PEOPLE
OF THE
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G.R. No. 172696
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
*
carpio MORALES, VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: August 11, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
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BRION, J.: |
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We review in this appeal the decision[1]
and resolution[2] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The
prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with the crime of murder under
an Information that states:
x x
x
That on December 19, 1998 in the evening, in
Poblacion, Municipality of Diadi, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with a knife, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab one REYNALDO REYES,
thus inflicting upon the latter mortal wound which caused his instantaneous
death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
On
arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. The prosecution
presented the following witnesses in the trial on the merits that followed:
Ernesto Valencia; Normita Reyes; and Dr. Telesforo Ragpa. The appellant and
Rodolfo Castro took the witness stand for the defense.
Ernesto
Valencia (Ernesto) testified that
between 11:00 o’clock in the evening and 12:00 o’clock midnight of December 19,
1998, he was playing a local card game known as “tong-its” with Barangay
Captain Reynaldo Reyes (Reyes) and
Odion Cabezon at the wake of the mother of Norma Miguel, town mayor of Diadi,
Nueva Ecija.[5] In the
course of the game and while Reyes was looking at his cards, holding them close
to his face, the appellant suddenly approached the victim and stabbed him in
the stomach.[6] Due to
the force of the blow, Reyes was pushed backwards,[7]
dropping his playing cards and eyeglasses.[8] Blood spurted as the appellant pulled out the
knife from Reyes’ body. Although shocked,
Ernesto told Reyes, “adda tamam capitan”
(You are hit).[9] Reyes
covered the injured part of his stomach with his hand, grabbed his “batuta”,[10]
and chased the appellant towards the back of the house.[11] The appellant was, however, accosted by the
people around and brought to the Municipal Hall of Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya where
he was detained.[12]
Reyes
was rushed to the Habonillos Clinic in Cordon, Isabela where he later died.
Dr.
Telesforo A. Ragpa (Dr. Ragpa), the
Municipal Health Officer of Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya, narrated that on
Normita Reyes (Normita), the victim’s wife, declared on the witness stand that her
husband was 52 years old[17]
and a barangay captain when he died.[18]
Her husband also drove a jeepney three (3) weeks a month, earning P100.00
to P150.00 a day.[19] According to her, she incurred total expenses
of P66,090.50 due to her husband’s death.[20]
The appellant gave a different
version of the events, summarized in the RTC decision as follows:
He asseverated that on that fateful night of
Rodolfo
Castro (Castro) testified that he was
at the house of Mayor Norma Miguel on
A few minutes later, he heard a
scream. He went to the garage and saw Reyes hit the appellant in the forehead
with a truncheon.[33] Thereafter, Reyes went towards the direction
of the crowd.[34]
The RTC’s decision of May 27, 2002
convicted the appellant of the crime of murder; sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua (20 years and 1 day, to 40 years); and
ordered him to pay the victim’s heirs the sum of P66,090.50 as actual
damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00
as exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.[35]
The
appellant directly appealed his conviction to this Court in view of the penalty
of reclusion perpetua that the RTC imposed. We referred the case to the Court of Appeals
for intermediate review pursuant to our ruling in People v. Efren Mateo y
Garcia.[36]
The CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto in a decision dated
In his brief,[37] the
appellant imputes to the RTC the following errors:
1. The RTC erred in
finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder;
2. The RTC erred in giving
full faith and credence to the testimony of the prosecution witness and not
giving weight to the testimony of the defense witness; and
3. Assuming arguendo that
the appellant stabbed the victim, the RTC erred in convicting him of murder
instead of homicide.
THE COURT’S RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to deny
the appeal and to modify the amount of the awarded indemnities.
Sufficiency of
Prosecution Evidence
An
established rule in appellate review is that the trial court’s factual findings,
including its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the probative
weight of their testimonies, as well as the conclusions drawn from the factual
findings, are accorded respect, if not conclusive effect. These factual findings and conclusions assume
greater weight if they are affirmed by the CA.[38] Despite the enhanced persuasive effect of the
initial RTC factual ruling and the results of the CA’s appellate factual
review, we nevertheless carefully scrutinized the records of this case as the
penalty of reclusion perpetua that
the lower courts imposed on the accused demands no less than this kind of
scrutiny.
A
distinguishing feature of this present case is the presence of a witness –
Ernesto Valencia – who provided positive identification of the accused in his
PROSECUTOR CASTILLO:
Q: This person who stabbed
him, were you able to see and recognize him during that time?
ERNESTO
VALENCIA:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If you will see him will you recognize him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please look around the courtroom and point to him
A: He is here, sir.
Q: Where is he? Go down from that chair and approach the person
and tap on [sic] the shoulder.
A: (Witness went down
from the witness stand, went near a person and tapped his shoulder and when
asked to give his name gave his name as Benito Ballesteros)[39]
[Emphasis ours]
At
the continuation of the hearing on
PROSECUTOR CASTILLO:
Q: What about the blade, were you able to
see the blade?
ERNESTO
A: I saw the blade when the accused
already pulled it out, sir.
Q; From what was that pulled out?
A: From the body where it was stabbed,
sir.
Q: Whose body?
A: From the body of Brgy. Captain Reyes,
sir.
Q: And where were you at that time the knife was being drawn
from the body of the victim?
A: I was just sitting, sir.
Q: Who actually drew the knife from the body of the late Brgy.
Captain Reyes?
A: Ballesteros, sir.[40] [Emphasis ours]
Ernesto clearly implied in this
testimony that he did not see the actual stabbing as the thrust went in, but categorically claimed that he did see the
knife when it was already in Reyes’ body.
The holder of the knife was Ballesteros, the accused. On cross-examination, Ernesto actually confirmed
that he did not see the precise moment the appellant drove the knife into
Reyes.
The appellant seizes this gap in
Ernesto’s testimony as opening to argue that his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt; Ernesto did not see him actually stab Reyes.
Significantly, the trial proper was
not the only source of evidence available in the case. Stipulations and
admissions were made at the pre-trial conference that filled in the gaps of
what were not expressly brought up at the trial. These admissions are
conclusively established facts that are not for us to evaluate and reject as we
see fit; they are the evidence that the parties themselves admit and confirm.
At the pre-trial, the following
stipulations were agreed upon:
1.
The injury which led to the death of the victim was inflicted
at the house of Mayor Norma Miguel;
2.
During the infliction of the injury on the victim, there was
a wake relative to the mother of Mayor Norma Miguel;
3.
The coffin of the dead mother of Mayor Norma Miguel was in
the second floor of the house;
4.
At the time of the infliction of the injury, the accused was
in the vicinity of the house of Mayor Norma Miguel;
5.
Immediately before the infliction of the injury, the accused
was in the ground floor of the house of Mayor Norma Miguel;
6.
During the infliction of the injury, the accused was in
possession of a bladed weapon;
7.
After the infliction of the injury, a knife was recovered
from the accused;
8.
Immediately after the victim was stabbed, the accused was
held by the people in the place of the incident;
9.
Immediately after the accused was held, he was detained in
the municipal hall; and
10.
The victim was rushed to the Habonillos Clinic at Cordon,
Isabela.
In
his defense, the appellant denies that he stabbed the victim. He claims that Reyes, after hurling invectives
at him, hit him on the forehead with a truncheon, causing him to bleed
profusely. When Reyes tried to attack him again, he parried the blow and the
two of them grappled for the possession of the Reyes’ truncheon. After they
were separated, he saw blood coming from the breast of Reyes. By clear implication from all these, the
appellant says that while he was at the scene and did indeed grapple with
Reyes, someone else stabbed the latter.
The appellant’s witness, Rodolfo
Castro, supports much of what the appellant claims with respect to his
activities prior to the actual stabbing, particularly the fact that the victim
called the appellant “gago” and “ukkinam”. Castro, however, did not say anything
categorical about the actual
stabbing. To be exact, he stated that a
moment after the appellant went to the garage (where the card games were being
played), he heard a shout and a hitting sound.
When he looked towards the place, he saw the Barangay Captain hit
Ballesteros at his forehead with his “batuta”.
After which, the appellant leaned on the wall facing it, with one hand
and the other hand holding his forehead. The people who were there stood up and
there were confused movements in the place.
He saw the Barangay Captain go to the crowd after hitting the
appellant. He did not know what happened
next. He only knew that the police
arrested the appellant for reasons unknown to him. He overheard that the
Barangay Captain was stabbed and was brought to the hospital.[41] That the appellant indeed suffered an injury
was confirmed by Dr. Telesporo Ragpa who, testifying for the defense, stated
that the accused sustained a superficial wound, ruptured and located at the
mid-frontal area of the head.[42]
Based on these adduced and admitted evidence,
we see that the only gap or missing link in the chain of events was the actual
act of stabbing. For clarity, we
recapitulate below the significant aspects of these events.
The appellant admitted during the
pre-trial conference that he was in possession of a bladed weapon during the
stabbing incident. By his own testimony,
the appellant was in the immediate vicinity of where Reyes and his companions
were playing a card game. Ernesto
testified that Reyes was intent on his game closely holding his cards when he
was stabbed but he (Ernesto) did not see the actual act of stabbing. What he
saw was the appellant holding the knife imbedded in Reyes’ body. In fact, Ernesto
witnessed the appellant pull out the knife from the victim’s body. Informed by
Ernesto that he had been stabbed, Reyes clutched his wound with his hand, drew
his batuta and went after the
appellant who ran towards the back of the house. People within the vicinity accosted the
appellant and brought him to the Municipal Hall of Diadi while the victim was
brought to the hospital.
In our view, this succession of
events are consistent even with the testimony of Rodolfo Castro (the lone
defense witness except for the appellant himself) who significantly did not
testify about the actual act of stabbing because he was not actually
there. He only heard a shout and a loud
hitting sound, then saw Reyes hitting the appellant with his batuta.
Thereafter, there were “confused movements” and he subsequently heard
that the barangay captain had been stabbed.
Apparently, what Castro saw was the immediate aftermath of the stabbing
and the victim’s immediate reaction against the appellant, as also testified to
by Ernesto.
Under this critical examination and analysis,
we can only conclude that no other person could have stabbed Reyes except the
appellant who had the motive as he himself narrated; who was at the immediate
vicinity of the incident; and who had the weapon as testified to by Ernesto and
admitted at pre-trial. Ernesto’s
testimony clinches the case against the appellant as to his identity as knife
wielder and on how he acted after plunging the knife into Reyes and thereafter.
We find it very significant that the records bear no evidence showing any ill
motive on the part of Ernesto that would drive him to falsely impute the fatal
stabbing of Reyes to the appellant.
The Crime Committed
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
defines the crime of murder as follows:
Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and
shall be punished by reclusion perpetua
to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1.
With treachery x x x x
In convicting the appellant of
murder, the trial court appreciated treachery.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, method or forms which tend directly and especially to
insure its execution, without risk to the offender, arising from the defense
that the offended party might make.[43]
To prove this qualifying
circumstance, the following must be shown: (1) the employment of such means of
execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or
retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of
execution. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an
aggressor without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, thereby
depriving the latter of any real opportunity for self-defense and ensuring the
commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor.[44]
The evidence reveals that the attack
on the victim came at an unguarded moment when he was most vulnerable. He was holding his cards, close to his face,
thereby leaving his stomach area fully unprotected. He was moreover fully absorbed in the card
game and was not in the position to defend himself. That the attack came suddenly and unexpectedly can
be read from the failure of Ernesto – one of the card players – to see the
actual stabbing thrust. While the stab wound was at the stomach area, it was
established that the appellant came from behind and stabbed the unsuspecting
Reyes at the right side of his stomach that was fully exposed because of the
way he was holding his cards.
Based on these consideirations, we
find that the trial court correctly appreciated treachery as qualifying
circumstance for the crime of murder.
The Proper Penalty
The
crime of murder qualified by treachery is penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 7659) with reclusion perpetua to death.
While
evident premeditation was alleged in the Information, the court a quo correctly concluded that this
circumstance was not proven. For evident
premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must
be established: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2)
an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and
(3) sufficient lapse of time between decision and execution to allow the
accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[45]
The “time” requirement is critical in evident premeditation as it indicates the “premeditation” aspect - the opportunity to
coolly and serenely think and deliberate on the meaning and the consequences of
what the accused planned to do.[46]
In the stabbing of Reyes, the flow of events showed that this element was not
present.
In the absence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the felony, the court a quo correctly sentenced the appellant to reclusion perpetua,
conformably with Article 63(2)[47]
of the Revised Penal Code.
Civil Liability
The RTC awarded the amount of P66,090.50
to the victim’s heirs as actual damages. It appears that out of the said
amount, only P16,591.00[48]
were supported by receipts. The difference consists of the unreceipted amounts
claimed by Reyes’ heirs. To be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to
prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of
certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable to
the injured party.[49]
However, considering that the proven
amount is less than P25,000.00, we opt to award temperate damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 in lieu of actual damages pursuant to our ruling in
People v. Villanueva.[50] There, we held that when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than P25,000.00, as
in this case, the award of temperate damages for P25,000.00
is justified, in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount.
Moral damages are mandatory in
cases of murder and homicide, without need of allegation and
proof other than the death of the victim. In accordance with prevailing rules,
we increase the amount to P50,000.00.[51]
The heirs of the victim are
likewise entitled to exemplary damages since the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was firmly established. When a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance,
either qualifying or generic, an award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages
is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. We increase this amount from P10,000.00 to P25,000.00 to conform with
recent jurisprudence.[52]
We cannot award loss of
earning capacity to the victim’s heirs because no documentary evidence was presented
to substantiate this claim. As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a
claim for damages for loss of earning
capacity. While there are exceptions to the rule, these
exceptions do not apply as the victim, Reyes, was a barangay captain when he died; he was not a worker earning less
than the current minimum wage under current labor laws.
We affirm the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity pursuant to current
jurisprudence.[53]
WHEREFORE, in
light of all the foregoing, We hereby AFFIRM the
(1) moral damages is
INCREASED to P50,000.00;
(2) exemplary damages is
INCREASED to P25,000.00; and
(3) the appellant is ORDERED
to pay the heirs of the victim P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Designated
Additional Member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 512 dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M.
De
[2] CA rollo, pp. 142-143.
[3] Penned by Judge Jose B. Rosales, id., pp. 42-46.
[4] CA rollo, pp. 4-5.
[5] TSN,
[6]
[7] TSN,
[8]
[9] TSN,
[10]
[11] TSN,
[12] Pre-Trial Order.
[13] TSN,
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] TSN,
[18]
[19] TSN,
[20] TSN,
[21] TSN,
[22]
[23] TSN,
[24]
[25] TSN,
[26] TSN,
[27] TSN, March 7, p. 8.
[28] TSN,
[29] TSN,
[30] TSN,
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34] TSN,
[35] CA
rollo, p. 27.
[36] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[37] Supra note 35, pp. 69-83.
[38] People
v. Garalde, G.R. No. 173055,
[39] TSN,
[40] TSN,
[41] TSN,
[42] TSN,
[43] People
v. Batin, G.R. No. 177223,
[44] People
v. Felipe, G.R. No. 142505,
[45] People
v. Rodas, G.R. No. 175881,
[46] People v. dela Cruz, G.R. No. 171272,
June 7, 2007, 523 SCRA 433.
[47] ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. x x x
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
x x x
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
[48] See Exhibit “K” and Exhibit “N,” Records, pp. 92 and 95.
[49] People
v.
[50] G.R. No. 139177,
[51] People
v. Eling, G.R. No. 178546,
[52] See People
v. Tolentino, G.R. No. 176385,
[53] People
v. Villa, Jr., G.R. No. 179278,