Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
HERBERT
SOLAS, |
G.R. No. 162332 |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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|
YNARES-SANTIAGO, |
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-versus- |
Chairperson, |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, |
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NACHURA, and |
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POWER & TELEPHONE |
REYES, JJ. |
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SUPPLY PHILS., INC., DERWIN
OTWELL,* PELAGIO BATTUNG, JR.*
AND FRANKLIN QUIACHON,* Respondents.** |
Promulgated: August 28, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
This
resolves the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated
The
antecedent facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.
On
P21,600.00,
excluding bonuses and commission.
On
Thus, on
On
In response, private
respondents maintained that there was no agreement, written or oral, which
talked of the grant of 10% commission on gross sales to sales agent, nor was
there a CBA on the matter. There was
even no CBA to speak of, since the company had no union, with its employees
numbering only to less than 10, all being fixed-salaried employees. The company
gave bonuses when there was an income, but these were purely on the liberality
of the company, subject to the availability of funds and profits. Besides, petitioner has actually no client of
his own from whom he could close sales, thus the claim for commission was
utterly baseless.
Private respondents
maintained also that the claim of petitioner that he was constructively dismissed, was without basis. Beginning
Private respondents
asserted further that neither the order directing petitioner to return the
company car, the issued cellular phone and keys, nor the deductions made on his
salary, could constitute as basis for his alleged constructive dismissal, all
allegations being baseless and without merit.
Thus, private respondents prayed for an order directing petitioner to
pay the latter's debt with the company, and an award amounting to P100,000.00 as attorney's fees, as well as the dismissal of
petitioner from employment.
The parties submitted
their position papers. On
“WHEREFORE, premises
considered, respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant the amount of
P892,780.37 as sales commission, and clearly
computed appearing as Annex “K-K1” and “K-3” of complainant's position
paper. Complainant is also entitled to
six (6) months backwages and separation pay of one
month for every year of service and 10% attorney's fees, as computed below by
the Research and Information Unit of the Commission:
x x
x x
SO
ORDERED.[2]
Respondents
appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which reversed and
set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter (LA). The NLRC ruled that that there was no
constructive dismissal in this case, because petitioner never resigned but
merely filed an indefinite sick leave, even admitting during the preliminary
hearings that he was still an employee of respondents, and his principal claim was
for payment of his sales commission.
Furthermore, the NLRC saw no badge of constructive dismissal in
respondents' action of applying petitioner's salary for the month of February
2000 as payment for his debts to the company amounting to P95,000.00. It was also
held that petitioner failed to establish that there was an agreement between
him and respondent employer for a 10% sales commission, and that he failed to
establish the origin and authenticity of the specific amount of the commission
being claimed by him.
Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Decision, but the same was
denied per Resolution dated
From
such adverse judgment, petitioner elevated his case to the CA via a
petition for certiorari. On
An
examination of the resolution of the public respondent shows no patent and
gross error amounting to grave abuse of discretion. In reversing the labor arbiter, public
respondent NLRC rightly held that petitioner Herbert Solas did not really quit from his employment, nor did he
involuntarily resign from his office.
What he did was merely to file an indefinite sick leave. As aptly observed by public respondent, if
indeed petitioner resigned from his post, he should have filed a resignation
letter, not an indefinite sick leave. His
contention that the non-payment of his salary for the month of February 2000
and onwards bolsters even more his claim of constructive dismissal,
is without merit. Petitioner has
outstanding loans with private respondent.
Thus, it is more logical to conclude that the reason why he did not
receive his salary for the month of February 2000, was due to the off-setting
made by the company of his cash advances amounting to about P95,000.00.
Anent the issue of 10%
commission, We find no sufficient basis to grant the
claim of petitioner, having no satisfactory evidence to prove his entitlement
thereto. What the petitioner did in this
case was merely to present a certificate of employment which merely confirms
the fact that he is an employee of the company and is receiving the amount
provided therein as his salary, exclusive of any bonuses and commission, and
nothing more. Consequently, we cannot
grant petitioner's claim of commission on the basis of the certificate of employment
alone. Assuming, arguendo,
that the certificate on its face speaks of petitioner's entitlement to
commission, then, the same, however, does not provide for its percentage. The records attest that petitioner has not
presented sufficient evidence to bolster his claim that he is entitled to a 10%
commission. His self-serving
allegations are not sufficient to justify the claim.[3] (Emphasis supplied)
In
its Decision promulgated on
Petitioner then filed the present
petition for review on certiorari, alleging that:
I.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED AND COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN
IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE NLRC FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO ILLEGAL
DISMISSAL.
II. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT
OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE NLRC DELETING THE VARIOUS MONEY CLAIM AWARDED IN
FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER.[5]
Respondents counter
by stressing that the NLRC Decision has become final and executory, and insists that the NLRC and the CA committed
no error in ruling that petitioner was not constructively dismissed.[6]
The Court finds the petition
unmeritorious.
However, at the outset, respondents
must be disabused of their belief that since no appeal may be
taken from the NLRC Decision, then the same can no
longer be altered. In Panuncillo v. CAP
Philippines, Inc.,[7] the Court
explained that:
x x x while under the sixth paragraph of Article
223 of the Labor Code, the decision of the NLRC becomes final and executory after
the lapse of ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties, the adverse party is not precluded from assailing it via Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals and then to this Court via
a Petition for Review under Rule 45. x x x[8]
(Emphasis supplied)
Rule 65
gives the adverse party, petitioner in this case, 60 days from the date of
receipt of the order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration within
which to file a petition for certiorari with the
CA. Thus, petitioner took the proper
procedural steps to question the NLRC Decision before the CA.
As to the merits of the petition, our
oft-repeated ruling, reiterated in Reyes v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[9] must be
emphasized, to wit:
x x x findings of facts of quasi-judicial bodies
like the NLRC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in due course, are
conclusive on this Court, which is not a trier of
facts.
x x x x
x x x
Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which
have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but finality when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. Such findings deserve full respect and, without
justifiable reason, ought not to be altered, modified or reversed.[10]
The CA affirmed the finding of the NLRC
that petitioner's salary for February 2000 was applied as payment for his cash
advances from the company amounting to about P95,000.00. The CA
likewise upheld the NLRC's finding that the evidence
on record was insufficient to establish either that there was an
agreement between petitioner and respondents or that
it was company policy to give commissions to employees.
Considering that the NLRC reversed the
findings of the LA, it behooves the Court to re-examine the records and resolve
the conflicting rulings between the LA, on the one hand, and
those of the NLRC and the CA, on the other.[11]
The Court's examination of the records
reveals that such factual findings of the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, are
supported by substantial evidence; hence, there is no cogent reason
for this Court to modify or reverse the same.
In Duldulao v. Court
of Appeals,[12] the
Court held that:
There is constructive dismissal if an act of clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of
the employee that it would foreclose any choice by him except to forego his
continued employment. It exists where
there is cessation of work because “continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank
and a diminution in pay.”[13]
In this case, petitioner's allegations
that respondents committed acts of harassment, i.e., the
withholding of his salary for the month of February and
directing him to return the company car, cellphone
and office keys, have been rebutted and sufficiently explained by private
respondent company in its Position Paper.[14] Respondents were able to
show that its acts were not intended to harass or discriminate against
petitioner.
There was valid reason for respondents'
withholding of petitioner's salary for the month of February 2000. Petitioner does not deny that he is indebted
to his employer in the amount of around P95,000.00. Respondents
explained that petitioner's salary for the period of
With regard to the company car,
respondents explained that the company car was actually issued to Franklin D. Quiachon
although petitioner and another employee, Nelson Gatbunton,
may borrow the car for company operations with the consent of Quiachon as stated in an office memorandum dated
The
taking of the office key from petitioner was also justified, as respondents
stated that the company's office consisted only of one big room without
separate or individual offices, so it was only the main door that required a
key. The key to the office door could be
borrowed by any employee from a co-employee in possession thereof in case of
overtime or weekend work, but not a single employee had the exclusive use of
the key to the office. Thus, when another employee, Myrna Dumlao,
had to work overtime, she borrowed the key from petitioner on
As to
the cellphone, respondents maintain that said phone
remained the property of the company, and it became company policy for its
employees to pay for personal calls.
When petitioner's debts and advances accumulated, and he showed no
intention of paying for them despite receipt of bonuses, the company had to
take measures to regulate the use of the company cellphones.[18]
Notably, petitioner never refuted
respondents' explanations for withholding his salary and the reasons why he was
required to return the company car, key and cellphone. This constitutes admission by silence under
Section 32, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 32. Admission
by silence. - An act or declaration made in the presence and within the
hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or
declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and
when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against
him.
Verily, the only conclusion that may be
reached is that respondents' explanations are truthful and, based
thereon, the NLRC and the CA committed no grave abuse of discretion in ruling
that there was no constructive dismissal in this case.
Lastly, as to petitioner's claim for
commissions, the NLRC and the CA were correct in not
sustaining the award thereof by the LA.
It must be borne in mind that there is no law which requires employers
to pay commissions;[19] thus, it
is incumbent upon petitioner to prove that that there is indeed an agreement
between him and his employer for payment of the same.
The only evidence presented by
petitioner to prove that he is entitled to sales commissions are the employment
certificate, stating that he is an employee of respondents
receiving P21,600.00 per month as salary,
exclusive of bonuses and sales commissions, and the undisputed fact that
private respondent company gave him and its other employees the amount of P85,418.00
sometime in 1998. However, the CA was correct in ruling that the employment certificate was insufficient to prove that
petitioner was indeed entitled to his
claim for sales commissions, as said document does not give the details as to the
conditions for payment of the same or the agreed percentage, if any. As to the amount of P85,418.00,
respondents assert that said amount is actually a one-time bonus, not a
commission. Thus, even assuming arguendo that
petitioner is entitled to sales commissions, his evidence is inadequate to establish the
amount to which he is entitled. In Ropali
Trading Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,[20] the
employee presented a Memorandum from his employer stating that he would be
receiving a 20% overriding commission, including sales commission and interest
income on all sales he had successfully obtained. Yet, the Court still struck down petitioner's
claim for unpaid commissions, stating that the employee should present
evidence, such as credible documents, to prove his claim. Vague and doubtful sales documents, the
origins of which have not been proven, are considered insufficient to establish
a claim for payment of commissions.
Here, the NLRC and the CA found that
the computations for commissions were determined and prepared unilaterally by
petitioner. Thus, it was correctly ruled
that said computation, with its uncertain origin and authenticity, is self-serving
and cannot prove petitioner's claim for commissions in the amount of P892,780.37.
In sum, the Court sees no justification
whatsoever to deviate from the ruling of the NLRC and the CA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Respondents Derwin Otwell, Pelagio Battung, Jr. and Franklin Quiachon were included as respondents in their capacity as President, Vice President/General Manager, and Sales Manager, respectively, of Power & Telephone Supply Phils., Inc.
** The Court of Appeals, having been included as a co-respondent, is deleted from the title pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero, with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Regalado E. Maambong, concurring; rollo, p. 20.
[2] Rollo, pp. 20-22.
[3] Rollo, p. 26.
[4]
[5] Rollo, p. 10.
[6]
[7] G.R. No. 161305,
[8]
[9] G.R. No. 160233,
[10]
[11] Cabalen Management Co., Inc. v. Quiambao, G.R. No. 169494, March 14, 2007, 518 SCRA 342, 348-349.
[12] G.R. No. 164893,
[13]
[14] Rollo, pp. 72-100.
[15]
[16] Rollo, pp. 93-94.
[17]
[18]
[19] Lagatic v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 121004,
[20] G.R. No. 122409,