Republic
of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and G.R. No. 164790
LORELIE B. SOLIDUM, Branch
Manager, Cubao Branch, Present:
Petitioners,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus -
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
GLORIA
DE LOS SANTOS,
Respondent. August 29, 2008
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
REYES, R.T., J.:
AN
ESTRANGED wife who was not dependent upon her deceased husband for support is
not qualified to be his beneficiary.
The
principle is applied in this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA), awarding benefits to respondent Gloria de los
The Facts
Antonio de los
In 1983, Gloria left Antonio and went
to the United States (US). On
On
On
Antonio retired from his employment on
On
We
regret to inform you that your claim is denied for the following reason/s:
We
received documents showing that you have remarried in the
These
circumstances are sufficient ground for denial as the
SSC Disposition
Gloria elevated her claim to the
Social Security Commission (SSC). On
The SSC motu proprio impleaded Cirila as respondent in the case, it
appearing that she was another claimant to the death benefits of Antonio. Upon receipt of the summons, Cirila moved to
dismiss the petition of Gloria. She
argued that Gloria had no personality to sue because the latter is neither a
dependent nor a beneficiary of Antonio, as evidenced by the E-4 form
accomplished and submitted by him when he was still alive. Gloria had also remarried an American citizen in
the
Cirila likewise reasoned out that the
authority to determine the validity of the two marriages of Antonio lay with
the regular courts. Since Gloria had
already filed for settlement of the intestate estate of Antonio before the
Regional Trial Court (
Gloria opposed the motion to dismiss. She contended that her marriage to Larry
Constant was not the subsequent marriage contemplated under the Social Security
Law (SS Law)[4] that
would disqualify her as a beneficiary; that the decree of divorce issued by a
foreign state involving Filipino citizens has no validity and effect under
Philippine law. Lastly, Gloria
remonstrated that there was no forum shopping because the petition she filed
before the
The SSC denied the motion to dismiss.
After submission of position papers from
both sides, it issued a Resolution, dated
WHEREFORE,
this Commission finds, and so holds, that May-Ann de los Santos, daughter of
Antonio and private respondent Cirila de los Santos is the secondary
beneficiary of the former and as such, she is entitled to the balance of her
father’s five-year guaranteed pension.
Accordingly,
the P21,200
representing the total of the monthly pensions and dependent’s pension
previously received by private respondent Cirila Nimo and minor May-Ann de los
Santos, respectively, and to pay the latter, through her natural guardian
Cirila Nimo, the difference between the two amounts, if any. If there was overpayment of pension, the
private respondent is hereby ordered to forthwith refund the amount thereof to
the
The
petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO
ORDERED.[6]
The SSC deemed that Gloria abandoned Antonio
when she obtained a divorce against him abroad and subsequently married another
man. She thus failed to satisfy the
requirement of dependency required of primary beneficiaries under the law. The Commission likewise rejected her efforts
to use the invalidity of the divorce, which she herself obtained, to claim
benefits from the
However,
despite all the sophistry with which petitioner, through her counsel, sought to
justify her acts in the
The SSC added that since the marriage
of Antonio to Cirila was void, the latter was likewise not a qualified
beneficiary. The fruit of their union,
May-Ann, was considered as an illegitimate child and qualified as a secondary
beneficiary. May-Ann was entitled to 50%
of the share of the legitimate children of Antonio in accordance with Section 8(k)
of the SS Law.[8] However, considering that the legitimate
children of Antonio have reached the age of majority, May-Ann is the only remaining
qualified beneficiary and was thus entitled to 100% of the benefit.
R.A.
No. 8282, which is the law in force at the time of retiree Antonio’s death on
“Section 12-B. Retirement
Benefits. x x x
(d) Upon the death
of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his retirement shall be entitled to receive the
monthly pension. Provided, That if he
has no primary beneficiaries and he dies
within sixty (60) months from the start of his monthly pension, his secondary
beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to the
total monthly pensions corresponding to the balance
of the five-year guaranteed period, excluding the dependents’ pension.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Since Antonio de los Santos retired on March 1, 1996, and began receiving monthly pension since then, the determination of who his primary beneficiaries were at that times should be based on the relevant provisions of the applicable prevailing law then, R.A. No. 1161, as amended, which is quoted hereunder:
“Section
8. Terms
Defined. x x x
x x x x
(k)
Beneficiaries. – The dependent spouse until he remarries and
dependent children who shall be the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents, and
subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the legitimate
descendants and illegitimate children
who shall be the secondary beneficiaries. In the absence of any of the foregoing, any
other person designed by the covered employee as secondary beneficiary.” (Emphasis supplied)
Applying
these provisions to the case at hand, May-Ann de los Santos as the illegitimate
child of Antonio and Cirila is considered her father’s secondary beneficiary
who, in the absence of a primary beneficiary x x x, becomes entitled to the
balance of the five-year guaranteed pension as Antonio died just three (3)
years after he began receiving his retirement pension, pursuant to Section 12-B
par. (d) of the SS Law, as amended.[9]
CA Decision
Gloria
appealed the above SSC Resolution to the CA.
She insisted that she, as the legal wife, was the qualified beneficiary
to Antonio’s death benefits.
The
CA agreed with the SSC in its determination that the marriage of Gloria and
Antonio subsisted until his death and the subsequent marriages contracted by
both of them were void for being bigamous. But contrary to findings of the SSC, the CA
found that being the legal wife, Gloria was entitled by law to receive support
from her husband. Thus, her status
qualified Gloria to be a dependent and a primary beneficiary under the law. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
in the light of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is GRANTED and the
appealed Resolution dated February 13, 2003, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent SSS is DIRECTED to
compute the amount of benefits to which petitioner is entitled under the law.[10]
Issues
Petitioner
The
controversy revolves on who between respondent Gloria, the first wife who
divorced Antonio in the
Our Ruling
At the outset, let it be recalled
that in 2005, this Court ruled in Dycaico
v. Social Security System[12]
that the proviso “as of the date of retirement” in Section 12-B(d) of Republic
Act No. 8282,[13] which
qualifies the term “primary beneficiaries,” is unconstitutional for it violates
the due process and equal protection clauses. For ready reference, the concerned provision
is reproduced below:
SECTION
12-B. Retirement Benefits. – (a) A member who has paid at least one
hundred twenty (120) monthly contributions prior to the semester of retirement
and who (1) has reached the age of sixty (60) years and is already separated
from employment or has ceased to be self-employed or (2) has reached the age of
sixty-five (65) years, shall be entitled for as long as he lives to the monthly
pension; Provided, That he shall have the option to receive his first eighteen
(18) monthly pensions in lump sum discounted at a preferential rate of interest
to be determined by the
x x
x x
(d)
Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his retirement shall
be entitled to receive the monthly pension; Provided, That if he has no primary
beneficiaries and he dies within sixty (60) months from the start of his
monthly pension, his secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum
benefit equivalent to the total monthly pensions corresponding to the balance
of the five-year guaranteed period, excluding the dependents’ pension. (Emphasis added)
In deciding that death benefits should
not be denied to the wife who was married to the deceased retiree only after the
latter’s retirement, this Court in Dycaico
reasoned:
x x x In particular, the proviso was apparently intended to prevent sham marriages or those contracted by persons solely to enable one spouse to claim benefits upon the anticipated death of the other spouse.
x x
x However, classifying dependent spouses and determining their entitlement to
survivor’s pension based on whether the marriage was contracted before or after
the retirement of the other spouse, regardless of the duration of the said
marriage, bears no relation to the achievement of the policy objective of the
law, i.e., “provide meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries
against the hazard of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death and other
contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden.” x x x[14]
That said, the reckoning point in determining
the beneficiaries of the deceased Antonio should be the time of his death. There is
no need to look into the time of his retirement, as was the course followed by
the SSC in resolving the claim of respondent. We note, however, that considering the
circumstances of this case, the Dycaico
ruling does not substantially affect the determination of Antonio’s
beneficiaries.
The SS Law clearly and expressly
provides who are the qualified beneficiaries entitled to receive benefits from
the deceased:
“Section
8. Terms Defined. – For the purposes
of this Act, the following terms shall, unless the context indicates otherwise,
have the following meanings:
x x x x
(e) Dependents – The dependents shall be the following:
(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;
(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and
(3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.
x x x x
(k)
Beneficiaries – The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent
legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children, who
shall be the primary beneficiaries of the member: Provided, That the dependent
illegitimate children shall be entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the share of
the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children: Provided, further,
That in the absence of the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted
children of the member, his/her dependent illegitimate children shall be
entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of the benefits. In their absence, the dependent parents who
shall be the secondary beneficiaries of the member. In the absence of all of the foregoing, any
other person designated by the member as his/her secondary beneficiary.
As found by both the SSC and the CA,
the divorce obtained by respondent against the deceased Antonio was not binding
in this jurisdiction. Under Philippine
law, only aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according
to their national law.[15] The divorce was obtained by respondent Gloria
while she was still a Filipino citizen and thus covered by the policy against
absolute divorces. It did not sever her
marriage ties with Antonio.
However, although respondent was the
legal spouse of the deceased, We find that she is still disqualified to be his primary beneficiary under the SS Law. She fails to fulfill the requirement of
dependency upon her deceased husband Antonio.
Social Security System v. Aguas[16] is instructive in determining the
extent of the required “dependency” under the SS Law. In Aguas,
the Court ruled that although a husband and wife are obliged to support each
other, whether one is actually dependent for support upon the other cannot be
presumed from the fact of marriage alone.[17]
Further, Aguas
pointed out that a wife who left her family until her husband died and lived
with other men, was not dependent
upon her husband for support, financial or otherwise, during the entire period.
Said
the Court:
In a parallel case involving a claim for benefits under the GSIS law, the Court defined a dependent as “one who derives his or her main support from another. Meaning, relying on, or subject to, someone else for support; not able to exist or sustain oneself, or to perform anything without the will, power, or aid of someone else.” It should be noted that the GSIS law likewise defines a dependent spouse as “the legitimate spouse dependent for support upon the member or pensioner.” In that case, the Court found it obvious that a wife who abandoned the family for more than 17 years until her husband died, and lived with other men, was not dependent on her husband for support, financial or otherwise, during that entire period. Hence, the Court denied her claim for death benefits.
The obvious conclusion then is that
a wife who is already separated de facto
from her husband cannot be said to be “dependent for support” upon the husband,
absent any showing to the contrary.
Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife were still living
together at the time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was
dependent on the husband for support, unless it is shown that she is capable of
providing for herself.[18]
Respondent herself admits that she
left the conjugal abode on two (2) separate occasions, to live with two
different men. The first was in 1965,
less than one year after their marriage, when she contracted a second
marriage to Domingo Talens. The second
time she left Antonio was in 1983 when she went to the US, obtained a divorce,
and later married an American citizen.
In fine, these uncontroverted facts remove
her from qualifying as a primary beneficiary of her deceased husband.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED and the appealed
Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Social Security
Commission is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 8-14. CA-G.R. SP No. 70891. Penned by Associate Justice Arsenio J. Magpale, with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Bienvenido L. Reyes, concurring.
[2] Records, p. 11.
[3]
[4] Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1161, as amended by
R.A. No. 8282, known as the Social Security Act of 1997,
[5] Rollo, pp. 42-48.
[6]
[7]
[8] See note 4.
[9] Rollo,
pp. 46-47.
[10]
[11]
[12] G.R.
No. 161357,
[13] The Social Security Law, as amended, see note 4.
[14] Dycaico v. Social Security System, supra note 12, at 553.
[15] Llorente v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
124371,
[16] G.R.
No. 165546,
[17] Social Security System v. Aguas, id.
[18]