THIRD
DIVISION
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PEOPLE OF THE
Petitioners, - versus
- TERESITA PUIG and ROMEO PORRAS, Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 173654-765 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, REYES,
and DE
CASTRO,* JJ. Promulgated: August 28, 2008 |
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D
E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court with petitioner
People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
praying for the reversal of the Orders dated 30 January 2006 and 9 June 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the 6th Judicial Region, Branch
68, Dumangas, Iloilo, dismissing the 112 cases of Qualified Theft filed against
respondents Teresita Puig and Romeo Porras, and denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration, in Criminal Cases No. 05-3054 to 05-3165.
The
following are the factual antecedents:
On 7
November 2005, the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office filed before Branch 68
of the RTC in Dumangas, Iloilo, 112 cases of Qualified Theft against respondents
Teresita Puig (Puig) and Romeo Porras (Porras) who were the Cashier and
Bookkeeper, respectively, of private complainant Rural Bank of Pototan, Inc. The
cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 05-3054 to 05-3165.
The
allegations in the Informations[1]
filed before the RTC were uniform and pro-forma,
except for the amounts, date and time of commission, to wit:
INFORMATION
That on or about the 1st
day of August, 2002, in the Municipality of Pototan, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [respondents],
conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, with grave abuse of confidence,
being the Cashier and Bookkeeper of the Rural Bank of
Pototan, Inc., Pototan, Iloilo, without the knowledge and/or consent of the
management of the Bank and with intent of gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the sum of FIFTEEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00), Philippine Currency, to the damage and
prejudice of the said bank in the aforesaid amount.
After
perusing the Informations in these cases, the trial court did not find the
existence of probable cause that would have necessitated the issuance of a
warrant of arrest based on the following grounds:
(1)
the element of ‘taking without the consent
of the owners’ was missing on the ground that it is the
depositors-clients, and not the Bank, which filed the complaint in these cases,
who are the owners of the money allegedly taken by respondents and hence, are
the real parties-in-interest; and
(2)
the Informations are bereft of the phrase
alleging “dependence, guardianship or vigilance between the respondents and the
offended party that would have created a high degree of confidence between them
which the respondents could have abused.”
It added that allowing the 112 cases
for Qualified Theft filed against the respondents to push through would be
violative of the right of the respondents under Section 14(2), Article III of
the 1987 Constitution which states that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. Following Section 6, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the RTC dismissed the cases on
A
Motion for Reconsideration[2] was
filed on
On
Accordingly, the prosecution’s
Motion for Reconsideration should be, as it hereby, DENIED. The Order dated
Petitioner
went directly to this Court via
Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45, raising the sole legal issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE 112 INFORMATIONS FOR QUALIFIED THEFT SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGE THE ELEMENT OF TAKING WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE OWNER, AND THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE.
Petitioner prays that judgment be
rendered annulling and setting aside the Orders dated
Petitioner
explains that under Article 1980 of the New Civil Code, “fixed, savings, and
current deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed
by the provisions concerning simple loans.” Corollary thereto, Article 1953 of
the same Code provides that “a person who receives a loan of money or any other
fungible thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay to the
creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality.” Thus, it posits that the depositors who place
their money with the bank are considered creditors of the bank. The bank acquires ownership of the money
deposited by its clients, making the money taken by respondents as belonging to
the bank.
Petitioner
also insists that the Informations sufficiently allege all the elements of the
crime of qualified theft, citing that a perusal of the Informations will show
that they specifically allege that the respondents were the Cashier and
Bookkeeper of the Rural Bank of Pototan, Inc., respectively, and that they took
various amounts of money with grave abuse of confidence, and without the
knowledge and consent of the bank, to the damage and prejudice of the bank.
Parenthetically,
respondents raise procedural issues. They
challenge the petition on the ground that a Petition for Review on Certiorari via Rule 45 is the wrong mode of appeal because a finding of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest presupposes evaluation
of facts and circumstances, which is not proper under said Rule.
Respondents
further claim that the Department of Justice (DOJ), through the Secretary of
Justice, is the principal party to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari, considering that the
incident was indorsed by the DOJ.
We
find merit in the petition.
The
dismissal by the RTC of the criminal cases was allegedly due to insufficiency
of the Informations and, therefore, because of this defect, there is no basis
for the existence of probable cause which will justify the issuance of the
warrant of arrest. Petitioner assails
the dismissal contending that the Informations for Qualified Theft sufficiently
state facts which constitute (a) the qualifying circumstance of grave abuse of confidence; and (b) the element
of taking, with intent to gain and
without the consent of the owner, which is the Bank.
In
determining the existence of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, the
RTC judge found the allegations in the Information inadequate. He ruled that the Information failed to state
facts constituting the qualifying circumstance of grave abuse of confidence and the element of taking without the consent of the owner, since the owner of the
money is not the Bank, but the depositors therein. He also cites People v. Koc Song,[4] in
which this Court held:
There must be allegation in the information and proof of a relation, by reason of dependence, guardianship or vigilance, between the respondents and the offended party that has created a high degree of confidence between them, which the respondents abused.
At this point, it needs stressing that the RTC Judge based his conclusion
that there was no probable cause simply on the insufficiency of the allegations
in the Informations concerning the facts constitutive of the elements of the
offense charged. This, therefore, makes the issue of
sufficiency of the allegations in the Informations the focal point of
discussion.
Qualified
Theft, as defined and punished under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, is
committed as follows, viz:
ART. 310. Qualified Theft. – The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (Emphasis supplied.)
Theft,
as defined in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, requires the physical
taking of another’s property without violence or intimidation against persons
or force upon things. The elements of
the crime under this Article are:
1. Intent to gain;
2. Unlawful
taking;
3. Personal
property belonging to another;
4. Absence of violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things.
To
fall under the crime of Qualified Theft, the following elements must concur:
1. Taking of personal property;
2.
That the said property belongs to another;
3.
That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4.
That it be done without the owner’s consent;
5.
That it be accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things;
6. That it be done with grave abuse of
confidence.
On
the sufficiency of the Information, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
requires, inter alia, that the
information must state the acts or omissions complained of as constitutive of
the offense.
On
the manner of how the Information should be worded, Section 9, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court, is enlightening:
Section 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
It
is evident that the Information need not use the exact language of the statute
in alleging the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. The test is whether it enables a person of
common understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render
judgment properly.[5]
The
portion of the Information relevant to this discussion reads:
[A]bove-named [respondents], conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, with grave abuse of confidence, being the Cashier and Bookkeeper of the Rural Bank of Pototan, Inc., Pototan, Iloilo, without the knowledge and/or consent of the management of the Bank x x x.
It
is beyond doubt that tellers, Cashiers, Bookkeepers and other employees of a
Bank who come into possession of the monies deposited therein enjoy the
confidence reposed in them by their employer. Banks, on the other hand, where monies are
deposited, are considered the owners thereof. This is very clear not only from the express
provisions of the law, but from established jurisprudence. The relationship between banks and depositors
has been held to be that of creditor and debtor. Articles 1953 and 1980 of the New Civil Code,
as appropriately pointed out by petitioner, provide as follows:
Article 1953. A person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible thing acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay to the creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality.
Article 1980. Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning loan.
In
a long line of cases involving Qualified Theft, this Court has firmly
established the nature of possession by the Bank of the money deposits therein,
and the duties being performed by its employees who have custody of the money
or have come into possession of it. The
Court has consistently considered the allegations in the Information that such
employees acted with grave abuse of confidence, to the damage and prejudice of
the Bank, without particularly referring to it as owner of the money deposits,
as sufficient to make out a case of Qualified Theft. For a graphic illustration, we cite Roque
v. People,[6] where
the accused teller was convicted for Qualified Theft based on this Information:
That on or about the 16th day of
November, 1989, in the municipality of Floridablanca, province of
Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the
above-named accused ASUNCION GALANG ROQUE, being then employed as teller
of the Basa Air Base Savings and Loan Association Inc. (BABSLA) with office
address at Basa Air Base, Floridablanca, Pampanga, and as such was authorized
and reposed with the responsibility to receive and collect capital
contributions from its member/contributors of said corporation, and having
collected and received in her capacity as teller of the BABSLA the sum of TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), said accused, with intent of gain, with
grave abuse of confidence and without the knowledge and consent of
said corporation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away the amount of P10,000.00,
Philippine currency, by making it appear that a certain depositor by the name
of Antonio Salazar withdrew from his Savings Account No. 1359, when in truth
and in fact said Antonio Salazar did not withdr[a]w the said amount of P10,000.00
to the damage and prejudice of BABSLA in the total amount of P10,000.00,
Philippine currency.
In convicting the therein appellant,
the Court held that:
[S]ince the teller
occupies a position of confidence, and the bank places money in the teller’s
possession due to the confidence reposed on the teller, the felony of qualified
theft would be committed.[7]
Also
in People
v. Sison,[8] the
Branch Operations Officer was convicted of the crime of Qualified Theft based
on the Information as herein cited:
That
in or about and during the period compressed between January 24, 1992 and
February 13, 1992, both dates inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof,
take, steal and carry away the following, to wit:
Cash
money amounting to P6,000,000.00 in different denominations belonging to
the PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (PCIBank for brevity), Luneta
Branch, Manila represented by its Branch Manager, HELEN U. FARGAS, to the
damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount of P6,000,000.00,
Philippine Currency.
That
in the commission of the said offense, herein accused acted with grave abuse of
confidence and unfaithfulness, he being the Branch Operation Officer
of the said complainant and as such he had free access to the place where the
said amount of money was kept.
The
judgment of conviction elaborated thus:
The crime perpetuated by appellant against his employer, the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), is Qualified Theft. Appellant could not have committed the crime had he not been holding the position of Luneta Branch Operation Officer which gave him not only sole access to the bank vault xxx. The management of the PCIB reposed its trust and confidence in the appellant as its Luneta Branch Operation Officer, and it was this trust and confidence which he exploited to enrich himself to the damage and prejudice of PCIB x x x.[9]
From
another end, People v. Locson,[10]
in addition to People v. Sison, described the nature of possession by the
Bank. The money in this case was in the
possession of the defendant as receiving teller of the bank, and the possession
of the defendant was the possession of the Bank. The Court held therein that when the
defendant, with grave abuse of confidence, removed the money and appropriated
it to his own use without the consent of the Bank, there was taking as contemplated
in the crime of Qualified Theft.[11]
Conspicuously,
in all of the foregoing cases, where the Informations merely alleged the
positions of the respondents; that the crime was committed with grave abuse of
confidence, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the
Bank, without necessarily stating the phrase being assiduously insisted upon by
respondents, “of a relation by reason of dependence, guardianship or vigilance,
between the respondents and the offended party that has created a high degree
of confidence between them, which respondents abused,”[12]
and without employing the word “owner” in lieu of the “Bank” were considered to
have satisfied the test of sufficiency of allegations.
As
regards the respondents who were employed as Cashier and Bookkeeper of the Bank
in this case, there is even no reason to quibble on the allegation in the Informations
that they acted with grave abuse of confidence. In fact, the Information which alleged grave
abuse of confidence by accused herein is even more precise, as this is exactly
the requirement of the law in qualifying the crime of Theft.
In
summary, the Bank acquires ownership of the money deposited by its clients; and
the employees of the Bank, who are entrusted with the possession of money of
the Bank due to the confidence reposed in them, occupy positions of confidence.
The Informations, therefore,
sufficiently allege all the essential elements constituting the crime of
Qualified Theft.
On
the theory of the defense that the DOJ is the principal party who may file the
instant petition, the ruling in Mobilia
Products, Inc. v. Hajime Umezawa[13]
is instructive. The Court thus enunciated:
In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may be made only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State only, through the OSG. x x x.
On
the alleged wrong mode of appeal by petitioner, suffice it to state that the
rule is well-settled that in appeals by certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only errors of law may be raised,[14]
and herein petitioner certainly raised a question of law.
As
an aside, even if we go beyond the allegations of the Informations in these
cases, a closer look at the records of the preliminary investigation conducted
will show that, indeed, probable cause exists for the indictment of herein
respondents. Pursuant to Section 6, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court, the judge shall issue a warrant of arrest only upon
a finding of probable cause after personally evaluating the resolution of the prosecutor
and its supporting evidence. Soliven v. Makasiar,[15]
as reiterated in Allado v. Driokno,[16] explained
that probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of
such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested.[17] The records reasonably indicate that the
respondents may have, indeed, committed the offense charged.
Before
closing, let it be stated that while it is truly imperative upon the fiscal or
the judge, as the case may be, to relieve the respondents from the pain of
going through a trial once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to
form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the respondents, conversely, it is
also equally imperative upon the judge to proceed with the case upon a showing that
there is a prima facie case against
the respondents.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Orders dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice |
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro was designated to sit as additional member
replacing Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated
[1] Records,
pp. 1, 170-391.
[2] Records,
pp. 490-495.
[3]
[4] 63
Phil. 369, 371 (1936).
[5] People v. Lab-eo, 424 Phil. 482, 495 (2002).
[6] G.R.
No. 138954,
[7]
[8] 379
Phil. 363, 366-367 (2000).
[9]
[10] 57
Phil. 325 (1932).
[11]
[12] Rollo, p. 158.
[13] G.R.
No. 149357,
[14] Reas v. Bonife, G.R. Nos. 54348-49,
[15] G.R.
No. L-82585,
[16] G.R.
No. 113630,
[17]