Republic of the
Supreme Court
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EASTRIDGE GOLF
CLUB, INC., |
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G.R. No. 166760 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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- versus - |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., |
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EASTRIDGE GOLF
CLUB, INC., |
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Chairperson, |
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LABOR
UNION-SUPER, represented |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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by LORENZO M.
ESTEBAN, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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President and 13
others similarly |
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NACHURA, and |
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situated, namely:
REMEGIO |
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REYES, JJ. |
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ALEJANDRO RIVERA,
ANTONIO |
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ALVIZA, ELMER
ANONICAL, |
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GILBERT DARILAY,
APOLINAR CAISIP, |
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GERALDINE ARAGON,
ANTONIO |
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LLANTINO, ABSALON
BARBON, |
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ZELLER, LUISITO
TEVES, REYNALDO |
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Promulgated: |
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VICTORIOSO and
LORENZO M. ESTEBAN, |
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Respondents. |
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August 22, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of petitioner Eastridge Golf Club, Inc.
from the October 13, 2004 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) which ordered
the reinstatement of the
individual respondents; and the January 19, 2005 Resolution[2]
of the CA which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The relevant facts are of record.
Petitioner employed respondents as kitchen staff in its
Food and Beverage (F&B) Department. Effective October 1, 1999, petitioner terminated the
employment of respondents on the ground that the operations of the F&B Department had been turned over to
concessionaire Mother's Choice Meat Shop & Food Services.[3] Petitioner filed with the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) an Establishment Termination Report,[4]
stating that it laid off the respondents due to company
reorganization/downsizing and transfer of operations to a concessionaire.
Respondents filed with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch, a complaint for
illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and payment of 13th month
pay. They claimed that their dismissal
was not based on any of the causes allowed by law, and that it was effected
without due process.[5]
Petitioner denied respondents' claims, pointing out that
several months before their dismissal, it issued various office memoranda[6]
informing respondents that, to
minimize company losses, the management decided to bid out a part of its
operations, specifically the F&B
Department, to a concessionaire.[7]
The partial cessation of operations was bonafide,
as shown by such evidence as:
1. Agreement
(Food & Beverages Concessionaire), dated October 1, 1999, between Eastridge
Golf Club, Inc. and Mother's Choice Meat Shop & Food Services (Annex “10”);[8]
2. Certificate
of Registration of Business Name, dated January 26, 2000, issued by the
Department of Trade and Industry to Bilibiran Food Services (Annex “11”);[9]
and
3. Mayor's
Permit dated February 8, 2000 issued to Food Services/Bilibiran (Annex “11-A”).[10]
Petitioner further explained
that the transfer of operations was not intended to displace its workers. In fact, a procedure was adopted by which the
old F&B staff, such as respondents, could be rehired by the concessionaire.
Several F&B staff were in fact
rehired, as shown in Annexes “6”[11]
and “7”[12]
of its Position Paper. However,
respondents failed to comply with the rehiring procedure; hence, they were
considered resigned when the concessionaire took over operations on October 1,
1999.[13]
To controvert petitioner's claim that the partial
cessation of operations was bona fide, respondents filed a Motion to
Re-open Case[14]
in which they presented documentary evidence that there was no real transfer
of operations, for even after October 1, 1999, petitioner remained the real employer
of all the F&B staff. Their
documentary evidence consists of the following:[15]
1. Payslips
for the periods October 1-15, 1999 (Annex “A”);[16]
January 16-31, 2000 (Annex “A-1”);[17]
and May 1-15, 2000 (Annex “A-2”)[18]
issued by petitioner to various employees,
including those listed in Annex “6” and Annex “7”;
2. Monthly
Payroll Register (Annexes “C” to “C-1”) [19] issued
by petitioner for the entire F&B Department for the period
3. ME-5
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation Contribution Payment Return (Annex “D”)[20]
issued by petitioner, through its Chief Accountant Nestor Rubis, showing
payment of contributions for the period February 2000, in the total amount of P16,375.00,
for all its employees, including those listed in Annex “6” and Annex “7”;
4. RF-1
Employer Quarterly Remittance Report (Annexes “K” to “K-8”)[21]
submitted by petitioner through its Chief Accountant Nestor Rubis, indicating
remittance of premium contributions, in the total amount of P16,375.00,
of the individual employees listed therein, including employees listed in Annex
“6” and Annex “7”; and
5. R-5
Social Security System Contribution Payment Return (Annex “E”),[22]
showing payment by petitioner for March 2000.
In a Decision dated March 22, 2002, the Labor Arbiter (LA)
held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the complainants, holding that no sufficient ground to validly considered [sic]
them resigned from their job and holding illegal their dismissal from the
service by reason therefor. Accordingly, respondent company is ordered to
reinstate them to their former position without loss of seniority rights and
with full backwages, as shown in the attached computation hereof which is
adopted as our own and forming part of the decision as Annex “A”. Further, holding respondent company guilty of
unfair labor practice act under par. c, Article 248 of the Labor Code, as
amended and thereby ordered to pay each of the complianant and the union the
amount of P5,000.00 as and for damages.
The other claims are
dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[23]
On appeal, the NLRC, in a
Decision dated May 21, 2003, reversed the LA, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the
decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and this complaint DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Respondents, however, are ordered jointly and severally, to pay each
complainant of one (1) month salary for every year of service.
SO ORDERED.[24]
After their motion for reconsideration was denied by the
NLRC,[25] respondents filed with the CA a Petition
for Certiorari[26], which the appellate court granted
in the October 13, 2004 Decision assailed herein, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed NLRC decision and resolution dated May 21, 2003 and July 21, 2003,
respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dated March
22, 2002 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.[27]
Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied by the CA in its January 19, 2005 Resolution.[28]
Hence, petitioner’s
recourse to this Court, assailing the CA Decision and Resolution on
the sole ground that these were rendered contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence.[29]
Petitioner's recourse must fail.
The LA held the dismissal of
respondents illegal in the light of evidence that petitioner did not actually
cease the operation of its F&B Department:
By their own
declaration/admission, respondent [petitioner] company had not closed operation
but merely transferred management of its Food and Beverages Operations
temporarilly thru a concessionaire for alleged low income generation and
increasing operation expenses x x x.
x x x x
It is well to note
that respondents Food and Beverages Department continues to exist after complainants
[respondents] were dismissed as evidenced by the pay slip of complainants’
[respondents’] co-employees x x x and SSS premium payments by respondent
[petitioner] company to complainants’
co-employees at the Food & Beverages Department x x x as well as the
respondent [petitioner] company payroll xxx where complainants’ [respondents’]
co-employees are included x x x.[30]
The LA further held that even if it were true that
petitioner ceased operation of its F&B Department, the same would not have
warranted the dismissal of respondents because petitioner had not shown
evidence that it was incurring financial losses. To quote the LA:
Respondent alleged that the reason for the
implementation of the above-scheme was brought about by financial constraint --
“low income generation and increasing operational expenses” x x x.
As
correctly put forth by the complainants, allegation of losses, must be
established beyond cavil xxx. In our case, respondent had not at all presented
documentary evidence in support of their losses.[31]
Contradicting the LA, the NLRC held that the
evidence of respondents do not prove that petitioner acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner when it relinquished its F&B
operations.[32] The NLRC further held that the LA erred in
requiring petitioner to prove that it ceased its F&B operations because of
financial losses. No such requirement is
imposed by Article 283 because petitioner's “decision, as authorized by the Board of Directors,
to transfer the operation and Management of the F&B business to a
concessionaire was a valid exercise of management prerogative ‘to prevent
losses’ x x x. The employer’s act of terminating the services
of the affected employee is authorized before the anticipated losses are
actually sustained or realized, for it is not the intention of the lawmakers to
compel the employer to stay his hand and keep all his employees until after
losses shall have in fact materialized.”[33]
The CA discarded
the view of the NLRC and reverted to the position of the LA, thus:
Retrenchment
is one of the ways of terminating the employment to preserve the viability of
the business. However, the employer bears the burden of proving his allegation
of economic and business reverses with clear and satisfactory evidence.
Requirements for valid retrenchment must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. In this case, the Club [petitioner] allegedly decided to get a
concessionaire to avoid losses and further increase in its overhead expenses.
However, it had not presented documentary evidence in support of its alleged
losses.
On
the other hand, the Union [respondents] presented evidence sufficient to prove
that the Club’s [petitioner’s] Food and Beverage Department continues to exist
even after their dismissal like the Club’s Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation Employees Quarterly Remittance Report dated April 2, 2000 showing
the names of the employees allegedly absorbed by the concessionaire x x x.[34]
It is evident
that the CA and LA differ in their factual assessment and legal conclusion from
those of the NLRC on three planes: first, on the cause of the termination of
the employment of respondents; second, on the legal requirements for the
validity of the termination of respondents; and third, on petitioner’s
compliance with these requirements. Their differing views compelled the Court to
scrutinize the records to satisfy itself on which view was more in accord with
the facts and the law of the case.[35]
Petitioner argues that it has
sufficient business autonomy to close its F&B operations, and that it need
not justify its decision by presenting evidence that it has been incurring
financial losses.[36]
Article 283 of the Labor Code allows
various modes of termination of employment, to wit:
Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of
personnel. — The employer may also terminate the employment of any
employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment
to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the
establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the
workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before
the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of
labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be
entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to
at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In
case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of
operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses
or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month
pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever
is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1)
whole year.
Only the last two modes are relevant
here, i.e.: retrenchment to prevent losses and closure or cessation of
operation of the establishment or undertaking.
Retrenchment
or lay-off is the termination of employment initiated by the employer, through
no fault of the employees and without prejudice to the latter, during periods
of business recession, industrial depression, or seasonal fluctuations, or
during lulls occasioned by lack of orders, shortage of materials, conversion of
the plant for a new production program or the introduction of new methods or
more efficient machinery, or of automation.[37]
It is an exercise of management
prerogative which the Court upholds if compliant with certain substantive and
procedural requirements,[38]
namely:
1. That retrenchment is necessary to prevent
losses and it is proven, by sufficient and convincing evidence such as the
employer’s financial statements audited by an independent and credible external
auditor,[39] that such losses are substantial and not merely flimsy[40]
and actual or reasonably imminent; [41]
and that retrenchment is the only effective measure to prevent such imminent
losses; [42]
2. That written notice is served on to the employees and the DOLE at
least one (1) month prior to the intended date of retrenchment;[43]
and
3. That the retrenched employees receive
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month
pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.[44]
The employer must prove compliance
with all the foregoing requirements.[45]
Failure
to prove the first requirement will render the retrenchment illegal and make
the employer liable for the reinstatement of its employees and payment of full
backwages.[46] However, were the retrenchment undertaken by
the employer is bona fide, the same will not be invalidated by the
latter’s failure to serve prior notice on the employees and the DOLE; the employer
will only be liable in nominal damages,[47]
the reasonable rate of which the Court En Banc has set at P50,000.00[48]
for each employee.
Closure or cessation
of business is the complete
or partial[49]
cessation of the operations and/or shut-down of the establishment of the
employer. It is carried out to either
stave off the financial ruin[50] or
promote the business interest of the employer.[51]
Unlike
retrenchment, closure or cessation of business, as an authorized cause of
termination of employment, need not depend for validity on evidence of actual
or imminent reversal of the employer's fortune. Article 283 authorizes termination of
employment due to business closure, regardless of the underlying reasons and
motivations therefor, be it financial losses or not.[52]
In the case under review,
the cause invoked by petitioner in terminating the employment of respondents is
not retrenchment but cessation of a single aspect of its business undertaking, i.e.,
the F&B Department. This is evident
in the notices of termination it sent to respondents where petitioner indicated
that it had withdrawn from the direct operation of the F&B Department and
had transferred the management thereof to the concessionaire.[53] Also, in the various office memoranda it
posted, petitioner explained that the underlying reason for the cessation of
its F&B undertaking was that the economic depression had affected its sales
and operations and resulted in increased overhead expenses and decreased
incomes.[54]
Cessation
of its F&B operations being the
cause invoked by petitioner to terminate the employment of respondents, it need
not present evidence of financial losses
to justify such business decision.
Thus, the Court agrees with
petitioner that the CA erred when it declared that, for lack of evidence of
financial losses, petitioner's cessation of its F&B operations was not a
valid cause to terminate the employment of respondents.
But petitioner is not
out of the woods yet.
The decision to close business is a management prerogative
exclusive to the employer, the exercise of which no court or tribunal can
meddle with, except only when the employer fails to prove compliance with the
requirements of Art. 283, to wit: a) that the closure/cessation of business is bona
fide, i.e., its purpose is to advance the interest of the employer
and not to defeat or circumvent the rights of employees under the law or a
valid agreement; b) that written notice was served on the
employees and the DOLE at least one month before the intended date of closure
or cessation of business; and c) in case of closure/cessation of business not
due to financial losses, that the employees affected have been given
separation pay equivalent to ½ month pay for every year of service or one month
pay, whichever is higher.[55]
It should be borne in mind that where the closure of
business is found to be in bad faith, the dismissal of the employees shall be
declared illegal and the employer held liable for their reinstatement and
payment of full backwages,[56]
unless reinstatement is no longer feasible in which case the employer shall be
liable for full backwages as well as separation pay at the rate of one month
salary for every year of service, with a fraction of at least six months being
considered as one year.[57]
If the
closure of business due to serious business losses or
financial reverses is shown to be in good faith, the resultant dismissal
of the employees shall be upheld, with no separation benefits due them.[58] If the closure of business is not
due to serious business losses or financial reverses but it is shown to be in
good faith, the resultant dismissal of the employees will still be upheld but
the latter shall be entitled to separation pay at the
rate of ½ month pay for every year of service or one month pay, whichever is
higher.[59]
Both
the CA and the LA found that the cessation of petitioner's F&B operations
was a mere subterfuge in view of evidence that the latter continued to act as
the real employer by paying for the salaries and insurance contributions of the
employees of the F&B Department even after the concessionaire allegedly
took over its operations. The NLRC saw
otherwise, holding that the said evidence did not establish that the cessation
of petitioner's F&B operations was in bad faith.
Petitioner
insists that the documentary evidence presented by respondents hardly establish
that it remained the employer of the F&B staff even after the turn over of
its operations to the concessionaire. Said
evidence was even controverted by the quitclaims and release forms executed by
the individual respondents which show that petitioner had paid separation
benefits to those employees absorbed by the concessionaire,[60] Petitioner reasons out that if it had not
given up its F&B operations, it would not have paid those employees separation
benefits. [61]
Petitioner
fails to persuade the Court.
In Me-Shurn Corporation v. Me-Shurn Workers Union-FSM,[62]
the corporation shut down its operations allegedly due to financial losses and
paid its workers separation benefits. Yet, barely one month after the shutdown, the
corporation resumed operations. In light
of such evidence of resumption of operations, the Court held that the earlier
shutdown of the corporation was in bad faith.
With
a similar outcome was the closure of the brokerage department of the
corporation in Danzas Intercontinental, Inc. v. Daguman.[63] In view of evidence consisting of a mere
letter written by the corporation to its clientele that its brokerage
department was still operating but with a new staff, the Court declared the
earlier closure of the corporation's brokerage department not bona fide
and ordered the reinstatement of its former staff, despite the latter having
signed quitclaims and release forms acknowledging payment of separation
benefits.
The
closure of a high school department in St. John Colleges, Inc. v. St. John
Academy Fculty and Employees Union[64]
was likewise annulled upon evidence that barely one year after the announced
closure, the school reopened its high school department. The Court found the closure of the high
school in bad faith notwithstanding payment to the affected teachers of
separation benefits.
In
Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Meris[65]
the hospital justified the closure
of a unit and the dismissal of its head doctor by claiming that there was a
dwindling demand for the unit's services. However, upon examination of the records, the
Court found that service demand had in fact been rising, thus negating the very
reason proffered by the hospital in closing down the unit. On that score, the Court declared the action
of the hospital in bad faith.
The
evidence presented by respondents overwhelmingly shows that petitioner did not
cease its F&B operations but merely simulated its transfer to the
concessionaire. The payslips alone, the
authenticity of which petitioner did not dispute,[66]
bear the name of petitioner's Eastridge Golf Club, Food and Beverage
Department.[67] The payroll register for the Food and
Beverage Department is verified correct by petitioner's Chief Accountant,
Nestor Rubis.[68]
The Philhealth and Social Security
System (SSS) remittance documents are likewise certified correct by the same
Chief Accountant.[69] These pieces of documentary evidence
convincingly, even conclusively, establish that petitioner remained the
employer of the F&B staff even after the
Even
petitioner's own evidence adds weight to respondents’ evidence. The quitclaims and release forms which
petitioner required respondents to sign at the time of the alleged cessation of
petitioner's F&B operations all bear the signature of its Chief Accountant.
It was that same Chief Accountant who
certified and verified as correct the payroll register and Philhealth/SSS
remittance documents issued many months after the alleged cessation of the
F&B operations.
Moreover,
the documents which petitioner attached to prove that the concessionaire took
over the F&B operations are of doubtful veracity. For one, the October 1, 1999 Agreement (Food
& Beverages Concessionaire) with Mother's Choice Meat Shop & Food
Services is not notarized,[70]
which
is an unusual omission by a business entity such as petitioner. It is also curious that the Certificate
of Registration of Business Name as well as the Mayor's Permit are all in the
name of Bilibiran Food Services, not Mother's Choice Meat Shop & Food
Services.[71]
There is no doubt, therefore, that
the CA was correct in ruling that the cessation of petitioner's F&B
operations and transfer to the concessionaire were a mere subterfuge, and that
the dismissal of respondents by reason thereof was illegal.
Finally, it is noted that in
reinstating the decision of the LA, the CA in effect affirmed the finding of
unfair labor practice. In its petition
and memorandum, petitioner offered no argument in refutation of the said
finding, except for its claim that the cessation of its F&B operation was
justified, which claim has been revealed to be spurious. The Court must therefore also sustain the
judgment of the CA on the existence of unfair labor practice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Eliezer R. delos
[2]
[3] CA
rollo, pp. 66-77.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Position
Paper, id at 55-58.
[8]
[9]
[10] CA
rollo, p. 84.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] CA
rollo, pp. 117-124.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27] Rollo,
p. 15.
[28]
[29] Petition
for Review, id. at 46.
[30] LA
Decision, CA rollo, pp. 22 and 24.
[31] CA,
rollo, p. 23.
[32] NLRC
Decision, rollo, pp. 35-36.
[33]
[34] CA
Decision, rollo, p. 14.
[35] Cajucom
VII v. TPI Philippines Cement Corporation, G.R. No. 149090, February 11,
2005, 451 SCRA 70, 78; Asufrin, Jr. v. San Miguel Corporation, G.R. No.
156658,
[36] Petition,
rollo, pp. 48-50.
[37] Tanjuan v. Philippine Postal Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 155278, September 16, 2003, 411 SCRA 168, citing Sebuguero
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 115394, September 27,
1995, 248 SCRA 532, 542 , which in turn cites LVN Pictures Employees and
Workers Assocaition v. LVN Pictures, 146 Phil. 153 (1970), LVN Pictures
Employees and Worker Association derived the definition of the term from the
rulings of the Court in Phil. American Embroideries, Inc. v. Embroidery
& Garment Workers Union, No. L-20143,
[38] AMA
Computer College, Inc. v. Garcia, G.R.
No. 166703, April 14, 2008; EMCO Plywood Corporation v.
Abelgas, G.R. No. 148532, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 496.
[39] TPI
Philippines Cement Corporation v. Cajucom VII, G.R. No. 149138, February
28, 2006, 483 SCRA 494; De la Salle University v. De la Salle University Employees
Association, G.R. No. 110072, April 12, 2000, 330 SCRA 368.
[40] PT&T
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 147002,
[41] Blucor
Minerals Corporation v. Amarilla, G.R.
No. 161217,
[42] EMCO
Plywood Corporation, supra, note 38, citing
Saballa v. National Labor Relations Commission, 329 Phil. 511,
526-527 (1996); and Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Federation of Free Workers,
G.R. Nos. 75700-01, August 30, 1990, 189 SCRA 179, 186-187.
[43] TPI
Philippine Cement Corporation, supra note 39.
[44] EMCO
Plywood Corporation v. Abelgas, supra
note 38.
[45] Composite
Enterprises, Inc. v. Caparoso, G.R.
No. 159919,
[46] F.F.
Marine Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 152039,
April 8, 2005, 455 SCRA 154, 173; Philippine Carpet Employees Association v.
Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 168719,
February 22, 2006, 483 SCRA 128; Cabalen Management Co., Inc. v.
Quiambao, G.R. No. 169494, March 14, 2007, 518 SCRA 342.
[47] PT&T
v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40.
[48] Jaka Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot, G.R. No. 151378, March 28, 2005, 454 SCRA 119.
See also DAP Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 165811, December 14, 2005, 477 SCRA 792.
[49] Espina
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164582,
[50] Cama
v. Joni's Food Services, Inc., G.R. No. 153021, March 10, 2004, 425
SCRA 259.
[51] Angeles
v. Polytex Design, Inc., G.R. No. 1576273,
[52] Alabang
Country Club, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 157611,
August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 329; J.A.T General Services v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 148430, January 26, 2004, 421 SCRA 78.
[53] CA
rollo, pp. 66-77.
[54]
[55] Mac
[56] Stanley
Garments Specialists v. Gomez, G.R.
No. 154818, August 11, 2005, 466 SCRA 535; Danzas Intercontinental, Inc. v.
Daguman, G.R. No. 154368, April 15, 2005; Raycor Air Control Systems,
Inc. v. San Pedro, G.R. No.
158132, July 4, 2007, 526 SCRA 429.
[57] Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v.
Meris, G.R. No.
155098,
[58] Galaxie
Steel Workers Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
165757, October 17, 2006; Cama v. Joni's Food Services, Inc., supra at
49; Business Services of the Future Today, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157133, January 30, 2006.
[59] Angeles
v. Polytex Dsign, Inc., supra at 50; Pilar Espina v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 164582, March 28, 2007; J.AT General Services v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 148340, January 26, 2007. See also Kasapian ng Malayang Manggagawa
sa Coca-Cola (Kasama-CCO)-CFW Local 245 v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
159828,
[60] Petition,
rollo, p. 48.
[61] Memorandum
for Petitioner, rollo, pp. 394-396.
[62] G.R.
No. 156292,
[63] G.R. No. 154368,
[64] G.R.
No. 167892,
[65] Supra
at 47.
[66] Memorandum
for Petitioner, rollo, p. 394.
[67] Annexes
“A” and “A-3”, CA rollo, pp. 687, 690.
[68] Annex
“C,” id. at 693.
[69] Annex
“D,” id at 175.
[70] CA rollo, p. 79.
[71]