THIRD DIVISION
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REPUBLIC OF
THE Petitioner, - versus - GREGORIA L.
DILOY, Respondent. |
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G.R. No.
174633 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, REYES, and BRION,* JJ. Promulgated: August
26, 2008 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to set aside the Decision[1] dated
The antecedent facts of this case are
as follows:
As early as 1948, Crispin Leaban had
already declared the subject property for taxation purposes under his name, as
evidenced by Tax Declaration (T.D.) No. 2708.[4] He was then succeeded by his son, Eusebio
Leaban, who filed the following T.D. Nos.[5]
4501, 3710 and 2855 in his name from the period covering the years
1951-1969. Thereafter, in 1974, the
subject property was transferred to Eusebio Leaban’s daughter, Pacencia Leaban,
who, in turn, declared the same for taxation purposes under her name. It was evidenced by T.D. Nos. 8672, 7282 and
6231.[6] On
In 1997, respondent Gregoria L.
Diloy, now married to Joselito C. Espiritu, filed an Application[8]
for Registration of Title over the subject property under Section 14 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529[9]
before the 2nd MCTC of Silang-Amadeo, Silang,
To establish the jurisdictional
requirements required by the aforesaid law, the respondent submitted and marked
the following documents, to wit: (1) Application
for Registration as Exhibits “A”; “A-1” to “A-4”;[10] (2)
Notice of Initial Hearing dated 17
July 1997 as Exhibits “B” and “B-1”;[11]
(3) Certificate of Publication[12] by
the Land Registration Authority (LRA) as Exhibit “C” and Certificate of Notification[13]
by the LRA as Exhibit “C-1”; (4) Certificate
of Publication issued by the National Printing Office (NPO) as Exhibit “D”[14] and a copy of the Official Gazette (O.G.),
Volume 93, No. 39, 29 September 1997[15]
as Exhibits “D-1” to “D-3”; (5) Affidavit
of Publication[16]
issued by the We Forum newspaper[17]
as Exhibits “E”, “E-1” and “E-1-A”; (6) Registry
Receipts sent to the government agencies concerned as well as to the adjoining
owners as Exhibits “F,” “F-1” to “F-16,” inclusive; and (7) Certificate of Posting[18]
as Exhibit “G.”
Since the Public Prosecutor did not
interpose any objection, the court a quo
admitted the aforementioned Exhibits.[19]
The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), however, on behalf of the Republic, filed an Opposition[20]
to the aforesaid Application for Registration of Title. It filed a Notice of Appearance,[21] but
in a letter[22] dated
During the hearing of the Application
for Registration of Title, respondent presented her father, Rustico Diloy, and Armando
Ramos as witnesses to strengthen her claim that her predecessors-in-interest
had been in actual, continuous, open, notorious and adverse possession of the
subject property.
Rustico Diloy testified that the
first time he came to know of the subject property was in 1952 when he was twenty
years old, because he used to work on the said property. When he married Pacencia Leaban, the owner of
the subject property was Eusebio Leaban, the father of Pacencia Leaban. Said property was inherited by his wife from
her father. It then came to the
possession of the respondent by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed
between her and her mother, Pacencia Leaban.
According to him, from the time he came to know of the subject property
up to the present, it was continuously declared for taxation purposes. He also affirmed that the subject property has
an area of 22,249 square meters, and it is located in Barangay Dagatan, Amadeo,
To corroborate the testimony of
Rustico Diloy, Armando Ramos, 81 years old and presently residing in Barangay
Dagatan, Amadeo, Cavite, stated that he was the owner of the land adjoining the
subject property, and that he knew the previous owners of the same. He disclosed that he knew the subject
property even before the Japanese Occupation because he became the husband of
one of the heirs of the owner thereof.
Prior to the Japanese Occupation, he said the owner of the subject
property was his father-in-law, Narciso Leaban.
Then, in 1948, Crispin Leaban came into the possession of said land. From Crispin Leaban, he confirmed that the
subject property was inherited by Eusebio Leaban, the son of Crispin
Leaban. Eusebio Leaban, in turn,
transferred the same to his daughter, Pacencia Leaban. Then, in 1979, Pacencia Leaban conveyed the
subject property to her daughter, the respondent, who is the present owner of
the subject property where she plants coffee.[24]
The MCTC rendered a Decision dated
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby
APPROVES the Application for Registration filed by [respondent], married to
Joselito C. Espiritu. Thus,
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
Furnish a copy of this Decision to the Office of the Solicitor General, the [LRA], the Land Management Sector, Regional (sic) IV, Manila, the Register of Deeds of Cavite, the [Community Environment and Natural Resources Office] CENRO, Trece Martires City, Department of Agrarian Reform and the Department of Public Works and Highways, as well as the party and counsel.[25]
From
the aforesaid Decision, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration[26] arguing
that the respondent failed to prove her possession as required under
Presidential Decree No. 1529. In an
Order[27]
dated
As
a result thereof, the Republic appealed the Decision of the MCTC to the Court
of Appeals assigning the following error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE APPLICANT PROVED A REGISTRABLE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY.[28]
On
Aggrieved, the Republic filed a
motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision which was likewise
denied in a Resolution dated
Hence, this Petition.
The Republic now comes before this
Court with the sole issue of: whether or
not the respondent has acquired a registrable title.[29]
The Republic persistently argues that
the respondent’s Application for Registration of Title should have been denied
because the latter failed to comply with the period of possession required by
law, i.e., Section 14 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529.[30] The Republic reveals that the subject
property was only declared alienable and disposable on
In her Comment, respondent firmly
holds that the MCTC and the Court of Appeals did not commit any error or grave
abuse of discretion in rendering their Decisions granting her Application for Registration
of Title over the subject property. She
avows that she has satisfactorily established that she and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, continuous, open, notorious and
adverse possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable land under a bona fide claim of ownership over the
subject property for more than 30 years.
To prove the same, she tacked her own possession, commencing on
The Petition is meritorious.
Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree speaks of who may apply for registration of land. The said provisions of law refer to an
original registration through ordinary registration proceedings.[31] It specifically provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (Emphasis supplied.)
Based on the aforesaid provisions,
the three requisites for the filing of
an application for registration of title under the first category are: (1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; (2) that the applicants by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (3) that
such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12
June 1945 or earlier.[32] In effect, the period of possession - open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious - must at least be 30 years computed from
Section 14(1) of the aforesaid law requires
that the property sought to be registered
is already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed.[33]
In the case at bar, it is beyond question
that the subject property was already an alienable and disposable land at the
time the Application for Registration of Title over the same was filed by the
respondent. The Application for Registration of Title over the subject property was
filed by the respondent in the year 1997.
The Report,[34]
dated 27 July 1998, submitted by the Director of Lands and the Certification,[35]
dated 4 May 1998, issued by the CENRO, clearly established that the subject property was already within the
alienable and disposable zone as classified under Project No. 5, L.C. Map No.
3013 as early as 15 March 1982 per Forestry Administration Order No. 4-1650.[36] Even the parties to this case, particularly
the OSG, did not refute the fact that at the time the Application for Registration
of Title was filed, the subject property had already been classified as
alienable and disposable land.
Both lower courts upheld that the
respondent was able to prove that her possession of the subject property was
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious for more than 30 years. Here we quote the pronouncement made by the
Court of Appeals, thus:
The trial court committed no error in ruling that [respondent] has a registrable title. It is undisputed that [respondent] came into possession of the subject [property] by means of a [D]eed of [S]ale executed in her favor by Pacencia Leaban in 1979. Prior to the sale, Pacencia Leaban inherited said property from her father, Eusebio Leaban, who possessed the same since 1951. Testimonial evidence showed that Eusebio Leaban devoted the land to agriculture and that shrubs and barbed wire enclosed the subject property. At the time of filing of the application for registration, the crop found therein is coffee.
x x x. Rustico Diloy testified that he worked on the land under the supervision of Eusebio Leaban indicating that there were necessary farm works to be done thereon. The owner of the adjoining land stated that said land is a coffee plantation. There is also showing that the subject land was fenced, signifying a public and adverse possession thereof. Likewise, [respondent] with the aid of Rustico Diloy, caused the survey of the subject [property]. These are apparently acts of ownership. x x x.
Together with her predecessors-in-interest, [respondent] was in actual and adverse possession of the subject land for more than 30 years, thereby satisfying the period required under P.D. 1529. Coupled with the cultivation or possession is the regular payment of realty taxes on said land since 1948 up to the filing of the application for registration of title thereto.[37]
While this Court agrees with the
lower courts that, indeed, respondent’s possession of the subject property was
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, however, we hold that respondent
failed to prove that she or her predecessors-in-interest were already in
possession of the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since
12 June 1945 or earlier, which is the reckoning period specifically
provided in Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
As can be gleaned from the records, respondent’s
possession of the subject property started only in the year 1979 when her
mother executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the same in her favor. There
was also no showing that her predecessors-in-interest had already been in
possession or had already exercised acts of ownership over the subject property
since
From 1982 up to 1997, the year the
respondent filed an Application for Registration of Title over the subject
property, the respondent was in possession of the same for only 15 years, which
was short of another 15 years from the 30-year-period possession requirement.
Thus, this Court is constrained to abide by the Latin maxim “Dura lex sed lex.”[42]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ARTURO D.
BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Justice
Arturo D. Brion was designated to sit as additional member replacing Justice
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo with Associate Justices Elvi John S.
[2] Rollo, pp. 37-38.
[3] Penned by Presiding Judge Ma. Victoria N. Cupin-Tesorero. Rollo, pp. 42-45.
[4] Records, p. 72.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Property Registration Decree. It was approved on
[10] Records, pp. 1-5.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] As evidenced by an Order dated
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23] TSN,
[24]
[25] Rollo, p. 45.
[26] Records, pp. 106-108.
[27]
[28] CA rollo, p. 21.
[29] Rollo, p. 15.
[30] Signed into law on
[31] Republic
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144057,
[32]
[33]
[34] Records, p. 60.
[35]
[36]
[37] Rollo, pp. 34-35.
[38] Republic v. De Guzman, 383 Phil. 479, 483-484 (2000).
[39] Republic
of the
[40] Bracewell v. Court of Appeals, 380 Phil. 156, 163 (2000).
[41] Republic v. De Guzman, supra note 38 at 483.
[42]