THIRD DIVISION
|
PETER
TARAPEN y CHONGOY,
Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE
Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 173824 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, CARPIO,* AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: August 28, 2008 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26636, dated 31 January 2006, which
affirmed with modification the Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting petitioner Peter
Chongoy Tarapen of the crime of Homicide.
On
That on or about the 8th day of June, 2000, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, and assault JAMES LACBAO PANGODEN, by hitting his head twice with a steel shovel, thereby inflicting upon the latter: Cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cranio-cerebral injury, which directly caused his death.[4]
The
case was raffled to Branch 3. When
arraigned on
On
The prosecution presented the
following witnesses, namely: (1) Patricia S. Pangoden[7];
(2) Molly J. Linglingen[8];
(3) Silmana Linglingen[9];
(4) Virginia Costales[10];
(5) Dr. Lindo Mensalvas[11]; (6)
Dr. Rizal Leo Cala[12];
and (7) Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Juanito Meneses II.[13]
The collective testimonies of the
witnesses revealed:
At around
The wife of James, Patricia Pangoden,
arrived at the BGHMC and saw her husband in the Emergency Room. Dr. Rizal Leo Cala refused to operate on her husband,
saying that it was already hopeless. She
then requested for the transfer of her husband to the Saint Louis University
(SLU) Hospital. The request was approved,
and her husband was transferred to
Patricia S. Pangoden testified on the
events that happened to her husband from the time he was bought to the hospital
until the time he died. She also
testified on the expenses she incurred as a result of the incident.[17]
Molly J. Linglingen and Silmana
Linglingen, mother and daughter, and co-vendors of James at
Virginia Costales recounted the
events prior to her seeing James already slumped on the ground. She narrated that when the garbage truck was
going down
Dr. Lindo Mensalvas and Dr. Rizal Leo
Cala, physicians at the
SPO2 Juanito Meneses II, assigned at
Police Community Precinct 1,
The prosecution formally offered
Exhibits “A” to “H,” inclusive, with sub-markings which the trial court
admitted.[20]
For the defense, the following took
the witness stand: (1) Jimmy Pugoy,[21]
(2) petitioner Peter Tarapen,[22]
(3) Edmond Ferrer,[23] and
(4) Dr. Maryjane Tipayno.[24]
The version of the defense as culled
from these witnesses is as follows:
Jimmy Pugoy, petitioner Peter Tarapen
and Edmond Ferrer are garbage collectors employed by the General Services
Office of the City of
Peter, accompanied by his supervisor,
voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities. Per his request, he was brought to the
hospital where he met James’s wife who hit him on the back. To avoid trouble, he was brought to the City
Jail. Upon posting bail, he went to the
hospital for treatment.
Jimmy Pugoy testified on what he
allegedly saw that fateful morning. He
recounted that while he was maneuvering the garbage truck he was driving at Zandueta
St., he saw petitioner Peter Tarapen go down the truck and help an old woman, who
was in front of the truck, carry a sack of eggplants. At that moment, a person (James) went near
Peter and suddenly punched him on the face, causing him to fall and roll down
the street. When Peter stood up with his
hands raised, James punched him again on the face, making the latter fall and
roll again. Peter stood up a second time
with his hands up. This time, he said,
James delivered a flying kick, which hit Peter on the stomach. Peter fell and rolled once more. After this, Jimmy no longer saw what happened,
because the people had gathered, and he parked the truck. After parking the vehicle, what he saw was a
man lying on the ground. He went back to
the office and gave a report.
Edmond Ferrer narrated that at around
Petitioner testified that at the time
the incident subject of this case happened, he was in
Dr. Maryjane Tipayno, physician at
the BGHMC, testified that she performed an audio logic test on petitioner on
After formally offering Exhibits “1” and
“2” and with the admission thereof by the trial court, the defense rested its
case.[27]
As rebuttal witnesses, the
prosecution presented Molly Linglingen, who said that petitioner was standing
up when he hit James twice on the head with a shovel. He explained that James was standing with his
back turned, when Peter came from behind and hit him.[28]
On
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused
Peter Tarapen GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Homicide and he
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment at the National
Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City from Fourteen (14) Years as Minimum to Twenty
(20) Years as Maximum. Peter Tarapen
shall also indemnify private complainant Patricia Pangoden the following
amounts: One Hundred Ninety Five Thousand Eighty Pesos and 05/100 (P195,080.05),
representing the expenses for hospitalization, funeral and burial; Moral
Damages to Patricia Pangoden in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00)
and Death Indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), and Loss of
Earning Capacity in the amount of Three Million One Hundred Thirty Five
Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty Pesos (P3,680,800.05), plus costs of suit
against the accused.[29]
The trial court gave credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Molly J. Linglingen, Silmana
Linglingen and Virginia Costales as against the testimonies of defense
witnesses Jimmy Pugoy, petitioner Peter Tarapen and Edmond Ferrer. The trial court found the prosecution’s version
of the incident credible. The trial
court said Virginia Costales saw the first part of the incident, which was the
heated argument between petitioner and the victim involving the victim’s soiled
goods, while Molly J. Linglingen and Silmana Linglingen witnessed the second
part of the incident when petitioner went to the back portion of the garbage truck
and got a shovel with which he hit the victim from the back, twice on the head,
resulting in his death. Having had the
opportunity to observe them, it was convinced that they were telling the truth vis-à-vis the defense witnesses who were
lying, as can be seen from their hesitant answers and evasive looks when they
testified for the petitioner who was a co-employee.
The trial court likewise did not
appreciate self-defense in favor of petitioner, who struck the unarmed victim from
the back, twice on the head.
On
On
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing, the decision dated P51,549.25 in actual
damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and the sum of P1,960,200.00 representing lost earnings.[34]
On
On
In our Resolution[39]
dated
On
Petitioner
assails his conviction, arguing that both trial courts:
I. Erred in giving credence to the prosecution witnesses, despite the grave inconsistencies in their testimonies and not considering the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense showing manifest bias against the accused.
II. Erred in not acquitting the accused when the defense had sufficiently proved the existence of facts proving that indeed the accused was defending himself from James Pangoden.
III. Erred in not acquitting the accused based on reasonable doubt.[43]
On the first assigned error,
petitioner contends that the testimonies of Molly and Silmana Linglingen that
there was no prior quarrel or exchange of words between petitioner and James
before the former hit the latter with a shovel, are contrary to human experience,
because petitioner could not have taken the life of James, whom he did not
personally know, for no reason at all.
This contention is untenable.
A review of the testimonies of both
Molly and Silmana Linglingen shows they never said that petitioner and the
victim did not have any prior quarrel or exchange of words before Peter hit
James with the shovel. What they said
was that they never witnessed any quarrel or exchange of words between Peter
and James. They, however, declared in
unison that they saw petitioner get a shovel from the back of the garbage truck
and, coming from behind, twice struck James on the head with it. Both Molly and Silmana Linglingen never
witnessed the events prior to Peter’s act of getting the shovel. This void was substantially filled up by the
testimony of Virginia Costales, who actually witnessed the altercation between
the petitioner and the victim. Through
the testimony of Mrs. Costales, it became clear why petitioner got the shovel, which
he used in striking James twice on the head.
By combining the testimonies of the three ladies, a picture of the
incident has been wholly painted. The
rage that Peter had in him was brought about by his squabble with James. The defense cannot, therefore, claim that
Peter took the life of James for no reason at all.
Petitioner brands Molly and Silmana
Linglingen as biased witnesses, thus, unreliable, because they were town mates
and co-vendors of the victim. The fact that these two witnesses were the
victim’s town mates and co-vendors did not necessarily make them biased
witnesses. It is
well-settled that the mere relationship of a witness to the victim does not
impair the witness’ credibility. On the
contrary, a witness’ relationship to a victim of a crime would even make his or
her testimony more credible, as it would be unnatural for a relative, or a
friend as in this case, who is interested in vindicating the crime, to accuse
somebody other than the real culprit.[44] A witness is said to be biased when his relation to the cause
or to the parties is such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false
color to his statements, or to suppress or to pervert the truth, or to state
what is false.[45] To warrant rejection of the
testimony of a relative or friend, it must be clearly shown that, independently
of the relationship, the testimony was inherently improbable or defective, or
that improper or evil motives had moved the witness to incriminate the accused falsely.[46]
The
friendship of Molly and
Silmana Linglingen with the victim, per se, did not impair their
credibility. We, like both lower courts,
are convinced that they were telling the truth. Moreover, the defense failed to show any evidence
that prosecution witnesses Molly and Silmana Linglingen had improper or evil motives to testify
falsely against petitioner. This being
the case, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.
The defense accuses the prosecution
witnesses of deliberately suppressing material evidence favorable to the
petitioner. It thus argues that it may
be safely presumed that such evidence, having been willfully suppressed, would be
adverse if produced.
We do not find any suppression of
evidence by the prosecution. The defense
failed to specify which evidence was suppressed. It simply made a general statement that the
prosecution witnesses allegedly did not tell the truth and thus deliberately
suppressed material evidence favorable to the petitioner. The adverse presumption of suppression
of evidence is not applicable when (1) the suppression is not
willful; (2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative or
cumulative; (3) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and (4) the
suppression is an exercise of a privilege.[47] In the case at bar, the prosecution witnesses
who allegedly suppressed material evidence were presented in court and were
cross-examined by the defense counsel.
How then can the defense claim there was suppression? The defense counsel was able to question
these witnesses, but failed to elicit the answer he wanted or needed to hear for
the exoneration of his client.
The defense attacks the credibility
of Virginia Costales by pointing out that her testimony in court, that she did
not see petitioner and the victim engage in a fistfight, contradicts her declaration
in her sworn statement that that two engaged in a fistfight.
Such inconsistency will not discredit
her. It is settled that certain
discrepancies between declarations made in an affidavit and
those made on the witness stand seldom could discredit the declarant. Sworn statements, being taken ex parte, are
almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for various reasons, sometimes
from partial suggestion or for want of suggestion and inquiries. They are generally inferior to the testimony of the witness given in open court. Our case law is unequivocal in saying that the
testimony of a witness prevails over an affidavit.
In short, affidavits are generally subordinated in importance
to open-court declarations; or, more bluntly stated, whenever there is
inconsistency between an affidavit and the testimony
of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight.[48] The Court has consistently ruled that the alleged
inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court and his sworn
statement before the investigators are not fatal defects that would justify the
reversal of a judgment of conviction.[49] In this case, when
Mrs. Costales was confronted with this contradiction, she explained that she
never told the police that the petitioner and the victim had a fistfight. What she said was they had a quarrel; that
is, they faced each other and exchanged words.
The defense tries to destroy the version
of Molly and Silmana Linglingen that the victim was hit from behind by arguing
that same is not corroborated by medical findings. Molly and Silmana Linglingen’s claim that
James was hit on the right side of the head was, according to the defense,
negated by the findings of Dr. Mensalvas that James suffered injuries on the “left frontoparietal and left frontotemporo
parietal” areas of his head. The
findings of Dr. Mensalvas mean that James was facing Peter when hit by the
shovel contrary to the prosecution’s claim that James was hit by Peter from
behind.
We do not agree.
The defense relies too much on the
findings made by Dr. Lindo Mensalvas and completely omits the findings made by
Dr. Rizal Leo Cala. It must not be
forgotten that the victim was brought to two hospitals where the attending
doctors issued separate medico-legal certificates. The medico-legal certificate[50]
issued by Dr. Cala of the BGHMC was marked Exh. “D.” The one issued by Dr. Mensalvas was marked
Exh. “C.”
On the witness stand, Dr. Cala read
his findings as follows:
“Skull Fracture” meaning there is a break in the skull bone, “Linear” which is a straight line fracture, “parietal” area on the right side of the head, then we have “Epidural hematoma” it is a blood clot at the right side of the head.[51]
When cross-examined, he explained his
findings as follows:
q Both injuries you found were on the front parietal area?
a Yes, Sir.
q Will you please demonstrate to us?
a (Witness demonstrating by pointing to the right side of his head.)
q Doctor, while you were demonstrating, the linear fracture, is it perpendicular to the head?
a I am sorry but it was injury to the right side of the head, Sir.
q Only part of the right ear?
a Yes, sir.
q If I am facing you, it is on your?
a Right, Sir.
q Right side on your part. Did you find any injury on the left side?
a No, Sir.[52]
From
the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Cala and with his testimony in court,
it is clear that the victim suffered injuries on the right side of his
head. Thus, the claim of Molly and
Silmana Linglingen that the victim was struck from behind on the right side of
his head is consistent with the findings of Dr. Cala.
Dr.
Mensalvas, on the other hand, testified that the victim sustained four
injuries, three of which were on the left side of the head and one on the right
side. The medical certificate he issued
states that the victim was confined for the following injuries:
1. ACCI; CEREBRAL CONTUSSION
2. EPIDURAL HEMATOMA, LEFT FRONTOPARIETAL AREA
3. SUTURED SCALP LACERATION, RIGHT TEMPOROPARIETAL AREA
4.
SCALP CONTUSSION, LEFT FRONTOTEMPORO
PARIETAL AREA WITH UNDERLYING LINEAR FRACTURE OF THE SKULL EXTENDING FROM THE
LEFT FRONTAL TO THE LEFT TEMPORAL BONE.[53]
The question now is: which medical
findings should this Court believe?
This Court believes in the findings
made by Dr. Cala as contained in the medico-legal certificate he issued showing
that the victim suffered injuries on the right side of his head, consistent
with the declarations of prosecution witnesses that the victim was, from
behind, struck with a shovel twice on the right side of the head. We give more weight to this medical
certificate, because the same was issued by a government doctor. By actual practice, only government
physicians, by virtue of their oaths as civil service officials, are competent
to examine persons and issue medical certificates which will be used by the
government.[54] As such, the medical certificate carries the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his functions and duties. Moreover,
under Section 44, Rule 130,[55]
Revised Rules of Court, entries in official records made in the performance of
official duty are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated.
Dr. Cala’s findings that the victim sustained injuries on the right side
of his head are, therefore, conclusive
in the absence of evidence proving the contrary, as in this case. We cannot consider the contents of the medical
certificate issued by Dr. Mensalvas sufficient to controvert the findings of
Dr. Cala. As held by this Court, an
unverified medical certificate not issued by a government physician is
unreliable.[56]
Even
assuming arguendo that we give more weight to the medical certificate issued by
Dr. Mensalvas, this does not mean that the testimonies of Molly and Silmana Linglingen shall be
disbelieved. It is noted that Dr.
Mensalvas testified that the victim sustained a wound on the right side of his
head, possibly caused by a steel shovel.[57] Such a finding is consistent with the claim
of Molly and Silmana Linglingen that the victim was hit on the right side of
the head. Though there can be
inconsistencies of the testimonies of the witnesses with Dr. Mensalvas’s other
findings (i.e., injuries on the left
portion of the head) this does not mean that we should totally doubt and
discard the other portions of their testimonies.
Well-settled
is the rule that the testimony of a witness may be believed in part and
disbelieved in another, depending on the corroborative evidence or the
probabilities and improbabilities of the case. Where a part of the testimony of a witness
runs counter to the medical evidence submitted, it is within the sound
discretion of the court to determine which portions of the testimony to reject
as false and which to consider worthy of belief.[58]
From
the two medical certificates issued, what cannot be doubted is the fact that
the victim sustained head injuries, whether on the left or the right, which caused
his demise.
We find the testimonies of the
prosecution eyewitnesses more credible and convincing than those of the defense
eyewitnesses. When it comes to
credibility, the trial court’s assessment deserves great weight and is even
conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence.
The reason is obvious. Having the
full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of
testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to
evaluate testimonial evidence properly.[59]
The Court of Appeals further affirmed the findings
of the RTC. In this regard, it is
settled that when the trial court’s findings
have been affirmed by the appellate court,
said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court. We find
no compelling reason to deviate from their findings.
Petitioner claims that the trial
court judge was not able to observe the demeanor of the prosecution witnesses,
because they were looking at the court interpreter when they were
testifying. We find this untenable. The trial court judge was emphatic in saying
that he had the chance to see the face of the witness while she testified.[60]
On the second and third assigned
errors, petitioner admits killing James but invokes self-defense. He claims that the victim was the unlawful
aggressor and that he (petitioner) did not provoke the victim.
Article
11, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, provides for the elements and/or
requisites in order that a plea of self-defense may be validly considered in
absolving a person from criminal liability, viz:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal
liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided
that the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself.
Having admitted that he killed James,
the burden of evidence that one acted in self-defense shifted to petitioner. Like an
alibi, self-defense is inherently weak, for it is easy to fabricate.[61] It is textbook doctrine that when self-defense
is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to
show that the killing was justified, and that he incurred no criminal liability
therefor. He must rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence, for,
even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open
admission of responsibility for the killing. Hence, he must prove the essential
requisites of self-defense as aforementioned.[62]
Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance
of self-defense, whether complete or incomplete.[63] Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual,
sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude.[64] There must be actual physical force or a threat to inflict
physical injury. In case of a threat, it
must be offensive and positively strong so as to display a real, not imagined,
intent to cause injury.[65]
We agree with the Court of Appeals
that petitioner failed to clearly and convincingly prove self-defense, whether
complete or incomplete.
We confirm the observation of the trial court. A circumspect scrutiny of accused-appellant’s version of what happened likewise leaves this Court unconvinced that he killed the victim James Pangoden in self-defense.
First, accused-appellant’s claim that the victim James Pangoden, suddenly and without provocation, boxed him on his right ear is simply unbelievable. By his own account, he (accused-appellant) was at that moment helping a road vendor carry her sack of eggplants away from the path of the truck. If this is true, then his testimony that James Pangoden attacked and boxed him for no reason at all loses credibility. Testimonies to be believed must not only come from the mouth of credible witnesses but should by themselves be credible, reasonable, and in accord with human experience.
Second, it is likewise inconceivable how accused-appellant could have hit the victim James Pangoden twice in the head while he (accused-appellant) was allegedly in a sitting position and holding the shovel by the middle part of its shaft. Interestingly also, while accused-appellant and his witness testified that he was in a “sitting” position when he hit James Pangoden with the shovel, accused-appellant portrayed a different account when asked during cross-examination to demonstrate how he hit the victim, viz:
Q: Now, how did you hit Pangoden with the shovel, demonstrate it to the Court. All right you can step down from the witness stand (Witness demonstrating.)
For the record, witness was in a kneeling position when he got the shovel.
A: I was down on the ground, and I was groping (sic) to somebody and I was able to get hold of the shovel, that was the time I swang (sic) it towards him.
Q: You have not demonstrated how you hit Pangoden with the shovel?
For the record, witness is in a kneeling position when he allegedly picked up the shovel holding it in the middle part. With his two hands and swang (sic) it upwards towards his left.
For the record, accused held the shovel on the middle part of the shaft, your Honor, not on the handle.
Third, it simply goes against the grain of human experience for the victim James Pangoden to persist in his attack against accused-appellant after getting hit in the head with a steel shovel, considering that he is unarmed and had nothing to match accused-appellant’s weapon on hand. That James Pangoden still had the resolution and power for a second assault on accused-appellant, after getting hit with a steel shovel in the head, flouts ordinary human capacity and nature. In contrast, accused-appellant would claim that he “fell down” and “felt dizzy” after getting boxed on the right side of his head by James Pangoden with his bare fist.
Fourth, accused-appellant himself admitted walking away from the crime scene immediately after the incident. As we see it, this actuation on his part is contrary to his assertion of self-defense. Flight strongly indicates a guilty mind and betrays the existence of a guilty conscience, for a righteous individual will not cower in fear and unabashedly admit the killing at the earliest possible opportunity if he were morally justified in doing so.
Finally, the nature and number of the fatal injuries inflicted upon James Pangoden negate accused-appellant’s claim of self-defense. Said victim suffered cerebral contusion, epidural hematoma, scalp laceration and skull fracture, which directly caused his death. If accused-appellant hit the victim just to defend himself, it certainly defies reason why he had to aim for the head and do it twice. Indeed, the nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by the victim belie the assertion of self-defense since the gravity of said wounds is indicative of a determined effort to kill and not just to defend.
x x x x
But even assuming arguendo that accused-appellant was able to establish the element of unlawful aggression, still, this Court will rule out self-defense.
It
is undisputed that James Pangoden was unarmed while accused-appellant was armed
with a steel shovel. There was no
reasonable necessity for accused-appellant to use a steel shovel to repel the
attack of an unarmed man. Moreover, the
eyewitnesses’ account of how accused-appellant uncaringly threw the soiled
eggplants towards the direction of James Pangoden’s goods would negate the
absence of sufficient provocation on the part of accused-appellant. Thus, the second and third requisites for
self-defense to be successfully invoked, namely, reasonable necessity of the
means employed to repel the attack and lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the accused, are not present in this case.[66]
We now go to the imposition of the
penalty. We agree with the Court of
Appeals when it appreciated in favor of the petitioner the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender. It was
established that a few hours after the incident, petitioner submitted himself
to his supervisors, who, in turn, surrendered him to the police authorities.
Petitioner is guilty of Homicide for
having killed James Pangoden. The penalty
for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. However, considering that there is one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance in the
commission of the crime, the imposable penalty, following Article 64(2) of the
Revised Penal Code, is reclusion temporal
in its minimum period or within the range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty to be
imposed shall be taken from the minimum period of reclusion temporal, while the minimum shall be taken from within
the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor or from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years.
The Court of Appeals sentenced
petitioner to suffer the penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. We find this to be in order.
With respect to award of damages, the
trial court awarded to the heirs of the victim the following amounts: P195,080.05
as actual damages; P300,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as
death indemnity; and P3,135,720.00 for loss of earning capacity.
The Court of Appeals, except for the
award of death indemnity, reduced the awards given by the trial court as
follows: P51,549.25 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P1,960,200.00 for lost income.
When death occurs due to a crime, the
following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory
damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.[67]
Civil indemnity is mandatory and
granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission
of the crime.[68] Under prevailing jurisprudence,[69]
the award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim as civil indemnity is
in order.[70]
As to actual damages, the heirs of the victim are entitled
thereto, because said damages amounting to P51,549.25 were duly proved by
receipts. It is necessary for a party
seeking actual damages to produce competent proof or the best evidence
obtainable, such as receipts, to justify an award therefor.[71]
Moral damages must also
be awarded because these are mandatory in cases of murder and homicide, without
need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim.[72]
The award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is in order.
The award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial
and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.[73] Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code,
temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of
the victim suffered pecuniary loss, although the exact amount was not proved.[74] In the case on hand, temperate damages cannot
be awarded, because evidence of expenses for burial and funeral has been
presented for which actual damages have been awarded.
As regards exemplary damages, Article 2230 of the Civil Code
allows the award thereof as part of the civil liability when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.[75] There being no aggravating circumstance that
accompanied the commission of the crime, exemplary damages cannot be awarded.
The computation of the Court of
Appeals with respect to lost earning capacity is correct. At the time of his death, the victim was 31
years old. His gross annual income was P120,000.00 because he was
earning P10,000.00
monthly. Living expenses are estimated at 50% of the gross
annual income. Loss of earning capacity is
computed by applying the following formula:[76]
|
= life expectancy
x [Gross Annual –
living expenses [2/3(80-age Income (GAI) (50% of GAI)] at
death)] |
|
|
|
= [2/3(80-31)] x [(GAI) – (50% of GAI)] |
|
|
|
|
|
= 2 (49) x [ 3 |
|
|
= [98/3] x [ = [32.67] x
[ |
|
= |
WHEREFORE, all
the foregoing considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 26636, dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Justice
Antonio T. Carpio was designated to sit as additional member replacing Justice
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Sesinando E. Villon, concurring; CA rollo, pp. 131-145.
[2] Records, pp. 347-358.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] TSN,
[8] TSN, 7 May 2001.
[9] TSN, 8 May 2001.
[10]
[11] TSN, 21 May 2001.
[12] TSN, 28 May 2001.
[13]
[14] TSN,
[15] TSN,
[16] TSN,
[17]
[18] Exh. C – Certificate issued by Dr.
Mensalvas (
Exh. D – Certificate issued by Dr. Cala (BGHMC –
[19] Exh. “A.”
[20] Records, pp. 226-229, 242.
[21] TSN,
[22] TSN,
[23] TSN,
[24] TSN,
[25] TSN,
[26] Exhs. “A” and “B”; records, pp. 312-313.
[27] Records, pp. 311 and 321.
[28] TSN,
[29] Records, p. 358.
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34] CA rollo, pp. 144-145.
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38] Rollo, pp. 9-31.
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44] People
v. Romero, 459 Phil. 484, 499 (2003).
[45] People v. Ulgasan, 390 Phil. 763, 778 (2000).
[46] People
v. Daen, Jr., 314 Phil.
280, 291 (1995).
[47] People
v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 93852,
[48] People v. Ortiz, 413 Phil. 592, 611 (2001).
[49] People v. Sorila, Jr., G.R. No. 178540,
[50] Exh.
“D”; Records, p. 232.
[51] TSN
[52]
[53] Exh.
“C”; Records, p. 231.
[54] People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144332,
[55] SEC.
44. Entries in official records. – Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the
[56] People v. Court
of Appeals, supra note 54.
[57] TSN,
[58] People v. Cantuba, 428 Phil. 817, 828 (2002).
[59] People
v. Escultor, G.R. Nos. 149366-67,
[60] TSN,
[61] People v. Beltran, Jr., G.R. No. 168051,
[62] Sanchez
v. People, G.R. No. 161007,
[63]
[64] People v. Cario, 351 Phil. 644, 659
(1998).
[65]
[66] Rollo,
pp. 53-56.
[67] People v. Beltran, Jr., supra note 61.
[68] People
v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271,
[69] People
v. Buban, G.R. No. 170471,
[70] People
v. Pascual, G.R. No. 173309,
[71] People
v. Jamiro, 344 Phil. 700, 721-722 (1997).
[72] People v. Bajar, 460 Phil. 683, 700 (2003).
[73] People v. Eling, G.R. No. 178546,
[74] People
v. Surongon, G.R. No. 173478,
[75] People v. Eling, supra 73.
[76] People v. Nabong, G.R. No. 172324,