THIRD
DIVISION
|
JUDY ANNE L. SANTOS,
Petitioner, - versus- PEOPLE OF
THE
Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 173176 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA,* CHICO-NAZARIO, and REYES,
JJ. Promulgated: August 26, 2008 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioner Judy Anne L. Santos (Santos) seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Resolution,[2] dated 19 June 2006, of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) en banc in C.T.A. EB. CRIM. No. 001 which denied petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review. Petitioner intended to file the Petition for Review with the CTA en banc to appeal the Resolutions dated 23 February 2006[3] and 11 May 2006[4] of the CTA First Division in C.T.A. Crim. Case No. 0-012 denying, respectively, her Motion to Quash the Information filed against her for violation of Section 255, in relation to Sections 254 and 248(B) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended; and her Motion for Reconsideration.
There is no controversy as to the facts that gave rise to the present Petition.
On
I have the honor to refer to you for preliminary
investigation and filing of an information in court if evidence so warrants,
the herein attached Joint Affidavit of RODERICK C. ABAD, STIMSON P. CUREG,
VILMA V. CARONAN, RHODORA L. DELOS REYES under Group Supervisor TEODORA
V. PURINO, of the National Investigation Division, BIR National Office
Building, BIR Road, Diliman, Quezon
City, recommending the criminal prosecution of MS. JUDY ANNE LUMAGUI SANTOS
for substantial underdeclaration of income, which
constitutes as prima facie evidence of false or fraudulent return
under Section 248(B) of the NIRC and punishable under Sections 254 and 255 of
the Tax Code.
In said letter,
BIR Commissioner Parayno summarized the findings of
the investigating BIR officers that petitioner, in her Annual Income Tax Return
for taxable year 2002 filed with the BIR, declared an income of P8,033,332.70
derived from her talent fees solely from ABS-CBN; initial documents gathered from the BIR
offices and those given by petitioner’s accountant and third parties, however,
confirmed that petitioner received in 2002 income in the amount of at least P14,796,234.70,
not only from ABS-CBN, but also from other sources, such as movies and product
endorsements; the estimated tax liability arising from petitioner’s underdeclaration amounted to P1,718,925.52,
including incremental penalties; the non-declaration by petitioner of an amount
equivalent to at least 84.18% of the income declared in her return was
considered a substantial underdeclaration of income,
which constituted prima facie evidence of false or fraudulent return
under Section 248(B)[6]
of the NIRC, as amended; and petitioner’s failure to account as part of her
income the professional fees she received from sources other than ABS-CBN and
her underdeclaration of the income she received from
ABS-CBN amounted to manifest violations of Sections 254[7]
and 255,[8]
as well as Section 248(B) of the NIRC, as amended.
After an exchange of affidavits and
other pleadings by the parties, Prosecution Attorney Olivia Laroza-Torrevillas
issued a Resolution[9]
dated
Pursuant to the 21 October 2005 DOJ
Resolution, an Information[10]
for violation of Section 255 in relation to Sections 254 and 248(B) of the
NIRC, as amended, was filed with the CTA on 3 November 2005 and docketed as C.T.A.
Crim. Case No. 0-012.
However, the CTA First Division, after noting several discrepancies in
the Information filed, required the State Prosecutor to clarify and explain the
same, and to submit the original copies of the parties’ affidavits, memoranda,
and all other evidence on record.[11]
Consequently, Prosecution Attorney Torrevillas, on behalf of respondent People, submitted on
The undersigned Prosecution Attorney of the Department of Justice hereby accuses JUDY ANNE SANTOS y Lumagui of the offense of violation of Section 255, of Republic Act No. 8424, otherwise known as the “Tax Reform Act of 1997,” as amended, committed as follows:
“That
on or about the 15th day of April, 2003, at Quezon
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
file a false and fraudulent income tax return for taxable year 2002 by
indicating therein a gross income of P8,033,332.70 when in truth and in
fact her correct income for taxable year 2002 is P16,396,234.70 or a
gross underdeclaration/difference of P8,362,902
resulting to an income tax deficiency of P1,395,116.24 excluding
interest and penalties thereon of P1,319,500.94 or a total income tax
deficiency of P2,714,617.18 to the damage and prejudice of the
government of the same amount.[”]
In a Resolution[14]
dated
The CTA First Division then issued on
P20,000.00.[16]
On 10 January 2006, petitioner filed with the CTA First Division a Motion
to Quash[17]
the Information filed in C.T.A. Crim. Case No. 0-012
on the following grounds:
1. The facts
alleged in the INFORMATION do not constitute an offense;
2. The officer
who filed the information had no authority to do so;
3. The
Honorable Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case; and
4. The
information is void ab initio, being violative
of due process, and the equal protection of the laws.
In a Resolution[18]
dated
Petitioner received a copy of the
In the case before Us, the
petitioner is asking for an extension of time to file her Petition for Review
to appeal the denial of her motion to quash in C.T.A. Crim.
Case No. 0-012. As stated above, a
resolution denying a motion to quash is not a proper subject of an appeal to
the Court En Banc under Section 11 of R.A. No. 9282 because a ruling
denying a motion to quash is only an interlocutory order, as such, it cannot be
made the subject of an appeal pursuant to said law and the Rules of Court. Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
provides that “no appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order” and Section
1 (i) of Rule 50 provides for the dismissal of an
appeal on the ground that “the order or judgment appealed from is not appealable”. Time
and again, the Supreme Court had ruled that the remedy of the accused in case
of denial of a motion to quash is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial
and after an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom
in the manner authorized by law.
Since a denial of a Motion to Quash is not appealable, granting petitioner’s Motion for Extension of
Time to File Petition for Review will only be an exercise in futility
considering that the dismissal of the Petition for Review that will be filed by
way of appeal is mandated both by law and jurisprudence.[22]
Ultimately, the CTA en banc
decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner’s Motion for Extension of
Time to File Petition for Review filed on
Now comes petitioner before this Court raising
the sole issue of:
WHETHER A RESOLUTION OF A CTA
DIVISION DENYING A MOTION TO QUASH IS A PROPER SUBJECT OF AN APPEAL TO THE CTA EN
BANC UNDER SECTION 11 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9282, AMENDING
SECTION 18 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1125.[24]
Section 18 of Republic Act No. 1125,[25]
as amended by Republic Act No. 9282,[26]
provides:
SEC. 18.
Appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc. – No civil proceedings involving matters
arising under the National Internal Revenue Code, the Tariff and Customs Code
or the Local Government Code shall be maintained, except as herein provided,
until and unless an appeal has been previously filed with the CTA and disposed
of in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
A party adversely affected by a resolution of a Division of
the CTA on a motion for reconsideration or new trial, may file a petition for
review with the CTA en banc.
Petitioner’s primary argument is that a resolution of a CTA Division
denying a motion to quash is a proper subject of an appeal to the CTA en
banc under Section 18 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, because the law
does not say that only a resolution that constitutes a final disposition of a
case may be appealed to the CTA en banc.
If the interpretation of the law by the CTA en banc prevails, a
procedural void is created leaving the parties, such as petitioner, without any
remedy involving erroneous resolutions of a CTA Division.
The Court finds no merit in the petitioner’s assertion.
The petition for review under Section 18 of Republic
Act No. 1125, as amended, may be new to the CTA, but it is actually a mode of
appeal long available in courts of general jurisdiction.
Petitioner is invoking a very narrow and literal reading of Section 18 of
Republic Act No. 1125, as amended.
Indeed, the filing of a petition for review with the CTA en banc from
a decision, resolution, or order of a CTA Division is a remedy newly made
available in proceedings before the CTA, necessarily adopted to conform to and
address the changes in the CTA.
There was no need for such rule under Republic Act No. 1125, prior to its
amendment, since the CTA then was composed only of one Presiding Judge and two
Associate Judges.[27] Any two Judges constituted a quorum and the
concurrence of two Judges was necessary to promulgate any decision thereof.[28]
The amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 9282 to Republic Act No.
1125 elevated the rank of the CTA to a collegiate court, with the same rank as
the Court of Appeals, and increased the number of its members to one Presiding
Justice and five Associate Justices.[29]
The CTA is now allowed to sit en banc
or in two Divisions with each Division consisting of three Justices. Four Justices shall constitute a quorum for
sessions en banc, and the affirmative votes of four members of the Court
en banc are necessary for the rendition of a decision or resolution;
while two Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions of a Division and the
affirmative votes of two members of the Division shall be necessary for the
rendition of a decision or resolution.[30]
In A.M. No. 05-11-07-CTA, the Revised CTA Rules, this Court delineated the
jurisdiction of the CTA en banc[31]
and in Divisions.[32] Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised CTA Rules
recognizes the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA en banc to
review by appeal the following decisions, resolutions, or orders of the CTA
Division:
SEC. 2. Cases within
the jurisdiction of the Court en banc. – The Court en banc
shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the
following:
(a) Decisions
or resolutions on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court in
Divisions in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over:
(1) Cases
arising from administrative agencies – Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of
Customs, Department of Finance, Department of Trade and Industry, Department of
Agriculture;
(2)
Local tax cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts in the
exercise of their original jurisdiction; and
(3)
Tax collection cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts
in the exercise of their original jurisdiction involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and
penalties, where the principal amount of taxes and penalties claimed is less
than one million pesos;
x x x x
(f) Decisions,
resolutions or orders on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court
in Division in the exercise of its exclusive original jurisdiction over cases
involving criminal offenses arising from violations of the National Internal
Revenue Code or the Tariff and Customs Code and other laws administered by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue or Bureau of Customs.
(g) Decisions,
resolutions or order on motions for reconsideration or new trial of the Court
in Division in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
criminal offenses mentioned in the preceding subparagraph; x x x.
Although the filing of a petition for review with the CTA en banc
from a decision, resolution, or order of the CTA Division, was newly made
available to the CTA, such mode of appeal has long been available in Philippine
courts of general jurisdiction. Hence,
the Revised CTA Rules no longer elaborated on it but merely referred to
existing rules of procedure on petitions for review and appeals, to wit:
RULE 7
PROCEDURE
IN THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS
SEC. 1.
Applicability of the Rules of the Court of Appeals.
– The procedure in the Court en banc or in Divisions in original and in
appealed cases shall be the same as those in petitions for review and appeals
before the Court of Appeals pursuant to the applicable provisions of Rules
42, 43, 44 and 46 of the Rules of Court, except as otherwise provided for
in these Rules.
RULE 8
PROCEDURE IN CIVIL
CASES
x x x x
SEC. 4. Where to
appeal; mode of appeal. –
x x x x
(b) An
appeal from a decision or resolution of the Court in Division on a motion for
reconsideration or new trial shall be taken to the Court by petition for review
as provided in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The Court en banc shall act on the
appeal.
x x x x
RULE 9
PROCEDURE IN CRIMINAL CASES
SEC. 1.
Review of cases in the Court. – The review of criminal cases in
the Court en banc or in Division shall be governed by the applicable provisions
of Rule 124 of the Rules of Court.
x x x x
SEC. 9.
Appeal; period to appeal. –
x x x x
(b) An
appeal to the Court en banc in criminal cases decided by the Court in
Division shall be taken by filing a petition for review as provided in Rule
43 of the Rules of Court within fifteen days from receipt of a copy of the
decision or resolution appealed from.
The Court may, for good cause, extend the time for filing of the
petition for review for an additional period not exceeding fifteen days. (Emphasis ours.)
Given the foregoing, the petition for review to be filed with the CTA en
banc as the mode for appealing a decision, resolution, or order of the CTA
Division, under Section 18 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, is not a
totally new remedy, unique to the CTA, with a special application or use
therein. To the contrary, the CTA merely
adopts the procedure for petitions for review and appeals long established and
practiced in other Philippine courts.
Accordingly, doctrines, principles, rules, and precedents laid down in
jurisprudence by this Court as regards petitions for review and appeals in
courts of general jurisdiction should likewise bind the CTA, and it cannot
depart therefrom.
General rule: The denial of a motion to quash is an
interlocutory order which is not the proper subject of an appeal or a petition
for certiorari.
According to Section 1, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, governing
appeals from the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) to the
Court of Appeals, an appeal may be taken only from a judgment or final order
that completely disposes of the case or of a matter therein when declared by
the Rules to be appealable. Said provision, thus, explicitly states that
no appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order.[33]
The Court distinguishes final judgments and orders from interlocutory
orders in this wise:
Section 2, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "(o)nly final judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal." Interlocutory or incidental judgments or orders do not stay the progress of an action nor are they subject of appeal "until final judgment or order is rendered for one party or the other." The test to determine whether an order or judgment is interlocutory or final is this: "Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final”. A court order is final in character if it puts an end to the particular matter resolved or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, such that no further questions can come before the court except the execution of the order. The term "final" judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which disposes of the cause as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or directions for future determination. The order or judgment may validly refer to the entire controversy or to some definite and separate branch thereof. "In the absence of a statutory definition, a final judgment, order or decree has been held to be x x x one that finally disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the rights, or some right or rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or on some definite and separate branch thereof, and which concludes them until it is reversed or set aside." The central point to consider is, therefore, the effects of the order on the rights of the parties. A court order, on the other hand, is merely interlocutory in character if it is provisional and leaves substantial proceeding to be had in connection with its subject. The word "interlocutory" refers to "something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy."[34]
In other words, after a final order or judgment, the court should have
nothing more to do in respect of the relative rights of the parties to the case.
Conversely, “an order that does not finally dispose of the case and does not
end the Court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions in determining
their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates
that other things remain to be done by the Court, is interlocutory.”[35]
The rationale for barring the appeal of an interlocutory order was
extensively discussed in Matute v. Court of
Appeals,[36]
thus:
It is settled that an
"interlocutory order or decree made in the progress of a case is always
under the control of the court until the final decision of the suit, and may be
modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final
judgment . . ." Of similar import is the ruling of this Court declaring
that "it is rudimentary that such (interlocutory) orders are subject to
change in the discretion of the court." Moreover, one of the inherent
powers of the court is "To amend and control its process and orders so as
to make them conformable to law and justice.
In the language of Chief Justice Moran, paraphrasing the ruling in Veluz vs. Justice of the Peace of Sariaya, “since judges are human, susceptible to
mistakes, and are bound to administer justice in accordance with law, they are
given the inherent power of amending their orders or judgments so as to make
them conformable to law and justice, and they can do so before they lose their
jurisdiction of the case, that is before the time to appeal has expired and no
appeal has been perfected.” And in the abovecited Veluz case,
this Court held that “If the trial court should discover or be convinced that
it had committed an error in its judgment, or had done an injustice, before the
same has become final, it may, upon its own motion or upon a motion of the
parties, correct such error in order to do justice between the parties. . . .
It would seem to be the very height of absurdity to prohibit a trial judge from
correcting an error, mistake, or injustice which is called to his attention
before he has lost control of his judgment.”
Corollarily, it has also been held “that a
judge of first instance is not legally prevented from revoking the
interlocutory order of another judge in the very litigation subsequently
assigned to him for judicial action.”
Another recognized reason of the law in permitting appeal only from a
final order or judgment, and not from an interlocutory or incidental one, is to
avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which must necessarily
suspend the hearing and decision on the merits of the case during the pendency of the appeal. If such appeal were allowed, the trial on the
merits of the case would necessarily be delayed for a considerable length of
time, and compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of
the parties may interpose as many appeals as incidental questions may be raised
by him, and interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court.[37]
There is no dispute that a court order denying a motion to quash is
interlocutory. The denial of the motion
to quash means that the criminal information remains pending with the court,
which must proceed with the trial to determine whether the accused is guilty of
the crime charged therein. Equally settled is the rule that an order denying a
motion to quash, being interlocutory, is not
immediately appealable,[38]
nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the
ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial.[39]
The Court cannot agree in petitioner’s contention that there would exist a procedural void following the denial of her Motion
to Quash by the CTA First Division in its Resolutions dated
An order denying a Motion to Acquit (like an order denying a motion to quash) is interlocutory and not a final order. It is, therefore, not appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. Such order of denial may only be reviewed, in the ordinary course of law, by an appeal from the judgment, after trial. As stated in Collins vs. Wolfe, and reiterated in Mill vs. Yatco, the accused, after the denial of his motion to quash, should have proceeded with the trial of the case in the court below, and if final judgment is rendered against him, he could then appeal, and, upon such appeal, present the questions which he sought to be decided by the appellate court in a petition for certiorari.
In Acharon vs. Purisima, the procedure was well defined, thus:
“Moreover,
when the motion to quash filed by Acharon to nullify
the criminal cases filed against him was denied by the Municipal Court of
General Santos his remedy was not to file a petition for certiorari but
to go to trial without prejudice on his part to reiterate the special defenses
he had invoked in his motion and, if, after trial on the merits, an adverse
decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the
manner authorized by law. This is the procedure that he should have followed as
authorized by law and precedents. Instead, he took the usual step of filing a
writ of certiorari before the Court of First Instance which in our
opinion is unwarranted it being contrary to the usual course of law.”[40]
Hence, the CTA en banc
herein did not err in denying petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Review, when such Petition for Review is the wrong remedy to
assail an interlocutory order denying her Motion to Quash.
While the general rule proscribes
the appeal of an interlocutory order, there are also recognized exceptions to
the same. The general rule is not
absolute. Where special circumstances
clearly demonstrate the inadequacy of an appeal, then the special civil action
of certiorari or prohibition may exceptionally be allowed.[41] This Court recognizes that under certain
situations, recourse to extraordinary legal remedies, such as a petition for certiorari,
is considered proper to question the denial of a motion to quash (or any other
interlocutory order) in the interest of a “more enlightened and substantial
justice”;[42] or to
promote public welfare and public policy;[43]
or when the cases “have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to
proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof”;[44]
or when the order was rendered with grave abuse of discretion.[45] Certiorari is an appropriate remedy to
assail an interlocutory order (1) when the tribunal issued such order without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (2) when
the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous, and the remedy of
appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief.[46]
Recourse to
a petition for certiorari to assail an interlocutory order is now
expressly recognized in the ultimate paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41 of the
Revised Rules of Court on the subject of appeal, which states:
In all the above instances where the judgment or final
order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file
an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
As to whether
the CTA en banc, under its expanded jurisdiction in Republic Act No.
9282, has been granted jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari
is not raised as an issue in the Petition at bar, thus, precluding the Court
from making a definitive pronouncement thereon.
However, even if such an issue is answered in the negative, it would not
substantially affect the ruling of this Court herein, for a party whose motion
to quash had been denied may still seek recourse, under exceptional and
meritorious circumstances, via a
special civil action for certiorari with this Court, refuting
petitioner’s assertion of a procedural void.
The CTA First Division did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s Motion to Quash.
Assuming that the CTA en banc,
as an exception to the general rule, allowed and treated petitioner’s Petition
for Review in C.T.A. EB. CRIM. No. 001 as a special civil action for certiorari, [47]
it would still be dismissible for lack of merit.
An act of a court or tribunal may
only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was
performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment, which is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all
in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. In this connection, it is only upon showing
that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion that an interlocutory order such as that involved in this
case may be impugned. Be that as it may,
it must be emphasized that this practice is applied only under certain
exceptional circumstances to prevent unnecessary delay in the administration of
justice and so as not to unduly burden the courts.[48]
Certiorari is not
available to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge’s findings
and conclusions of law and fact. It is only in the presence of extraordinary
circumstances evincing a patent disregard of justice and fair play where resort
to a petition for certiorari is proper.
A party must not be allowed to delay litigation by the sheer expediency
of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court based on scant allegations of grave abuse.[49]
A writ of certiorari is not
intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling: it is
resorted to only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise
of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Its function is limited
to keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieve persons
from arbitrary acts – acts which courts or judges have no power or authority in
law to perform. It is not designed to correct erroneous findings and
conclusions made by the courts.[50]
The Petition for Review which
petitioner intended to file before the CTA en banc relied on two
grounds: (1) the lack of authority of Prosecuting Attorney Torrevillas
to file the Information; and (2) the filing of the said Information in
violation of petitioner’s constitutional rights to due process and equal protection
of the laws.
Anent the first ground, petitioner
argues that the Information was filed without the approval of the BIR
Commissioner in violation of Section 220 of NIRC, as amended, which provides:
SEC. 220. Form and Mode
of Proceeding in Actions Arising under this Code. - Civil and
criminal actions and proceedings instituted in behalf of the Government under
the authority of this Code or other law enforced by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue shall be brought in the name of the Government of the Philippines and
shall be conducted by legal officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue but no
civil or criminal action for the recovery of taxes or the enforcement of any
fine, penalty or forfeiture under this Code shall be filed in court without the
approval of the Commissioner.
Petitioner’s
argument must fail in light of BIR Commissioner Parayno’s
letter dated 19 May 2005 to DOJ Secretary Gonzales referring “for preliminary
investigation and filing of an information in court if evidence so
warrants,” the findings of the BIR officers recommending the criminal
prosecution of petitioner. In said
letter, BIR Commissioner Parayno already gave his
prior approval to the filing of an information in court should the DOJ, based
on the evidence submitted, find probable cause against petitioner during the
preliminary investigation. Section 220
of the NIRC, as amended, simply requires that the BIR Commissioner approve the
institution of civil or criminal action against a tax law violator, but it does
not describe in what form such approval must be given. In this case, BIR Commissioner Parayno’s letter of
Still on the purported lack of
authority of Prosecution Attorney Torrevillas to file
the Information, petitioner asserts that it is the City Prosecutor under the Quezon City Charter, who has the authority to investigate
and prosecute offenses allegedly committed within the jurisdiction of
The Court is not persuaded. Under Republic Act No. 537, the Revised
Charter of Quezon City, the City Prosecutor shall
have the following duties relating to the investigation and prosecution of
criminal offenses:
SEC. 28. The City Attorney - His assistants - His duties. –
x x x x
(g) He
shall also have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors,
and violations of city ordinances, in the Court of First Instance and the
municipal courts of the city, and shall discharge all the duties in respect to
the criminal prosecutions enjoined by law upon provincial fiscals.
(h) He
shall cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors,
and violations of ordinances and have the necessary information or complaints
prepared or made against the persons accused. He or any of his assistants may
conduct such investigations by taking oral evidence of reputable witnesses, and
for this purpose may issue subpoena, summon witnesses to appear and testify
under oath before him, and the attendance or evidence of an absent or
recalcitrant witness may be enforced by application to the municipal court or
the Court of First Instance. No witness summoned to testify under this section
shall be under obligation to give any testimony which tend to incriminate himself.
Evident from the foregoing
is that the City Prosecutor has the power to investigate crimes, misdemeanors,
and violations of ordinances committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
the city, and which can be prosecuted before the trial courts of the said
city. The charge against petitioner,
however, is already within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the CTA,[51] as
the Information states that her gross underdeclaration
resulted in an income tax deficiency of P1,395,116.24,
excluding interest and penalties. The
City Prosecutor does not have the authority to appear before the CTA, which is
now of the same rank as the Court of Appeals.
In contrast, the DOJ is the
principal law agency of the Philippine government which shall be both its legal
counsel and prosecution arm.[52] It has the power to investigate the
commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and correction
system.[53] Under the DOJ is the Office of the State
Prosecutor whose functions are described as follows:
Sec. 8. Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor. - The Office of the Chief State Prosecutor shall have
the following functions:
(1) Assist the
Secretary in the performance of powers and functions of the Department relative
to its role as the prosecution arm of the government;
(2) Implement
the provisions of laws, executive orders and rules, and carry out the policies,
plans, programs and projects of the Department relative to the investigation
and prosecution of criminal cases;
(3) Assist the
Secretary in exercising supervision and control over the National Prosecution Service
as constituted under P.D. No. 1275 and/or otherwise hereinafter provided; and
(4) Perform such
other functions as may be provided by law or assigned by the Secretary.[54]
As explained by CTA First
Division in its Resolution dated
[T]he
power or authority of the Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito
Zuño, Jr. and his deputies in the Department of
Justice to prosecute cases is national in scope; and the Special Prosecutor’s
authority to sign and file informations in court
proceeds from the exercise of said person’s authority to conduct preliminary
investigations.[55]
Moreover, there is nothing in the
Revised Quezon City Charter which would suggest that
the power of the City Prosecutor to investigate and prosecute crimes,
misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the city is to the exclusion of the State Prosecutors. In fact, the Office of the State Prosecutor
exercises control and supervision over City Prosecutors under Executive Order
No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987.
As regards petitioner’s second
ground in her intended Petition for Review with the CTA en banc, she
asserts that she has been denied due process and equal protection of the laws
when similar charges for violation of the NIRC, as amended, against Regina Encarnacion A. Velasquez (Velasquez) were dismissed by the
DOJ in its Resolution dated 10 August 2005 in I.S. No. 2005-330 for the reason
that Velasquez’s tax liability was not yet fully determined when the charges
were filed.
The Court is unconvinced.
First, a motion to quash should be
based on a defect in the information which is evident on its face.[56] The same cannot be said herein. The
Information against petitioner appears valid on its face; and that it was filed
in violation of her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection
of the laws is not evident on the face thereof.
As pointed out by the CTA First Division in its
Second, petitioner cannot claim
denial of due process when she was given the opportunity to file her affidavits
and other pleadings and submit evidence before the DOJ during the preliminary
investigation of her case and before the Information was filed against
her. Due process is merely an opportunity
to be heard. In addition, preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOJ is merely inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on the
merits. Its sole purpose is to determine whether a crime has been
committed and whether the respondent therein is probably guilty of the
crime. It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties’ evidence. Hence, if the investigating prosecutor is already
satisfied that he can reasonably determine the existence of probable cause
based on the parties’ evidence thus presented, he may
terminate the proceedings and resolve the case.[58]
Third, petitioner cannot likewise
aver that she has been denied equal protection of the laws.
The equal protection clause exists
to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination
and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real
differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute
equality. It merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both
as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.[59]
Petitioner was not able to duly
establish to the satisfaction of this Court that she and Velasquez were indeed
similarly situated, i.e., that they committed identical acts for which
they were charged with the violation of the same provisions of the NIRC; and
that they presented similar arguments and evidence in their defense - yet, they
were treated differently.
Furthermore, that the Prosecution
Attorney dismissed what were supposedly similar charges against Velasquez did
not compel Prosecution Attorney Torrevillas to rule
the same way on the charges against petitioner.
In People v. Dela Piedra,[60]
this Court explained that:
The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally
guilty are not prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal
protection of the laws. Where the official action purports to
be in conformity to the statutory classification, an erroneous or mistaken
performance of the statutory duty, although a violation of the statute, is not
without more a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a
statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are
entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there
is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful
discrimination. This may appear on the face of the action taken with
respect to a particular class or person, or it may only be shown by extrinsic
evidence showing a discriminatory design over another not to be inferred from
the action itself. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there
must be a showing of “clear and intentional discrimination.” Appellant has
failed to show that, in charging appellant in court, that there was a “clear
and intentional discrimination” on the part of the prosecuting officials.
The discretion of who to prosecute depends on the
prosecution’s sound assessment whether the evidence before it can justify a
reasonable belief that a person has committed an offense. The presumption is that the prosecuting
officers regularly performed their duties, and this presumption can be overcome
only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation. Indeed,
appellant has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption.
The mere allegation that appellant, a Cebuana, was
charged with the commission of a crime, while a Zamboangueña,
the guilty party in appellant’s eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion
that the prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws.
There is also common sense practicality in sustaining
appellant’s prosecution.
While all persons
accused of crime are to be treated on a basis of equality before the law, it
does not follow that they are to be protected in the commission of crime.
It would be unconscionable, for instance, to excuse a defendant guilty of
murder because others have murdered with impunity. The remedy for
unequal enforcement of the law in such instances does not lie in the
exoneration of the guilty at the expense of society x x
x. Protection of the law will be extended to
all persons equally in the pursuit of their lawful occupations, but no person
has the right to demand protection of the law in the commission of a crime.
Likewise, [i]f the failure of prosecutors to enforce the criminal laws
as to some persons should be converted into a defense for others charged with
crime, the result would be that the trial of the district attorney for
nonfeasance would become an issue in the trial of many persons charged with
heinous crimes and the enforcement of law would suffer a complete breakdown. (Emphasis ours.)
In the case at bar, no evidence of
a clear and intentional discrimination against petitioner was shown, whether by
Prosecution Attorney Torrevillas in recommending the
filing of Information against petitioner or by the CTA First Division in
denying petitioner’s Motion to Quash.
The only basis for petitioner’s claim of denial of equal protection of
the laws was the dismissal of the charges against Velasquez while those against
her were not.
And lastly, the Resolutions of the
CTA First Division dated 23 February 2006 and 11 May 2006 directly addressed
the arguments raised by petitioner in her Motion to Quash and Motion for
Reconsideration, respectively, and explained the reasons for the denial of both
Motions. There is nothing to sustain a
finding that these Resolutions were rendered capriciously, whimsically, or
arbitrarily, as to constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
In sum, the CTA en banc did
not err in denying petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition
for Review. Petitioner cannot file a
Petition for Review with the CTA en banc to appeal the Resolution of the
CTA First Division denying her Motion to Quash.
The Resolution is interlocutory and, thus, unappealable. Even if her Petition for Review is to be
treated as a petition for certiorari, it is dismissible for lack of
merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Justice
Renato C. Corona was designated to sit as additional
member replacing Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
per Raffle dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-24.
[2] Signed by
Associate Justices Juanito C. Castañeda,
Jr, Lovell R. Bautista, Erlinda
P. Uy, and Caesar A. Casanova; with Presiding Justice
Ernesto D. Acosta and Associate Justice Olga Palanca-Enriquez,
on leave.
[3] Signed by Caesar A. Casanova, with
a Separate Concurring Opinion penned by Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta; Associate Justice
Lovell R. Bautista, on leave.
[4] Signed by
Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta and Associate Justices Lovell R. Bautista
and Caesar A. Casanova.
[5]
[6] SEC. 248. Civil
Penalties. –
x x x x
(b) In case of willful neglect to file the return within the period
prescribed by this Code or by rules and regulations, or in case a false or
fraudulent return is wilfully made, the penalty to be imposed shall be fifty
percent (50%) of the tax or of the deficiency tax, in case any payment has been
made on the basis of such return before the discovery of the falsity or fraud: Provided,
That a substantial underdeclaration of taxable sales,
receipts or income, or a substantial overstatement of deductions, as determined
by the Commissioner pursuant to the rules and regulations to be promulgated by
the Secretary of Finance, shall constitute prima facie evidence of a false or
fraudulent return: Provided, further, That failure to report
sales, receipts or income in an amount exceeding thirty percent (30%) of that
declared per return, and a claim of deductions in an amount exceeding (30%) of
actual deductions, shall render the taxpayer liable for substantial underdeclaration of sales, receipts or income or for
overstatement of deductions, as mentioned herein.
[7] SEC. 254. Attempt to
Evade or Defeat Tax. - Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax
imposed under this Code or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other
penalties provided by law, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine not
less than Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) but not more than One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000) and suffer imprisonment of not less than two
(2) years but not more than four (4) years: Provided, That the
conviction or acquittal obtained under this Section shall not be a bar to the
filing of a civil suit for the collection of taxes.
[8] SEC. 255. Failure to File
Return, Supply Correct and Accurate Information, Pay Tax Withhold and Remit Tax
and Refund Excess Taxes Withheld on Compensation. - Any person
required under this Code or by rules and regulations promulgated thereunder to pay any tax, make a return, keep any record,
or supply any correct and accurate information, who willfully
fails to pay such tax, make such return, keep such record, or supply correct
and accurate information, or withhold or remit taxes withheld, or refund excess
taxes withheld on compensation, at the time or times required by law or rules
and regulations shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, upon
conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000)
nor more than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and suffer imprisonment
of not less than one (1) year but not more than ten (10) years.
[9] Rollo, pp. 322-330.
[10]
[11] CTA
First Division Resolution, dated
[12]
[13]
[14] Signed by Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta and Associate
Justices Lovell R. Bautista and Caesar A. Casanova.
[15]
[16] CTA
First Division Resolution signed by Associate Justices Lovell R. Bautista and
Caesar A. Casanova, with Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta, on leave.
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals.
[26] An
Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), Elevating Its
Rank to the Level of a Collegiate Court with Special Jurisdiction and Enlarging
Its Membership, Amending for the Purpose Certain Sections of Republic Act No.
1125, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Law Creating the Court of Tax Appeals,
and for Other Purposes.
[27] Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 1125.
[28] Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 1125.
[29] Section 1 of Republic Act No. 9282.
[30] Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9282.
[31] Section 2, Rule 4.
[32] Section 3, Rule 4.
[33] Section 1(c), Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.
[34] De la Cruz v. Paras, G.R. No.
L-41053,
[35] BA Finance Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 84294,
[36] 136 Phil. 157,
203-204 (1969).
[37] Sitchon v. Sheriff of
Occidental
[38] Villasin v. Seven-Up
Bottling
[39] Gamboa v. Cruz, G.R. No.
L-56291,
[40]
[41] Principio v. Barrientos,
G.R. No. 167025,
[42] Mead v. Hon. Argel,
200 Phil. 650, 656 (1982);
[43] Pineda
v. Bartolome, 95 Phil. 930, 937 (1954), citing People v. Zulueta,
89 Phil. 752, 756 (1951).
[44]
[45]
[46] Casil v. Court of Appeals, 349
Phil. 187, 196-197 (1998).
[47] This
Court proceeds with the discussion on the assumption that the CTA en banc
has jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari. The issue on whether the CTA, under its
expanded jurisdiction in Republic Act No. 9282, has been granted jurisdiction
over special civil actions for certiorari is not raised in the Petition
at bar, thus, precluding the Court from making a definitive pronouncement
thereon. If such an issue is
subsequently ruled upon by this Court in the negative, it would not
substantially alter the ruling of this Court herein, for under exceptional and
meritorious circumstances, a party whose motion to quash has been denied may
still seek recourse via a special civil action for certiorari with this
Court.
[48] Yee v. Bernabe, G.R. No. 141393,
[49] La Campana Development Corp. v.
See, G.R. No. 149195,
[50] Bonifacio Construction Management Corporation v. Perlas-Bernabe, G.R. No. 148174, 30 June 2005, 462 SCRA 392, 396-397, citing Indiana
Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education, 408 Phil. 483, 501
(2001).
[51] According to Section 7(b)(1) of
Republic Act No. 1125, as amended by Republic Act No. 9282:
SEC. 7.
Jurisdiction. – The CTA shall exercise:
x
x x x
(b) Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses
as herein provided:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising
from violations of the National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs
Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the
Bureau of Customs: Provided, however, That offenses or felonies mentioned in
this paragraph where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of
charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00)
or where there is no specified amount claimed shall be tried by the regular
Courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be appellate. Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to
the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil
action for the recovery of civil liability for taxes and penalties shall at all
times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same
proceeding by the CTA, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to
reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the
criminal action shall be recognized.
[52] Section 1, Chapter 1, Title III,
Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code
of 1987.
[53] Section 3(2), Chapter 1, Title III,
Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987.
[54] Chapter 2, Title
III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987.
[55] Rollo, pp. 369-370.
[56] Gozos v. Hon. Tac-An,
360 Phil. 453, 464 (1998).
[57] Rollo, pp. 370-371.
[58] De Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. G.R. No. 147932,
[59] Himagan
v. People, G.R.
No. 113811,
[60] 403 Phil. 31, 54-56 (2001).