ATTY. GEORGE S. BRIONES,
Petitioner, - versus - LILIA J. HENSON-CRUZ, RUBY J. HENSON, and ANTONIO
J. HENSON, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 159130
Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, carpio MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: August 22, 2008 |
X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
|
|
|
|
|
D
E C I S I O N
|
|
|
|
|
BRION, J:
We review in this petition[1]
the Decision of the Court of Appeals (Fifteenth Division) dated
THE ANTECEDENTS
Respondent Ruby J. Henson filed on
Lilia Henson-Cruz, one of the
deceased’s daughters and also a respondent in this petition, opposed Ruby’s
petition. She alleged that Ruby
understated the value of their late mother’s estate and acted with “unconscionable
bad faith” in the management thereof. Lilia
prayed that her mother's holographic will be disallowed and that she be
appointed as the Intestate Administratrix.
Lilia subsequently moved for the
appointment of an Interim Special Administrator of the estate of her late
mother, praying that the Prudential Bank & Trust Company-Ermita Branch be
appointed as Interim Special Administrator.
The trial court granted the motion but designated Jose V. Ferro (Senior
Vice-President and Trust Officer, Trust Banking Group of the Philippines
National Bank) as the Special Administrator.
Ferro, however, declined the appointment.
The trial court then designated petitioner
Atty. George S. Briones as Special Administrator of the estate. Atty. Briones accepted the appointment, took
his oath of office, and started the administration of the estate. The significant highlights of his
administration are listed below:
1.
On
2.
On P75,000.00
per month. These fees were in addition to the commission referred
to in Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court. The trial court granted
the motion but reduced the fees to P60,000.00 per month, retroactive to
the date Atty. Briones assumed office.
3.
Atty. Briones filed a Special
Administrator’s Report No. 1 dated
4.
On
5.
On P97,850,191.26
representing eight percent (8%) of the value of the estate under his
administration.
6.
The respondents opposed the
approval of the final report and prayed that they be granted an opportunity to
examine the documents, vouchers, and receipts mentioned in the statement of
income and disbursements. They likewise
asked the trial court to deny the Atty. Briones’ claim for commission and that
he be ordered to refund the sum of P134,126.33 to the estate.
7.
On
8.
In an Order dated
9.
The respondents moved for the
reconsideration of Order dated
10. The trial court handed down an Order
dated
IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the court hereby:
1.
Reiterates
its designation of the accounting firm of Messrs. Alba, Romeo & Co. to
immediately conduct an audit of the administration by Atty. George S. Briones
of the estate of the late Luz J. Henson, the expenses of which shall be charged
against the estate.
2.
Suspends
the approval of the report of the special administrator except the payment of
his commission, which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate.
3. Directs the special administrator to deliver the residue to the heirs
in proportion to their shares. From the shares of Lilia J. Henson-Cruz, there
shall be deducted the advances made to her.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
On April 29, 2002, respondents filed
with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus which was raffled to the
CA’s Ninth Division and docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 70349. The petition assailed the
Order dated
Prior the filing of the petition for certiorari in CA G.R. SP No. 70349, the
heirs of Luz Henzon filed on
The trial court, however, denied the
appeal and disapproved the record on appeal on
On
On the other hand, the petitioner insisted
that the respondents committed forum shopping when they assailed the Order of
On
WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED and respondent Judge is directed to give due course to the appeal of
petitioners from the Order dated
SO ORDERED.
The Court
of Appeals held that the trial court had neither the power nor the authority to
deny the appeal on the ground of forum shopping. It pointed out that under Section 13, Rule 41
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the authority of the trial
court to dismiss an appeal, either motu
proprio or on motion, may be exercised only if the appeal was taken out of
time or if the appellate court docket and other fees were not paid within the
reglementary period.
Atty.
Briones moved for the reconsideration of this decision. The appellate court
denied his motion in its Resolution dated
In the interim, on
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated
SO ORDERED.
THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS
The petitioner faults the appellate
court for refusing to resolve the forum shopping issue in its Decision of
As basis, the petitioner cites Section
3 of this Court’s Circular No. 28-91 which provides that “(a) Any violation of
this Circular shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of the multiple
petition or complaint; and (b) Any willful and deliberate forum shopping by any
party and his lawyer with the filing of multiple petitions and complaints to
ensure favorable action shall constitute direct contempt of court.”
To prove that forum shopping
transpired, the petitioner cites the respondents’ petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus (CA-G.R. SP No. 70349) that
prayed for the annulment of the assailed Order of
The petitioner cites in support of his
position the cases of Silahis
International, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[4]
Tantoy Sr. v. Court of Appeals,[5]
and First Philippine International Bank
v. Court of Appeals.[6] Silahis was cited for the proposition
that only one recourse – the appeal – should have been filed because the issues
were inter-related. Tantoy, Sr. spoke
of related causes or the same or substantially the same reliefs in considering
whether there is forum shopping. On the
other hand, First Philippine International
Bank was cited to emphasize that the key to a finding of forum shopping is
the objective of the relief; though differently worded, there is violation of
the rule against forum shopping if the objective in all the actions filed
involves the same relief – in this case, the setting aside of the Order of April
3, 2002. The petitioner noted that the
respondents had succeeded in obtaining this relief in their petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus (CA-G.R. SP No. 70349) and the
ruling in this petition already constituted res
judicata on the validity of the Order of
The respondents, for their part, claim
that “the mere failure to specify in the decision the contentions of the
appellant and the reason for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold
the same contrary to the provisions of the law and the Constitution.”[7] In support of the twin recourses they took,
they cite Argel v. Court of Appeals[8]
where this Court rejected the ground for objection similar to present
petitioner’s because “the special civil action for certiorari and the appeal did not involve the same issue.” The respondents saw as ineffective the
argument that the petition for certiorari
prayed for the annulment of the entire Order of
THE ISSUE
The sole issue presented to us for
resolution is: Did the Court of Appeals
(Fifteenth Division) err in not dismissing the respondents’ petition for mandamus (CA-G.R. SP No. 71844) on the
ground of forum shopping?
THE COURT’S RULING
We find
the petition devoid of merit as the discussions below will show.
The Order
of
An
examination of the RTC Order of April 3, 2002 shows that it resolved three
matters, namely: (1) the designation
of the accounting firm of Alba, Romeo & Co. to conduct an audit of the
administration of Atty. George S. Briones of the estate of Luz J. Henson, at
the expense of the estate; (2) the
payment of the petitioner’s commission as the estate’s Special Administrator;
and (3) the directive to the
petitioner to deliver the residue of the estate to the heirs in their
proportional shares. Of these, only the first two are relevant to the
present petition as the third is the ultimate directive that will close the
settlement of estate proceedings.
The first part of the Order (the
auditor’s appointment) was the subject of the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
that the respondents filed before the appellate court (CA-G.R. SP No. 70349). Whether this part is interlocutory or one that
fully settles the case on the merits can be answered by the test that this
Court laid down in Mirada v. Court of
Appeals: “The test to ascertain whether or not an order is interlocutory or
final is – Does it leave something to be done in the trial
court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory;
if it does not it is final.” [9]
The terms of the trial court’s order
with respect to the appointment or “designation” of the accounting firm is
clear: “to immediately conduct an audit
of the administration by Atty. George
To audit,
is “to examine and verify (as the books of account of a company or a
treasurer’s accounts).” An audit is the
“formal or official examination and verification of books of account (as for
reporting on the financial condition of a business at a given date or on the
results of its operations for a given period).”[10] Black’s Law Dictionary defines it no
differently: “a systematic inspection of accounting records involving analyses,
tests and confirmations; a formal or official examination and authentication of
accounts, with witnesses, vouchers, etc.”[11]
Given that
the subject matter of the audit is Atty. Briones’ Final Report in the administration
of the estate of the decedent, its preparatory
character is obvious; it is a prelude to the court’s final settlement and
distribution of the properties of the decedent to the heirs. In the context of what the court’s order
accomplishes, the court’s designation of an auditor does not have the effect of
ruling on the pending estate proceeding on its merits (i.e., in terms of finally determining the extent of the net estate
of the deceased and distributing it to the heirs) or on the merits of any
independently determinable aspect of the estate proceeding; it is only for
purposes of confirming the accuracy of the Special Administrator’s Final Report,
particularly of the reported charges against the estate. In other words, the designation of the auditor
did not resolve Special Proceedings No. 99-92870 or any independently
determinable issue therein, and left much to be done on the merits of the
case. Thus, the
In contrast with the interlocutory
character of the auditor’s appointment, the second part is limited to the
Special Administrator’s commission which was fixed at 1.8% of the value of the
estate. To quote from the Order: the court hereby. . . 2. Suspends the
approval of the report of the special administrator except the payment of his
commission, which is hereby fixed at 1.8% of the value of the estate.” Under
these terms, it is immediately apparent that this pronouncement on an independently
determinable issue – the special administrator’s commission – is the
court’s definite and final word on the matter, subject only to whatever a
higher body may decide if an appeal is made from the court’s ruling.
From an estate proceeding perspective,
the Special Administrator’s commission is no less a claim against the estate
than a claim that third parties may make.
Section 8, Rule 86 of the Rules recognizes this when it provides for
“Claim of Executor or Administrator Against an Estate.”[12] Under Section 13 of the same Rule, the action
of the court on a claim against the estate “is appealable as in ordinary cases.”[13] Hence,
by the express terms of the Rules, the ruling on the extent of the Special
Administrator’s commission – effectively, a claim by the special administrator
against the estate – is the lower court’s last word on the matter and one that
is appealable.
Available
Recourses against
the
We
bring up the above distinctions between the first two parts of the Order of
Section 1. Subject of appeal. – An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal shall be taken from:
x x x
(c) An interlocutory order.
x x x
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Under these terms and taking into account the previous discussion
of the nature of the various parts of the Order of
Rulings abound on
when an appeal or a petition for certiorari
is the appropriate recourse to take from a lower court ruling.[14] The twist
in the present case is that the losing party took two available recourses from
the same Order of the lower court: an appeal was made with respect to that
portion of the Order that is final in character, and a petition for certiorari was taken against the portion
that, again by its nature, is interlocutory.
It was under these circumstances that the petitioner posited that forum
shopping had been committed as the respondents should have simply appealed, citing
the interlocutory aspect as an error in the appeal of the final aspect of the
Order of April 3, 2002.
While the
petitioner’s position may be legally correct as a general rule, it is not true
in the present case considering the unique nature of the case that gave rise to
the present petition. The petitioner is
the special administrator in a settlement of estate, a special proceeding
governed by Rule 72 to 109 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 1, Rule 109 in part states:
Section
1. Orders
or judgments from which appeals may be taken. – An interested person may appeal in special proceedings from
an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile
Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
x
x x x x x x x x
(c)
allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a
deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a
claim against it;
(d)
settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e)
constitutes, in the proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person x x x a final determination in the lower court of the rights of
the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the
appointment of a special administrator.
The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to enable the
rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is
resolved by the court and held to be final.[15] In this multi-appeal mode, the probate court
loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter of the appeal but retains
jurisdiction over the special proceeding from which the appeal was taken for
purposes of further remedies the parties may avail of.[16]
Where multi-appeals are allowed, we
see no reason why a separate petition for certiorari
cannot be allowed on an interlocutory aspect of the case that is
separate and distinct as an issue from the aspect of the case that has been
adjudged with finality by the lower court.
To reiterate, the matter appealed matter was the special administrator’s
commission, a charge that is effectively a claim against the estate under
administration, while the matter covered by the petition for certiorari was the appointment of an
auditor who would pass upon the special administrator’s final account. By their respective natures, these matters can
exist independently of one another and can proceed separately as envisioned by
the Rules under Rule 109.
The Forum Shopping Issue
Forum shopping is
the act of a litigant who “repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on
the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all
raising substantially the same issues
either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court to increase
his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in
another.”[17] It is directly addressed and prohibited under
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and is signaled by the presence of the following
requisites: (1) identity of parties,
or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions, (2) identity of the rights asserted
and the relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (3) identity of the two preceding
particulars such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other.[18] In simpler terms, the test to determine
whether a party has violated the rule against forum shopping is where the
elements of litis pendentia are
present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.[19]
We see no forum shopping after
considering these standards as neither litis
pendentia nor res judicata would
result in one case from a ruling in the other, notwithstanding that the appeal that subsequently became the
subject of CA-G.R. SP No. 71844 and the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 70439 both stemmed from the trial
court’s Order dated April 3, 2002. The
simple reason – as already discussed above – is that the petition and the
appeal involve two different and distinct issues so that a ruling in either one
will not affect the other.
Forum shopping is further negated when
the nature of, and the developments in, the proceedings are taken into account
– i.e., an estate proceedings where
the Rules expressly allow separate appeals and where the respondents have
meticulously distinguished what aspect of the RTC’s single Order could be
appealed and what could not. Thus, the
petitioner cannot take comfort in the cases it cited relating to forum
shopping; these cases, correct and proper in their own factual settings, simply
do not apply to the attendant circumstances and special nature of the present
case where the issues, although pertaining to the same settlement of estate
proceedings and although covered by the same court order, differ in substance
and in stage of finality and can be treated independently of one another for
the purposes of appellate review.
Did the Court of Appeals err in
refusing to resolve the issue of forum shopping?
Given our above discussion and
conclusions, we do not see forum shopping as an issue that would have made a
difference in the appellate court’s ruling.
Nor is it an issue that the appellate court should, by law, have fully
ruled upon on the merits. We agree with
the respondent that the appellate court is not required “to resolve every
contention and issue raised by a party if it believes it is not necessary to do
so to decide the case.” [20]
The reality though is that the
appellate court did rule on the
issue when it stated that “it becomes
unnecessary to discuss whether the latter engaged in forum shopping. Apparently, the issue on forum shopping was
also raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 70349 and private respondent can again raise the
same in the appeal from the order dated April 3, 2002, where the issue should
be properly resolved.”[21] To the appellate court – faced with the task
of ruling on a petition for mandamus
to compel the trial court to allow the respondents’ appeal – forum shopping was
not an issue material to whether the trial court should or should not be
compelled; what was material are the requisite filing of a notice of appeal and
record on appeal, and the question of whether these have been satisfied. We cannot find fault with this reasoning as
the forum shopping issue – i.e.,
whether there was abuse of court processes in the respondents’ use of two
recourses to assail the same trial court order – has specific pertinence and relevance
in the sufficiency and merits of the recourses the respondents took.
In sum, we hold that the Court of
Appeals did not err in refusing to resolve forum shopping as an issue in its
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 71844.
WHEREFORE,
we hereby DENY the petition and,
accordingly, AFFIRM the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated
SO
ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice Chairperson |
|
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 44-51; penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon, with
Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Associate Justice Danilo B. Pine
concurring.
[3] Rollo,
pp. 92-100; penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-De la Cruz, with Associate
Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid
concurring.
[4] G.R.
No. 104513,
[5] G.R. No. 141427,
[6] G.R.
No. 115849,
[7] Air
[8] G.R.
No. 128805,
[9] G.R.
No. L-33007,
[10] Webster’s
Third International Dictionary (1993 ed.), p. 143.
[11] Fifth Ed. (1979), p. 120.
[12] Section
8. Claim
of executor or administrator against an estate. – If the executor or
administrator has a claim against the estate he represents, he shall give
notice thereof in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a special
administrator, who shall, in the adjustment of such claim, have the same power
and be subject to the same liability as the general administrator or executor
in the settlement of other claims. The
court may order the executor or administrator to pay the special administrator
necessary funds to defend such action.
[13] Section 13. Judgment appealable. The
judgment of the court approving or disapproving a claim, shall be filed
with the record of the administration proceedings with notice to both parties,
and is appealable as in ordinary cases. A judgment against the executor or administrator
shall be that he pay, in due course of administration, the amount ascertained
to be due, and it shall not create any lien upon the property of the estate, or
give to the judgment creditor any priority of payment.
[14] See People
v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 128587,
[15] Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 111324, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 186.
[16] Valarao
v. Pascual, G.R. No. 150164, November 26, 2002, 392 SCRA 695.
[17] Gatmaytan
v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 123332, February 3, 1997, 267 SCRA 487. See
also: Mondragon Leisure and Resorts Corp.
v. United Coconut Planters Bank, 427 SCRA 585 (2044), citing T’Boli Agro-Industrial Development, Inc.
(TADI) v. Solidapsi, 394 SCRA 269 (2002).
[18] Hongkong
& Shanghai Banking Corp. Ltd. v. Catalan, G.R. Nos. 159590-91, October
18, 2004, 440 SCRA 498, 513-514, citing Phil.
Commercial International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 406 SCRA 575 (2003).
[19] Velasquez
v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 150732 & 151095, August 31, 2004, 437 SCRA 357,
367, citing Bangko Silangan Development
Bank v. Court of Appeals, 360 SCRA 322 (2001), Phil. Economic Zone Authority v. Vianzon, 336 SCRA 309 (2000), Progressive Development Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, 301 SCRA 637 (1999).
[20] Air
[21] Rollo,
pp. 54-55.