Republic of the
Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
BONAVENTURE
MINING G.R. No. 174918
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
-
versus - CARPIO,
AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
V.I.L. MINES,
INCORPORATED,
Represented by
its Corporate Promulgated:
Secretary,
ROXANNA S. GO, August
13, 2008
Respondent.
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D E C I S I O N
PUNO, C.J.:
Before us
is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the
petitioner Bonaventure Mining Corporation (BMC), to set aside the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals dated August 29, 2006 (CA Decision) which reversed the
Decision[2]
of the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) and reinstated the Decision[3]
of the Panel of Arbitrators upholding the EPA-IVA-63 of respondent V.I.L.
Mines, Incorporated (VMI), and canceling the EPA-IVA-72 of petitioner BMC.
This
case involves a conflict over mining claims between BMC and VMI over a
mountainous section that transcends the common boundaries of the provinces of
Quezon and Camarines Norte, specifically within the municipal jurisdictions of
Tagkawayan and Guinigayangan in Quezon, and Labo and Sta. Elena in Camarines
Norte.[4]
The
facts are of record.
On
On
March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942 (R.A. No. 7942), otherwise known as “The
Philippine Mining Act of 1995,” was passed by Congress. It provided for the maximum allowable area
that may be granted a qualified person under a FTAA, viz:
SECTION 34. Maximum Contract Area. — The maximum contract area that may be granted per qualified person, subject to relinquishment shall be:
(a) 1,000 meridional blocks onshore;
(b) 4,000 meridional blocks offshore; or
(c) Combinations of (a) and (b) provided
that it shall not exceed the maximum limits for onshore and offshore areas.
On
Section 257. Non-impairment of Existing Mining/Quarrying Rights. —
x x x
All pending applications for MPSA/FTAA and exploration permits issued prior to the promulgation of these implementing rules and regulations shall be governed by the provisions of the Act and these implementing rules and regulations; Provided, however, that where the grant of such FTAA application/proposals would exceed the maximum contract area restrictions contained in Section 34 of the Act, the applicant/proponent shall have one year, from the effectivity of these implementing rules and regulations, to divest or relinquish applications or portions thereof which, if granted, would exceed the maximum contract area allowance provided under the Act; Provided, finally, that this provision is applicable only to all FTAA applications filed under DAO 63 prior to the approval of the Act. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x
On
Section 257. Non-Impairment of Existing Mining/Quarrying Rights.—
x x x
All pending applications for MPSA/FTAA covering forest land and other government reservations shall not be required to re-apply for exploration permit provided, that where the grant of such FTAA applications/proposals would exceed the maximum contract area restrictions contained in Section 34 of the Act, the applicant/proponent shall be given an extension of one year, reckoned from September 13, 1996, to divest or relinquish in favor of government, areas in excess of the maximum area allowance provided under the Act. (Emphasis supplied)
On
Section
272. Non-Impairment of Existing Mining/Quarrying Rights.—
x x x
All pending applications for MPSA/FTAA covering forest land and Government Reservations shall not be required to re-apply for Exploration Permit: Provided, That where the grant of such FTAA applications/proposals would exceed the maximum contract area restrictions contained in Section 34 of the Act, the applicant/proponent shall be given an extension of one (1) year, reckoned from September 13, 1996, to divest or relinquish pursuant to Department Administrative Order No. 96-25 in favor of the Government, areas in excess of the maximum area allowance provided under the Act. For this purpose, a Special Exploration Permit of limited applications and activities shall be issued by the Secretary upon the recommendation of the Director, subject to the terms and conditions specified in the Permit and pertinent provisions of Chapter V hereof: Provided, That an area permission shall be granted likewise by the Secretary to undertake limited exploration activities in non-critical forest reserves and forest reservations and such other areas within the jurisdiction of the Department. In other areas, however, the applicant/proponent shall secure the necessary area clearances or written consent by the concerned agencies or parties, as provided for by law: Provided, further, That the time period shall be deducted from the life of the MPSA/FTAA and exploration costs can be included as part of pre-operating expenses for purposes of cost recovery should the FTAA be approved: Provided, finally, That this provision is applicable only to all FTAA/MPSA applications filed under Department Administrative Order No. 63 prior to the effectivity of the Act and these implementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x
On August 27, 1997, the DENR issued Department
Memorandum Order No. 97-07 (DMO 97-07), entitled “Guidelines in the
Implementation of the Mandatory September 15, 1997 Deadline for the Filing of
Mineral Agreement Applications by Holders of Valid and Existing Mining Claims
and Lease/Quarry Applications and for Other Purposes.” DMO 97-07 provides, among others, for the
following: (1) the deadline for the
relinquishment of excess areas shall be on September 15, 1997 (September 13,
1997 falling on a Saturday);[6]
(2) all applicants of FTAA applications filed under DAO 57 and DAO 63 with
insufficient compliance of the mandatory requirements shall submit, on
September 15, 1997, a Status Report indicating the requirements that have not
been complied with and a Letter with the undertaking that the said requirements
will be completely complied with on or before October 30, 1997;[7]
and (3) the deadlines prescribed shall not be subject to extension.[8]
On
On September 26, 1997,
pursuant to DMO 97-07, Greenwater filed a Letter of Intent[9]
dated September 10, 1997 with the MGB stating its intention to retain its first
FTAA application in Marinduque and to relinquish the areas in excess of the
maximum allowable 81,000 hectares covered by its other FTAA applications
including those which cover areas of Quezon Province and Camarines Norte.
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
From this decision, VMI filed its Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the MAB and reinstated the decision of the Panel of Arbitrators.
Hence, BMC now comes to this Court raising the following issues:
A.
WHETHER
THE COURT OF APPEALS
B.
WHETHER
THE COURT OF APPEALS
VMI, however, questions the timeliness of the filing of the petition. Hence, before we can consider the merits of the case, it is imperative that the Court address this issue in view of the procedural stricture that the timely perfection of an appeal is both a mandatory and jurisdictional requirement.
In its Comment, VMI contends
that BMC received a copy of the CA Decision on September 5, 2006 and not on
October 9, 2006 as alleged by BMC.[17] To support its claim, VMI presented a
Certification[18] from
the Makati Central Post Office dated October 5, 2005 stating that a copy of the
CA Decision was served by Letter Carrier Larry Lopez to BMC’s counsel on
September 5, 2006 but the same was returned by the Letter Carrier to the
sender, the Court of Appeals, for the reason that counsel for BMC had allegedly
“
In its Reply, BMC alleges that the office address of its
counsel, Atty. Fernando Peńarroyo (Atty. Peńarroyo), is and has always been at Unit 201
According to VMI, the CA
Decision which was received on
BMC counters, however, that
the fact that the copy of the CA Decision received on
We hold that the petition was filed out of time.
Well-settled is the rule
that when a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and
notices must be made upon said attorney.[26] Accordingly, it is the date of service on
counsel of record of the notice of judgment which is considered the starting
point from which the period of appeal prescribed by law shall begin to run.[27]
The records of this case clearly show that Atty. Peńarroyo’s address of
record used in the proceedings below is L/2 and not Unit 201 at the Orient
Mansions.
In the proceedings before
the Panel of Arbitrators, the Resolution[28]
denying BMC’s Motion for Reconsideration, from which BMC filed a Notice of
Appeal, was furnished to Atty. Peńarroyo at L/2 Orient Mansions.
In the proceedings before
the MAB, the Notice of Issuance of An Order[29]
informing the parties that a decision has been rendered was likewise furnished
to Atty. Peńarroyo at L/2 Orient Mansions.
In the proceedings before
the Court of Appeals, the Notice of Resolution[30]
informing the parties of the resolution ordering BMC to comment on the petition
for review filed by VMI indicates that Atty. Peńarroyo’s address is at L/2
Orient Mansions. This was received by
him since in compliance he filed a Comment in which he used the same address.[31] Likewise, CA Form No. 1[32]
informing the parties of the resolution directing them to file their respective
memoranda was sent to him at L/2 Orient Mansions. This was received by him for in compliance he
filed a Memorandum in which he used the same address.[33]
It was only in the Petition filed before
this Court did Atty. Peńarroyo use Unit 201 as his address after VMI had
already filed a Manifestation[34]
questioning the alleged date of receipt of the CA Decision. In fact, in the Reply, where he alleged that
his address of record has always been at Unit 201, he still indicated L/2 as
his address below his signature.[35]
Hence, we cannot give credence to Atty. Peńarroyo’s claim that his address is and has always been at Unit 201. The fact that both addresses refer to the same building does not obliterate the fact that they are two different addresses. BMC and Atty. Peńarroyo cannot expect the public to assume that both addresses are one and the same and neither can they be used interchangeably. It was incumbent upon him to inform the Court of Appeals of the change of his address of record from L/2 to Unit 201 at the Orient Mansions. His failure to do so bears consequences which bind BMC.
The rule is that clients are
bound by the actions of their counsel in the conduct of their case. If counsel moves to another address without
informing the court of that change, such omission or neglect is inexcusable and
will not stay the finality of the decision. The court cannot be expected to
take judicial notice of the new address of a lawyer who has moved.[36]
In brief, the service of the CA Decision on
Nevertheless, we have reviewed the records and find that even on its merits the instant petition is destined to fail for reasons we shall discuss briefly.
Section 12 of DMO 97-07 reads:
SECTION 12. Divestment/Relinquishment of Areas in Excess of Maximum FTAA Contract Area
All
FTAA applications filed prior to the effectivity of the Act which exceed the
maximum contract area as set forth in Section 34 of the Act and Section 51 of
the IRR must conform to said maximum on
or before
x x x
Failure to relinquish/divest areas in excess of the maximum contract area as provided for in this section will result in the denial or cancellation of the FTAA application after which, the areas covered thereby shall be open for Mining Applications. (Emphasis supplied)
BMC
contends that based on the foregoing provision, the inability of the FTAA
applicant to submit the required documents is only a ground for the MGB or the
DENR to cancel or revoke its FTAA application and an executive action is needed
before the area becomes open for mining applications.[37] Accordingly, Greenwater’s FTAA applications
were cancelled and the areas covered thereby became open to mining applications
only fifteen days after its receipt of the
We find no merit to BMC’s contention.
It is
undisputed that Greenwater filed its Letter of Intent only on
Section 12 of DMO 97-07 provides for the effect of failing to relinquish excess areas within the deadline, that it “will result in the denial or cancellation of the FTAA application.…” No further executive action is necessary since DMO 97-07 itself already provided for the sanction of failing to meet the deadline. Any executive action beyond the deadline would be a mere superfluity.
Section 12 of DMO 97-07 must be read in conjunction
with Section 14 which states that the deadlines therein are not subject to
extension, viz:
SECTION 14. No Extension of Periods
The
deadline set at
DMO 97-07 was promulgated precisely to set a specific
date for all FTAA applicants within which to relinquish all areas in excess of
the maximum prescribed by law.
Accordingly, the deadline cannot be extended or changed except by
amending DMO 97-07. OIC-Regional
Director Reynulfo Juan had no authority to extend the deadline set by DMO
97-07. We agree with the ruling of the
Court of Appeals:
The language of the memorandum order is
plain, precise and unequivocal – the period cannot be extended. Beyond that, the pending FTAA applications
could no longer be officially acted upon as they were deemed to have expired. DMO
97-07 could only be extended by another
memorandum order or law specifically amending the deadline set forth
therein. No government officer or employee can do so.
x x x
It is Our considered view that the FTAA application of Greenwater ipso facto expired when it did not take any step to comply with the order. There was no need for any pronouncement or official action. If ever there would be any executive action, it would only be to certify that the application was already cancelled as OIC-Regional Director Reynulfo Juan did when, on January 23, 1998 (sic)[38], it wrote Greenwater that its application over the excess areas was cancelled. No executive action can stretch the deadline beyond what was stated in the memorandum order, DMO 97-07.
OIC-Regional Director Reynulfo Juan violated DMO 97-07, when in his October 22, 1997 Letter, he gave Greenwater a period beyond the date of the deadline within which to submit the technical descriptions of the areas it wanted to relinquish. By giving Greenwater a period extending beyond October 30, 1997, he was in effect extending the deadline set forth in Section 13 of DMO 97-07. That he could not lawfully do.
He had no authority extending the deadline because the memorandum order which he was supposed to implement stated that the “period prescribed herein shall not be subject to extension.” Beyond October 30, 1997 all FTAA applications which failed to comply with the memorandum order expired and were deemed cancelled by operation of law.[39] (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, even
equitable considerations do not favor the petitioner. It is clear from the outset that Greenwater
had already lost interest in pursuing its FTAA application. After being given two (2) years to comply
with the requirements, Greenwater only filed its Letter of Intent belatedly and
did not take any further action nor contested the letter dated February 23,
1998 of OIC-Regional Director Reynulfo Juan informing it that its FTAA
applications have been deemed relinquished.
It must be emphasized that Greenwater and the public were aware of the
deadline and the consequences of failing to meet the same. Accordingly, VMI cannot be faulted for
relying on the fact that Greenwater did not comply with the requirements within
the deadline set by DMO 97-07 and had already lost interest, for all intents
and purposes, in the area it wished to apply for. VMI filed its application on November 10,
1997, or almost 2 years ahead than BMC’s application which was filed on May 4,
1999. To rule now that it is BMC’s
application which should be given due course on an alleged technicality which
has no clear basis in law or in the rules will be highly inequitable.
IN VIEW
WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate
Justice
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp.
52-70; penned by Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, concurred in by Justices Elvi
John S. Asuncion and Sesinando E. Villon.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Section 12 of DENR Department Memorandum Order No. (DMO)
97-07,
[7]
[8]
[9] CA rollo, p. 43.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Rollo, pp. 76-89.
[15] Id. at 91-105.
[16] Id. at 16.
(Boldfaced in the original)
[17] Id. at 110.
[18] Id. at 222.
[19] Id. at 244-245.
[20] Id. at 245.
[21] Id. at 253-254.
[22] Id. at 255-266.
[23] Id. at 267-268.
[24] Id. at 450.
[25] Id. at 246-247.
[26] Karen and Kristy
Fishing Industry v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 172760-61, October 15,
2007, 536 SCRA 243, 250.
[27] Cubar, et al. v. Hon.
Mendoza, etc., et al., 205 Phil. 672, 676 (1983).
[28] CA rollo, pp.
232-240; dated June 11, 2002.
[29] Id. at 319; dated
August 30, 2004.
[30] Id. at 446; dated
August 18, 2005.
[31] Id. at 479.
[32] Id. at 515; signed
by Zamita T. Mationg, Acting Division Clerk of Court of the Special Sixteenth
Division of the Court of Appeals.
[33] Id. at 609.
[34] Id. at 663 to 670;
dated October 23, 2006.
[35] Rollo, p. 250.
[36] Supra note 26 at 249.
[37] Rollo, pp.
326-329.
[38] Should be February 23, 1998.
[39] Rollo, p. 66.