ERIC L. LEE, G.R. No. 164648
Petitioner,
Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Chico-Nazario,
Nachura, and
Reyes, JJ.
HON. HENRY J. TROCINO,
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SIXTH
JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 62,
EX OFFICIO SHERIFF OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SIXTH
JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 62, Promulgated:
M. PEÑA,
Respondents.
August 6, 2008
x
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This
petition for review on certiorari assails the March 19, 2004 Decision[1] and
July 27, 2004 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65023, dismissing the petition for indirect
contempt filed against private respondent Magdaleno M. Peña as well as the petition
for prohibition and certiorari instituted to enjoin the Regional Trial Court of
Bago City, Branch 62, from further proceeding with Civil Case Nos. 754 and 1088.
On March
1, 1996, Peña filed before the Regional Trial Court of Bago City a complaint
(docketed as Civil Case No. 754) for recovery of agent’s compensation,
expenses, damages and attorney’s fees against Urban Bank, Inc. (Urban Bank), its
board of directors and officers, namely: Teodoro Borlongan (Borlongan); Delfin
Gonzales, Jr. (Gonzales); Benjamin de Leon (de Leon); Siervo Dizon; herein
petitioner Eric Lee (Lee); Ben Lim, Jr.; Corazon Bejasa (Bejasa); and Arturo
Manuel, Jr. On
WHEREFORE, premised from the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the
following amounts:
1. P24,000,000.00
as compensation for plaintiff’s services plus the legal rate of interest from
the time of demand until fully paid;
2. P3,000,000.00
as reimbursement of plaintiff’s expenses;
3. P1,000,000.00
as and for attorney’s fees;
4. P500,000
as exemplary damages;
5. Costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.[3]
On
The appeal
from the trial court’s decision was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 65756 in the
Court of Appeals.
On
Thus, Lee and
his co-defendants de Leon and Gonzales filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55667) which issued on November 9,
1999, a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining the implementation of the October
29, 1999 Special Order and writ of execution.
On
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Special
Order and writ of execution both dated
Respondents are directed to desist from further
implementing the writ of execution and to lift the garnishment and levy made
pursuant thereto.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Peña filed
a motion for reconsideration which was granted.
Thus, on
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of respondent
Magdaleno M. Peña is GRANTED. Accordingly, this Court’s decision dated
SO ORDERED.[9]
Lee, de
Leon and Gonzales moved for reconsideration, but it was denied by the appellate
court in its Resolution[10] dated
WHEREFORE, petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration is
DENIED for lack of merit, while the Supplemental Motions for Reconsideration
are DENIED for being filed out of time and for lack of merit.
Respondent Magdaleno M. Peña is directed to post, within
five (5) days from notice, an indemnity bond in the amount of P15,000,000.00 to
answer for the damages which petitioners may suffer in case of reversal on
appeal of the trial court’s decision.
Finally, the Office of the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the
Regional Trial Court, Sixth Judicial Region (Branch 62, Bago City), is directed
to furnish this Court, within five (5) days from notice, with copies of the
returns of its proceedings on the execution pending appeal of the trial court’s
decision, together with copies of the corresponding notices of levy/garnishment
and execution sales, certificates of sale and other pertinent documents.
SO ORDERED.[11]
On October
31, 2000, however, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution[12]
staying the execution of the trial court’s Decision dated May 28, 1999 conditioned
upon posting a supersedeas bond in the amount of P40 million.
Peña moved
for reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution[13]
dated
WHEREFORE, respondent Magdaleno M. Peña’s Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motions are DENIED for lack of merit, while
his motions for extension of time to file an indemnity bond are GRANTED in that
he is given an extension expiring on
The supersedeas bond (PGA Bond No. HO-63671-200) dated
October 27, 2000 in the sum of Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) posted by
Prudential Guarantee and Assurance Corporation, with petitioners Benjamin L. de
Leon, Delfin C. Gonzalez, Jr. and Eric L. Lee as principals, is APPROVED. Accordingly, execution pending appeal of the
trial court’s judgment against said petitioners is STAYED.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Previously,
or sometime in 1999 and 2000, Peña, pursuant to the Special Order and Writ of
Execution, had caused the levy and sale by public auction of some of Urban Bank
and its co-defendants’ properties, including the shares of stock of Lee in EQL
Properties, Inc. (EQLPI). Peña then sought
to transfer Lee’s shares in his (Peña’s) name, but the EQLPI Corporate
Secretary refused to act on the request.
Thus, on
Claiming
that Civil Case No. 1088 was filed to enforce the Special Order and Writ of
Execution which were covered by the Stay Order, Lee moved to dismiss the same,
but the trial court denied the motion. Instead
of filing an Answer, Lee filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action
(docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65023), for indirect contempt against Peña and the
sheriff for alleged contumacious disobedience to the lawful order of the appellate
court in CA-G.R. SP No. 55667, and a petition for prohibition and certiorari against
all the herein respondents to annul and set aside the proceedings in Civil Case
No. 1088, and to prohibit the trial court, in Civil Case No. 754, from further
proceeding with the implementation of the Special Order and the Writ of
Execution.
Incidentally,
on December 7, 2000, or prior to the filing of CA-G.R. SP No. 65023 before the
Court of Appeals on June 5, 2001, Lee and his co-defendants Delfin Gonzales,
Jr. and Benjamin de Leon, had filed a Petition for Review (docketed as G.R. No.
145822) with this Court.[16] Citing the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 65023, and
claiming that the subject matter and reliefs sought therein are the same as
those in G.R. No. 145822, Peña moved to dismiss the said petition (G.R. No.
145822) on the ground of forum-shopping. However, in a Resolution[17]
dated
Meanwhile,
as a result of the levy and sale at auction of Lee’s personal properties,[18] Peña
moved (in Branch 62) for the cancellation and transfer of some of these
properties in his name and in that of his assignees.[19] Previous orders of the trial court (dated
September 1, 2000 and December 4, 2000) likewise directing the cancellation and
transfer of the stock certificates went unheeded, specifically with respect to Lee’s
Manila Polo Club, Inc. and Tagaytay Highlands International Golf Club, Inc.
shares of stock. The trial court, acting
upon Peña’s motion, issued on
On January
3, 2001, the trial court issued an Order[21] directing
the Manila Golf and Country Club, Inc., under pain of contempt, to comply with the
court’s Orders dated October 4, 2000 and December 20, 2000 ordering the
Corporate Secretary thereof to cancel Stock Certificate No. 2395 in the name of
Lee and to transfer the same in the name of Sylvia Ting, who appears to be the
successful bidder in the execution sale of said Manila Golf share.
On
On
WHEREFORE, the dispositive portions of the orders of this
court dated
(A) To cancel the
stock certificates covering the shares described in the orders dated October
31, 2000, in the names of Delfin C. Gonzalez, Jr., Eric L. Lee and Teodoro C.
Borlongan, and to effect the transfer of said shares of stocks in the names of
the following purchasers at the public auction sale conducted on October 30,
2000, to wit:
ATTY. MAGDALENO M. PEÑA
a. One (1)
share of stock in the name of Teodoro C. Borlongan in Subic Bay Yacht Club;
b. 30,585
shares of stocks in D.C. Gonzalez, Jr., Inc. at P20.00 per share in the name of
Delfin C. Gonzalez, Jr.;
c. 60,757
shares of stocks in EQL Properties, Inc. at P20.00 per share in the name of
Eric Q. Lee.
MR. RAMON P. EREÑETA
a. Ten (10)
shares of stocks in D.C. Gonzalez, Jr., Inc. at P50.00 per share in the name of
Delfin C. Gonzalez, Jr.;
b. Ten (10)
shares of stocks in EQL Properties, Inc. at P50.00 per share in the name of
Eric Q. Lee;
MR. ROBERTO A. DEMIGILLO
a. Ten (10)
shares of stocks in D.C. Gonzalez, Jr., Inc. at P50.00 per share in the name of
Delfin C. Gonzalez, Jr.;
b. Ten (10)
shares of stocks in EQL Properties, Inc. at P50.00 per share in the name of
Eric Q. Lee;
MR. NOEL M. MALAYA
a. Ten (10)
shares of stocks in EQL Properties, Inc. at P50.00 per share in the name of
Eric Q. Lee;
b. Ten (10)
shares of stocks in D.C. Gonzalez, Jr., Inc. at P50.00 per share in the name of
Delfin C. Gonzalez, Jr.;
MR. DEMETRIO M. VINSON, JR.
a. Ten (10)
shares of stocks in EQL Properties, Inc. at P50.00 per share in the name of
Eric Q. Lee;
b. Ten (10)
shares of stocks in D.C. Gonzalez, Jr., Inc. at P50.00 per share in the name of
Delfin C. Gonzalez, Jr.;
(B) To supply
and provide the said purchasers thru their counsel within three (3) days from
receipt of this order the following data: stock certificate number, if any,
date of acquisition of the shares; cost of acquisition; and transfer fees paid,
if any, for each share; and
(C) To inform
this court in writing within ten (10) days from notice of compliance with (A)
and (B) above, and to show to the Clerk of Court of this Court the
corresponding Stock and Transfer Book reflecting the cancellation and transfer
of aforesaid, within the same period.
SO ORDERED.[24]
On
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the
SO ORDERED.[30]
On
Lee filed
a motion for reconsideration but it was denied; hence the instant petition
raising the following assignment of errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN:
1) RULING
THAT THE PETITIONER ENGAGED IN FORUM-SHOPPING;
2) FAILING TO
CITE RESPONDENTS FOR INDIRECT CONTEMPT FOR WILLFUL AND CONTUMACIOUS VIOLATIONS
OF THE INJUNCTIVE STAY ORDERS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA G.R. SP 55667;
3) FAILING TO
ANNUL THE CONTUMACIOUS ACTS OF EXECUTION BY RESPONDENT JUDGE AND RESPONDENT
SHERIFF; AND
4) FAILING TO
PROHIBIT RESPONDENT JUDGE AND RESPONDENT SHERIFF FROM PROCEEDING WITH THE ACTS
OF EXECUTION THAT VIOLATED THE INJUNCTIVE AND STAY ORDERS OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS.[32]
Sometime
in 2000, Urban Bank filed a disbarment suit[33] against
Peña. In its complaint, the bank cited
the following material facts, which shed factual light upon the instant case:
3. Last
4. To fully
implement the abovementioned condition, ISC engaged the services of herein
Respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña. This
was communicated by ISC to Respondent in a Memorandum dated
5. Respondent
accepted the engagement of his services by ISC and he proceeded to take the
necessary steps to evict the occupants of the property subject of the sale.
6. During the
eviction process, Complainant was informed by ISC and Respondent about the
necessity of a letter of authority in favor of the latter, granting him the
authority to represent Complainant in maintaining possession of the aforesaid
property and to represent Complainant in any court action that may be
instituted in connection with the exercise of said duty.
7. Complainant
acceded to the request and issued a letter-authority dated
8. Subsequently
however, Respondent requested for a modification of said letter of authority by
furnishing Complainant with a draft containing the desired wordings (including
the date, i.e.,
9. If only to
expedite and facilitate matters, Complainant willingly obliged and re-issued a
new letter of authority to Respondent, this time incorporating some of
Respondent’s suggestions. Thus it came
to pass that the actual letter of authority was dated
10. Eventually,
the eviction of the occupants of the property in question was successfully
carried out. After the lapse of more than thirteen (13) months, Respondent
filed a collection suit against herein Complainant and its senior officers “for
recovery of agent’s compensation and expenses, damages and attorney’s fees”, on
the strength of the letter of authority issued by Atty. Bejasa and Mr. Manuel,
Jr. A copy of the complaint filed by
herein Respondent with the Bago City Regional Trial Court is attached hereto
and made an integral part hereof as Annex “G”.
11. The act of
Respondent in securing the letter of authority from Complainant, ostensibly for
the purpose of convincing the occupants sought to be evicted that he was duly
authorized to take possession of the property and then using the same letter as
basis for claiming agent’s compensation, expenses and attorney’s fees from
Complainant, knowing fully well the circumstances surrounding the issuance of
said letter of authority, constitutes deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said provision
enumerates the grounds for the suspension and disbarment of lawyers, namely:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court,
on what grounds, - A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath of which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court or for corruptly
or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without any
authority to do so. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.[34]
Peña, in
his Comment to the disbarment complaint, alleged that Urban Bank,
through
its duly authorized officers, engaged his services to rid the property of
tenants and intruders in the course of a telephone conversation. He added that there was no reason for him to
deceive complainant into writing a letter of authority because he knew very
well that the verbal agreement was sufficient to constitute an attorney-client
relationship. The request for a letter
of authority, according to him, was “merely to formalize the engagement.”
Lastly, he argued that the complainant accepted the benefits of his service,
just as it never disclaimed that he was acting in its behalf during the period
of engagement.[35]
The Commission
on Bar Discipline of the IBP made the following findings of fact and recommendation,
which was adopted by the Court, to wit:
[T]he
complainant (plaintiff) in RTC Bago City Civil Case is the respondent in the
present case which only showed that to get even with the respondent,
complainant instituted the present case as leverage for respondent’s complaint
in the civil case. The complainant in
the RTC Bago City Civil case is the respondent in the present case and
vice-versa; therefore there was no institution by the same party for remedies
in different fora which negates forum shopping.
The fact remains however that complainant never contested
the actuations done by the respondent to rid its property from tenants and
intruders; and even executed a letter of authority in favor of respondent dated
Nevertheless, it is not for this Office to determine who
should pay the respondent for this is a matter not within its jurisdiction but
for the proper court to do so.
The only issue for resolution of this Office is whether or
not respondent committed malpractice, deceit and gross misconduct in the
practice of his profession as member of the bar.
The evidence on record showed that respondent successfully
performed his task of evicting the tenants and intruders in the property in
question. More so, no less than Senior
Vice-President Corazon Bejasa was very thankful for his job well done.
Complainant benefited from respondent’s task and for a
period of fifty (50) days no behest or complaint was received by the respondent
from the complainant. It was only when
payment for his legal services was demanded that complainant re-acted when it
is incumbent upon the benefactor of services that just compensation should be
awarded.
It is but just and proper that if refusal to pay just
compensation ensues in any transaction, the proper remedy is to institute an
action before the proper court and such actuation of the respondent herein did
not constitute deceit, malpractice or gross misconduct.
In view of the foregoing, the Undersigned hereby
recommends that the complaint against Atty. Magdaleno Peña be dismissed for
lack of merit.[36]
Based on
the foregoing findings and recommendation, the Court dismissed the disbarment
case, thus:
From the record and evidence before us, we agree with the
commissioner’s conclusion that respondent cannot be found guilty of the charges
against him. Apart from the allegations
it made in various pleadings, complainant has not proferred any proof tending
to show that respondent really induced it, through machination or other
deceitful means, to issue the December 19 letter of authority ostensibly for
the purpose of evicting illegal occupants, then using the very same letter for
demanding agent’s compensation. During the scheduled hearing, it did not
introduce a single witness to testify apropos the circumstance under which the
letter was dispatched. Those who signed
and issued the letter, Corazon M. Bejasa and Arturo E. Manuel Jr., were never
presented before the investigating commissioner to substantiate its assertion
that the letter it gave to the respondent was only “for show,” and for a
purpose which is limited in scope.
Similarly, not even the sworn statements from these or other vital
witnesses were attached to the memorandum or the other pleadings it
submitted. It is one thing to allege
deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct, and another to demonstrate by evidence
the specific acts constituting the same.
To be sure, no evidence in respect of the supposed deceit,
malpractice or gross misconduct was adduced by the complainant. It is axiomatic that he who alleges the same
has the onus of validating it. In
disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the complainant and this
Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if the former establishes its
case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. In this regard, we find
that complainant failed to meet the required standard.
In an effort to lend credence to its claim that there was
no contractual relation between them, complainant attempted to establish that
the legal services of the respondent was engaged, not by it, but by the seller
of the lot, Isabela Sugar Company. This
should presumably settle any doubt that the December 19 letter was only to be
used by respondent for the purpose of supervising the eviction of the occupants
of the property and protecting it from intruders, and nothing more. To support this, it submitted correspondence
coming from people who appear to be responsible officers of ISC (one from
Enrique Montilla III, and another from Julie Abad and Herman Ponce) informing
respondent of the engagement of his services by the ISC. These letters, though, cannot by themselves
be accorded strong probative weight in the face of respondent’s emphatic
assertion that he has never seen any of these documents. Likewise, they do not
indicate that copies thereof were received by him or by any authorized person
in his behalf. It bears stressing that
they do not carry his signature, nor the time or date he took possession of
them. It follows that they cannot be
used to bind and prejudice the respondent absent any showing that he had actual
and ample knowledge of their contents.
Lastly, complainant seems to belabor under the mistaken
assumption that the basis of the respondent in instituting the civil case
against it was the December 19 letter of authority. Well to point out, the suit was grounded on
an oral contract of agency purportedly entered into between him and the
complainant, represented by its duly authorized officers. This is evident from the averments embodied
in the Complaint filed with the Bago City Trial Court x x x.
It is clear from the above that what respondent was trying
to enforce were the terms and conditions of the contract. The letter, from his own admission, just
served to officially confirm a done deal.
It was, hence, utilized solely as documentary evidence to buttress
respondent’s assertion regarding the existence of the agency agreement. In fact, the amount of compensation (to the
tune of 10% of the market value of the property) he was recovering in the
action was never mentioned in the letter, but apparently settled in the course
of an oral conversation. Indeed,
respondent, with or without the letter, could have instituted a suit against
the complainant. There is no gainsaying
that a verbal engagement is sufficient to create an attorney-client
relationship.
In sum, we find that, under the premises, respondent can
hardly be faulted and accused of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct for
invoking the aid of the court in recovering recompense for legal services which
he claims he undertook for the complainant, and which the latter does not deny
to have benefited from. Indeed, what he
did was a lawful exercise of a right.[37] (Emphasis
supplied)
From the
above decision in the disbarment case, the Court accordingly found the
existence of an attorney-client relationship between Peña and Urban Bank,
giving ground to the former to collect fees on account of services he rendered in
an ejectment case. It is precisely upon
this argument that Peña had initiated Civil Case No. 754 for the recovery of
compensation for his legal services. Civil
Case No. 1088, on the other hand, is an offshoot of the enforcement of the trial
court’s award in Civil Case No. 754.
In his
first assignment of error, Lee denies engaging in forum-shopping when he filed CA-G.R.
SP No. 65023 during the pendency of G.R. No. 145822, citing the Court’s
Resolution of
Lee also contends
that in view of the injunctive pronouncement in the dispositive portion of the
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Special
Order and Writ of Execution both dated October 29, 1999 are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.
Respondents are
directed to desist from further implementing the Writ of Execution and to lift
the garnishment and levy made pursuant thereto.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
private respondent Peña and
the sheriff of Bago City Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, committed indirect
contempt in proceeding with the 1999 and 2000 garnishment, levy and auction
sales of Lee and his co-defendants’ properties. Lee argues that the sheriff and Peña –
engaged
in a pattern of disobedience calculated to defy, circumvent, evade, resist and
render futile and ineffective the injunctive and stay orders of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55667.[38]
Lee claims
that the October 31, 2000 Stay Order of the Court of Appeals subsisted at the
time of the levy and sale on execution; that under Section 4, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, the injunction contained in the January 12, 2000 Decision was
immediately executory and by it, the trial court was decreed to enjoin further
execution or implementation of the Special Order and Writ of Execution
“effective continuously from November 9, 1999 up to the present.”[39]
Furthermore,
Lee insists that the Amended Decision (which set aside the January 12, 2000
Decision) has not achieved finality on account of the timely filing of his
motion for reconsideration; thus the January 12, 2000 Decision remained valid
and effective, and the trial court, sheriff and Peña were enjoined from further
implementing the Writ of Execution.
Finally,
Lee argues that the appellate court committed grave error in its failure to annul
and prohibit the “acts of execution” already carried out.
In the
main, Lee would have this Court, in Civil Case No. 754, enjoin, annul and set
aside the entire execution process, as well as declare respondents guilty of indirect
contempt for proceeding with the levy and execution sale of his personal properties
in violation of the Stay Order. In Civil
Case No. 1088, he claims that EQLPI cannot be compelled to transfer his (Lee’s)
share to Peña’s name due to the nullity of the execution process in Civil Case
No. 754. Verily, a resolution of the
issues raised in Civil Case No. 754 will affect the resolution of the issues
raised in Civil Case No. 1088.
On the
issue of forum-shopping, we find that the appellate court disregarded our
ruling in G.R. No. 145822, given the denial therein of Peña’s motion to dismiss
on precisely that ground. The Court has
ruled before on this issue; it should now be considered settled.
We find no
merit in the rest of Lee’s assigned errors.
When the appellate
court promulgated the
The
Amended Decision effectively reinstated the trial court’s Special Order allowing
execution pending appeal. Consequently,
there is no merit in Lee’s insistence that the injunction of such execution
pending appeal continues (under the
Likewise,
Lee’s argument that the January 12, 2000 Decision was immediately executory and
the trial court was thus directed to enjoin further implementation of the
Special Order and Writ of Execution “effective continuously from
Under the
Rules of Court, discretionary execution, like execution pending appeal, may be
stayed only upon approval by the proper court of a sufficient supersedeas bond
filed by the party against whom it is directed, conditioned upon the
performance of the judgment or order allowed to be executed in case it shall be
finally sustained in whole or in part.[43]
Lee’s
contention, that the filing and pendency of the Motion for Reconsideration of
the Amended Decision, has the effect of staying the enforcement of the same,[44]
thereby reinstating the injunction aspect
of the
There is
likewise no merit in Lee’s claim that the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue
the Special Order allowing execution pending appeal and the Writ of Execution since
it had already lost jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of his (Lee’s)
appeal. Under the Rules of Court, in
appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon
the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties,[46]
and not just the plaintiff’s or defendant’s.
In the
instant case, the trial court decision was issued on
Nor can we
attribute a willful attempt by the trial court to delay the transmittal of the records
of the case to the appellate court. When
a motion for execution pending appeal is filed within the reglementary period
for perfecting an appeal, the court must hear and resolve the motion for it
would become part of the records to be elevated on appeal. Since the court has jurisdiction to act on the
motion at the time it was filed, said jurisdiction continues until the matter is
resolved and is not lost by the subsequent action of the opposing party.[49]
Petitioner
Lee’s claim that since the sheriff’s return of November 15, 1999 stated that
the Writ of Execution had been “duly implemented,” which means that the
judgment had been satisfied in full, thereby prohibiting further execution of
the judgment is without merit. The
phrase simply means that the writ had been implemented, not necessarily that
judgment had been satisfied in full.
When Lee
seeks the annulment and setting aside of the levy and sale on execution of his
personal properties in Civil Case No. 754 in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 65023,
he has placed the entire execution process under review by this Court, and
necessarily so, since we cannot determine the propriety of the pendency of
Civil Case No. 1088 without settling the execution issue in Civil Case No. 754.
In other words, we cannot allow Civil
Case No. 1088 to proceed if the execution process in Civil Case No. 754 were to
be invalidated.
We agree with the appellate court’s
ratiocination in CA-G.R. SP No. 55667 that there is good ground to order
execution pending appeal. Records show
that on
Barring
any irregularity in the execution process in Civil Case No. 754, we find no cogent
reason to allow the dismissal of Civil Case No. 1088, much less an indirect
contempt charge against the respondents to prosper. By his own inaction, Lee failed to participate
in the execution sale or to timely post a supersedeas bond to stay execution of
the trial court’s decision. This
eleventh-hour attempt to salvage and correct that which has been caused by his
own undoing, is in vain. Notwithstanding
his victory in the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 65756,[52]
he could no longer recover the personal properties sold at execution sale, except
only upon Peña’s indemnity bond. Since
there is no right to redeem personal property, the rights of ownership are
vested to the purchaser at the foreclosure (or execution) sale and are not
entangled in any suspensive condition that is implicit in a redemptive period.[53]
Nowhere is
the foregoing more evident than in Lee’s Reply to Peña’s Comment,[54] where
the former seems to impress us with the notion that Peña’s independent suit
(Civil Case No. 1088) to secure the transfer of EQLPI certificates of stock in
his name must be considered to be still part of the execution proceedings in
Civil Case No. 754, which must be enjoined as well. But it is not. Upon the sale of personal property on
execution, all ownership and proprietary rights leave the judgment debtor and become
vested in the purchaser,[55]
and the judgment debtor may no longer recover the same by redemption, to which
he has no right. As the new owners of
the shares of stock in EQLPI, Manila Polo Club, Manila Golf and Country Club,
Sta. Elena Golf and Country Club, and Tagaytay Highlands International Golf
Club, Peña, his assignees, as well as the other purchasers at the execution
sale where these shares were sold, are entitled – without delay – to transfer
said shares in their name and exercise ownership over the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The March 19, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65023, dismissing the petition for indirect contempt and
the petition for prohibition and certiorari instituted to enjoin the Regional
Trial Court of Bago City, Branch 62, from further proceeding with Civil Case
Nos. 754 and 1088, as well as the July 27, 2004 Resolution denying the motion
for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 62-74; penned by Associate
Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices
Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Regalado E. Maambong.
[2]
[3] CA
rollo, Vol. I, p. 166; penned by
Judge Edgardo L. Catilo.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
Entitled “Magdaleno Peña v. EQL Properties, Inc., Eric Lee, et al.”
[16] Entitled “Delfin Gonzales, Jr. v.
Magdaleno Peña.”
[17] Rollo, pp. 369-370.
[18]
Which, apart from EQLPI shares, consisted of shares of stock in Manila Polo
Club, Manila Golf and Country Club, Sta. Elena Golf and Country Club and
Tagaytay Highlands International Golf Club.
[19] Rollo, pp. 193-195.
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
Appeal from the May 28, 1999 Decision as well as the October 29, 1999 Special
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Bago City, Branch 62 in Civil Case No. 754
for recovery of agent’s commission and expenses, damages and attorney’s fees;
entitled “Magdaleno M. Peña v. Urban Bank, Inc., Atty. Manuel R. Singson, Atty.
Allan B. Gepty, Teodoro C. Borlongan, Corazon C. Bejasa, Arturo Manuel, Jr.,
Ben Y. Lim, Jr., P. Siervo H. Dizon,
Atty. Gilbert T. Reyes, Atty. Jaime G. Hofileña, Atty. Nick Emmanuel C.
Villaluz, Benjamin L. De Leon, Delfin C. Gonzalez, Jr., Eric L. Lee, Atty. Luis
A. Verz Cruz, Atty. Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.,
Atty. Gilbert D. Gallos, and Atty. Remegio Michael A. Ancheta II.”
[27]
Petition for Indirect Contempt filed by Peña entitled “Magdaleno M. Peña v.
Urban Bank, Inc., Benjamin L. De Leon, Delfin C. Gonzalez, Jr., Eric L. Lee,
Teodoro C. Borlongan, Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo Manuel, Jr., Ben Y. Lim, Jr.,
and Siervo P. Hizon.”
[28]
Should read as
[29] Should
read as
[30] Rollo, p. 411.
[31]
For Indirect Contempt for alleged contumacious disobedience to the lawful order
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55667 and for Prohibition and
Certiorari to prohibit respondent Judge from further proceeding in Civil Case
Nos. 754 and 1088 relative to the alleged premature implementation of the
execution pending appeal and despite the stay order of the Court of Appeals.
[32] Rollo, p. 28.
[33] Urban Bank, Inc. v. Peña, A.C. No. 4863,
September 7, 2001, 364 SCRA 597; penned by now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
and concurred in by then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and Associate
Justices Santiago M. Kapunan, Bernardo P. Pardo and Consuelo Ynares-Santiago.
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38] Rollo, p. 34.
[39]
[40] Imperial v. De la Cruz, 153 Phil. 697 (1973).
[41]
The TRO was issued on
[42]
[43]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 39, Sec. 3.
[44] Rollo, p. 22.
[45]
[46]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 41, Sec. 9, par. (3).
[47]
[48]
[49] Cebu Contractors Consortium Company v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 98046, December 14, 1992, 216 SCRA 597, 601.
[50] Rollo, pp. 156-157.
[51] Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation v.
Malayan Insurance Company, Inc., G.R. No. 143933, February 14, 2003, 397
SCRA 431.
[52]
The decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 65756 (November 6, 2003) failed to take into
account our pronouncement in Urban Bank,
Inc. v. Peña (September 7, 2001), where we found the existence of an
attorney-client relationship between Urban Bank and Peña, albeit the matter of
who is obligated to pay the latter was left unresolved.
[53] Paray v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 132287, January
24, 2006, 479 SCRA 571, 580.
[54] Rollo, p. 448.
[55] Paray v. Rodriguez, supra at 579.