Republic of the
Supreme Court
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HEIRS OF THE
DECEASED SPOUSES |
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G.R. No. 162886 |
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VICENTE S.
ARCILLA and JOSEFA |
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ASUNCION ARCILLA,
namely: |
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Aida Arcilla Alandan, Rene A. Arcilla, |
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Present: |
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Oscar A. Arcilla, Sarah A. Arcilla, and |
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Nora A. Arcilla, now deceased and |
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., |
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substituted by
her son Sharmy Arcilla, |
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Chairperson, |
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represented by
their attorney-in-fact, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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Sarah A. Arcilla, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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Petitioners, |
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NACHURA, and |
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REYES, JJ. |
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- versus - |
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MA. |
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Promulgated: |
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Respondent. |
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August 11, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the
The facts of the case
are as follows:
On
On
In their Opposition
dated August 19, 1996, petitioners contended that they are the
owners pro-indiviso of the subject lots
including the building and other improvements constructed thereon by virtue of
inheritance from their deceased parents, spouses Vicente and Josefa Arcilla; contrary to the
claim of respondent, the lots in question were owned by their father, Vicente,
having purchased the same from a certain Manuel Sarmiento
sometime in 1917; Vicente's ownership is evidenced by several tax declarations
attached to the record; petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest had been
in possession of the subject lots since 1906. Petitioners moved to dismiss the application
of respondent and sought their declaration as the true and absolute owners pro-indiviso of the subject lots and the registration and
issuance of the corresponding certificate of title in their names.
Subsequently, trial of the case
ensued.
On
Petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss Application[8] on the ground that
respondent should have filed the certificate against forum shopping
simultaneously with the petition for land registration which is a mandatory
requirement of SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94 and that any violation of
the said Circular shall be a cause for the dismissal of the application upon
motion and after hearing.
Opposing the motion to dismiss,
respondents asserted that the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss Application was
filed out of time; respondent's failure to comply with SC Administrative
Circular No. 04-94 was not willful, deliberate or intentional; and the Motion
to Dismiss was deemed waived for failure of petitioners to file the same during
the earlier stages of the proceedings.
On
On
NOW THEREFORE,
and considering all the above premises, the Court finds and so holds that
Applicant MA. LOURDES A. TEODORO, having sufficient title over this land
applied for hereby renders judgment, which should be, as it is hereby CONFIRMED
and REGISTERED in her name.
IT
IS SO ORDERED.[11]
Herein petitioners then filed an
appeal with the Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes. In its
Decision[12] dated
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision,
petitioners filed a Petition for Review[14]
with the CA. On
Hence, the herein petition based on
the following grounds:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals did
not rule in accordance with the prevailing rules and jurisprudence when it held
that the belated filing, after more than two (2) years and three (3) months
from the initial application for land registration, of a sworn certification against
forum shopping in Respondent's application for land registration, constituted
substantial compliance with SC Admin. Circular No. 04-94.
B. The
Honorable Court of Appeals did not rule in accordance with prevailing laws and
jurisprudence when it held that the certification of non-forum shopping
subsequently submitted by respondent does not require a certification from an
officer of the foreign service of the
C. The
Honorable Court of Appeals did not rule in accordance with prevailing laws and
jurisprudence when it upheld the decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
and Municipal Trial Court (MTC) that the lots in question were not really owned
by Petitioners' father Vicente S. Arcilla, contrary
to the evidence presented by both parties.
D. The
Honorable Court of Appeals did not rule in accordance with prevailing laws and
jurisprudence when it sustained the decision of the RTC which affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC and in not reversing the
same and rendering judgment in favor of Petitioners.[16]
In their Memorandum, petitioners further raise the following issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire into
conclusions of facts made by the Honorable Court of Appeals in the instant
Petition.[17]
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
The CA ruled correctly when it
held that the belated filing of a sworn certification of non-forum shopping was
substantial compliance with SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
Under the attendant circumstances in
the present case, the Court cannot uphold petitioners’ contention that
respondent's delay of more than two years and three months in filing the
required certificate of non-forum shopping may not be considered substantial
compliance with the requirements of SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94 and
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court; that respondent's reasons of oversight
and inadvertence do not constitute a justifiable circumstance that could excuse
her non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of the above-mentioned
Circular and Rule; that subsequent compliance with the requirement does not
serve as an excuse for a party's failure to comply in the first instance.
Section 5, Rule 7, of the Rules of
Court provides:
Sec.
5. Certification against forum shopping.
– The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or
other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he
has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same
issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is
such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action
or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five
(5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply
with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of
the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after
hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of
the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without
prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts
of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum
shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and
shall constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for administrative
sanctions.
This Rule was
preceded by Circular No. 28-91, which originally required the certification of
non-forum shopping for petitions filed with this Court and the CA; and SC Administrative
Circular No. 04-94, which extended the certification requirement for civil
complaints and other initiatory pleadings filed in all courts and other
agencies.
In Gabionza
v. Court of Appeals,[18]
this Court has held that Circular No. 28-91 was designed
to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly administration
of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of
procedure – which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.[19] The same guideline still applies in
interpreting what is now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[20]
The Court is fully aware that
procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded, for these
prescribed procedures insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.[21]
However, it is equally settled that
litigation is not merely a game of technicalities.[22]
Rules of procedure should be viewed as
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.[23]
Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed.[24]
Even the Rules of Court reflect this
principle.[25]
Moreover, the emerging trend in
our jurisprudence is to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for
the proper and just determination of his cause free from the constraints of technicalities.[26]
It must be kept
in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is
mandatory, nonetheless the requirement must not be interpreted too literally
and thus defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum
shopping.[27] In Uy
v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[28]
the Court ruled, thus:
The
admission of the petition after the belated filing of the certification,
therefore, is not unprecedented. In those cases where the Court excused
non-compliance with the requirements, there were special circumstances or
compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule clearly
unjustified. In the case at bar, the apparent merits of the substantive aspects
of the case should be deemed as a “special circumstance” or “compelling reason”
for the reinstatement of the petition. x x x[29]
Citing De Guia
v. De Guia[30]
the Court, in Estribillo v. Department of
Agrarian Reform,[31]
held that even if there was complete non-compliance with the rule on
certification against forum-shopping, the Court may still proceed to decide the
case on the merits pursuant to its inherent power to suspend its own rules on
grounds of substantial justice and apparent merit of the case.
In the instant case, the Court finds
that the lower courts did not commit any error in proceeding to decide the case
on the merits, as herein respondent was able to submit a certification of non-forum
shopping. More importantly, the apparent
merit of the substantive aspect of the petition for land registration filed by
respondent with the MTC coupled with the showing that she had no intention to
violate the Rules with impunity, as she was the one who invited the attention
of the court to the inadvertence committed by her counsel, should be deemed as
special circumstances or compelling reasons to decide the case on the merits.
In addition, considering that a
dismissal contemplated under Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court is, as a
rule, a dismissal without prejudice, and since there is no showing that
respondent is guilty of forum shopping, to dismiss respondent's petition for
registration would entail a tedious process of re-filing the petition,
requiring the parties to re-submit the pleadings which they have already filed
with the trial court, and conducting anew hearings which have already been
done, not to mention the expenses that will be incurred by the parties in re-filing
of pleadings and in the re-conduct of hearings. These would not be in keeping with the
judicial policy of just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.[32]
The certification of non-forum shopping executed in a
foreign country is not covered by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
There is no merit to petitioners’
contentions that the verification and certification subsequently submitted by
respondent did not state the country or city where the notary public exercised
her notarial functions; and that the MTC simply
concluded, without any basis, that said notary public was from Maryland, USA;
that even granting that the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping were notarized in the USA, the same may not be deemed admissible for
any purpose in the Philippines for failure to comply with the requirement of
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court that the notarized document must be
accompanied by a certificate issued by an officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines who is stationed in the country in which a record of the subject
document is kept, proving or authenticating that the person who notarized the
document is indeed authorized to do so and has custody of the same.
The Court
agrees with the disquisition of the CA, to wit:
From
the foregoing provision [referring to Section 24, Rule 132, Rules of Court], it
can be gathered that it does not include documents acknowledged before [a]
notary public abroad. For foreign public documents to be admissible for any
purpose here in our courts, the same must be certified by any officer of the
Philippine legation stationed in the country where the documents could be found
or had been executed. However, after judicious studies of the rule, Sec. 24,
Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court basically pertains to written official
acts, or records of the official of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country. This is so, as Sec. 24, Rule 132 explicitly refers only to paragraph
(a) of Sec. 19. If the rule comprehends to cover notarial
documents, the rule could have included the same. Thus, petitioners-oppositors' contention that the certificate of forum
shopping that was submitted was defective, as it did not bear the certification
provided under Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, is devoid of any merit.
What is important is the fact that the respondent-applicant certified before a
commissioned officer clothed with powers to administer oath that [s]he has not
and will not commit forum shopping.[33]
The ruling of the Court in Lopez v. Court of Appeals,[34] cited by
petitioners, is inapplicable to the present case because
the Rules of Evidence which were in effect at that time were the old Rules
prior to their amendment in 1989.
The
rule applied in Lopez, which was decided prior to the effectivity of the amended Rules of Evidence,[35] was Section
25, Rule 132, to wit:
Sec.
25. Proof of public or official record – An official record or an
entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record
is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country,
the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis
supplied)
When the Rules of Evidence were amended in 1989, Section 25, Rule 132
became Section 24, Rule 132; and the amendment consisted in the deletion of the
introductory phrase “An official record or an entry therein,” which was
substituted by the phrase “The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19.”
Thus, Section 24,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court now reads as follows:
Sec.
24. Proof of official record. - The
record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof
or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by
his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with
a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated
by the seal of his office. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 19(a)
of the same Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Classes of documents. - For the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public
documents are:
(a)
The written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines or of a foreign
country;
(b)
Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments;
and
(c)
Public records, kept in the
All
other writings are private.
It cannot be
overemphasized that the required certification of an officer in the foreign
service under Section 24 refers only to the documents enumerated in Section
19(a), to wit: written official acts or records of the official acts of
the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of
the
In Lopez, the requirements of then Section 25, Rule 132 were made
applicable to all public or official records without any distinction because
the old rule did not distinguish. However, in the present rule, it is clear
under Section 24, Rule 132 that its provisions shall be made applicable only to
the documents referred to under paragraph (a), Section 19, Rule 132.
The CA
did not err in sustaining the findings of fact and conclusion of law of the MTC
and the RTC.
Settled is the
rule that the trial court’s findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the
CA, are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.[36] There
are recognized exceptions to this rule, among which are: (1) the conclusion is
grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence
on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is
contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA
are contrary to the findings of the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA are beyond
the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions
of both parties.[37]
However, petitioners failed to show that any of the exceptions is present in
the instant case to warrant a review of the findings of fact of the lower
courts.
Petitioners insist that the
documents which were presented in evidence by respondent to prove her ownership
of the subject lot are rife with defects and inconsistencies. Petitioners
contend that the subject lot should not have been included in the Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of Jose Arcilla, because he
was no longer the owner of the said property at the time of said settlement;
the Deed of Sale should be declared null and void because the seller, Pacifico Arcilla, was not the
owner of the subject lands at the time the said Deed was executed; the
Affidavit of Quitclaim is not valid and has no force and effect considering
that the document indicates that the signatures of petitioners were affixed in
different places, none of which is in Virac, Catanduanes where they supposedly acknowledged said
document.
The only evidence of
petitioners to prove their claim that the disputed property was sold by Jose Arcilla to Manuel Sarmiento in
1908 is a single Tax Declaration in the name of the latter, with a notation
that the property was acquired by purchase.
The Court agrees with
the CA in its finding that petitioners failed to present any substantial
evidence, such as a deed of sale, to prove their claim that their predecessor,
Vicente Arcilla, bought the disputed property from Sarmiento. Petitioners
were only able to present tax declarations in Vicente's name to prove their
allegation that Vicente became the owner of the subject property. The tax declarations presented in evidence by
petitioners are not supported by any other substantial proofs.
The Court has ruled time and
again that tax declarations do not prove ownership but are at best an indicium of claims of ownership.[38] Payment of taxes is not proof of ownership,
any more than indicating possession in the concept of an owner.[39] Neither a tax receipt nor a declaration of
ownership for taxation purposes is evidence of ownership or of the right to
possess realty when not supported by other effective proofs.[40]
In addition, the Court agrees with the CA when it held that if Vicente,
in fact, owned the disputed properties, his widow, Josefa,
would not have agreed to include said lots among those partitioned in the
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Jose.
On the other hand,
respondent's claim of ownership is not only backed up by tax declarations but
also by other pieces of evidence such as the subject Extrajudicial Settlement,
Affidavit of Quitclaim, and Deed of Sale.
Petitioners
question the validity of the above-mentioned documents. However, as the CA, RTC
and MTC found, these documents are all notarized. It is settled that a notarized document is
executed to lend truth to the statements contained therein and to the
authenticity of the signatures.[41] Notarized documents enjoy the presumption of
regularity which can be overturned only by clear and convincing evidence.[42]
Petitioners' bare denials of the contents of the subject documents will not suffice to
overcome the presumption of their regularity considering that they are all
notarized. To overthrow such presumption
of regularity, the countervailing evidence must be clear, convincing and more
than merely preponderant, which petitioners failed to present.[43]
An examination of the subject
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate clearly shows that the disputed lot forms
part of the properties adjudicated in favor of Pacifico
Arcilla, respondent’s
predecessor-in-interest.
Moreover, petitioners themselves
admit that the Extrajudicial Settlement being referred to in the Affidavit of
Quitclaim executed by petitioner and her co-heirs is the Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of Jose
Arcilla and not of Vicente Arcilla.
An examination of the Affidavit of Quitclaim shows that the reference made
therein with respect to the date of execution of the said Extrajudicial
Settlement as well as the notary public who acknowledged the same and the
Document Number, Page Number, Book Number and Series Number all coincide with
those appearing in the document evidencing the Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate
of Jose Arcilla. Hence, what has been waived by petitioners is
their right, if any, to the properties mentioned in the said Affidavit of
Quitclaim, which includes the presently disputed lot.
Petitioners posit that they are not
bound by the subject Extrajudicial Settlement because they did not participate
in nor did they sign the document evidencing such settlement and that their
mother who signed on their behalf
was not, in fact, authorized to do so. However, the Court agrees with the ruling of
the RTC that the Extrajudicial Settlement is a public document, the same having
been notarized; that such document is entitled to full faith and credit in the
absence of competent evidence showing that its execution was tainted with
defects and irregularities which would warrant a declaration of
nullity; that in the absence of evidence showing that the person who signed in
behalf of herein petitioners was, in fact, not authorized to do so, the
presumption that she had the authority, as stated in the Extrajudicial
Settlement, remains undisturbed.
Moreover,
petitioners' execution of the subject Affidavit of Quitclaim is proof that they
have ratified the contents of the disputed Extrajudicial Settlement.
Petitioners' claim that
the Affidavit of Quitclaim is null and void on the ground that the signatories
thereto are not residents of Virac, Catanduanes and that they affixed their signature in places
other than Virac, Catanduanes
where they supposedly acknowledged the said document, is not persuasive. The Court finds no error in the finding of the
MTC, as affirmed by the CA, that the execution of the subject Affidavit of
Quitclaim or the signatures of the affiants appearing therein were never
contested nor raised as an issue and that petitioner Sarah Arcilla
herself acknowledged her own signature in the said Affidavit.
In any event, the law
does not require that parties to a document notarized by a notary public should
be residents of the place where the said document is acknowledged or that they
affix their signature in the presence of the notary public. What is necessary
is that the persons who signed a notarized document are the very same persons
who executed and personally appeared before the notary public in order to
attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.[44]
In the instant case, it is established that, with the exception of
petitioner Rene Arcilla, all of herein petitioners,
including their now deceased mother Josefa and sister
Nora, executed and personally acknowledged before the notary public the subject
Affidavit of Quitclaim. Hence, aside from Rene, the said Affidavit of Quitclaim
is valid and binding on all the petitioners.
With respect to Rene,
petitioner Oscar Arcilla, acting as his
attorney-in-fact, signed the document on the former’s
behalf. However, settled is the rule
that:
A
member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him. The acts of the affiants cannot be
delegated to anyone for what are stated therein are facts of which they have
personal knowledge. They should swear to the document personally and not
through any representative. Otherwise, their representative’s name should
appear in the said documents as the one who executed the same. That is the only
time the representative can affix his signature and personally appear before
the notary public for notarization of the said document. Simply put, the party
or parties who executed the instrument must be the ones to personally appear before
the notary public to acknowledge the document.[45]
Thus, the herein subject
Affidavit of Quitclaim may not be binding on Rene. Nonetheless, with or without Rene’s participation
in the quitclaim, respondent’s ownership of the subject lots has been
established by preponderance of evidence, as unanimously found by the MTC, the RTC
and the CA.
Finally, petitioners'
physical occupation of the commercial building which they erected on the disputed
property does not necessarily prove their ownership of the subject lots.
This Court has held
that:
ownership and possession are two
entirely different legal concepts. Just as possession is not a definite proof
of ownership, neither is non-possession inconsistent with ownership. The first
paragraph of Article 1498 of the Civil Code states that when the sale is made
through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the
delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. Possession, along
with ownership, is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of
conveyance. Thus, in light of the circumstances of the present case, it is of
no legal consequence that petitioner did not take actual possession or
occupation of the disputed lot after the execution of the deed of sale in her
favor because she was already able to perfect and complete her ownership of and
title over the subject property.[46] (Emphasis supplied)
The Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate in favor of Pacifico,
respondent’s predecessor-in-interest, the Affidavit of Quitclaim and the Deed
of Sale in favor of respondent establish respondent’s ownership over the
disputed property.
WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero with the concurrence of Justices Andres B.
Reyes, Jr. and Regalado E. Maambong;
rollo, p. 8.
[2]
[3] Annex
“I” to Petition, CA rollo, p. 114
[4] Annex
“H” to Petition, id. at 109.
[5] Annex
“J” to Petition, id. at 115.
[6] Entitled:
An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts , Amending for the Purpose Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129,
Otherwise Known as the “Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.”
[7] Annex
“D” to Petition, CA rollo, p. 99.
[8] Annex
“E” to Petition, id. at 102.
[9] Annex
“G” to Petition, id. at 107.
[10] Annex
“A” to Petition, id. at 73-87.
[11]
[12] Annex
“B” to Petition, id. at 88-97.
[13] Annex
“C” to Petition, id. at 98.
[14]
[15]
[16] Rollo, pp. 35-36.
[17]
[18] Gabionza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
112547,
[19] Manuel
v. Galvez, G.R. No. 147394,
[20] Estribillo v. Department of Agrarian Reform,
G.R. No. 159674, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 218, 233-234.
[21] Barnes
v. Padilla, G.R. No. 160753, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 533,538 citing Ginete v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127596,
September 24, 1988, 292 SCRA 38 and Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 152766, June 20, 2003, 404 SCRA 540.
[22] Barnes
v. Padilla, supra.
[23] Barnes
v. Padilla, supra at 541
[24]
[25]
[26] Anadon v. Herrera, G.R. No. 159153, July 9,
2007, 527 SCRA 90, 96-97; Villena v. Rupisan, G.R. No. 167620, April 4, 2007, 520 SCRA 346,
361.
[27] Varorient Shipping Co., Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 164940, November 28, 2007, 539 SCRA 131,
140.
[28] G.R.
No. 136100,
[29]
[30] G.R.
No. 135384,
[31] Supra
note 18.
[32] See
Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court.
[33] CA
Decision, rollo, p. 90.
[34] No.
L-77008,
[35] The
amendments to the Rules of Evidence were made effective on
[36] Sandejas v. Ignacio, Jr., G.R. No. 155033,
[37]
[38] Heirs
of Emilio Santioque v. Heirs of Emilio Calma, G.R. No. 160832, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 665,
682; Abing v. Waeyan,
G.R. No. 146294, July 31, 2006, 497 SCRA 202, 208-209.
[39]
[40]
[41] Llemos v. Llemos,
G.R. No. 150162,
[42]
[43] Tapuroc .v Loquellano Vda. de Mende, G.R.
No.152007,
[44] Fulgencio v. Martin, A.C. No. 3223,
[45] Bautista
v. Bernabe, A.C. No. 6963,
[46] Tating v. Marcella, G.R. No. 155208,