FIRST DIVISION
|
BENEDICTO B. POTENCIANO II, Petitioner, - versus
- GREGORY P. BARNES, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 159421 Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CORONA, AZCUNA, and LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ. Promulgated: August 20, 2008 |
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a
petition for review[1]
of the Decision[2]
dated
The Facts
In February
2000, GP Barnes Group of Companies hired petitioner Benedicto
B. Potenciano II (Potenciano)
as a member of the Management Committee of the Barnes Marketing Concept which
held office in
On 9 May 2001,
Potenciano filed with the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276 (trial court) a complaint for damages against respondent
Gregory P. Barnes (Barnes), the owner and president of GP Barnes Group of
Companies, for alleged harassment and
maltreatment.
On
On
On
On
Prescinding, judgment is rendered for Plaintiff [Benedicto B. Potenciano II], declaring Defendant Gregory Paul Barnes, by himself and severally, jointly with his companies, being GP Barnes Group of Companies, Barnes Marketing Concept, London Underground Bar and Restaurant and Executive Dinner Club International, with which Plaintiff was connected or working with, for sometime during his employment with Mr. Barnes, for damages and are therefore directed to personally, jointly and severally pay Plaintiff as follows:
1.
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00)
as and by way of moral damages;
2.
Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00)
as and by way of nominal damages;
3.
Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00)
as and by way of exemplary damages;
4.
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00)
and Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) per appearance, as and by way of
attorney’s fees; and
5. Costs of the suit.
It is SO OR
On
Barnes
filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, with prayer for a
temporary restraining order or preliminary prohibitory injunction, praying for
the nullification of the following orders and resolution of the trial court:
(1) Order dated
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION and MANDAMUS is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Orders dated
Let the entire record of the case be remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.
The application for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary prohibitory injunction is hereby declared moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Potenciano moved for reconsideration, which the Court of
Appeals denied. Hence, this petition for review.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Order
dated
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of
Appeals held that there was no valid service of summons since neither Mr.
Herrera nor E. Himan Law Office was the defendant.
When Mr. Herrera, as a representative of E. Himan Law
Office, received a copy of the summons,
Barnes had not yet engaged the services of E. Himan
Law Office. The Court of Appeals ruled
that the sheriff did not exert any effort to comply with Section 6, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court, either by handing a copy of the summons to Barnes in person
and should Barnes refuse to receive and sign the summons, by tendering it to him.
Since there was no valid service of summons on Barnes, the trial court
therefore did not acquire jurisdiction over Barnes.
The Issues
Potenciano raises the following issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals committed grievous error of law when it impliedly ruled in favor of the propriety of the remedy of special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus; and
2. Whether the Court of Appeals committed grievous error of law when it ruled that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent, and rendered the trial court’s proceedings null and void.[5]
The Ruling of the Court
We find the
petition without merit.
Service of
summons on the defendant is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over the defendant.[6] Summons serves as a notice
to the defendant that an action has been commenced against him, thereby giving
him the opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him.[7] This is in accordance with the constitutional
guaranty of due process of law which requires notice and an opportunity to be
heard and to defend oneself.
Section 6,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court underscores the importance of actual delivery or
tender of the summons to the defendant himself:
Section
6. Service in person on defendant. – Whenever
practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the
defendant in person, or if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering
it to him.
Under this
provision, service of summons should be made on the defendant himself. However,
if for justifiable reasons the defendant cannot be served in person within a
reasonable time, substituted service of summons is proper. Thus, Section 7,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section
7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the
defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the
preceding section, service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by
leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof.
In this case,
there was no attempt whatsoever on the part of the deputy sheriff to serve the
summons on Barnes himself, who was the defendant in the complaint. The deputy
sheriff just handed a copy of the summons, complaint, and the annexes to a
certain Mr. Herrera who is a representative of E. Himan
Law Office, which claimed to be the counsel of Barnes. The Return of Summons of
the trial court’s deputy sheriff reads:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on May 11, 2001, Mr. Jaime S. Herrera Jr. came to this branch asking a copy of the Summons together with the Complaint and its annexes on the above-entitled case and when asked what is his participation in this case he answered that he is the representative of E. Himan Law Office, the counsel for the defendant Gregory Paul Barnes.
That he was told by the said Law Office to come to Branch 276, R.T.C. Muntinlupa to get the copy of the Summons and the Complaint and its annexes, so that the undersigned give [sic] him the said documents, as evidenced by his signature appearing on the original Summons.
Wherefore
said original copy of Summons is hereto attached to the record of the
above-entitled case DULY SERVED.[8]
Clearly, there
was no service of summons on Barnes himself. The handing of a copy to Mr.
Herrera cannot even qualify as substituted service under Section 7 of Rule 14.
The requisites of substituted service of summons are: (1) the defendant cannot
be served personally within a reasonable time; and (2) the impossibility of
prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the
defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed, and this statement
should be made in the proof of service.[9] In this case, the deputy
sheriff never made any effort to serve the summons on Barnes himself. Neither
was the copy of the summons served at Barnes’ residence nor at his office or
regular place of business, as provided under Section 7 of Rule 14. The deputy sheriff just handed a copy of the
summons to a messenger of E. Himan Law Office who
came to the office of the trial court claiming that E. Himan
Law Office was the counsel of Barnes. Giving a copy of the summons to a
messenger of a law firm, which was not even the counsel of the defendant,
cannot in any way be construed as equivalent to service of summons on the
defendant.
Since there
was no service of summons on Barnes, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction
over Barnes and the trial court’s order of default and the judgment by default
are void.[10]
The trial court should have refrained from issuing the default order when E. Himan Law Office manifested that it did not represent
Barnes who had not engaged its services. It would have been more prudent for
the trial court at that point to order
the deputy sheriff to serve the summons on Barnes himself by handing it to him
personally.
Other than
valid service of summons on the defendant, the trial court can still acquire
jurisdiction over the defendant by his voluntary appearance,[11] in accordance with
Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.[12] However, this is not the
case here. There is no evidence on record that Barnes authorized E. Himan Law Office to represent him in the case. In fact, E. Himan Law Office filed a Comment/Manifestation to the
Motion to Declare Defendant in Default, alleging that Barnes had not yet
engaged the services of E. Himan Law Office, which
could not therefore represent Barnes.
Thus, the receipt of the summons by E. Himan Law
Office and its filing of a Comment/Manifestation to the Motion to Declare
Defendant in Default cannot be considered as voluntary appearance on the part
of Barnes.
It was only on
This case is
similar to the case of Cavili v. Hon. Vamenta, Jr.,[13] where summons was served
only on one of the defendants. The two other defendants were not served with
summonses and neither did they authorize the counsel of the other defendant to
represent them in the case. The Court
held:
As shown in the return of the service of summons (Annex “B” of Petition), which is not contested by the respondents, summons was served on defendant Perfecta Cavili in Bayawan, Negros Oriental, but not on defendants Quirino and Primitivo Cavili who were then staying in Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. While Perfecta Cavili’s counsel, Atty. Jose Alamillo, filed in behalf of all the three defendants a motion for extension of time to file an answer upon assurance of Perfecta Cavili that she would summon her brothers, Quirino and Primitivo to Bayawan to authorize him to represent them in the case, said counsel later on manifested before the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental that he desisted from further appearing in the case since Perfecta Cavili’s assurance that he would be authorized by the other two defendants to represent them in the case was never carried out. The motion for extension of time to file an answer cannot, thus, be construed as a voluntary appearance in the case by the defendants Quirino and Primitivo Cavili.
Neither can the motion for new trial filed later by Atty. Reuben A. Espancho on behalf of the Cavili brothers cure the jurisdictional defect brought about by the non-service of summons on them precisely because the motion was predicated on such lack and was intended to secure for said defendants the opportunity to be heard in a new trial. It cannot be construed as a waiver of the right to be heard.[14] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, since
the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over Barnes, either by personal or
substituted service of summons or by Barnes’ voluntary appearance in court and
submission to its authority, the trial court’s order of default and the
succeeding judgment are void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. The trial court should have
granted Barnes’ Motion for New Trial to afford him due process of law. The appellate court was
therefore correct in granting the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the
petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated
SO
ORDERED.
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring.
[3] CA
rollo, pp. 37-38.
[4] Rollo, pp. 40-41.
[5]
[6] Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 172242, 14 August 2007, 530 SCRA 170.
[7] Pioneer International, Ltd. v. Guadiz, Jr., G.R. No. 156848, 11 October 2007, 535 SCRA 584; Alegar Corporation v. Alvarez, G.R. No. 172555, 10 July 2007, 527 SCRA 289.
[8] Rollo, p. 46.
[9] Pioneer International, Ltd. v. Guadiz, Jr., supra note 7; Air Material Wing Savings and Loan Association, Inc. v. Manay, G.R. No. 175338, 9 October 2007, 535 SCRA 356.
[10] Regner v.
Logarta, G.R. No. 168747,
[11]
[12] Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 20. Voluntary
appearance. – The defendant’s voluntary appearance
in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a
motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
[13] 199 Phil. 528 (1982).
[14]