SPECIAL

 SECOND DIVISION

 

 

CITIBANK, N.A., 

                               Petitioner,

 

 

 

 

                  - versus -

 

 

 

 

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROSITA TAN PARAGAS,

                             Respondent.

G.R. No.  159302

 

Present:

 

  QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

  CARPIO,

  CARPIO MORALES, 

  TINGA, and

  VELASCO, JR.  

 

 

Promulgated:

                            

August 22, 2008

 

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  x

 

 

 

R E S O L U T I O N

 

 

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

         

For consideration are respondent’s Motion for Leave to Admit (Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration) and her SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (MR), both dated July 22, 2008.  

          At the outset, the Court notes respondent’s claim that she learned of the Resolution dated April 23, 2008 denying her earlier motion for reconsideration only when she inquired about the status of her case with the Judicial Records Section of this Court last July 9, 2008.  She admits, however, that copy of the Resolution may have been sent to the Law Firm of M.M. Lazaro & Associates, her counsel of record, with which she has had no communication ever since she filed her earlier motion.  The reason proffered by respondent for such lack of communication was that her case was being handled by the said counsel on a pro bono basis and “she found it difficult to dismiss his services without creating any negative impression, or straining their relations,” considering that she “still owes her lawyer for a debt of gratitude for handling this case.”[1]   

          Records with this Court show that notice of the April 23, 2008 Resolution was received by the above-mentioned counsel for respondent last June 5, 2008.  Notice to respondent’s counsel is notice to her.

 

            It is axiomatic that when a client is represented by counsel, notice to counsel is notice to client.  In the absence of a notice of withdrawal or substitution of counsel, the Court will rightly assume that the counsel of record continues to represent his client and receipt of notice by the former is the reckoning point of the reglementary period.  As heretofore adverted, the original counsel did not file any notice of withdrawal.  Neither was there any intimation by respondent at that time that it was terminating the services of its counsel.[2]    

 

The Motion for Leave and the attached Second MR, which respondent filed on July 24, 2008, were thus filed way out of time.

          At all events, the Court has delved into the substance of respondent’s Motion for Leave and Second MR and found the same to be bereft of merit.

In her Motion for Leave, respondent admits having been once advised by counsel that second MRs are prohibited but that there have been instances where the rules were suspended by this Court to make them conformable to
law and justice and to subserve the overriding public interest.  She submits that this is a situation where a second MR should be allowed.

          As for her second MR, respondent outlines her arguments in paragraphs 7.1 to 7.4 of her motion for leave, as follows:

7.1. Petitioner’s second motion for extension of time and the petition for review on certiorari were already denied with finality in the Court’s Resolution dated January 14, 2004;

7.2. Private respondent[’s] claim for her retirement benefits was included in her position paper;

7.3. Both the Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated June 29, 1998 and the NLRC Resolution dated October 24, 2004 did not make any findings of serious misconduct allegedly committed by the private respondent;

7.4. Petitioner failed to comply with Section 3, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Procedure, Revised Circular No. 1-88 and Supreme Court Circular No. 19-91;

7.5. Petitioner’s counsel failed to indicate his attorney’ roll number in all the documents he filed in Court in violation of Bar Matter No. 1132 of the Supreme Court.[3] 

 

          Respondent correctly argues that the prohibition against second MRs is not absolute, there being instances where the same are allowed in the interest of justice.  Indeed, this was the reason why the second MR of petitioner was granted by this Court, by Resolution of August 17, 2005, paving the way to the reinstatement of its petition which was eventually decided in its favor.   In that Resolution, the Court found ththat extraordinarily persuasive reasons for granting ns for granting petitioner’s second second MR were present; that the petition appearthat the petition appeared  meritorious on its face; and that the ends of  and that the ends of substantial justice would be better served by allowing the motion.[4] would be better served by the allowing the motion.

          With regard to respondent’s Motion for Leave and second MR, she has not shown any extraordinarily persuasive reasons, let alone merely persuasive reasons, for this Court to grant the same. 

 

          Respondent’s above-quoted arguments in paragraphs 7.1 and 7.4 in her Motion for Leave both involve procedural issues which were already addressed by this Court in its Resolution of August 17, 2005 granting petitioner’s second MR.   Novelty Philippines, Inc. v. CA[5] further reinforces the Court’s line of reasoning taken in the Resolution – where the merits of the case were given precedence over technicalities, viz:

            The policy of our judicial system is to encourage full adjudication of the merits of an appeal.  In the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, this Court may reverse the dismissal of appeals that are grounded merely on technicalities.  Moreover, procedural niceties should be avoided in labor cases in which the provisions of the Rules of Court are applied only in a suppletory manner.  Indeed, rules of procedure may be relaxed to relieve a part of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of noncompliance with the process required.

            The foregoing judicial policy acquires greater significance where there has been subsequent compliance with the requirements of the rules, as in this case in which petitioner has submitted the Special Power of Attorney together with its Motion for Reconsideration.  (Underscoring supplied)

           

            As for respondent’s above-quoted arguments under paragraphs 7.2 and 7.3, these were already extensively discussed in the Decision of February 6, 2008. 

          Finally, the defect stated in above-quoted paragraph 7.5 of respondent’s Motion for Leave, while true up until petitioner’s filing of MANIFESTATION AND MOTION dated February 24, 2004, has since been remedied when petitioner filed its Reply dated January 10, 2006 wherein its counsels’ Roll Numbers were indicated.  As clarified in D.O. Plaza Management Corp. v. Co-owners Heirs of Andres Atega,[6] the requirement to indicate counsel’s Roll Number was intended to protect the public by making it easier to detect impostors who represent themselves as members of the Bar and to help lawyers keep track of their Roll of Attorneys Number.  It was not meant to be a ground to dismiss an action or expunge from the records any pleading in which such Roll of Attorneys Number was not indicated.

          There being then no extraordinarily persuasive reason advanced by respondent for the Court to depart from the general rule that second MRs are prohibited, respondent’s motions fail. 

 

          WHEREFORE, respondent’s Motion for Leave to Admit (Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration) and SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, both dated July 22, 2008, are DENIED. 

          SO ORDERED.

 

 

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

                                        Associate Justice

 

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

 

 

 

       LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

      Associate Justice

Chairperson

            ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

 

 

 

      

 

 

 

 

DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice

 

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

ATTESTATION

 

 

          I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

                                                         

 

                                      LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

                                      Associate Justice

                                   Chairperson

 

 

 

 

CERTIFICATION

 

 

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

 

 

 

                                                       REYNATO S. PUNO

                                                              Chief Justice

 

 


[1]                      Rollo, p. 491.

[2]               Manaya v. Alabang Country Club, Inc., G.R. No. 168988, June 19, 2007, 525 SCRA 140, 147.

[3]               Rollo, pp. 490-491.

[4]               Resolution dated August 17, 2005, p. 2, citing Ortigas and Co. Limited Partnership v. Velasco (254 SCRA 234, 240 [1996]) and Somoso v. CA (178 SCRA 654, 663 [1989]).

 

[5]                      458 Phil. 36 (2003).

[6]              G.R. No.  158526, December 16, 2004, 447 SCRA 171, 182 (2004).