eventually, NICORP purchased the subject
property from Lim on October 19, 2004.[11]
The De
Leon sisters did not file a separate answer to respondent's complaint.
Meanwhile,
Provincial Adjudicator Teodoro A. Cidro, to whom the case was assigned, died. Thus, the case was referred to the Office of
the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) for resolution.
In
compliance with the directive of the RARAD, respondent submitted as evidence an
Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate[12]
dated February 20, 1989 to prove that, as a result of her relationship with
her sisters-in-law, she was made a tenant of the land; a tax declaration[13]
showing that the land was classified as irrigated riceland; several affidavits[14]
executed by farmers of adjacent lands stating that respondent and her family
were tenants-farmers on the subject land; and several documents and receipts[15]
to prove the agricultural activities of respondent and her family.
Respondent
likewise submitted a handwritten letter[16] of
Susana De Leon addressed to respondent’s daughter Dolores, showing that the
former purportedly acknowledged respondent's son, Rolando, as the legitimate
tenant-lessee on the land. However,
Rolando died on September 1, 2003 as evidenced by his death certificate.[17]
On
December 6, 2004, the RARAD rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for
failure of respondent to prove by substantial evidence all the requisites of an
agricultural tenancy relationship.[18] There was no evidence to show that the De
Leon sisters constituted respondent as tenant-lessee on the land; neither was
it proved that there was sharing of harvests with the landowner.
The
DARAB affirmed the decision of the RARAD.[19]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and
set aside the findings of the RARAD/DARAB stating that there was sufficient
evidence to prove the elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship; that the
letter of Susana De Leon to Dolores clearly acknowledged respondent’s son,
Rolando, as a tenant, as well as respondent’s share in the proceeds of the sale
of the land; and that the sharing of produce was established by the affidavits
of neighboring farmers that were not controverted by petitioners.
The
appellate court further held that the reclassification of the land by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan as residential cannot be given weight because it is
only the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) that can reclassify or convert an
agricultural land to other uses or classifications; and that the sale of the
land by the De Leon sisters to petitioner Lim is void because it violated
Section 70 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657[20]
or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).
Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.[21] Hence, petitioners Lim and NICORP separately
filed petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which were consolidated
per resolution of the Court dated June 4, 2007.[22]
Petitioners allege that respondent
failed to prove by substantial evidence all the elements of a tenancy relationship;
hence the Court of Appeals erred in finding that respondent has tenancy rights
over the subject land.
The
petitions are meritorious.
There
is a tenancy relationship if the following essential elements concur: 1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject
matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between
the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring
about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of
the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between
landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.[23] All the foregoing requisites must be proved by
substantial evidence and the absence of one will not make an alleged tenant a de
jure tenant.[24] Unless a person has established his status as
a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure or covered by
the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.[25]
In the instant
case, there is no substantial evidence to support the appellate court’s
conclusion that respondent is a bona fide tenant on the subject property.
Respondent failed to prove the third and
sixth elements cited above. It was not
shown that the De Leon sisters consented to a tenancy relationship with
respondent who was their sister-in-law; or that the De Leon sisters received
any share in the harvests of the land from respondent or that the latter
delivered a proportionate share of the harvest to the landowners pursuant to a
tenancy relationship.
The
letter of Susana De Leon to Dolores, which allegedly proved consent of the De
Leon sisters to the tenancy arrangement, partially reads:
Nuong ako ay nandiyan, hindi nagkaayos ang bukid kasi ang
iyong Kuya Roly ay ayaw na si Noli ang ahente. Pero bago ako umalis ay
nagkasundo kami ni Buddy Lim (Salvador) na aayusin niya at itutuloy ang bilihan
at siya ang bahala sa Kuya Roly mo.
Kaya nagkatapos kami at ang kasama ng Kuya mo ngayon ay
si Buddy Lim. Ang pera na para sa kasama ay na kay Buddy Lim. Ang kaparte ng
Nanay Onching (Leoncia) mo ay nasa akin ang karamihan at ako na ang
mag-aasikaso.
The
Court cannot agree with the appellate court’s conclusion that from the tenor of
the letter, it is clear that Susana acknowledged respondent's deceased son as “kasama”
or tenant, and recognized as well respondent’s share in the proceeds of the
sale, thus proving the existence of an implied leasehold relations between the
De Leon sisters and respondent.[26] The word “kasama” could be taken in varying
contexts and not necessarily in relation to an agricultural leasehold
agreement. It is also unclear whether
the term “kasama” referred to respondent's deceased son, Rolando, or some other
person. In the first sentence of the
second paragraph, the word “kasama” referred to petitioner Lim while the second
sentence of the same paragraph, did not refer by name to Rolando as “kasama.”
Likewise,
“Nanay Onching,” as mentioned in the letter, referred to Leoncia, one of the De
Leon sisters, on whose behalf Susana kept part of the proceeds of the sale, and
not herein respondent as understood by the Court of Appeals, who had no right
to such share. It is Leoncia who
co-owned the property with Susana and who is therefore entitled to a part of
the sale proceeds.
Significantly,
respondent was not mentioned at all in Susana’s letter, but only her son,
Rolando. However, even if we construe
the term “kasama” as pertaining to Rolando as a tenant of the De Leon sisters,
respondent will not necessarily be conferred the same status as tenant upon her
son’s death. A direct ascendant or
parent is not among those listed in Section 9 of Republic Act No. 3844 which specifically
enumerates the order of succession to the leasehold rights of a deceased or
incapacitated agricultural tenant, to wit:
In case of death or permanent incapacity of the
agricultural lessee to work his landholding, the leasehold shall continue
between the agricultural lessor and the person who can cultivate the
landholding personally, chosen by agricultural lessor within one month from
such death or permanent incapacity, from among the following: a) the surviving
spouse; b) the eldest direct descendant by consanguinity; or (c) the next
eldest descendant or descendants in the order of their age. x x x Provided,
further that in the event that the agricultural lessor fails to exercise
his choice within the period herein provided, the priority shall be in
accordance with the order herein established.
There is no evidence that the De Leon sisters
consented to constitute respondent as their tenant on the subject land. As correctly found by the RARAD/DARAB, even
the Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate that respondent offered in evidence to
prove the alleged consent does not contain any statement from which such
consent can be inferred.[27] Absent any other evidence to prove that the De
Leon sisters consented to the tenurial arrangement, respondent’s cultivation of
the land was by mere tolerance of her sisters-in-law.
The
appellate court found that the element of sharing in the produce of the land
was established by the affidavits of neighboring farmers attesting to the fact
that respondent cultivated the land since time immemorial.[28] However, perusal of the said affidavits reveals
that there is nothing therein that would indicate a sharing of produce between
the De Leon sisters and respondent. The
affidavits did not mention at all that the De Leon sisters received a portion
of the harvests or that respondent delivered the same to her sisters-in-law. The affidavits failed to disclose the
circumstances or details of the alleged harvest sharing; it merely stated that
the affiants have known respondent to be the cultivator of the land since time
immemorial. It cannot therefore be
deemed as evidence of harvest sharing.
The
other pieces of evidence submitted by respondent likewise do not prove the
alleged tenancy relationship. The
summary report of the Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation, the official
receipts issued by the National Food Authority and the certificate of
membership in Bacoor Agricultural Multi-Purpose Cooperative,[29]
only prove that respondent and her family engaged in agricultural activities
but not necessarily her alleged status as tenant of the De Leon sisters. Besides, these documents are not even in the
name of respondent but were issued in favor of her daughter Dolores.
That respondent
was allowed to cultivate the property without opposition, does not mean that the
De Leon sisters impliedly recognized the existence of a leasehold relation with
respondent. Occupancy and continued possession of the land will not ipso
facto make one a de jure tenant.[30] The principal factor in determining whether a
tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy
is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does
upon the land but is, moreso, a legal relationship.[31]
Thus, the intent of the
parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements,
provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are more
important.[32]
Finally,
the sale of the subject land to petitioners did not violate Sections 65[33]
and 73[34]
(c) of R.A. No. 6657. There was no
illegal conversion of the land because Sec. 65 applies only to lands which were
covered by the CARP, i.e. those lands beyond the five-hectare retention limit
allowed to landowners under the law, which were distributed to
farmers-beneficiaries. In the instant
case, it was not shown that the subject land was covered by the CARP. Neither
was it shown that the sale was made to circumvent the application of R.A. 6657
or aimed at dispossessing tenants of the land that they till.
The
sale of the land to petitioners likewise did not violate R.A. No. 3844 or the
Agricultural Tenancy Act. Considering
that respondent has failed to establish her status as de jure tenant, she has no right of pre-emption or redemption under
Sections 11[35] and 12[36]
of the said law. Even assuming that
respondent’s son Rolando was a tenant of the De Leon sisters, his death
extinguished any leasehold on the subject land. Section 8[37]
of R.A. 3844 specifically provides for the extinction of an agricultural
leasehold relation, in the absence of persons enumerated under Section 9 of the
law who are qualified to succeed the deceased tenant.
WHEREFORE,
the petitions are GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92316 and the Resolution
denying the motions for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board in DARAB Case No. 13502, which affirmed
in toto the Decision of the Regional Adjudicator in DARAB Case No.
0402-031-03, dismissing the complaint of respondent Leonida De Leon for
lack of merit, is REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo in G.R. No. 177125, pp. 42-49;
penned by Associate Justice Santiago Javier Ranada and concurred in by
Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Jose C. Mendoza.
[2] Id. at 34-41.
[3] Id. at 21-31.
[4] Id. at 61-62; penned by Associate
Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C.
Mendoza and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente.
[5] CA
rollo, p. 156.
[6] Id. at 33-37.
[7] Id. at 54.
[8] Id. at 57.
[9] Id. at 47-50.
[10] Id. at 59.
[11] Rollo in G.R. No. 176942, pp. 27-28.
[12]
CA rollo, p. 128.
[13] Id. at 132.
[14] Id. at 133-135.
[15] Id. at 137-143.
[16] Id. at 146-147.
[17] Id. at 145.
[18] Rollo in G.R. No. 177125, pp. 27-31.
[19] Id. at 34-41.
[20] Id. at 46-48.
[21] Id. at 61-62.
[22] Id. at 63.
[23] Dalwampo v. Quinocol Farm Workers and
Settlers’ Association, G.R. No. 160614, April 25, 2006, 488 SCRA 208, 221.
[24] Suarez v. Saul, G.R. No. 166664, October
20, 2005, 473 SCRA 628, 634.
[25] Ambayec v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
162780, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 537, 543.
[26] Rollo in G.R. No. 177125, p. 47.
[27] Rollo in G.R. No. 176942, p. 36.
[28] CA
rollo, pp. 133-136.
[29] Id. at 137-142.
[30] Ambayec v. Court of Appeals, supra note 25 at 545.
[31] Sialana v. Avila, G.R. No. 143598, July
20, 2006, 495 SCRA 501, 507-508.
[32] Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 170346, March 12, 2007, 518 SCRA 202, 210.
[33]
SECTION 65. Conversion of Lands.-
After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be
economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has
become urbanized and the land will have greater economic value for residential,
commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary
or the landowner, with due notice to the effected parties, and subject to
existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and
its disposition: Provided, That the
beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.
[34]
SECTION 73. Prohibited Acts and Omissions. – The following are prohibited:
x x x x
(c) The conversion by any landowner of
his agricultural land into any non-agricultural use with intent to avoid the
application of this Act to his landholdings and to dispossess his tenant
farmers of the land tilled by them.
[35]
SEC. 11. Lessee’s Right of Pre-emption. – In case the agricultural lessor
decides to sell the landholding, the agricultural lessee shall have the
preferential right to buy the same under reasonable terms and conditions: Provided That the entire landholding
offered for sale must be pre-empted by the Land Authority if the landowner so
desires unless the majority of the lessees object to such acquisition: x x x.
[36]
SEC. 12. Lessee’s Right of Redemption. – In case the landholding is sold to
a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter
shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and
consideration: Provided, That the entire landholding sold must
be redeemed: x x x.
[37]
SEC. 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relations. – The
agricultural leasehold relation established under this Code shall be
extinguished by:
x x x x
(3) Absence of the persons under Section
nine to succeed to the lessee, in the
event of death or permanent incapacity of the lessee.