THIRD
DIVISION
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MAKATI INSURANCE CO., INC.,
Petitioner, - versus
- HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, RUBILLS
INTERNATIONAL, INC., TONG WOON SHIPPING PTE LTD, and ASIAN TERMINALS, INC., Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 167403 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed
in this Petition for Review under Rule 45[1] of
the Revised Rules of Court are (1) the Decision[2]
dated 12 August 2004 of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition filed in
CA-G.R. SP No. 74220 by herein petitioner Makati
Insurance Co., Inc., and affirming the Order[3]
dated 2 October 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 36, in
Civil Case No. 97-84952, which dismissed petitioner’s Notice of Appeal for
having been filed three days beyond the reglementary period; and (2) the
Resolution[4]
dated 17 February 2005 of the Court of Appeals in the same case denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of its earlier Decision.
The
generative facts of the present Petition are as follows.
Petitioner
filed before the RTC a Complaint[5]
against private respondents Rubills International,
Inc., Tong Woon Shipping PTE., LTD., and Asian
Terminals, Inc. for damages arising from breach of contract of carriage. In its Complaint, petitioner alleged that:
3.1 [Herein private respondents] Rubills International, Inc. and Tong Woon Shipping Pte. Ltd. [Rubills for brevity], were and are the owners, operators, charterers, bailees, representatives, or agents of several ocean going vessels, engaged in ocean carriage to and from Philippine ports in foreign trade, one of which is the vessel M/V “Cherry” a common carrier, bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the care and custody of goods while in its protective custody.
3.2 [Herein private respondent] Asian Terminals, Inc. [ATI] was and is the arrastre operator at the port of Manila and as such was charged and obligated with the duty of receiving cargoes discharged from the vessels docking at the port of Manila, of safekeeping and taking good care of the same while in its protective custody, and thereafter delivering the same to the respective consignees and/or consignee’s representatives.
4.0 On or about August 11, 1996, the [private respondents] Rubills and Tong Woon vessel M/V “CHERRY” arrived in Manila and docked at Pier 15 South Harbor, Manila, and therein completely unloaded on September 9, 1996 a shipment of 120MT Red Beans and 153.00MT Cattle Meat Colloid covered by Bill of Lading dated August 01, 1996, a photocopy of which is herewith attached as Annex “A” and made an integral part hereof;
5.0 It was found out after the inspection of the subject shipment that eighty four (84) ton bags of the shipment were in apparent damaged condition, partly to badly wet and loose/torn on sides and/or ends with spillages/wettages to contents apparent. x x x.
x x x x
6.0 The
aforesaid losses and damages sustained by the subject shipment were directly
caused and brought about by the wanton fault, gross negligence, malevolent
mishandling and culpable disregard, recreance and/or breach of contractual
obligations of all or either of the [private respondents] as common carrier and
arrastre operator respectively, and as a result of
which the owner/assured/consignee Silver Allies Trading International sustained
damages and losses in the total sum of Four Hundred Twelve Thousand Two Hundred
Fifty Three & 91/100 Pesos (P412,253.91) for which [herein
petitioner]-insurer paid the consignee-assured.
Thus, [petitioner] was subrogated into the rights and interests of the
consignee-assured relative to the said losses and damages sustained by the
subject shipment;
7.0 Demands were lodged against the [private respondents] for compensation of the amount paid by the [petitioner] to the consignee-assured, but the [private respondents] failed, ignored and refused to heed the same to the damage and prejudice of the [petitioner];
8.0 [Private respondents] are guilty of wanton fault, gross negligence, malevolent mishandling and culpable disregard of their contractual obligations in bringing about and contumaciously causing the losses and damages to the said shipment x x x.[6]
Petitioner prayed in its Complaint that:
[J]udgment be rendered ordering the [herein private respondents], jointly and severally or whichever may be found liable, to pay [herein petitioner]:
a. Actual
damages in the amount of P412,253.91 with legal interest from the date
of the filing of the complaint until fully paid;
b. Exemplary
damages in the sum of at least P20,000.00 or as may be found proper by
this Honorable Court;
c. Attorney’s
fees in the sum equivalent to twenty five percent (25%) of the principal claim
of P103,063.47; and
d. Litigation
expenses in the sum of at least P10,000.00 or as may be proven, plus
costs of suit.[7]
After
the issues were joined, the case was set for pre-trial conference. For the
failure of petitioner’s counsel to appear at the scheduled pre-trial conference
on
On third call of this case at
Respective counsels of [private respondents] moved for the dismissal of the case on the following grounds:
1. For
failure of [petitioner] to properly appear for pre-trial conference on
2. For failure of [petitioner] to appear at the pre-trial conference at the proper time set on October 16, 2001 although [petitioner]’s counsel came in after [private respondents]’ counsel had left the court room and the case re-set for continuation of pre-trial on November 19, 2001, and
3. For failure of [petitioner]’s counsel to appear at today’s pre-trial.
It appearing that [petitioner]’s counsel has been given ample opportunity to appear in the pre-trial conference of this case with the requisite authority for its counsel and/or representative and that [petitioner]’s counsel has failed to so appear for pre-trial conference, and upon motion of [private respondents]’ counsel, this case is dismissed without prejudice.
WHEREFORE, the case at bar is dismissed without prejudice. No costs.[8]
On
According
to the
After a careful review of the grounds relied upon by [herein petitioner]’s counsel in his verified motion for reconsideration dated December 1, 2001, the Court has no other recourse but to deny the same as the grounds of said motion for reconsideration are not impressive so as to convince the Court to reverse its Order of November 19, 2001,
WHEREFORE, [petitioner]’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.[11]
Petitioner received notice of the
afore-mentioned Order on
On
On
On
WHEREFORE, plaintiff’s notice of appeal is ordered dismissed as it was filed three (3) days beyond the reglementary period.[18]
Petitioner then filed with the Court
of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court questioning the 2 October 2002 RTC
Order dismissing its Notice of Appeal.
The Petition, however, was denied by the Court of Appeals based on the
following reasons:
[F]rom an order dismissing an action without prejudice, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, or to re-file the case. On this score, therefore, petitioner’s Notice of Appeal is clearly dismissible.
Even assuming arguendo that appeal is petitioner’s proper remedy, it should still be denied for having been filed out of time. x x x.[19]
The
Court of Appeals held:
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed Order dated
The
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated
In
the Petition at bar, petitioner insists that:
EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDANT TO THE CASE AT BAR WARRANT THE LIBERAL APPLICATION OF THE RULES.[21]
We first hew our attention to the
main issue for our resolution: whether
the Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner was filed out of time.
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by
a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of
time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken
within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from.[22] A final judgment or order is one that finally
disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to
it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence
presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations
of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.[23]
Propitious to petitioner is Neypes v. Court of Appeals,[24] promulgated
on
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth,
this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on
petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals;
Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and
Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or
any final order or resolution. (Emphasis ours.)
Rules of Procedure are mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice; their strict and rigid
application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice must always be eschewed.[25]
We justified in Neypes
that:
In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural
rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even
establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the
speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the
Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions
of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their
appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.[26]
Hence, in the interest of substantial
justice, procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of
compliance may be relaxed.[27]
With the advent of the "fresh
period rule," parties who availed themselves of the remedy of motion for
reconsideration are now allowed to file a notice of appeal within fifteen days
from the denial of that motion.[28]
The “fresh period rule” is not
inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court which states
that the appeal shall be taken “within fifteen (15) days from notice of
judgment or final order appealed from.” The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies
disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as
a rule, be construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies.[29] Hence, the use of “or” in the above provision
supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice
of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the “final order,” which, in this
case is the 17 July 2002 RTC Order denying petitioner’s Verified Motion for
Reconsideration, received by petitioner on 3 July 2002.
Neither does the new rule run counter
to the spirit of Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to
15 days to hasten the disposition of cases.
The original period of appeal remains and the requirement for strict
compliance still applies. The fresh
period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is
given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize
and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with
dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we
likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.[30]
The “fresh period rule” finally
eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted
– from receipt of notice of judgment or from receipt of notice of “final order”
appealed from.[31]
Taking our bearings from Neypes, in Sumaway
v. Urban Bank, Inc.,[32]
we set aside the denial of a notice of appeal which was purportedly filed five
days late. With the fresh period rule,
the 15-day period within which to file the notice of appeal was counted from
notice of the denial of the therein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
We followed suit in Elbiña v. Ceniza,[33] wherein
we applied the principle granting a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or
resolution.
Thereafter, in First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands,[34]
we held that a party litigant may now file his notice of appeal either within
fifteen days from receipt of the original decision or within fifteen days from
the receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration.
In De los
We thus hold that when herein petitioner
filed its notice of appeal on
This fresh 15-day period within which
to file notice of appeal counted from notice of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration may be applied to petitioner’s case inasmuch as rules of
procedure may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined
at the time of their passage. In Republic
v. Court of Appeals,[36]
involving A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, which provided for the rule that the 60-day
period within which to file a petition for certiorari shall be reckoned
from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration, we stated
that rules of procedure “may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right
of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no
vested rights in rules of procedure.”
We also take note of an important
declaration made by the Court of Appeals in its assailed Decision that even if
petitioner’s Notice of Appeal was considered filed on time, it was dismissible
for being the wrong remedy.
It bears repeating that the RTC
dismissed Civil Case No. 97-84952 without prejudice. The rules[37]
provide:
Rule 41
APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURTS
Section 1. x x x
No appeal may be taken from:
x x x x
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
Indeed, under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 41, Section 1(h), thereof expressly provides that no appeal may
be taken from an order dismissing an action without prejudice. It may be
subject of a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by the said 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals,
therefore, acted correctly in stating that the Notice of Appeal filed by the petitioner
was dismissible.
Even if in the interest of substantial
justice, we consider the Notice of Appeal as a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, still no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to the RTC in
dismissing Civil Case No. 97-84952.
The
Writ of Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy to correct errors
of jurisdiction. An act of a court or
tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when
the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to
act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. Be that as it may, it must be emphasized that
this practice is applied only under certain exceptional circumstances to
prevent unnecessary delay in the administration of justice and so as not to
unduly burden the courts.[38]
In the present case, Civil Case No.
97-84952 was initially scheduled for pre-trial conference on
All these postponements truly
manifest a lack of interest to prosecute on the part of the petitioner as found
by the RTC. Section 3, Rule 17 of the
Rules of Court states:
SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. – If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
We have always been steadfast in
ruling that in every action, the plaintiff is duty-bound to prosecute the same
with utmost diligence and with reasonable dispatch to enable him to obtain the
relief prayed for and, at the same time, minimize the clogging of the court
dockets. The expeditious disposition of
cases is as much the duty of the plaintiff as the court. It must be remembered that a defendant in a
case likewise has the right to the speedy disposition of the action filed
against him, considering that any delay in the proceedings entails prolonged
anxiety and valuable time wasted.[54]
In all, we find that while it is true that
the petitioner’s Notice of Appeal was timely filed based on our ruling in Neypes, said
Notice of Appeal was the wrong remedy.
Even if considered as a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the same has no merit as discussed above.
Wherefore, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated
SO
ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Perlita J. Tria Tirona, concurring. Rollo, pp. 17-22.
[3] Records, p. 170.
[4] Rollo, p. 24.
[5] Records, p. 1.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Rollo, p. 154.
[14]
[15] Records, p. 166.
[16] Rollo, p. 170.
[17]
[18] Records, p. 174.
[19] Rollo, p. 19.
[20]
[21] Rollo, p. 109.
[22] Nuñez v. GSIS Family Bank, G.R. No. 163988,
[23] PAL
Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.,
G.R. No. 161110,
[24] G.R. No. 141524,
[25] San
Miguel Corp. v. Aballa, G.R. No. 149011,
[26] Neypes v. Court of Appeals, supra note 24 at 643-644.
[27] De
los
[28] Active
Realty and Development Corporation v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 157186,
[29] Neypes v. Court of Appeals, supra note 24 at 645-646.
[30]
[31]
[32] G.R. No. 142534,
[33] G.R. No. 154019,
[34] G.R. No. 154034,
[35] De
los
[36] 447 Phil. 385, 393-394 (2003).
[37] 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[38] Yee
v. Bernabe, G.R. No. 141393,
[39] Records, p. 83.
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48]
[49]
[50]
[51]
[52]
[53]
[54] Ko v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. Nos. 169131-32,