THIRD DIVISION
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LEO WEE, Petitioner, - versus - GEORGE DE CASTRO (on his
behalf and as attorney-in-fact of ANNIE DE CASTRO and FELOMINA UBAN) and
Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 176405 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: August 20, 2008 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioner Leo Wee,
seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision[2]
dated
In their Complaint[5]
filed on 1 July 2002 with the MTC of
Alaminos City, docketed as Civil
Case No. 1990, respondents alleged that they are the registered
owners of the subject property, a two-storey building erected on a parcel of
land registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 16193 in the
Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan, described and bounded as follows:
A parcel of
land (Lot 13033-D-2, Psd-01550-022319, being a portion of P93,400.00.[6]
Respondents rented out the subject property to
petitioner on a month to month basis for P9,000.00 per
month.[7] Both parties agreed that effective P9,000.00
to P15,000.00. Petitioner,
however, failed or refused to pay the corresponding increase on rent when his
rental obligation for the month of
It must be noted, at this point, that although the Complaint stated that it was
being filed by all of the respondents, the Verification and the Certificate of
Non-Forum Shopping were signed by respondent George de Castro alone. He would subsequently attach to his position
paper filed before the MTC on 28 October 2002 the Special Powers of Attorney
(SPAs) executed by his sisters Annie de Castro and Felomina de Castro Uban
dated 7 February 2002 and 14 March 2002 respectively, authorizing him to institute
the ejectment case against petitioner.
Petitioner, on the other hand, countered that
there was no agreement between the parties to increase the monthly rentals and
respondents’ demand for an increase was exorbitant. The agreed monthly rental was only for the
amount of P9,000.00 and he was religiously paying the same every
month. Petitioner then argued that
respondents failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirement of
conciliation before the Barangay Lupon
prior to the filing of Civil Case. No.
1990, meriting the dismissal of their Complaint therein. The Certification to file action issued by
the Barangay Lupon appended to
the respondents’ Complaint merely referred to the issue of rental increase and
not the matter of ejectment. Petitioner
asserted further that the MTC lacked jurisdiction over the ejectment suit,
since respondents’ Complaint was devoid of any allegation that there was an
“unlawful withholding” of the subject property by the petitioner.[8]
During the Pre-Trial Conference[9]
held before the MTC, the parties stipulated that in May 2002, petitioner tendered to respondents the sum of P9,000.00 as rental payment for the month of January 2002;
petitioner paid rentals for the months of October 2001 to January 2002 but only
in the amount of P9,000.00 per month; respondents, thru counsel, sent a
letter to petitioner on 10 June 2002 terminating their lease agreement which
petitioner ignored; and the Barangay Lupon did issue a
Certification to file action after the parties failed to reach an agreement
before it.
After the submission
of the parties of their respective Position Papers, the MTC, on
WHEREFORE,
premised considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the dismissal of this
case. Costs against the [herein respondents].
On appeal, docketed as Civil Case No. A-2835, the RTC of Alaminos,
Pangasinan, Branch 54, promulgated its Decision[11]
dated P9.000.00 per month for the rent of the subject property, and no
concession was reached by the parties to increase such amount to P15.000.00,
petitioner cannot be faulted for paying only the originally agreed upon monthly
rentals. Adopting petitioner’s position,
the RTC declared that respondents’ failure to refer the matter to the Barangay court for conciliation process
barred the ejectment case, conciliation before the Lupon being a condition sine
qua non in the filing of ejectment suits.
The RTC likewise agreed with petitioner in ruling that the allegation in
the Complaint was flawed, since respondents failed to allege that there was an
“unlawful withholding” of possession of the subject property, taking out Civil
Case No. 1990 from the purview of an
action for unlawful detainer. Finally, the
RTC decreed that respondents’ Complaint failed to comply with the rule that a
co-owner could not maintain an action without joining all the other
co-owners. Thus, according to the
dispositive portion of the RTC Decision:
WHEREFORE
the appellate Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the court a quo. The Decision dated
Undaunted, respondents filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari[13]
with the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90906. Respondents argued in their Petition that the
RTC gravely erred in ruling that their failure to comply with the conciliation
process was fatal to their Complaint, since it is only respondent George de
Castro who resides in Alaminos City, Pangasinan, while respondent Annie de
Castro resides in Pennsylvania, United States of America (USA); respondent
Felomina de Castro Uban, in California, USA; and respondent Jesus de Castro,
now substituted by his wife, Martiniana, resides in Manila. Respondents further claimed that the MTC was
not divested of jurisdiction over their Complaint for ejectment because of the
mere absence therein of the term “unlawful withholding” of their subject
property, considering that they had sufficiently alleged the same in their
Complaint, albeit worded differently.
Finally, respondents posited that the fact that only respondent George
de Castro signed the Verification and the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping
attached to the Complaint was irrelevant since the other respondents already
executed Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) authorizing him to act as their attorney-in-fact in the
institution of the ejectment suit against the petitioner.
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated June 27, 2005
issued by the RTC of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 54, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A new one is hereby rendered
ordering [herein petitioner] Leo Wee to SURRENDER and VACATE the leased
premises in question as well as to pay the sum of P15,000.00 per month reckoned
from March, 2002 until he shall have actually turned over the possession
thereof to petitioners plus the rental arrearages of P30,000.00
representing unpaid increase in rent for the period from October, 2001 to
February, 2002, with legal interest at 6% per annum to be computed from June 7,
2002 until finality of this decision and 12% thereafter until full payment
thereof. Respondent is likewise hereby
ordered to pay petitioners the amount of P20,000.00 as and for
attorney’s fees and the costs of suit.[14]
In a Resolution dated
Petitioner
is now before this Court via the Petition at bar, making the following
assignment of errors:
I.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT CONCILIATION PROCESS
IS NOT A JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT NON-COMPLIANCE THEREWITH DOES NOT
AFFECT THE JURISDICTION IN EJECTMENT CASE;
II.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE
ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT DESPITE THE WANT OF ALLEGATION OF
“UNLAWFUL WITHOLDING PREMISES” (sic) QUESTIONED BY PETITIONER;
III.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FILING OF THE
COMPLAINT OF RESPONDENT GEORGE DE CASTRO WITHOUT JOINING ALL HIS OTHER
CO-OWNERS OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS PROPER;
IV.
THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR
NO. 10 WHICH DIRECTS A PLEADER TO INDICATE IN HIS PLEADINGS HIS OFFICIAL
RECEIPT OF HIS PAYMENT OF HIS IBP DUES.[15]
Petitioner avers that respondents failed to go
through the conciliation process before the Barangay Lupon, a jurisdictional defect that bars
the legal action for ejectment. The
Certification to file action dated
The barangay justice system was
established primarily as a means of easing up the congestion of cases in the
judicial courts. This could be
accomplished through a proceeding before the barangay courts which,
according to the one who conceived of the system, the late Chief Justice Fred
Ruiz Castro, is essentially arbitration in character; and to make it truly
effective, it should also be compulsory. With this primary objective of the barangay
justice system in mind, it would be wholly in keeping with the underlying
philosophy of Presidential Decree No. 1508 (Katarungang
Pambarangay Law), which would be better served if an out-of-court
settlement of the case is reached voluntarily by the parties.[16]
To ensure this objective, Section 6 of
Presidential Decree No. 1508 requires the parties to undergo a conciliation
process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo
as a precondition to filing a complaint in court subject to certain
exceptions. The said section has been
declared compulsory in nature.[17]
Presidential Decree No. 1508 is now incorporated
in Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code), which took effect on
The pertinent provisions of the Local Government
Code making conciliation a precondition to the filing of complaints in court
are reproduced below:
SEC. 412. Conciliation.-
(a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. – No complaint,
petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of
the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other
government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation
between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no
conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon
secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman
or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.
(b) Where parties may go directly
to court. – The parties may go directly to court in the following instances:
(1) Where the accused is under detention;
(2) Where a
person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas
corpus proceedings;
(3) Where
actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction,
attachment, delivery of personal property, and support pendente lite;
and
(4) Where
the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.
(c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural communities. –
The customs and traditions of indigenous cultural communities shall be applied
in settling disputes between members of the cultural communities.
SEC. 408. Subject
Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. – The lupon of each
barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing
in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes
except:
(a)
Where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof;
(b) Where
one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;
(c)
Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding
Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d)
Offenses where there is no private offended party;
(e)
Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or
municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(f)
Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities
or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the
parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon;
(g)
Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the
interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
There is no question that the parties to this
case appeared before the Barangay Lupon for conciliation
proceedings. There is also no dispute
that the only matter referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation was
the rental increase, and not the ejectment of petitioner from the subject
property. This is apparent from a
perusal of the Certification to file action in court issued by the Barangay Lupon on
CERTIFICATION
TO FILE COMPLAINTS
This is to
certify that:
1. There was personal confrontation
between parties before the barangay Lupon regarding rental increase of a
commercial building but conciliation failed;
2. Therefore, the corresponding dispute of
the above-entitled case may now be filed in Court/Government Office.[18] (Emphasis ours.)
The question now to be resolved by this Court is
whether the Certification dated 18 January 2002 issued by the Barangay Lupon
stating that no settlement was reached by the parties on the matter of rental
increase sufficient to comply with the prior conciliation requirement under the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law to
authorize the respondents to institute the ejectment suit against petitioner.
The Court rules affirmatively.
While it is true that the Certification to file
action dated
We now proceed to discuss the meat of the
controversy.
The contract of lease between the parties did not
stipulate a fixed period. Hence, the parties
agreed to the payment of rentals on a monthly basis. On this score, Article 1687 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art.
1687. If the period for the lease has
not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent
agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from
week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be
paid daily. However, even though a monthly rent is paid, and no period for the lease
has been set, the courts may fix a longer term for the lease after the lessee
has occupied the premises for over one year. If the rent is weekly, the courts
may likewise determine a longer period after the lessee has been in possession
for over six months. In case of daily rent, the courts may also fix a longer
period after the lessee has stayed in the place for over one month. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The rentals being paid monthly, the period of
such lease is deemed terminated at the end of each month. Thus, respondents have every right to demand
the ejectment of petitioners at the end of each month, the contract having
expired by operation of law. Without a
lease contract, petitioner has no right of possession to the subject property
and must vacate the same. Respondents,
thus, should be allowed to resort to an action for ejectment before the MTC to
recover possession of the subject property from petitioner.
Corollarily, petitioner’s ejectment, in this
case, is only the reasonable consequence of his unrelenting refusal to comply
with the respondents’ demand for the payment of rental increase agreed upon by
both parties. Verily, the lessor’s right
to rescind the contract of lease for non-payment of the demanded increased
rental was recognized by this Court in Chua v. Victorio[19]:
The right of
rescission is statutorily recognized in reciprocal obligations, such as
contracts of lease. In addition to the
general remedy of rescission granted under Article 1191 of the Civil Code,
there is an independent provision granting the remedy of rescission for breach
of any of the lessor or lessee’s statutory obligations. Under Article 1659 of
the Civil Code, the aggrieved party may, at his option, ask for (1) the
rescission of the contract; (2) rescission and indemnification for damages; or
(3) only indemnification for damages, allowing the contract to remain in force.
Payment of
the rent is one of a lessee’s statutory obligations, and, upon non-payment by
petitioners of the increased rental in September 1994, the lessor acquired the
right to avail of any of the three remedies outlined above. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner next argues that respondent George de Castro cannot maintain
an action for ejectment against petitioner, without joining all his co-owners.
Article 487 of the New Civil Code is explicit on
this point:
ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment.
This article covers all kinds of action for the
recovery of possession, i.e., forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of
possession (accion publiciana), and
recovery of ownership (accion de
reivindicacion). As explained by the renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino[20]:
A co-owner may bring
such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as
co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of
all. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he
claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not
prosper. (Emphasis added.)
In the more recent case of Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman,[21]
this Court declared that a co-owner is not even a necessary party to an action
for ejectment, for complete relief can be afforded even in his absence, thus:
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all
co-owners are real parties in interest.
However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and the relevant
jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action for the
recovery of co-owned properties.
Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the
suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party
thereto. The other co-owners are not
indispensable parties. They are not even
necessary parties, for a complete relief can be afforded in the suit even without
their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the
benefit of all co-owners.
Moreover, respondents Annie de Castro and Felomina de Castro Uban each
executed a Special Power of Attorney, giving respondent George de Castro the
authority to initiate Civil Case No. 1990.
A power of attorney is an instrument in writing by which one person, as
principal, appoints another as his agent and confers upon him the authority to
perform certain specified acts or kinds of acts on behalf of the
principal. The written authorization
itself is the power of attorney, and this is clearly indicated by the fact that
it has also been called a “letter of attorney.”[22]
Even then, the Court views the SPAs as mere surplusage, such that the
lack thereof does not in any way affect the validity of the action for
ejectment instituted by respondent George de Castro. This also disposes of petitioner’s contention
that respondent George de Castro lacked the authority to sign the Verification
and the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping.
As the Court ruled in
We likewise hold that the execution of the certification against forum
shopping by the attorney-in-fact in the case at bar is not a violation of the
requirement that the parties must personally sign the same. The attorney-in-fact, who has authority to
file, and who actually filed the complaint as the representative of the
plaintiff co-owner, pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney, is a party to the
ejectment suit. In fact, Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
includes the representative of the owner in an ejectment suit as one of the
parties authorized to institute the proceedings. (Emphasis supplied.)
Failure by respondent George de Castro to attach the said SPAs to the
Complaint is innocuous, since it is undisputed that he was granted by his
sisters the authority to file the action for ejectment against petitioner prior
to the institution of Civil Case No. 1990. The SPAs in his favor were
respectively executed by respondents Annie de Castro and Felomina de Castro
Uban on 7 February 2002 and 14 March 2002; while Civil Case No. 1990 was filed by respondent George de Castro on
his own behalf and on behalf of his siblings only on 1 July 2002, or way after he was given by his siblings the
authority to file said action. The Court
quotes with approval the following disquisition of the Court of Appeals:
Moreover, records show that [herein respondent]
George de Castro was indeed authorized by his sisters Annie de Castro and
Felomina de Castro Uban, to prosecute the case in their behalf as shown by the
Special Power of Attorney dated
Respondent deceased Jesus de Castro’s failure to sign the Verification
and Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping may be excused since he already executed
an Affidavit[25] with respondent George
de Castro that he had personal knowledge of the filing of Civil Case No.
1990. In Torres v. Specialized
Packaging Development Corporation,[26]
the Court ruled that the personal signing of the verification requirement was
deemed substantially complied with when, as in the instant case, two out of 25 real parties-in-interest, who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge
and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition, signed the
verification attached to it.
In the same vein, this Court is not persuaded by petitioner’s assertion
that respondents’ failure to allege the jurisdictional fact that there was
“unlawful withholding” of the subject property was fatal to their cause of
action.
It is apodictic that what determines the nature of an action as well as
which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations in the complaint and
the character of the relief sought. In an unlawful detainer case, the
defendant’s possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so upon the
expiration of his right to possess. Hence, the phrase “unlawful
withholding” has been held to imply possession on the part of defendant, which
was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract, express or
implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant.[27]
In Barba v. Court of Appeals,[28] the Court held that although the phrase “unlawfully withholding” was
not actually used by therein petitioner in her complaint, the Court held that
her allegations, nonetheless, amounted to an unlawful withholding of the
subject property by therein private respondents, because they continuously
refused to vacate the premises even after notice and demand.
In the Petition at bar, respondents alleged in their Complaint that
they are the registered owners of the subject property; the subject
property was being occupied by the petitioner pursuant to a monthly lease
contract; petitioner refused to accede to respondents’ demand for rental
increase; the respondents sent petitioner a letter terminating the lease
agreement and demanding that petitioner vacate and turn over the possession of
the subject property to respondents; and despite such demand, petitioner failed
to surrender the subject property to respondents.[29] The Complaint sufficiently alleges the
unlawful withholding of the subject property by petitioner, constitutive of
unlawful detainer, although the exact words “unlawful withholding” were not
used. In an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the
defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed
sufficient, without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.[30]
Petitioner’s averment that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed
respondents’ Petition in light of the failure of their counsel to attach the
Official Receipt of his updated payment of Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
dues is now moot and academic, since respondents’ counsel has already duly
complied therewith. It must be stressed
that judicial cases do not
come and go through the portals of a court of law by the mere mandate of
technicalities.[31] Where a rigid application of the rules will
result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities should
be disregarded in order to resolve the case. [32]
Finally, we agree in the ruling of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable for the payment of back rentals, attorney’s fees and cost of the suit. Respondents must be duly indemnified for the loss of income from the subject property on account of petitioner’s refusal to vacate the leased premises.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the instant Petition is DENIED.
The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-25.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe
with Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Rosmari D. Carandang, concurring;
rollo, pp. 27-36.
[3] Rollo, p. 38.
[4] During the proceedings, respondent Jesus de Castro died
and was substituted in this action by his widow, Martiniana de Castro.
[5] Rollo, pp.
39-44.
[6] CA rollo, pp.
33-34.
[7] The records do
not show when the lease agreement started.
[8] Rollo, p. 47.
[9]
[10] CA rollo, pp. 33-42.
[11] Rollo, pp. 46-49.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] People v. Caruncho, Jr., 212 Phil. 16, 27 (1984).
[17] Morata v. Go, 210 Phil. 367, 372 (1983).
[18] CA rollo, p.
28.
[19] G.R. No. 157568,
[20] Tolentino, Civil
Code of the
[21] G.R. No. 160347,
[22] 3 Am. Jur. 2d, 433.
[23] G.R. No. 156402,
[24] Rollo, pp. 32-33.
[25] CA rollo, p. 34.
[26] G.R. No. 149634,
[27] Umpoc v. Mercado,
G.R. No. 158166,
[28] 426 Phil. 598 (2002) as cited in Umpoc v. Mercado, id.
[29] Rollo, pp. 39-45.
[30] Javelosa v. Court
of Appeals, 333 Phil. 331, 339 (1996).
[31] Fulgencio v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 457 Phil. 868, 880-881 (2003).
[32]