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WILLIE
ONG, doing business under the name and style EXCEL Fitness Center, Petitioner, |
G.R. No. 167899
Present: |
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- versus - |
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ. |
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LUCIA N. BASCO (and husband ANTONIO BASCO, as nominal
party), Respondents. |
Promulgated: August 6, 2008 |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
For
review on certiorari is the Resolution[1] dated March 16, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87699
which had dismissed petitioner’s petition for certiorari.
It appears from the
records that on April 23, 2004, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 43, rendered a Decision[2]
in Civil Case No. 98-92072 ordering petitioner Willie Ong, doing business
under the name and style EXCEL Fitness Center, to pay respondent Lucia
N. Basco the amount of P200,000 as moral damages, P150,000 as
exemplary damages plus 10% of the total amount as attorney’s fees.
On
In an Order[5] dated
On
On
On
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Hence, this petition
wherein Ong alleges that the Court of Appeals erred
in dismissing his petition for certiorari because:
I.
SPECIAL
CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI WAS THE PROPER REMEDY AGAINST THE DENIAL OF THE
MOTION FOR INHIBITION...
II.
UNDER
THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, THE REMEDY OF APPEAL WAS INADEQUATE TO
RELIEVE PETITIONER FROM THE INJURIOUS EFFECTS OF THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR
INHIBITION.[11]
Essentially, the issue
is: Did the Court of Appeals err when it
ruled that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was
not the proper remedy from the denial of petitioner’s motion for inhibition?
Petitioner contends
that a special civil action for certiorari was the proper remedy. He argues that the issue he raised before the
Court of Appeals involved an error of jurisdiction on the part of Judge Reyes,
thus, correctible only by a special civil action for certiorari. He maintains that Judge Reyes exhibited bias
when she simultaneously denied his motions for reconsideration and
inhibition. He further contends that the
factual findings of Judge Reyes were baseless and erroneous. Assuming arguendo that appeal was the proper remedy, he avers that it is inadequate to
afford him relief.
Respondent counters that certiorari was not
the proper remedy from the denial of petitioner’s motion for inhibition. First, she points out that petitioner did not
file a motion for reconsideration on the denial of his motion for inhibition
before filing the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Second, she stresses that Judge Reyes acted
within her jurisdiction and an alleged misapprehension of facts, if any, is a
mere error of judgment correctible by appeal.
She asserts that partiality and bad faith of a judge cannot be presumed
but must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Third, she contends that petitioner is guilty
of forum-shopping when he availed both remedies of appeal and certiorari in
assailing the RTC Order which denied his motions for reconsideration and
inhibition.
After carefully considering the parties’
contentions, we are in agreement that the petition lacks merit.
First of all, under the circumstances of the case, i.e., after
a judgment had been rendered by the RTC and an appeal therefrom had been
perfected, petitioner’s
resort to a special civil action for certiorari is no longer proper because
there exists plain, speedy and adequate remedy, i.e. an ordinary
appeal. Section 2, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court is
controlling:
SEC.
2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and
effect.–If it be claimed that an official is disqualified
from sitting as [provided in Section 1 hereof], the party objecting to his
competency may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the
grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or
withdraw, therefrom in accordance with his determination of the question of his
disqualification. His decision shall be
forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers in the case, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by means
of, his decision in favor of his own competency, until after final judgment in
the case. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Here the appeal affords petitioner
adequate and expeditious relief because the issue of whether the trial judge
acted correctly or erroneously on her competency to take cognizance of a case
could be raised on appeal from the main decision.[12]
Second, while
the restriction in the Rule against appeal or stay of the proceedings where the
trial judge rules in favor of her competency to sit in a case is not an
absolute rule in civil cases, and has not precluded a resort in appropriate
cases to the special civil action of certiorari before the higher courts
for determination, this will apply only in cases where the denial of the motion
for inhibition or disqualification was made ahead of the trial court’s judgment
on the merits and there is a clear showing that the case is an exceptional
one. This is not true in the case of the
present petitioner.
In this case,
a judgment
on the merits has already been rendered by Judge Reyes before she issued
the Order dated September 13, 2004, deciding in favor of her competency and denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the April 23, 2004 RTC
Decision. Judge Reyes acted judiciously
when she decided to sit in Civil Case No. 98-92072 and proceeded to render the
decision in the case,[13] and later resolved petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. It was her official duty to do so.
Third, we cannot indulge on the unfounded
assumptions of bias, prejudice and partiality hurled by petitioner against
Judge Reyes. While those grounds have been recognized as valid reasons
for the voluntary inhibition of a judge under Section 1, paragraph 2,[14]
of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, the rudimentary rule is that the mere
suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough.[15]
Petitioner cannot validly argue that Judge Reyes acted with bias and partiality
simply because Judge Reyes decided the case against him.
Fourth,
the instant case does not fall under the instances covered by the rule on the
mandatory disqualification of judges as enumerated in Section 1, paragraph 1[16]
of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court; thus, the issue of voluntary inhibition is
primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge.[17]
We must
emphasize that the special civil action for certiorari cannot prosper when
there are no special circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of an
appeal. As this Court
held in Bristol Myers Squibb, (Phils.), Inc. v. Viloria[18]
…the settled rule is that a writ of certiorari may be
granted in cases where, despite availability of appeal after trial, there is at
least a prima facie showing on the
face of the petition and its annexes that: (a) the trial court issued the order with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction;
(b) appeal would not prove to be a speedy and adequate remedy; (c) where the
order is a patent nullity; (d) the decision in the present case will arrest
future litigations; and (e) for certain considerations such as public welfare
and public policy.[19]
To be a disqualifying
circumstance, the grounds relied upon must be shown to have stemmed from an
extrajudicial source and resulted in an opinion on the merits on some basis
other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.[20] Since petitioner failed to show any strong ground
of bias and partiality on the part of Judge Reyes, there can be no irregularity
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to
speak of that would merit the filing of a certiorari case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED
for lack of merit. The Resolution dated
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
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DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. Associate Justice |
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ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 42-45. Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon,
with Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Santiago Javier Ranada
concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] CA rollo, pp. 11-35.
[9] Rollo, pp. 44-45.
[10]
[11]
[12] Paredes v. Gopengco, No. L-23710,
[13] People v.
[14] SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. − …
A
judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
[15] Te v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
126746, November 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 327, 339-340.
[16] SECTION
1. Disqualification of
judges.−No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which
he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor
or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree
of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without
the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon
the record.
x x x x
[17] Chin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
144618,
[18] G.R. No. 148156,
[19]
[20] Chin v. Court of Appeals, supra at 214.