Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
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VICTORIA FERNANDO, |
G.R. No. 176282 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, |
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Chairperson, |
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-versus- |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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NACHURA, and |
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REYES, JJ. |
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SPS. REGINALDO LIM and Respondents. |
Promulgated: August 22, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before
the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the August 31, 2006 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the ejectment
of Victoria Fernando (petitioner) from
the property of Spouses Reginaldo and Asuncion Lim; and the January 15, 2007 CA
Resolution[2]
which denied the motion for reconsideration.
The
relevant facts are of record.
Lim
Kieh Tong and Sons, Inc. (LKTSI) was the owner of a
parcel of land with an area of 400 sq. meters,
known as Lot 1 of the
consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-320, located at Blumentritt
Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila and registered in its name under Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 125241..[3]
On
the property are improvements registered in the name of LKTSI under Tax
Declaration No. 00198.[4]
Among these improvements is Unit 1682 which, as of P10,412.00 plus withholding tax of P520.60
or a total of P10,932.60.[5]
When
it was about to be dissolved, LKTSI executed on April 1, 2004 a Deed of
Assignment of Real Property,[6]
transferring by way of liquidating
dividends all its rights and interests in the property covered by TCT No.
125241 to its stockholder, respondent Reginaldo Lim.
Spouses
Reginaldo and Asuncion Lim (respondents) subdivided
the assigned property and registered their title to the larger portion under
TCT No. 263331, and to the smaller
portion -- which covers Unit 1682 --
under TCT No. 264835.[7]
They also registered in their
names the improvements on the assigned property under Tax Declaration No.
00182.[8]
In
a letter dated
We are writing you in behalf of our client, Mr. Reginaldo Lim, to formally inform you that he is now the new owner of the property you are presently leasing. Please find attached a copy of his title to the said property.
Our client
decided not to renew or extend any lease agreement you may have entered with
the previous owner. We understand that your lease of the property is on a month-to-month
basis. Hence, your lease contract ends on
We trust that you will see yourself clear on this matter and surrender peacefully the possession of the leased premises to our client.[9]
As their demand went unheeded, respondents filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 16, P25,000.00 and attorney's fees.
In
her Answer,[11] petitioner
questioned the jurisdiction of the MeTC in
view of an issue of title over Unit 1682 that she raised in a complaint[12] she filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to annul the April 1, 2004 deed of assignment for
violation of Sec. 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1517 (P.D. No. 1517), which
states:
Sec. 6. Land Tenancy
in Urban Land Reform Areas. Within the Urban Zones legitimate tenants who
have resided on the land for ten years or more who have built their homes on
the land and residents who have legally occupied the lands by contract,
continuously for the last ten years shall not be dispossessed of the land and
shall be allowed the right of first refusal to purchase the same within a
reasonable time and at reasonable prices, under terms and conditions to be
determined by the Urban Zone Expropriation and Land Management Committee
created by Section 8 of this Decree.
She pointed out that the MeTC could not decide
the complaint for ejectment
without determining whether the assignment of Unit 1682 to respondents
impinged on her preemptive rights under P.D. No. 1517; that the MeTC would also have to determine whether respondents could
legally eject her despite the express prohibition against her dispossession
under said law; and that, therefore, as the issues of possession and title
could not be adjudicated separately, the case should have been brought before
the RTC, not the MeTC.[13]
Petitioner further argued that respondents had no cause of
action for ejectment because they did not serve on
her a valid demand to pay rent and vacate, or resort to barangay
conciliation.[14] Petitioner was never remiss in her obligations
under the monthly lease contract; and under the Rent Control Law, expiration of
contract is not a valid ground for ejectment. [15]
After
the parties submitted their position papers, the MeTC
rendered a Decision[16]
dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff [respondents] and against the defendant [petitioners]:
1. Ordering the defendant [petitioner] and all persons claiming right under her to vacate the subject premises and peacefully surrender possession of the property located at 1682 Blumentritt, Sta. Cruz, Manila;
2. Ordering the defendant
[petitioner] to pay a reasonable monthly
rental of P25,000.00 to plaintiffs [respondents] computed from the time
the instant action was filed up to the time the subject premises is completely
vacated and surrendered to plaintiffs [respondents];
3. Ordering the defendant
[petitioner] to pay plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees.
4. Without Costs.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Petitioner
appealed to the RTC, Branch 20,
Moreover,
in the event that the complaint for ejectment be
found proper, petitioner invoked the protection against ejectment
provided under existing rent control laws. She argued that, contrary to the
ruling of the MeTC, said laws were applicable to her because she had been using Unit 1682 not just as her
business office but also as a dwelling place.[21]
Moreover, her lease on the
property started more than thirty (30) years ago; hence, the P7,500.00
threshold rent set by the Rent Control Law could not prejudice her.[22]
Finally,
petitioner questioned the MeTC's imposition of a P25,000.00 monthly rent for
lack of factual and legal basis.[23]
In
a Decision dated
WHEREFORE, the assailed
Decision dated
1. Ordering the defendant [petitioner] and all persons claiming right under her to vacate the subject premises and peacefully surrender possession of the property located at 1682 Blumentritt, Sta. Cruz, Manila to herein plaintiffs [respondents];
2. Ordering
the defendant [petitioner] to pay a reasonable monthly rental of P15,000.00
to plaintiffs [respondents] computed from the time the instant action was filed
up to the time the subject premises is completely vacated and surrendered to
plaintiffs;
3. Ordering
the defendant [petitioner] to pay plaintiffs [respondents the sum of P20,000.00
as attorney's fees.
4. Without cost.
SO ORDERED.[24]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the
RTC denied it in its Order[25]
dated
She
then filed with the CA a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court in the
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the
foregoing, the instant petition is perforce denied. Accordingly, we
affirm with modification the assailed decision dated P20,000.00
is hereby deleted.
SO
ORDERED.[26]
Her
motion for reconsideration[27]
having been denied by the CA in its Resolution[28]
dated
In
a Resolution[29] dated
February 28, 2007, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
enjoining the CA, RTC, MeTC and respondents or their agents and assigns from
implementing or enforcing the August 31, 2006 Decision and January 15, 2007
Resolution of the CA. Petitioner posted a cash bond in the amount of P100,000.00.[30]
Respondents filed a Motion to Lift
the TRO or to Require Petitioners to Make the Required Monthly Deposit,[31]
to which petitioner filed a
Consolidated Comment.[32]
In its Resolution[33]
of July 9, 2007, the Court denied respondents' motion to lift the TRO, but
granted their prayer that petitioner be
required to pay P10,932.60 monthly rental from the date of
receipt by petitioner of
the MeTC decision, in accordance with
Section 19,[34] Rule
70 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In separate Certifications[35]
dated P100,000.00. Hence, respondents filed a Manifestation
and Motion[36]
dated
In her January 28, 2008 Comment[38]
to the September 12, 2007 Manifestation and Motion, petitioner explained that
she already complied with the July 9, 2007 Resolution of the Court by filing a supersedeas bond for P100,000.00, and that she had
filed with the RTC an urgent motion for computation of back rentals but the
same had remained unresolved, thus preventing her from making the required
monthly deposit.
Earlier,
on P10,932.60 as directed in the Court’s July 9, 2007
Resolution and to submit proof of compliance within ten (10) days from notice;
otherwise, the temporary restraining order would be lifted.
In a Manifestation
and Compliance[41] dated
Based on
court records, copy of the Resolution was mailed to petitioner on
The Court now resolves the main issues in the Petition, viz.:
1. Whether the pending action for annulment of transfer of title on ground of violation of P.D. 1517 (granting right of first refusal to the lessee and prohibiting dispossession of the property) filed by the petitioner against private respondents and previous lessor LKTSI constitutes litis pendentia or at the very least poses legal questions warranting the suspension of the proceedings of this ejectment suit.
2. Whether the court where the prior pending action involving the issue of whether the lessee can be dispossessed has exclusive and original jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts where the action for dispossession via ejectment suit is filed after.
3. Whether the trial court a quo has jurisdiction over the complaint.
4. Whether there is a lease relationship between the parties that can entitle the lessor to file an ejectment case.
5. Whether there is a proper demand for purposes of ejectment suit.
6. Whether the appellate
court and the trial court a quo could make an award for payment of monthly
rental in such amount more than if not other than the last agreed monthly
rentals between petitioner and LKTSI.[46]
To
the foregoing set of issues, however, petitioner, in her Memorandum, added
several more, to wit:
1. Whether private respondents committed forum-shopping;
xxx
7. Whether on account of the foregoing issues, the application for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction may be granted as prayed for in the petition.
8. Whether ejectment proceedings which are summary in nature can take precedence over an annulment action based upon a violation of specific and express provision of law (PD 1517).
9. Whether the ejectment proceeding can be suspended when it comes to direct conflict with an existing and applicable law; and
10. Whether which rights in
the instant case must be a priori protected – physical or material right of possession or
substantial issue of ownership which subsumes the issue of possession pursuant
to the existing and applicable provision of law, [47]
in arrant disregard of the
Consequently,
the Court will not resolve such new issues, except when they are related to the
issues raised in the Petition, which may actually be condensed, thus:
First,
whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC for sustaining the jurisdiction of
the MeTC over the ejectment
complaint; and
Second,
whether the CA erred in affirming with modification the judgments of the RTC
and MeTC ordering the ejectment
of petitioner.
Third,
whether the temporary restraining order issued by the Court should be lifted as
prayed for by respondents.
On the issue of jurisdiction
The
allegations in a complaint[50]
and the character of the relief sought[51]
determine the nature of the action and the court with jurisdiction over it. The defenses set up in an answer are not determinative.[52]
A
complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it
recites that: a) initially, possession of the property by the defendant was by
contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
b) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; c) thereafter, defendant remained in possession
of the property and deprived plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and d) within
one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.[53]
The complaint for ejectment which
respondents filed against petitioner alleges:
3. Plaintiffs [respondents]
are the absolute and registered owners of the land located at
xxx
5. xxx The first unit, designated as 1682 Blumentritt St., Sta. Cruz, Manila xxx is presently being occupied by herein defendant [petitioner].
6. Defendant's
[petitioner's] lease of Unit 1682 xxx with LKT,[sic] as with the others, was on a month-to-month
basis. The property was transferred to plaintiffs [respondents] on
7. However, defendant [petitioner] did not cooperate and instead stubbornly remained on the subject premises.
xxx
9. Thus, plaintiffs
[respondents], through their counsel, formally wrote to defendant Victoria
Fernando [petitioner], informing the latter that her lease of the aforegmentioned premises, which is on a month-to-month
basis, ended on April 30, 2004 and will
no longer be renewed. Defendant [petitioner] was also informed that if she ever
continued to stay in the premises beyond
10. Defendant, who duly received the letter, was given fifteen (15) days to peacefully surrender possession of the subject premises, particularly 1682 Blumentritt, St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, to herein plaintiffs. A copy of said letter dated April 29, 2004 is hereto attached and made an integral part hereof as “Annex C”.
11. However, despite oral and written demands to vacate subject premises, defendant failed and refused, and still fails and refuses, without justifiable reason, to vacate the said subject premises and to peacefully surrender possession thereof to plaintiffs, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.[54]
In
essence, the complaint recites that when respondents acquired Unit 1682 from
LKTSI, petitioner was still in
possession of the property by virtue of a month-to-month lease contract with
LKTSI; that said lease contract was set
to expire on April 30, 2005; that respondents verbally informed petitioner that her lease contract
would not be renewed when it expired; and that respondents also served a
written demand dated April 29, 2004 on
petitioner to vacate Unit 1682, but the latter refused to do so. By these allegations, the complaint clearly
drew up a case for unlawful detainer. It was
therefore correctly filed with the MeTC which has
jurisdiction over ejectment cases.[55]
Petitioner, however, has
raised an issue of title, to question the jurisdiction of the MeTC. She claims that respondents have no right to institute the action for unlawful detainer because they did not validly acquire the property
in view of the prohibition under P.D. No. 1517 against her dispossession or the
transfer of the property without first offering it for sale to her. She insists
that such issue of title prevents the MeTC from acquiring jurisdiction over the case; it should
have deferred to the jurisdiction of the RTC where there is a pending
case for annulment of the title of respondents.
As a rule,
the nature of a complaint for unlawful detainer and
the jurisdiction of a court over it are not altered by the mere claim of the
defendant of title to the property subject matter of the ejectment
case.[56]
Even a pending action involving title to the property which the defendant may
have instituted in another court will not abate or suspend the summary
proceedings for unlawful detainer.[57] The underlying reason for this rule
is to prevent the defendant from trifling with the summary nature of the case
by the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the disputed property.[58]
Respondents
cite Solanda Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals.[59] It involves an action for ejectment filed by
the vendee of a parcel of land against the vendor’s lessees on the property. In
turn, the lessees filed an action for annulment of the sale of the property between the vendor
and vendee on the ground that the sale violated their [lessees'] preemptive
rights over the property as guaranteed
under P.D. No. 1517. The Court held that the action for ejectment
may proceed independently of the action for annulment, citing the following
reason:
xxx the consistent case law is that ejectment suits deal only with the issue of physical possession. The pendency of an action for the annulment of the sale and the reconveyance of the disputed property may not be successfully pleaded in abatement of an action for ejectment. Private respondent's alleged right of possession is conditioned on his right to acquire ownership over the land. His right of the possession is, at best, only inchoate. In any event, the private respondent's expectation of being granted the preemptive right to purchase the property neither establishes his right to possess nor justifies the dismissal of the ejectment case against him. [Emphasis added.]
It
is important to bear in mind that in Solanda,
it was conclusively found that the property in dispute was not within the
coverage of P.D. No. 1517 as defined
under Proclamation No. 1967[60] and certified to by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB).
But
then, there have been two rare cases in which the Court allowed the suspension
of an action for unlawful detainer to make way for an
action for annulment of title.
In Vda.
de Legaspi v. Avendańo,[61] the Court suspended the enforcement of
a writ of demolition rendered in an ejectment case
until after a case for annulment of title involving the property to be
demolished was decided. The Court ratiocinated:
x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved, thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts. (Emphasis supplied)
More in point is Dulay
v. Tabago,[62] in which the Court sustained the RTC in
suspending the eviction of Spouses Tabago from the property
of Spouses Dulay in view of the issuance of
Presidential Decree No. 2016, which
placed the disputed property under the coverage of P.D. No. 1517 and prohibited the eviction of the tenants therein. As there was no dispute over the status
of Spouses Tabago
as tenants on the property since 1959, or over the status of the property as an
urban land reform area, the Court therein held:
Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 2016, which
was promulgated to forestall violations of P.D. No. 1517, provides that “No
tenant or occupant family, residing for ten years or more, reckoned from the
date of issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1517 [June 11, 1978] otherwise
known as the Urban Land Reform Law, in land proclaimed as Areas of Priority
Development . . . shall be evicted from the land or otherwise dispossessed”
(emphasis added). Considering that respondents have been occupants of the lot in question
since 1959 and in view of the subsequent classification of the said land as an
APD, petitioners’ action for ejectment cannot
prosper.
To
be entitled to the beneficence of P.D. No. 1517, a party must provide prima facie evidence of the following
facts: a) that the property being leased falls within an Area for Priority Development and Urban
Land Reform Zone;[63]
b) that the party is
a tenant on said property as defined under Section 3 (f)[64]
of P.D. No. 1517;[65]
c) that the party built a house on said property;[66]
and d) that the party has been residing on the property continuously for the
last ten (10) years or more, reckoned from 1968.[67]
The question is, did
petitioner establish the foregoing requisites as to avail herself of the “suspensive” effect of P.D. No. 1517 as in Sps. Dulay and Vda. de Legaspi ?
It is noted that the MeTC rejected the claim of petitioner to preferential
rights over the property, but petitioner objected on the ground that the MeTC had no jurisdiction to resolve such subject
matter.
Petitioner’s objection
was frivolous. Under Section 33[68]
of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, the MeTC is conditionally vested with
authority to resolve the question of ownership raised as an incident in the
case, the determination of which is necessary for a complete adjudication of
the issue of possession.[69] In the present case, the MeTC’s foray into the issue of whether under P.D. No. 1517,
petitioner has preferential rights to the purchase and occupation of Unit 1682
as against respondents’ rights was necessary to resolve the issue of material
possession.
The provisional ruling of the MeTC on said issue is that P.D. No. 1517 does not apply to
the case because there was no sale between LKTSI and respondents but a mere
distribution of liquidating dividends on account of the dissolution of LKTSI.[70]
The share
of each stockholder in the remaining assets of the corporation upon liquidation,
after the payment of all corporate debts and liabilities, is what is known as
liquidating dividend.[71] In its interpretation of recent tax laws,
the Bureau of Internal Revenue viewed the distribution of liquidating
dividends not as a sale of asset by the liquidating corporation to its
stockholder but as a sale of shares by the stockholder to the corporation or the surrender
of the stockholder’s interest in the corporation, in place of which said
stockholder receives property or money from the corporation about to be
dissolved.[72] Thus, on the part of the stockholder, any gain or loss is
subject to tax, while on the part of the
liquidating corporation, no tax is
imposed on its receipt of the shares surrendered by the stockholder or transfer
of assets to said stockholder because said transaction is not treated as a
sale.[73]
Preliminarily, therefore, the Court agrees with the view of the MeTC
that the
In addition to the foregoing reason,
the Court also finds no prima facie evidence that petitioner
qualifies as a tenant under P.D. No. 1517.
Respondents presented a Land
Transaction Certificate issued by the HLURB, stating that Unit 1682 is outside
any Area for Priority Development.[74]
However, Proclamation No. 1967
identifies in Appendix “J”[75] thereof 244 sites in Metropolitan
Manila that fall within the coverage of P.D. No. 1517. In the West Sector (
Moreover, petitioner had
a month-to-month lease contract with LKTSI on Unit 1682, which expired on
However,
other than her bare claim that she owns the structure on Unit 1682 because she
allegedly rebuilt it after it was burned down, petitioner offered no concrete
evidence of when the original structure was burned down and when she rebuilt
it. She presented no detail on how she spent for the construction of the
structure, or proof that LKTSI allowed her to claim ownership thereof. On the
other hand, it was respondents who
presented Tax Declaration No. 00182 which indicates that they are the
registered owners of the improvements, including Unit 1682, on the land covered by TCT No. 264835.
Furthermore,
except for her empty allegation -- which respondents dispute --[77] that she has been occupying Unit 1682 for
more than thirty (30) years, petitioner presented no concrete evidence of the
exact period of her occupation, even when she could have easily produced
receipts of past rental payments similar to the receipt[78]
she easily presented for her March 2004 rental payment. Such unexplained
omission prevents an adjudication on whether petitioner’s period of occupation
qualifies her to exercise the right of
first refusal under P.D. No. 1517.[79]
Therefore,
unlike in Sps. Dulay or Guardacasa de Legaspi, there is no prima facie showing in
this case that petitioner is protected under P.D. No. 1517 from dispossession
of Unit 1682, or that she has the right of first refusal in the sale of said
property. Petitioner, therefore, cannot
invoke P.D. No. 1517 in abatement of the complaint for unlawful detainer.
Another
matter raised by petitioner relating to the jurisdiction of the MeTC is the personality of respondents to give notice to
vacate and to file an ejectment case. The Court need not belabor the point for it
is well-settled that, as vendees of the
property, respondents were placed in the shoes of the original lessor LKTSI and vested with the right to evict petitioner
as the lessee from the premises.[80] Whether the transfer of the property to
respondents was valid is of no moment, for all that is to be resolved in the ejectment case is whether the latter are entitled to the
material possession of the property.[81]
All told, the Court sustains the CA in
affirming the ruling of the RTC that the MeTC
correctly exercised jurisdiction over the complaint for unlawful detainer.
On the issue of the correctness of
the judgment of eviction
Petitioner
poses no serious challenge to the concurrent findings of the MeTC, RTC and CA that her right to possession of Unit 1682
has expired; that her continued possession thereof unlawfully deprives respondents of the
enjoyment of the property; and that, therefore, she must now peacefully surrender possession thereof to
respondents. Her remaining defense is
that, under the rent control laws, respondents cannot eject her because she has
been religiously paying her rent.
Republic
Act No. 9161,[82]
otherwise known as the “Rental Reform Act of 2002,” was the rent control law in
force at the time the complaint for unlawful detainer
was filed. Sec. 7(e) thereof allows for
judicial ejectment of a lessee on the ground of
expiration of the period of the lease contract. As already discussed, the
month-to-month lease contract of petitioner expired on
Petitioner has also questioned the
award of reasonable rent of P15,000.00.
Trial courts are authorized to
fix the reasonable value for the continued use and occupancy of the leased
premises after the termination of the lease contract; and they are not bound by
the stipulated rental in the contract of lease, since it is equally
settled that upon termination or expiration of said contract, the rental
stipulated therein may no longer be the reasonable value for the use and
occupation of the premises as a result or by reason of the change or rise in
values.[84] As to what amount would constitute a
reasonable rent of Unit 1682, the same is a question of fact on which the
determination of the CA binds the Court, unless the latter finds reason
to reverse it.[85] In the present case, the CA reduced the award
of reasonable rent from P25,000.00 to P15,000.00 based on the
finding that such amount represents the reasonable amount of lost opportunity
income respondents would have derived from the conversion of Unit 1682 into a
San Miguel Food shop.[86] Petitioner has not adduced evidence in
refutation of the factual findings of the CA.
Considering that no error has been
committed by the CA in its
On the issue of whether the temporary
restraining order should be lifted
The Court finds respondents'
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
temporary restraining order issued by the court is LIFTED and SET
ASIDE.
Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and concurred in by Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas-Peralta and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal; rollo, p. 59.
[2]
[3] CA rollo, p. 56.
[4]
[5] Position Paper of respondents in Civil Case No. 000000002-CV, CA rollo, p. 92; Position Paper of petitioner in Civil Case No. 00000002-CV, CA rollo, p. 107.
[6] CA rollo, p. 59.
[7]
[8]
[9] CA rollo, p. 61.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Answer, CA rollo, pp. 75-78.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] CA rollo, p. 126.
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24] CA rollo, pp. 36-37.
[25]
[26] Rollo, p. 67.
[27]
[28]
[29] CA rollo, pp. 110-114.
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34] Sec. 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same.—If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed. All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or authorized government depositary bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition thereof on the merits.
After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the court by the defendant for purposes of the stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. In any case wherein it appears that the defendant has been deprived of the lawful possession of land or building pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court, damages for such deprivation of possession and restoration of possession may be allowed the defendant in the judgment of the Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal.
[35] Rollo, pp. 187 and 188.
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41] Rollo, p. 288.
[42] As Registered Letter No. 40591.
[43] Rollo, p. 311.
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47] Rollo, pp. 222-223.
[48]
[49] Valdes v. China Banking
Corporation, G.R. No. 155009,
[50] Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. v. Ong, G.R. No. 132197,
[51] Barrazona
v. Regional Trial
[52] Dela
Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139442,
[53] Dela
Cruz v. Court of Appeals, id.; Heirs of Demetrio
Melchor v. Melchor,
G.R. No. 150633,
[54] Complaint, CA rollo, pp. 65-67.
[55] Section 33, Chapter III of Batas Pambansa Blg.129. See also Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
[56] Palattao
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131762,
[57] Arambulo
v. Gungab, G.R. No. 156581,
[58] Tecson
v. Guitierrez,
G.R. No. 152978,
[59] G.R. No. 123479,
[60] Amending Proclamation No. 1893 by
Specifying 244 Sites in Metropolitan
[61] No. L-430437,
[62] Resolution dated
[63] Arlegui
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 428 Phil. 381, 391 (2002); Vidal, v. Escueta, G.R.
No. 156228,
[64] Sec. 3. Definitions. As used in this Decree, the following words and phrases shall have the following meanings and definitions: x x x (f) Tenant refers to the rightful occupant of land and its structure, but does not include those whose presence on the land is merely tolerated and without the benefit of contract, those who enter the land by force or deceit, or those whose possession is under litigation. (Emphasis added)
[65]
[66] Vidal, v. Escueta, supra note 63.
[67] Dimaculangan
v. Casalla, G.R. No. 156689,
[68] Section
33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.–Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: x x x (2) Exclusive original
jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer:
Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
[69] Aquino
v. Aure, G.R. No. 153567,
[70] MeTC Decision, CA rollo, pp. 123-126.
[71] PDIC v. Reyes, G.R. No.
154973.
[72] See, however, Jose Campos, The
Corporation Code Volume II, p. 417, citing Stockholders of Guanzon
v. Register of Deeds, No. L-18216,
[73] BIR
Ruling No. DA-111-2005,
[74] CA rollo, p. 272.
[75] The Annex Attached to Proclamation 1967 Enumerates the Following Areas of Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones.
[76] Garrido,
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118462,
[77] Memorandum for Respondents, rollo, p. 210
[78] Supra note 5.
[79] Dimaculangan v. Casalla, supra note 67.
[80] Rule
70 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. –
Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of
the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom
the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld xxx. See also Ocampo v. Tirona,
G.R. No. 147812,
[81] Barnes, v. Quijano,
G.R. No. 160753,
[82] Effective
[83] Lopez
v. Fajardo, G.R. No. 157971,
[84] Sps. Catungal v. Hao, G.R. No. 134972, March 22, 2001, 355 SCRA 29
citing Sia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108222, May 5, 1997, 272 SCRA 141.
[85]
[86] CA Decision, rollo, p. 67.