SECOND DIVISION
|
MEDIAN
CONTAINER CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
- versus - METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 166904 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: August
11, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO
MORALES, J.:
Respondent, Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company (Metrobank), filed a complaint for sum of money[1] on
June 23, 2003 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati against petitioner
Median Container Corporation (MCC) and the spouses Carlos T. Ley and Fely C. Ley, Vice President/Treasurer of MCC for failure of
MCC to settle the amount of more than P5,000,000
representing the outstanding balance of loans contracted by MCC, represented by
Fely C. Ley.
Summonses addressed as follows to the
defendants were issued on
MEDIAN CONTAINER CORPORATION
Lot
San Bartolome,
Novaliches,
CARLOS T. LEY AND FELY C. LEY
Metro
In the August 20, 2003 Process
Server’s Return,[3] no date
of filing of which is indicated, process server George S. de Castro stated that
Summons was served on MCC on August 7, 2003 at its given address upon one
Danilo Ong (Ong) as shown by Ong’s signature at the left bottom portion of the Summons,
below which signature the process server wrote the words “General
Manager.”
In the same August 20, 2003 Process
Server’s Return, the process server stated that he was unable to serve the Summons
upon the spouses Ley at their given address as they were no longer residing
there. Summons was eventually served
upon the spouses Ley.
On August 28, 2003, MCC filed a motion
to dismiss[4] the
complaint on the grounds of defective service of Summons over it and defective verification and
certificate against non- forum
shopping. The spouses Ley, upon the
impression that the Summons was also served upon them through Ong, also filed a
motion to dismiss on the same grounds as those of MCC’s.
In its Motion to Dismiss, MCC alleged
that, contrary to the statement in the August 20, 2003 Process Server’s Return,[5] Ong, on whom the Summons was served, was not its General
Manager, he being merely a former employee who had resigned as of July 2002.[6] In support
of its claim, MCC annexed to its motion photocopies of a resignation
letter dated
Respecting its claim of defective
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, MCC questioned the
authority of Atty. Alexander P. Mendoza to accomplish the same on behalf of
Metrobank in this wise:
. . . A careful
perusal of the “authority” discloses that a certain Atty. Ramon S. Miranda
delegated his authority to Atty. Mendoza to “sign the complaint and/or
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping in the case entitled MBTC
v. Median Container Corporation and Spouses Carlos T. Ley and Fely C. Ley
filed before the
As
previously discussed, Atty. Mendoza verified the complaint and signed the
certification against forum shopping on
By Order[9] of
The Process Server’s Return dated
Only MCC went to the Court of Appeals
via Petition for Certiorari filed on May 19, 2004 to assail the Order of the
trial court denying its Motion to Dismiss and its Motion for Reconsideration, arguing
in the main that the trial court “acted with grave abuse of discretion . . .
considering that the Complaint failed to comply with Rule 7, Section 5 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Verification and Certification thereof
having been signed and executed by one who had no authority to bind respondent
Metrobank at the time of such signing and execution.”[12]
As
correctly defined by the appellate court, the issues raised by MCC were:
1) the alleged belated filing of
Metrobank’s Opposition, and
2) the alleged violation of Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
regarding the verification/certification against forum shopping.[13]
By the present challenged Decision of
September 23, 2004,[14]
the appellate court dismissed petitioner’s petition for certiorari, holding
that the trial court did not commit any abuse of discretion since “Atty.
Mendoza was already clothed with the proper authority to sign the verification
and certification through a Board’s Resolution dated June 3, 2003 when the
complaint was filed on June 23, 2003.”[15]
Its definition
of the issues raised by MCC notwithstanding, the appellate court found it necessary
to pass upon the unraised issue of improper service of summons, it finding the
same to be a “basic jurisdictional issue and if only to completely dispose of
th[e] incident and facilitate the prompt resolution of the main underlying case
(sum of money).”[16]
Brushing
aside the impropriety of service of Summons upon MCC, the Court of Appeals stated:
The case invoked by [MCC] in support of its position that service of summons was improper, is E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. v. Benito where the Honorable Supreme Court ruled that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner (a partnership) where service of summons was made on a branch manager instead of the general manager at the partnership’s principal office. . . .[17] (Emphasis in original)
x x x x
After
considering the facts and developments in this case in their totality, we
believe – as the public respondent did – that the ruling in the cited Villarosa
case should be applied with an eye on the unusual facts of the present case. We find it significant that the process
server in this case certified that he served the summons upon the “general
manager” of the petitioner. The
process server apparently was fully aware of the strict requirements of the
Rules as interpreted in the cited Villarosa case. The twist in the process certification is the
petitioner’s claim that Danilo Ong, the person who received the summons, was
not the general manager but was a mere former employee. In other words, unlike in Villarosa
where summons was served on the branch manager (a patently wrong
party under the requirements of the Rules), there was, in the present case,
the INTENTION on the part of the process server to observe the mandatory
requirements on the services of summons and to serve it on the correct
recipient.[18] (Emphasis in the original; capitalization and underscoring
supplied)
Its Motion for Reconsideration[19]
having been denied,[20] MCC
filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari[21]
raising the following issues including, this time, the impropriety of
service of Summons upon it, thus, whether:
. . . A COMPLAINT SHOULD PROPERLY BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 7, SECTON 5 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION PORTION THEREOF HAVING BEEN SIGNED AND EXECUTED BY ONE WHO HAD NO AUTHORITY TO BIND THE PARTY-PLAINTIFF AT THE TIME OF SUCH SIGNING AND EXECUTION;
. . . IT IS FULL COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 14, SECTION 11 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, OR THE MERE INTENTION OF THE PROCESS SERVER TO SERVE THE SUMMONS ON THE INTENDED RECIPIENT, THAT DETERMINES THE VALIDITY OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS WHEN THE DEFENDANT IS A DOMESTIC PRIVATE CORPORATION; and
. . . IT IS THE ACTUAL RECEIPT OF THE SUMMONS, OR THE VALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES, THAT VESTS THE TRIAL COURT WITH JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT.[22] (Underscoring supplied)
Verification is a formal, not
jurisdictional, requirement.[23] It is simply intended to secure an assurance
that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct, and that the
pleading is filed in good faith.[24] That explains why a court may order the
correction of the pleading if verification is lacking, or act on the pleading
although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that
strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order to serve the
ends of justice.[25]
As for the required certification
against forum shopping, failure to comply therewith is generally not curable by
its submission subsequent to the filing of the petition nor
by amendment, and is cause for its dismissal.[26] A certification against forum shopping signed
by a person on behalf of a corporation which is unaccompanied by proof that the
signatory is authorized to file the petition[27] is generally likewise cause for
dismissal. In several cases, however,
this Court relaxed the application of these requirements upon appreciation of attendant
special circumstances or compelling reasons.
Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals[28]
cites some of those instances:
. . . In Loyola v. Court of Appeals, et. al. . . . , the Court considered the filing of the certification one day after the filing of an election protest as substantial compliance with the requirement. In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et. al. . . . , the Court allowed the filing of the certification 14 days before the dismissal of the petition. In Uy v. LandBank, . . . , the Court had dismissed Uy’s petition for lack of verification and certification against non-forum shopping. However, it subsequently reinstated the petition after Uy submitted a motion to admit [verification] and non-forum shopping certification. In all these cases, there were special circumstances or compelling reasons that justified the relaxation of the rule requiring verification and certification on non-forum shopping.
In
the instant case, the merits of
petitioner’s case should be considered special circumstances or compelling
reasons that justify tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate
of non-forum shopping. Moreover, in Loyola,
Roadway, and Uy, the Court excused non-compliance with the
requirement as to the certificate of non-forum shopping. With more reason should we allow the instant
petition since petitioner herein did submit a certification on non-forum
shopping, failing only to show proof that the signatory was authorized
to do so. That petitioner
subsequently submitted a secretary’s certificate attesting that Balbin was authorized to
file an action on behalf of petitioner likewise mitigates this oversight.[29] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, simultaneous with
the filing of the complaint, Metrobank submitted both a certification of
non-forum shopping and proof that Atty. Mendoza who signed it on its behalf was
authorized to do so. The proof of
authorization of Atty. Mendoza was dated later than the date of his signing of
the certification of non-forum shopping, however, thus giving the impression
that he, at the time he affixed his signature, was not authorized to do
so. The passing on
As for MCC’s contention that the summons
addressed to it was served on a wrong party, hence, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over it, the same fails.
A certificate of service by a proper
officer is prima facie evidence of the facts set out therein, and the
presumption arising from the certificate can only be overcome by clear and
convincing evidence.[31]
To disprove that Ong was neither its
General Manager or an employee of MCC at the time of the service of summons,
MCC submitted before the trial court a photocopy of his purported July
31, 2003 resignation letter and a photocopy of an August 1, 2003 Quitclaim
purportedly signed by him. MCC did not
present the original copies of these documents.[32] Be that as it may, the appellate court’s en passant disposition of the questioned
service of summons, viz:
. . . [W]e searched the records – particularly the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioner – for the reason why and how service was made on a former employee who was then at the correct address, who signed for the summons, and whom the process server identified as “general manager”. We note that aside from the bare allegation that the court did not have jurisdiction due to improper service of summons, no statement was ever made to explain why a former employee was at petitioner’s premises and ended up receiving the summons served by the process server. Truly, we wondered why a process server who apparently knew the technicalities of his duties so served the summons and then certified that service was upon the general manager, even naming Danilo Ong as the general manager.
This
aberrant turn of events and the questions it raises convince us that we cannot
view the service of summons in this case along the strict lines of Villarosa
whose attendant facts are both simple and different. What should assume materiality here are
the following circumstances: that
the process server went to the correct address of the petitioner to serve the
summons; that the summons was received at that address by a person who was
there; that the petitioner does not dispute that it ultimately received the summons; and that the process server certified in his return that service was duly made upon the general manager whom he identified as Danilo Ong who acknowledged receipt of the summons by signing on the lower portion thereof.[33] (Emphasis and italics in the original; underscoring supplied),
persuades as this Court notes the dubious
proof that Ong had resigned from MCC at the time the summons was served. Consider this: The signature attributed to Ong in the photocopy
of his purported July 31, 2002 letter of resignation effective also on July 31,
2002, and the signature attributed to
him in the photocopy of the August 1, 2002 Quitclaim he purportedly
executed, appear to have been written by a hand different from that which
affixed the signature attributed to him on the Summons.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
RENATO C.
CORONA Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Additional
member in lieu of Justice Dante O. Tinga per Special
Order No. 512 dated
[1] Records, pp. 1-8.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Records, p. 71.
[10]
[11]
[12] CA
rollo, p. 13.
[13]
[14] Penned by Justice Arturo D. Brion (now an associate member of the SC), with the
concurrence of Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and
Eliezer R. De los
[15]
[16] Ibid.
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Rollo,
pp. 38-61.
[22]
[23] Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, 404 Phil. 981,
994 (2001), citation omitted.
[24]
[25] Ibid.
[26] Rules of Court, Rule 7, Section 5.
[27] Vide Retro Drug Distribution, Inc. v. Narciso, G.R. No. 147478,
[28] Supra
note 23.
[29]
[30] New
Civil Code Articles 1869 (“Agency may be express, or implied from the
acts of the principal, from his silence or lack of action, or his failure to
repudiate the agency, knowing that another person is acting on his behalf
without authority.” x x x) and 1910 (“x x x As for any obligation wherein the agent has exceeded his
power, the principal is not bound except when he ratifies it expressly or
tacitly.”); Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. v. Linsangan, G.R. No.
151319, November 22, 2004, 443 SCRA 377, 394 (“Ratification in agency is the
adoption or confirmation of one person of an act performed on his behalf by
another without authority. The substance
of the doctrine is confirmation after conduct, amounting to a substitute for a
prior authority.”)
[31] Vide
R. Transport Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 111187,
[32] Vide
Rules of Court, Rule 130,
Section 3, Rule 132, Section 20.
[33] CA rollo,
pp. 238-239.