Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
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THE PEOPLE OF THE |
G.R. No. 168102 |
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Plaintiff-Appellee, |
Present: |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO,
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Chairperson, |
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-versus- |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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VELASCO,* and |
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REYES, JJ. |
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JAYSON TUAZON Y OLIA,
Accused-Appellant. |
Promulgated:
August
22, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before the Court on automatic review
is the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated April 14, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00047 which affirmed, with modification, an
earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City, Branch 163, in Criminal Case No. 120458-H, finding appellant Jayson Tuazon y Olia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Consistent with the Court's decision
in People v. Cabalquinto,[2]
the real name of the rape victim in this case is withheld and, instead,
fictitious initials are used to represent her. Also, the personal circumstances
of the victim or any other information tending to establish or compromise her
identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, are not disclosed in this decision.
The facts of
the case, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
Evidence on record show that on
Around
AAA's
mother and her sister, BBB, who left the house at
In an
Information[4] dated
On or about March 3, 2001 in Taguig,
Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with AAA, [over] whom
accused has moral ascendancy being the daughter of his common-law-wife with
whom he is living with, which sexual act done against the will and consent of
said AAA as she was then threatened with a knife.[5]
On arraignment, appellant
pleaded not guilty.[6]
Pre-trial conference followed. Thereafter, trial ensued.
On
WHEREFORE, accused, JAYSON TUAZON y OLIA is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the cost.
On the civil aspect of this case, accused is ordered to pay the victim, AAA, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity plus moral, exemplary and nominal damages in the respective sums of P50,000.00, P50,000.00 and P25,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.[9]
Thereafter, the trial court ordered the transmittal of the entire records of
the case to this Court.[10]
Pursuant to
the Court's pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[11]
which modified the provisions of the Rules of Court insofar as they provide for
direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases in which the penalty imposed
by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the case was referred to
the CA for appropriate action and disposition.[12]
After a review of the case,
the CA affirmed the RTC's decision convicting the appellant. However, the
appellate court modified the trial court's award of damages by reducing the
grant of exemplary damages and deleting the award of nominal damages.
Appellant filed a Notice of
Appeal pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC.
The case was then elevated to
this Court for review.
In a
Resolution[13]
dated
Appellant
assigned a lone error in his Brief, to wit:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE.[14]
The Court finds appellant's
contentions untenable.
To determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[15]
Accordingly, in resolving rape cases,
primordial consideration is given to the credibility of the victim's testimony.[16]
The settled rule is that the
trial court’s conclusions on the credibility of witnesses in rape
cases are generally accorded great weight and respect, and at times even
finality, unless there appear in the record certain facts or circumstances of
weight and value which the lower court overlooked or misappreciated
and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case.[17]
Having seen and heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their behavior and manner of testifying, the trial
court stood in a much better position to decide the question of credibility.[18]
Findings of the trial court on such matters are binding and conclusive on the
appellate court, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted.[19]
No such facts or circumstances exist in the present case.
In this case, both the RTC and the CA
are in agreement that AAA was candid, natural, forthright
and unwavering in her testimony that appellant raped her.
During trial, the RTC observed that
AAA wept while recounting her heart-rending experience. The trial court held
thus:
AAA's
testimony was straight-forward, logical, probable and credible. She was
occasionally in tears when she narrated in court the sexual ordeal she had gone
through. Her embarrassment, emotional pain and indignation, as well as her
intense desire for justice and the punishment of her defiler, were clearly
discernible from the expression of her face and demeanor.[20]
The Court has consistently held that
the crying of the victim during her testimony was evidence of the credibility
of the rape charge with the verity borne out of human nature and experience.[21]
AAA’s credibility is strengthened by
the absence of convincing evidence showing that she had any ill motive in
testifying against appellant.
Appellant contends that private
complainant's reason in charging him with the crime of rape is that she got
angry with him because appellant allegedly embarrassed her in front of her
visitors.[22]
Appellant's claim deserves scant consideration. The Court finds it incredible
for private complainant to
trump up a charge of rape against appellant because she wanted to
exact revenge on the latter for the
simple reason that he caused her embarrassment. No woman would cry rape, allow
an examination of her private parts, subject herself to humiliation, go through
the rigors of public trial and taint her good name if her claim were not true.[23]
Appellant
does not deny the sexual intercourse between him and AAA but claims that it was
a consensual sex because he and the private complainant were sweethearts.
The Court is not persuaded and agrees
with the CA that the “sweetheart defense” is a much-abused defense that rashly
derides the intelligence of the Court and sorely tests its patience.[24] To be worthy of judicial acceptance, such a
defense should be supported by documentary, testimonial or other evidence.[25]
Being an affirmative defense, it must be established with convincing evidence -
by some documentary and/or other evidence like mementos, love letters, notes,
pictures and the like.[26]
The “sweetheart theory” which appellant proffers is effectively an admission of
carnal knowledge of the victim and consequently places on him the burden of
proving the supposed relationship by substantial evidence.[27]
In the present case, the appellant failed to discharge this burden. There was
no substantial support to his claim that he and AAA were having an affair. The
document denominated as Kasunduan Naming Dalawa[28]
which was signed by the private complainant hardly constitutes proof that appellant
and private complainant were lovers. If any, it merely shows that on P1,500.00
and expects to receive the same amount from appellant on a monthly basis
thereafter. No reason was specified why appellant agreed to give her such
amounts of money. Besides, the private complainant had explained that she was
deceived into signing the said document the day before she was raped and that
when she asked appellant why it was dated
Moreover, appellant's claim that he treated
private complainant as his own daughter is inconsistent with his allegation
that they were lovers.[30]
Granting that appellant's claim is true that he
and the private complainant were indeed lovers and that they agreed to keep
their affair a secret, the latter would not have fabricated a charge of rape
against the former at the risk of exposing their illicit relationship and,
thereby, subjecting themselves to public shame and ridicule, not to mention the
ire of private complainant's mother who is appellant's common-law wife.[31]
More importantly, the
victim’s subsequent acts of promptly disclosing and complaining about her
molestation to her relatives and the authorities and taking immediate steps to
subject herself to medical examination represent
conduct consistent with her straightforward, logical and probable testimony
that she was in fact raped by appellant. They represent strong and compelling
factors that enhance complainant’s credibility as a witness.
AAA's credibility is further
bolstered by the fact that her testimony is consistent with the findings of the
physician who examined her. When the consistent and forthright testimony of a
rape victim corresponds with medical findings, there is sufficient basis to
warrant a conclusion that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge have
been established.[32]
AAA testified that appellant
repeatedly rubbed his private organ on her private part and that she felt his
organ come in and out of hers.[33]
On the other hand, it is clear from the Medico-Legal Report of the physician
who examined AAA that at the time of private complainant's examination, which
was conducted on the same day that she informed police authorities that she was
raped, her genitalia exhibited signs of “some form of physical trauma.”[34]
The physician confirmed her findings when she testified in open court that she
found redness and inflammation on AAA's labia minora and hymen which are
indications that the said parts of her organ were subjected to some kind of
friction with a foreign object.[35]
In addition, the medico-legal officer found that AAA's posterior fourchette,
found at the end of her labia minora and at the outer
portion of her vagina, had an abrasion which indicated that it repeatedly came
in contact with a blunt object.[36]
As to appellant's argument
that it was uncharacteristic for the private complainant to be able to go about
her daily chores after she was allegedly raped, the settled rule is that not
all rape victims can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations
of everyone and that different and varying degrees of behavioral responses are
expected in the proximity of, or in confronting, an aberrant episode.[37]
It is well-settled that different people react differently to a given situation
or type of situation.[38]
There is no standard form of reaction for a woman when facing a shocking and
horrifying experience such as a sexual assault.[39] The
workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and
people react differently - some may shout, some may faint, and some may be
shocked into insensibility while others may openly welcome the intrusion.[40]
However, any of these reactions does not impair the credibility of a rape
victim.
There is likewise no merit in
appellant's submission that the prosecution was not able to sufficiently prove
the element of force and intimidation; that the application of force and
intimidation was solely based on the mere allegation of the private
complainant; that there was no physical manifestation of the force allegedly
employed upon her.
AAA testified that before she
was sexually abused, appellant poked a knife at her.[41]
The act of holding a knife is by itself strongly suggestive of force or at
least intimidation, and threatening the victim with a
knife is sufficient to bring her into submission.[42]
In
any case, it is settled that force or intimidation is not limited to physical
force.[43] As
long as it is present and brings the desired result, all consideration of
whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point.[44]
The force or violence that is required in rape cases is
relative; when applied, it need not be overpowering or irresistible.[45]
That it enables the offender to consummate his purpose is enough.[46]
The force, violence, or intimidation in rape is a relative
term, depending not only on the age, size, and strength of the parties but also
on their relationship with each other.[47] Appellant
is the common-law husband of private complainant's mother. Private complainant
testified that she treated appellant with respect, being the second husband of
her mother.[48]
Appellant himself admitted that he acted like a father to AAA and her sister by
showing them love and concern and by disciplining them.[49]
As such, appellant is deemed in legal contemplation to have moral ascendancy
over the victim.[50] It is a
settled rule that in rape committed by a close kin, moral ascendancy takes the
place of violence and intimidation.[51]
Against
the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution, appellant merely interposed the
defense of denial. Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent
any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the
matter, prevails over the defense of denial.[52]
In the present case, there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of
the victim to testify falsely against the accused or to implicate him falsely
in the commission of the crime; hence, the logical conclusion is that no such
improper motive exists and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and
credence. Accordingly, appellant's weak defense of denial cannot prosper.
WHEREFORE,
the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00047,
finding herein appellant Jayson Tuazon
y Olia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape committed against AAA and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the victim the sum of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity ex delicto, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
moral damages and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary
damages, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
* In
Lieu of Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per
raffle dated
[1] Penned by Justice Japar B. Dimaampao with the concurrence of Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Edgardo F. Sundiam, rollo, p. 3.
[2] G.R.
No. 167693,
[3] Original
Records, pp. 137-138.
[4] OR, p.
1.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[12] CA rollo, p. 96.
[13] Rollo, p. 28.
[14] CA rollo, p. 36.
[15] People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No.
171020,
[16] People v. Noveras, G.R. No.
171349,
[17]
[18] People v. Balonzo, G.R. No.
176153,
[19] People v. Hermocilla, G.R. No.
175830,
[20] RTC
Decision, OR, p. 139.
[21] People
v. Aguilar, G.R. No. 17749, December 17, 2007, 540 SCRA 509, 523; People
v. Canare, G.R. No. 168444, December 13, 2006,
511 SCRA 31, 39; People v. Galang, G.R. Nos.
150523-25, July 2, 2003, 405 SCRA 301,
308; People v. Supnad, G.R. Nos. 133791-94,
August 8, 2001, 362 SCRA346, 355-356.
[22] TSN,
[23] People
v. Marcelo, G.R. Nos. 126538-39,
[24] People v. Rapisora, G.R. No.
147855,
[25]
[26] People
v. San Antonio, Jr., G.R. No. 176633,
[27]
[28] OR, p.
115.
[29] See
TSN,
[30] See
TSN,
[31] People
v. Rapisora, supra note 24.
[32] People v. Senieres, G.R. No.
172226,
[33] TSN,
[34] Exhibit
“C-2”, OR, p. 84.
[35] TSN,
[36]
[37] People
v. San Antonio, Jr., G.R. No. 176633,
[38]
[39]
[40] People
v. San Antonio, Jr., supra note 37.
[41] TSN,
[42] People v. Noveras, G.R. No.
171349,
[43] People
v. San Antonio, Jr., supra note 37, at 428.
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47] People v. Ubiña, G.R. No. 176349,
[48] TSN,
[49] TSN,
[50] People
v. Blancaflor, G.R. No. 130586,
[51] People v. Noveras, G.R. No.
171349,
[52] People
v. Quezada, G.R. Nos. 135557-58,