SECOND DIVISION
|
J-PHIL MARINE, INC. and/or JESUS CANDAVA and NORMAN
SHIPPING SERVICES, Petitioners, - versus - NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and WARLITO E. DUMALAOG, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 175366 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: August 11, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO
MORALES, J.:
Warlito
E. Dumalaog (respondent), who served as cook aboard vessels plying overseas,
filed on March 4, 2002 before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a
pro-forma complaint[1] against
petitioners ─ manning agency J-Phil Marine, Inc. (J-Phil), its then president
Jesus Candava, and its foreign principal Norman Shipping Services ─ for
unpaid money claims, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
Respondent
thereafter filed two amended pro forma complaints[2] praying
for the award of overtime pay, vacation leave pay, sick leave pay, and
disability/medical benefits, he having, by his claim, contracted enlargement of
the heart and severe thyroid enlargement in the discharge of his duties as cook
which rendered him disabled.
Respondent’s
total claim against petitioners was P864,343.30 plus P117,557.60 representing
interest and P195,928.66 representing attorney’s fees.[3]
By Decision[4] of
On appeal,[5]
the NLRC, by Decision of
By Resolution[10]
of
During
the pendency of the case before this Court, respondent, against the advice of
his counsel, entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners. He
thereupon signed a Quitclaim and Release subscribed and sworn to before the
Labor Arbiter.[12]
On
On July
2, 2007, respondent’s counsel filed before this Court a Comment and Opposition (to
Petitioners’ Manifestation of May 7, 2007)[14] interposing
no objection to the dismissal of the petition but objecting to “the absolution”
of petitioners from paying respondent the total amount of Fifty Thousand US Dollars
(US$50,000.00) or approximately P2,300,000.00, the amount awarded by the
NLRC, he adding that:
There
being already a payment of P450,000.00, and invoking the doctrine of parens
patriae, we pray then [to] this Honorable Supreme Court that the said amount
be deducted from the [NLRC] judgment award of US$50,000.00, or approximately
P2,300,000.00, and petitioners be furthermore ordered to pay in favor of
herein respondent [the] remaining balance thereof.
x x x x[15] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Respondent’s
counsel also filed before this Court, purportedly
on behalf of respondent, a Comment[16] on
the present petition.
The
parties having forged a compromise agreement as respondent in fact has executed
a Quitclaim and Release, the Court dismisses the petition.
Article
227 of the Labor Code provides:
Any compromise settlement, including those involving labor standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the Department of Labor, shall be final and binding upon the parties. The National Labor Relations Commission or any court shall not assume jurisdiction over issues involved therein except in case of non-compliance thereof or if there is prima facie evidence that the settlement was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In Olaybar
v. NLRC,[17]
the Court, recognizing the conclusiveness of compromise settlements as a means
to end labor disputes, held that Article 2037 of the Civil Code, which provides
that “[a] compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res
judicata,” applies suppletorily to labor cases even if the compromise is
not judicially approved.[18]
That respondent
was not assisted by his counsel when he entered into the compromise does not render
it null and void. Eurotech Hair Systems, Inc. v. Go[19] so
enlightens:
A compromise agreement is valid as long as the consideration is reasonable and the employee signed the waiver voluntarily, with a full understanding of what he was entering into. All that is required for the compromise to be deemed voluntarily entered into is personal and specific individual consent. Thus, contrary to respondent’s contention, the employee’s counsel need not be present at the time of the signing of the compromise agreement.[20] (Underscoring supplied)
It bears
noting that, as reflected earlier, the Quitclaim and Waiver was subscribed and
sworn to before the Labor Arbiter.
Respondent’s
counsel nevertheless argues that “[t]he amount of Four Hundred Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P450,000.00) given to respondent on April 4, 2007, as ‘full and
final settlement of judgment award,’ is unconscionably low, and un-[C]hristian,
to say the least.”[21] Only
respondent, however, can impugn the consideration of the compromise as being unconscionable.
The
relation of attorney and client is in many respects one of agency, and the
general rules of agency apply to such relation.[22] The acts of an agent are deemed the acts of
the principal only if the agent acts within the scope of his authority.[23] The circumstances of this case indicate that respondent’s
counsel is acting beyond the scope of his authority in questioning the
compromise agreement.
That a client has undoubtedly the right
to compromise a suit without the intervention of his lawyer[24] cannot
be gainsaid, the only qualification being that if such compromise is entered
into with the intent of defrauding the lawyer of the fees justly due him, the
compromise must be subject to the said fees.[25] In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent
intended to defraud his counsel of his fees.
In fact, the Quitclaim and Release, the execution of which was witnessed
by petitioner J-Phil’s president Eulalio C. Candava and one Antonio C. Casim,
notes that the 20% attorney’s fees would be “paid 12 April 2007 – P90,000.”
WHEREFORE, the
petition is, in light of all the
foregoing discussion, DISMISSED.
Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished respondent, Warlito E. Dumalaog, at his given address at
SO
ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
RENATO C.
CORONA Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Additional
member in lieu of Justice Dante O. Tinga per Special Order No. 512 dated
[1] NLRC records, p. 2.
[2]
[3] Dumalaog’s POSITION PAPER, NLRC records, pp. 18-21.
[4]
[5]
[6] Decision of
[7] NLRC records, unnumbered pages.
[8] Ibid.
[9] CA rollo, pp. 2-19.
[10] Penned by Court of Appeals Associate
Justice Danilo B. Pine, with the concurrences of Associate Justices Rosmari D.
Carandang and Arcangelita Romilla-Lontok.
[11] Penned by Court of Appeals Associate
Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, with the concurrence of Associate
Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Rosmari D. Carandang,
[12] “Quitclaim and Release” dated
[13] Rollo,
pp. 226-228.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] G.R. No. 108713,
[18]
[19] G.R. No. 160913,
[20]
[21] Rollo, p. 241.
[22] Uytengsu III v. Baduel, Adm.
Case No. 5134,
[23] Vide Siredy Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 437 Phil. 580, 589 (2002).
[24] Vide
Rustia v. Judge of First Instance of
Batangas, 44 Phil. 62, 65 (1922).
[25] Vide Aro v. Nañawa etc., et al., 137 Phil. 745, 761 (1969).