Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
|
WILHELMINA
S. OROZCO, Petitioner, - versus - THE FIFTH DIVISION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, and LETICIA JIMENEZ
MAGSANOC, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 155207
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: August
13, 2008 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
The case before this Court raises a
novel question never before decided in our jurisdiction – whether a newspaper
columnist is an employee of the newspaper which publishes the column.
In this Petition for Review under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner Wilhelmina S.
Orozco assails the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 50970 dated
In March 1990, PDI engaged the
services of petitioner to write a weekly column for its Lifestyle section. She
religiously submitted her articles every week, except for a six-month stint in P250.00 – later
increased to P300.00 – for every column published.[5]
On
On the other hand, PDI claims that in
June 1991, Magsanoc met with the Lifestyle section editor to discuss how to
improve said section. They agreed to cut down the number of columnists by
keeping only those whose columns were well-written, with regular feedback and
following. In their judgment, petitioner’s column failed to improve, continued
to be superficially and poorly written, and failed to meet the high standards
of the newspaper. Hence, they decided to terminate petitioner’s column.[8]
Aggrieved by the newspaper’s action,
petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, backwages, moral and
exemplary damages, and other money claims before the NLRC.
On
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding complainant to be an employee of respondent company; ordering respondent company to reinstate her to her former or equivalent position, with backwages.
Respondent company is also ordered to pay her 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay.
Other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The Labor Arbiter found that:
[R]espondent company exercised full and complete control over the means and method by which complainant’s work – that of a regular columnist – had to be accomplished. This control might not be found in an instruction, verbal or oral, given to complainant defining the means and method she should write her column. Rather, this control is manifested and certained (sic) in respondents’ admitted prerogative to reject any article submitted by complainant for publication.
By virtue of this power, complainant was helplessly constrained to adopt her subjects and style of writing to suit the editorial taste of her editor. Otherwise, off to the trash can went her articles.
Moreover, this control is already manifested in column title, “Feminist Reflection” allotted complainant. Under this title, complainant’s writing was controlled and limited to a woman’s perspective on matters of feminine interests. That respondent had no control over the subject matter written by complainant is strongly belied by this observation. Even the length of complainant’s articles were set by respondents.
Inevitably, respondents would have no control over when or where complainant wrote her articles as she was a columnist who could produce an article in thirty (3) (sic) months or three (3) days, depending on her mood or the amount of research required for an article but her actions were controlled by her obligation to produce an article a week. If complainant did not have to report for work eight (8) hours a day, six (6) days a week, it is because her task was mainly mental. Lastly, the fact that her articles were (sic) published weekly for three (3) years show that she was respondents’ regular employee, not a once-in-a-blue-moon contributor who was not under any pressure or obligation to produce regular articles and who wrote at his own whim and leisure.[10]
PDI appealed the Decision to the
NLRC. In a Decision dated
The NLRC also resolved the appeal on
its merits. It found no error in the Labor Arbiter’s findings of fact and law.
It sustained the Labor Arbiter’s reasoning that respondent PDI exercised
control over petitioner’s work.
PDI then filed a Petition for Review[12]
before this Court seeking the reversal of the NLRC Decision. However, in a
Resolution[13] dated
The CA rendered its assailed Decision
on
The
Court does not agree with public respondent NLRC’s conclusion. First, private
respondent admitted that she was and [had] never been considered by petitioner
PDI as its employee. Second, it is not disputed that private respondent had no
employment contract with petitioner PDI. In fact, her engagement to contribute
articles for publication was based on a verbal agreement between her and the
petitioner’s Lifestyle Section Editor. Moreover, it was evident that private
respondent was not required to report to the office eight (8) hours a day.
Further, it is not disputed that she stayed in
Moreover, with regards (sic) to the control test, the public respondent NLRC’s ruling that the guidelines given by petitioner PDI for private respondent to follow, e.g. in terms of space allocation and length of article, is not the form of control envisioned by the guidelines set by the Supreme Court. The length of the article is obviously limited so that all the articles to be featured in the paper can be accommodated. As to the topic of the article to be published, it is but logical that private respondent should not write morbid topics such as death because she is contributing to the lifestyle section. Other than said given limitations, if the same could be considered limitations, the topics of the articles submitted by private respondent were all her choices. Thus, the petitioner PDI in deciding to publish private respondent’s articles only controls the result of the work and not the means by which said articles were written.
As such, the above facts failed to measure up to the control test necessary for an employer-employee relationship to exist.[15]
Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated
In a Resolution dated P15,350.00. Thus, PDI posted the requisite bond on
We shall initially dispose of the
procedural issue raised in the Petition.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred
in not dismissing outright PDI’s Petition for Certiorari for PDI’s failure to post a cash or surety bond in
violation of Article 223 of the Labor Code.
This issue was settled by this Court
in its Resolution dated
But while the posting of a cash or surety bond is
jurisdictional and is a condition sine qua non to the perfection of an appeal,
there is a plethora of jurisprudence recognizing exceptional instances wherein
the Court relaxed the bond requirement as a condition for posting the appeal.
x x x x
In the case of Taberrah v.
NLRC, the Court made note
of the fact that the assailed decision of the Labor Arbiter concerned did not
contain a computation of the monetary award due the employees, a circumstance
which is likewise present in this case. In said case, the Court stated,
As a rule, compliance with the
requirements for the perfection of an appeal within the reglamentary (sic)
period is mandatory and jurisdictional. However, in National Federation of
Labor Unions v. Ladrido as well as in several other cases, this Court relaxed
the requirement of the posting of an appeal bond within the reglementary period
as a condition for perfecting the appeal. This is in line with the principle
that substantial justice is better served by allowing the appeal to be resolved
on the merits rather than dismissing it based on a technicality.
The judgment of the Labor Arbiter in
this case merely stated that petitioner was entitled to backwages, 13th
month pay and service incentive leave pay without however including a
computation of the alleged amounts.
x x x x
In the case of NFLU v.
Ladrido III, this Court postulated that “private respondents cannot be
expected to post such appeal bond equivalent to the amount of the monetary award
when the amount thereof was not included in the decision of the labor arbiter.”
The computation of the amount awarded to petitioner not having been clearly
stated in the decision of the labor arbiter, private respondents had no basis
for determining the amount of the bond to be posted.
Thus, while the requirements for
perfecting an appeal must be strictly followed as they are considered
indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge
of judicial business, the law does admit of exceptions when warranted by the
circumstances. Technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of
equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties.
But while this Court may relax the observance of reglementary periods and
technical rules to achieve substantial justice, it is not prepared to give due
course to this petition and make a pronouncement on the weighty issue obtaining
in this case until the law has been duly complied with and the requisite appeal
bond duly paid by private respondents.[18]
Records show that PDI has complied
with the Court’s directive for the posting of the bond;[19]
thus, that issue has been laid to rest.
We now proceed to rule on the merits
of this case.
The main issue we must resolve is
whether petitioner is an employee of PDI, and if the answer be in the
affirmative, whether she was illegally dismissed.
We rule for the respondents.
The
existence of an employer-employee relationship is essentially a question of
fact.[20]
Factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC are generally
accorded respect and finality if supported by substantial evidence.[21]
Considering, however, that the CA’s
findings are in direct conflict with those of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC, this
Court must now make its own examination and evaluation of the facts of this
case.
It
is true that petitioner herself admitted that she “was not, and [had] never
been considered respondent’s employee because the terms of works were arbitrarily
decided upon by the respondent.”[22]
However, the employment status of a person is defined
and prescribed by law and not by what the parties say it should be.[23]
This Court has constantly adhered to
the “four-fold test” to determine whether there exists an employer-employee
relationship between parties.[24]
The four elements of an employment relationship are: (a) the selection and
engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of
dismissal; and (d) the employer’s power to control the employee’s conduct.[25]
Of these four elements, it is the
power of control which is the most crucial[26]
and most determinative factor,[27]
so important, in fact, that the other elements may even be disregarded.[28]
As this Court has previously held:
the significant factor in determining the relationship of the parties is the presence or absence of supervisory authority to control the method and the details of performance of the service being rendered, and the degree to which the principal may intervene to exercise such control.[29]
In other words, the test is whether
the employer controls or has reserved the right to control the employee, not
only as to the work done, but also as to the means and methods by which the
same is accomplished.[30]
Petitioner argues that several
factors exist to prove that respondents exercised control over her and her
work, namely:
a. As to the Contents of her Column – The PETITIONER had to insure that the contents of her column hewed closely to the objectives of its Lifestyle Section and the over-all principles that the newspaper projects itself to stand for. As admitted, she wanted to write about death in relation to All Souls Day but was advised not to.
b. As to Time Control – The PETITIONER, as a columnist, had to observe the deadlines of the newspaper for her articles to be published. These deadlines were usually that time period when the Section Editor has to “close the pages” of the Lifestyle Section where the column in located. “To close the pages” means to prepare them for printing and publication.
As a columnist, the PETITIONER’s writings had a definite day on which it was going to appear. So she submitted her articles two days before the designated day on which the column would come out.
This is the usual routine of newspaper work. Deadlines are set to fulfill the newspapers’ obligations to the readers with regard to timeliness and freshness of ideas.
c. As to Control of Space – The PETITIONER was told to submit only two or three pages of article for the column, (sic) “Feminist Reflections” per week. To go beyond that, the Lifestyle editor would already chop off the article and publish the rest for the next week. This shows that PRIVATE RESPONDENTS had control over the space that the PETITIONER was assigned to fill.
d. As to Discipline – Over time, the newspaper readers’ eyes are trained or habituated to look for and read the works of their favorite regular writers and columnists. They are conditioned, based on their daily purchase of the newspaper, to look for specific spaces in the newspapers for their favorite write-ups/or opinions on matters relevant and significant issues aside from not being late or amiss in the responsibility of timely submission of their articles.
The PETITIONER was disciplined to submit her articles on highly relevant and significant issues on time by the PRIVATE RESPONDENTS who have a say on whether the topics belong to those considered as highly relevant and significant, through the Lifestyle Section Editor. The PETITIONER had to discuss the topics first and submit the articles two days before publication date to keep her column in the newspaper space regularly as expected or without miss by its readers.[31]
Given this discussion by petitioner,
we then ask the question: Is this the
form of control that our labor laws contemplate such as to establish an
employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent PDI?
It is not.
Petitioner has misconstrued the
“control test,” as did the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
Not all rules imposed by the hiring
party on the hired party indicate that the latter is an employee of the former. Rules which serve as general guidelines towards
the achievement of the mutually desired result are not indicative of the power
of control.[32] Thus,
this Court has explained:
It should, however, be obvious that not
every form of control that the hiring party reserves to himself over the
conduct of the party hired in relation to the services rendered may be accorded
the effect of establishing an employer-employee relationship between them in
the legal or technical sense of the term. A line must be drawn somewhere, if
the recognized distinction between an employee and an individual contractor is
not to vanish altogether. Realistically, it would be a rare contract of
service that gives untrammelled freedom to the party hired and eschews any
intervention whatsoever in his performance of the engagement.
Logically, the line should be
drawn between rules that merely serve as guidelines towards the achievement of
the mutually desired result without dictating the means or methods to be
employed in attaining it, and those that control or fix the methodology and
bind or restrict the party hired to the use of such means. The first,
which aim only to promote the result, create no employer-employee relationship
unlike the second, which address both the result and the means used to achieve
it. x x x.[33]
The
main determinant therefore is whether the rules set by the employer are meant
to control not just the results of the work but also the means and method to be
used by the hired party in order to achieve such results. Thus, in this case,
we are to examine the factors enumerated by petitioner to see if these are merely
guidelines or if they indeed fulfill the requirements of the control test.
Petitioner believes that respondents’
acts are meant to control how she executes her work. We do not agree. A careful
examination reveals that the factors enumerated by the petitioner are inherent
conditions in running a newspaper. In other words, the so-called control as to
time, space, and discipline are dictated by the very nature of the newspaper
business itself.
We agree with the observations of the
Office of the Solicitor General that:
The Inquirer is the publisher of a newspaper of general circulation which is widely read throughout the country. As such, public interest dictates that every article appearing in the newspaper should subscribe to the standards set by the Inquirer, with its thousands of readers in mind. It is not, therefore, unusual for the Inquirer to control what would be published in the newspaper. What is important is the fact that such control pertains only to the end result, i.e., the submitted articles. The Inquirer has no control over [petitioner] as to the means or method used by her in the preparation of her articles. The articles are done by [petitioner] herself without any intervention from the Inquirer.[34]
Petitioner has not shown that PDI,
acting through its editors, dictated how she was to write or produce her
articles each week. Aside from the constraints presented by the space
allocation of her column, there were no restraints on her creativity;
petitioner was free to write her column in the manner and style she was
accustomed to and to use whatever research method she deemed suitable for her
purpose. The apparent limitation that she had to write only on subjects that
befitted the Lifestyle section did not translate to control, but was simply a
logical consequence of the fact that her column appeared in that section and
therefore had to cater to the preference of the readers of that section.
The perceived constraint on
petitioner’s column was dictated by her own choice of her column’s perspective.
The column title “Feminist Reflections” was of her own choosing, as she herself
admitted, since she had been known as a feminist writer.[35]
Thus, respondent PDI, as well as her readers, could reasonably expect her
columns to speak from such perspective.
Contrary to petitioner’s
protestations, it does not appear that there was any actual restraint or
limitation on the subject matter – within the Lifestyle section – that she
could write about. Respondent PDI did not dictate how she wrote or what she
wrote in her column. Neither did PDI’s guidelines dictate the kind of research,
time, and effort she put into each column. In fact, petitioner herself said
that she received “no comments on her articles…except for her to shorten them
to fit into the box allotted to her column.” Therefore, the control that PDI
exercised over petitioner was only as to the finished product of her efforts, i.e., the column itself, by way of
either shortening or outright rejection of the column.
The newspaper’s power to approve or
reject publication of any specific article she wrote for her column cannot be
the control contemplated in the “control test,” as it is but logical that one who
commissions another to do a piece of work should have the right to accept or
reject the product. The important factor to consider in the “control test” is still
the element of control over how the work itself is done, not just the end
result thereof.
In contrast, a regular reporter is
not as independent in doing his or her work for the newspaper. We note the
common practice in the newspaper business of assigning its regular reporters to
cover specific subjects, geographical locations, government agencies, or areas
of concern, more commonly referred to as “beats.” A reporter must produce
stories within his or her particular beat and cannot switch to another beat
without permission from the editor. In most newspapers also, a reporter must
inform the editor about the story that he or she is working on for the day. The
story or article must also be submitted to the editor at a specified time.
Moreover, the editor can easily pull out a reporter from one beat and ask him
or her to cover another beat, if the need arises.
This is not the case for petitioner.
Although petitioner had a weekly deadline to meet, she was not precluded from
submitting her column ahead of time or from submitting columns to be published
at a later time. More importantly, respondents did not dictate upon petitioner
the subject matter of her columns, but only imposed the general guideline that
the article should conform to the standards of the newspaper and the general
tone of the particular section.
Where a person who works
for another performs his job more or less at his own pleasure, in the manner he
sees fit, not subject to definite hours or conditions of work, and is
compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof,
no employer-employee relationship exists.[36]
Aside from the control test, this
Court has also used the economic reality test. The economic realities
prevailing within the activity or between the parties are examined, taking into
consideration the totality of circumstances surrounding the true nature of the
relationship between the parties.[37] This
is especially appropriate when, as in this case, there is no written agreement
or contract on which to base the relationship. In our jurisdiction, the
benchmark of economic reality in analyzing possible employment relationships
for purposes of applying the Labor Code ought to be the economic dependence of
the worker on his employer.[38]
Petitioner’s main occupation is not
as a columnist for respondent but as a women’s rights advocate working in
various women’s organizations.[39] Likewise, she herself admits that she also
contributes articles to other publications.[40] Thus,
it cannot be said that petitioner was dependent on respondent PDI for her
continued employment in respondent’s line of business.[41]
The inevitable conclusion is that
petitioner was not respondent PDI’s employee but an independent contractor,
engaged to do independent work.
There is no inflexible rule to determine
if a person is an employee or an independent contractor; thus, the characterization
of the relationship must be made based on the particular circumstances of each
case.[42] There
are several factors[43]
that may be considered by the courts, but as we already said, the right to control is the dominant factor in
determining whether one is an employee or an independent contractor.[44]
In our jurisdiction, the Court has
held that an independent contractor is one who carries on a
distinct and independent business and undertakes to perform the job, work, or
service on one’s own account and under one’s own responsibility according to one’s
own manner and method, free from the control and direction of the principal in
all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results
thereof.[45]
On this point, Sonza v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation[46]
is enlightening. In that case, the Court found, using the four-fold test, that
petitioner, Jose Y. Sonza, was not an employee of ABS-CBN, but an independent
contractor. Sonza was hired by ABS-CBN due to his “unique skills, talent and
celebrity status not possessed by ordinary employees,” a circumstance that, the
Court said, was indicative, though not conclusive, of an independent
contractual relationship. Independent contractors often present themselves to
possess unique skills, expertise or talent to distinguish them from ordinary
employees.[47] The Court also found that, as to payment of
wages, Sonza’s talent fees were the result of negotiations between him and
ABS-CBN.[48] As to
the power of dismissal, the Court found that the terms of Sonza’s engagement
were dictated by the contract he entered into with ABS-CBN, and the same
contract provided that either party may terminate the contract in case of
breach by the other of the terms thereof.[49]
However, the Court held that the foregoing are not determinative of an
employer-employee relationship. Instead, it is still the power of control that
is most important.
On the power of control, the Court
found that in performing his work, Sonza only needed his skills and talent – how
he delivered his lines, appeared on television, and sounded on radio were
outside ABS-CBN’s control.[50]
Thus:
We find that ABS-CBN was not involved in
the actual performance that produced the finished product of SONZA’s work.
ABS-CBN did not instruct SONZA how to perform his job. ABS-CBN merely reserved the right to modify
the program format and airtime schedule “for more effective programming.”
ABS-CBN’s sole concern was the quality of the shows and their standing in the
ratings. Clearly, ABS-CBN did not
exercise control over the means and methods of performance of SONZA’s work.
SONZA claims that ABS-CBN’s power not to
broadcast his shows proves ABS-CBN’s power over the means and methods of the
performance of his work. Although
ABS-CBN did have the option not to broadcast SONZA’s show, ABS-CBN was still
obligated to pay SONZA’s talent fees. Thus, even if ABS-CBN was completely
dissatisfied with the means and methods of SONZA’s performance of his work, or
even with the quality or product of his work, ABS-CBN could not dismiss or even
discipline SONZA. All that ABS-CBN could
do is not to broadcast SONZA’s show but ABS-CBN must still pay his talent fees
in full.
Clearly, ABS-CBN’s right
not to broadcast SONZA’s show, burdened as it was by the obligation to continue
paying in full SONZA’s talent fees, did not amount to control over the means
and methods of the performance of SONZA’s work. ABS-CBN could not terminate or
discipline SONZA even if the means and methods of performance of his work - how
he delivered his lines and appeared on television - did not meet ABS-CBN’s
approval. This proves that ABS-CBN’s
control was limited only to the result of SONZA’s work, whether to broadcast
the final product or not. In either
case, ABS-CBN must still pay SONZA’s talent fees in full until the expiry of
the Agreement.
In
SONZA further contends that ABS-CBN
exercised control over his work by supplying all equipment and crew. No doubt, ABS-CBN supplied the equipment,
crew and airtime needed to broadcast the “Mel & Jay” programs. However, the equipment, crew and airtime are
not the “tools and instrumentalities” SONZA needed to perform his job. What
SONZA principally needed were his talent or skills and the costumes necessary
for his appearance. Even though ABS-CBN
provided SONZA with the place of work and the necessary equipment, SONZA was
still an independent contractor since ABS-CBN did not supervise and control his
work. ABS-CBN’s sole concern was for SONZA to display his talent during the
airing of the programs.
A radio broadcast specialist who works
under minimal supervision is an independent contractor. SONZA’s work as
television and radio program host required special skills and talent, which
SONZA admittedly possesses. The records do not show that ABS-CBN exercised any
supervision and control over how SONZA utilized his skills and talent in his
shows.[51]
The
instant case presents a parallel to Sonza.
Petitioner was engaged as a columnist for her talent, skill, experience, and
her unique viewpoint as a feminist advocate. How she utilized all these in
writing her column was not subject to dictation by respondent. As in Sonza, respondent PDI was not involved
in the actual performance that produced the finished product. It only reserved
the right to shorten petitioner’s articles based on the newspaper’s capacity to
accommodate the same. This fact, we note, was not unique to petitioner’s
column. It is a reality in the newspaper business that space constraints often
dictate the length of articles and columns, even those that regularly appear
therein.
Furthermore,
respondent PDI did not supply petitioner with the tools and instrumentalities she
needed to perform her work. Petitioner only needed her talent and skill to come
up with a column every week. As such, she had all the tools she needed to
perform her work.
Considering that respondent PDI was not
petitioner’s employer, it cannot be held guilty of illegal dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the
foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 50970 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O
N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Juan
Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Teodoro P.
Regino, concurring; rollo, pp. 101-106.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Juan
Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Teodoro P. Regino and Remedios
Salazar-Fernando, concurring; id. at 107.
[3]
[4]
[5] Position Paper for Complainant, CA
rollo, p. 39.
[6] Also named in parts of the records
as “Lolita” or “Lita.”
[7] Reply to Respondent’s Position
Paper, CA rollo, p. 40.
[8] Petition for Certiorari, G.R. No.
117605, CA rollo, p. 4.
[9] Rollo, p. 88.
[10]
[11]
[12] Docketed as G.R. No. 117605, CA rollo, pp. 2-18.
[13] CA
rollo, p. 209.
[14] 356
Phil. 811 (1998).
[15] Supra
note 1.
[16] Manifestation and Compliance, rollo, pp. 410-416.
[17] Penned by Associate Justice Dante O.
Tinga, with Associate Justices Reynato S. Puno (now Chief Justice), Ma. Alicia
Austria-Martinez, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (now retired), and Minita V.
Chico-Nazario, concurring; id. at 380-393.
[18]
[19] Supra note 16.
[20] Lopez
v. Bodega City, G.R. No. 155731, September 3, 2007, 532 SCRA 56, 64, citing
Manila Water Company, Inc. v. Peńa, 434 SCRA 53, 58 (2004).
[21] The
Peninsula Manila, et al. v. Alipio, G.R. No. 167310, June 17, 2008, citing Trendline Employees Association-Southern
Philippines Federation of Labor v. NLRC, 272 SCRA 172, 179 (1997).
[22] Reply to Respondent’s Position
Paper, CA rollo, p. 40.
[23] Insular
Life Assurance, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
119930, March 12, 1993, 287 SCRA 476, 483, citing Industrial Timber
Corporation v. NLRC, 169 SCRA 341
(1989).
[24] Lopez
v. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewage System, G.R. No. 154472,
[25] Lakas sa Industriya ng Kapatirang Haligi ng
Alyansa-Pinagbuklod ng Manggagawang Promo ng Burlingame v. Burlingame
Corporation, G.R. No. 162833, June 15, 2007 524 SCRA 690, 695, citing Sy v.
Court of Appeals, 398 SCRA 301, 307-308 (2003); Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc. v. Schonfeld, G.R. No.
166920, February 19, 2007, 516 SCRA 209, 228.
[26] Abante,
Jr. v. Lamadrid Bearing and Parts Corporation, G.R. No. 159890, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 368, 379.
[27] Sandigan
Savings and Loan Bank, Inc v. National Labor Relations Commission, 324 Phil.
358 (1996), citing Ruga v. NLRC, 181
SCRA 266, 273 (1990). See also Coca Cola
Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. v. Climaco, G.R. No. 146881,
[28] Sandigan Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., v.
National Labor Relations Commission, supra, citing Sara v. Agarrado, 166 SCRA 625, 630 (1988).
[29] AFP
Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 334
Phil. 712, 721-722 (1997).
[30] Lazaro
v. Social Security Commission, 479 Phil. 385, 389-390 (2004), citing Investment Planning Corporation v. Social
Security System, 21 SCRA 924, 928-929 (1967). See also Abante, Jr. v. Lamadrid Bearing and Parts Corporation, supra note
26.
[31] Rollo,
pp. 75-76.
[32] Manila
Electric Company v. Benamira, G.R. No. 145271,
July 14, 2005, 463 SCRA 331, 352-353. (Citations omitted.)
[33] Insular
Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 84484, November 15, 1989, 179 SCRA 459, 464-465; Consulta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
145443, March 18, 2005, 453 SCRA 732, 740-741; Manila Electric Company v. Benamira, supra.
[34] Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General, rollo, p. 192.
[35] Reply to Position Paper of
Respondents, CA rollo, p. 43.
[36] Abante,
Jr. v. Lamadrid Bearing and Parts Corporation, supra note 26, citing Encyclopedia
Britannica (
[37] Francisco
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 170087,
[38]
[39] CA rollo, p. 200.
[40] Reply to Respondent’s Position
Paper, CA rollo, p. 43.
[41] See Francisco v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 37.
[42] Arkansas Transit Homes, Inc. v.
[43] The
court in
(a) the extent of control which,
by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one
employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with
reference to whether in the locality, the work is usually done under the
direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the
particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the
workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the
person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which
the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment,
whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a
part of the regular business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties
believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or
is not in business.
[44] Arkansas
Transit Homes, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty, supra note 42.
[45] Chavez
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 146530, January 17, 2005,
448 SCRA 478, 491, citing Tan v. Lagrama, 387 SCRA 393 (2002).
[46] G.R. No. 138051,
[47] Sonza
v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, id. at 595.
[48]
[49]
[50]
[51]