Republic
of the
Supreme Court
THIRD DIVISION
THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R.
No. 154155
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus
- AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
Respondent. August 6, 2008
x - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
REYES, R.T., J.:
NO less
than Our Constitution guarantees the right not just to a speedy trial but to
the speedy disposition of cases.[1]
However, it needs to be underscored that
speedy disposition is a relative and flexible concept. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not sufficient. Particular
regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.[2]
This is a petition
for review on certiorari of the
Decision[3]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 58925. The CA reversed and set aside the decision
and resolution of the Ombudsman finding respondent Bureau of Customs Division
Chief administratively liable for neglect of duty, penalizing him with
suspension for six months without pay.
The Facts
Sometime in 1992, Maglei Enterprises
Co., (Maglei), a partnership owned by Rose Cuyos and John Elvin C. Medina,
filed an application before the Bureau of Customs for the operation of a
Customs Bonded Warehouse (CBW)-Manufacturing Warehouse. As part of the evaluation of Maglei’s
application, CBW Supervisor Juanito A. Baliwag conducted an inspection of
Maglei’s compliance with structural requirements. Baliwag submitted a report[4]
recommending approval of the application.
On
1st
Indorsement
Respectfully forwarded to the Chief,
MMBWD, This Port, the within papers relative to the request of MAGLEI
ENTERPRISES CO., to establish and operate a Customs Manufacturing Bonded
Warehouse, pursuant to
Baliwag of this
Office, inviting attention to the recommendation stated therein to which the
undersigned concurs.
(Sgd.)
Atty.
Ben C. Jurado
Chief
Warehousing
Inspection Division[5]
Maglei’s application was submitted to
Rolando A. Mendoza, Chief of the MMBWD for his comment and recommendation. In a Memorandum (for the District Collector
of Customs) dated
On
Subsequently, on July 8 and 22, 1992,
MMBWD Senior Storekeeper Account Officer George O. Dizon was tasked by MMBWD
Chief Mendoza to check and verify the status of Maglei’s CBW. Dizon reported that the subject CBW was
existing and operating. However, upon
further verification by the Bureau of Customs, it was discovered that the
purported CBW of Maglei did not exist at the alleged site in
Ombudsman Disposition
On
On
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered; the undersigned investigators respectfully recommend the
following:
1. That criminal charges for violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and Section 3081 of the Tariff and Customs Code be
filed against the following officials namely:
a.
Emma M. Rosqueta
Director
Collector,
b.
Rolando A. Mendoza
Chief,
Miscellaneous Manufacturing
Bonded Warehouse Division
c.
Alex Gaticales
Executive Staff, Deputy Commissioner
d. Ben C. Jurado
Chief, Warehouse Inspection Division
CBW Supervisor
e.
Juanito A. Baliwag
CBW Supervisor
f.
George P. Dizon
Senior Storekeeper
All of the Bureau of Customs, and
g.
Rose Cuyos and John Elvin C. Medina
Owner, Maglei
Enterprises
Private
Respondents
2. That records of this case be forwarded to
the EPIB, this Office for the conduct of the required preliminary investigation
3. That administrative charges for dishonesty
and gross misconduct be likewise filed against the above-named BOC officials
before the AAB, this Office.[6]
On
On
On the
other hand, on
Aggrieved,
respondent appealed to the CA. In his
appeal, respondent argued, among others, that his right to a speedy disposition
of his case had been violated; that the administrative case against him should
have been dismissed following the dismissal of the criminal charges against
him; and that there is no substantial evidence on record to make him
administratively liable.
In a
Decision dated
Foregoing premises considered, the Petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. Resultantly, the challenged Decision/Resolution of the Ombudsman is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO
ORDERED.[7]
In ruling in favor of respondent, the
appellate court ratiocinated:
Indeed,
we are in accord with Petitioner’s arguments that his right to speedy
disposition of cases had been violated.
To be sure, Section 16, Article
“All persons shall have the right to
a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative bodies.”
x x
x x
In
the case at bench, the incident which gave rise to the complaint against
Petitioner happened on
From
the foregoing unfolding of events, it is quite clear that it took the Ombudsman
almost six (6) years to decide that a case be filed against Petitioner. Under
such circumstances, We cannot fault Petitioner for invoking violation of his
right to speedy disposition of his case.
More
importantly, We do not agree that Petitioner, under attendant facts and
circumstances can be held liable for negligence. First of all, Petitioner as, Deputy
Commissioner for Assessment and Operation, did not have the duty to make
inspection on the alleged warehouse.
Such duty belongs to other personnel/officers. Secondly, in Petitioner’s
1st Indorsement dated
“Respectfully
forwarded to the Chief, MMBWD, This Port, the within papers relative to the
request of MAGLEI ENTERPRISES CO., to establish and operate a Customs
Manufacturing Bonded Warehouse, pursuant to
A careful reading of said 1st
Indorsement undoubtedly shows that Petitioner invited attention to the
inspector’s (Supervisor Baliwag) qualified recommendation, to wit:
“Approval respectfully recommended, subject
to re-inspection, before transfer of imported goods.” (Underscoring for emphasis.)
After
Petitioner made the indorsement, he no longer had any participation nor was he
under obligation or duty to make a re-inspection. If afterwards damage was suffered, Petitioner
cannot be faulted but rather only those who had the duty to make re-inspection.
It is precisely because of such fact
that the criminal complaint filed against Petitioner did not prosper. Where there is no duty or responsibility, one
should not be held liable for neglect, as what has been done to Petitioner.[8]
Issues
Petitioner
Ombudsman now comes to this Court, raising twin issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT
RESPONDENT’S RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL WAS VIOLATED;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT
RESPONDENT WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY, AS THE CHIEF OF THE
WAREHOUSING INSPECTION DIVISION, DESPITE THE
Our Ruling
No violation of respondent’s
right
to speedy disposition of
cases.
We shall
first tackle the issue on speedy disposition of cases.
Article
It bears
stressing that although the Constitution guarantees the right to the speedy
disposition of cases, it is a flexible concept.
Due regard must be given to the facts and circumstances surrounding each
case. The right to a speedy disposition
of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried.[11] Just like the
constitutional guarantee of “speedy trial,” “speedy disposition of cases” is a
flexible concept. It is consistent with
delays and depends upon the circumstances.
What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.[12]
In determining whether or not the right to the
speedy disposition of cases has been violated, this Court has laid down the
following guidelines: (1) the length of
the delay; (2) the reasons for such delay; (3) the assertion or failure to
assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.[13]
Gleaned
from the foregoing, We find that respondent’s right to the speedy disposition
of cases has not been violated.
First.
It is undisputed that the FFB of the OMB
recommended that respondent together with other officials of the Bureau of
Customs be criminally charged for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 and Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code. The same bureau also recommended that
respondent be administratively charged. Prior
to the fact-finding report of the FFB of the OMB, respondent was never the
subject of any complaint or investigation relating to the incident surrounding
Maglei’s non-existent customs bonded warehouse.
In fact, in the original complaint filed by the Bureau of Customs,
respondent was not included as one of the parties charged with violation of the
Tariff and Customs Code. With respect to
respondent, there were no vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays because he was not made to undergo
any investigative proceeding prior to the report and findings of the FFB.
Simply put,
prior to the report and recommendation by the FFB that respondent be criminally
and administratively charged, respondent was neither investigated nor
charged. That respondent was charged only
in 1997 while the subject incident occurred in 1992, is not necessarily a
violation of his right to the speedy disposition of his case. The record is clear that prior to 1997,
respondent had no case to speak of – he was not made the subject of
any complaint or made to undergo any investigation. As held in Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals:[14]
In the Tatad
case, there was a hiatus in the proceedings between the termination of the
proceedings before the investigating fiscal on
In the present case, no proof was presented to show any
persecution of the accused, political or otherwise, unlike in the Tatad
case. There is no showing that petitioner was made to endure any vexatious
process during the two-year period before the filing of the proper
informations, unlike in the Angchangco
case where petitioner therein was deprived of his retirement benefits for an
unreasonably long time. Thus,
the circumstances present in the Tatad
and Angchangco cases justifying the
“radical relief” granted by us in said cases are not existent in the present
case.”[15] (Emphasis supplied)
Second.
Even if We were to reckon the period
from when respondent was administratively charged to the point when the
Ombudsman found respondent administratively liable, We still find no violation
of the right to speedy disposition of cases.
In
making a determination of what constitutes a violation of the right to the
speedy disposition of cases, this Court has time and again employed the balancing test. The balancing test first adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo[16] was crucial in the
Court’s resolution of the recent case of Perez
v. People:[17]
The Court went on to adopt a middle ground: the “balancing test,” in which “the conduct of both the prosecution and defendant are weighed.” Mr. Justice Powell, ponente, explained the concept, thus:
A balancing test
necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little more than identify some of
the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular
defendant has been deprived of his right.
Though some might express them in different ways, we identify four
such factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.
The length of the
delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism.
Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there
is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of
the right to speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an
inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the
case. To take but one example, the delay
that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than
for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.
Closely related
to length of delay is the reason the government assigns to justify the delay. Here, too, different weights should be
assigned to different reasons. A
deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be
weighted heavily against the government.
A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be
weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate
responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than
with the defendant. Finally, a valid
reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate
delay. We have already discussed the
third factor, the defendant’s responsibility to assert his right. Whether and how a defendant asserts his right
is closely related to the other factors we have mentioned. The strength of his
efforts will be affected by the length of the delay, to some extent by the
reason for the delay, and most particularly by the personal prejudice, which
is not always readily identifiable, that he experiences. The more serious the
deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain. The defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial
right, then, is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether
the defendant is being deprived of the right.
We emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for
a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.
A fourth factor
is prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice,
of course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which
the speedy trial right was designed to protect.
This Court has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent
oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii)
to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the
possibility that the defense will be impaired.
Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a
defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire
system. If witnesses die or disappear
during a delay, the prejudice is obvious.
There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall
accurately events of the distant past.
Loss of memory, however, is not always reflected in the record because
what has been forgotten can rarely be shown.[18] (Underscoring supplied)
The
Court likewise held in Dela Peña v.
Sandiganbayan:[19]
The concept of speedy disposition is relative or
flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning
of the time involved is not sufficient.
Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar
to each case. Hence, the doctrinal rule
is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the
factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of
the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to
assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.[20]
To
reiterate, there is a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases when
the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays;
or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or
when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried.[21]
In
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,[22] this Court found the
delay of almost three (3) years in the conduct of the preliminary investigation
violative of the rights of the accused to due process and speedy disposition of
cases. Said the Court:
We find the long delay in the
termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant
case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process.
Substantial adherence to the
requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation,
including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law
for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due
process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due
process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of “speedy disposition”
of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and
1987 Constitution), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner’s
constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed
reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the
case at bar. We are not impressed by the
attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the
speculative assumption that “the delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling
scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking
government official.” In the first
place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be
emphatically rejected. Secondly, three
out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to
file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No.
3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues
necessitating such “painstaking and grueling scrutiny” as would justify a delay
of almost three years in terminating the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged
bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while
presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant
or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve
the case.
It has been suggested that the
long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be deemed
fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not
warrant dismissal of the information. True
– but the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the
accused such investigation. But an undue
delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for
until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.[23]
Too,
in Angchangco v. Ombudsman,[24] this Court ruled that the
delay of almost six (6) years in resolving the criminal charges constitutes a
violation of the right of the accused to due process and speedy disposition of
the cases against them.
Here, the circumstance
attendant in Tatad and Angchangco are clearly absent. Records reveal that on
To our mind, the time it took
the Ombudsman to complete the investigation can hardly be considered an
unreasonable and arbitrary delay as to deprive respondent of his constitutional
right to the speedy disposition of his case.
Further, there is nothing in the records to show that said period was
characterized by delay which was vexatious, capricious or oppressive. There was no inordinate delay amounting to a
violation of respondent’s constitutional rights. The assertion of respondent that there was a
violation of his right to the speedy disposition of cases against him must
necessarily fail.
Respondent administratively
liable for neglect of duty.
It
is elementary that the dismissal of criminal charges will not necessarily
result in the dismissal of the administrative complaint based on the same set
of facts.[25] The quantum of evidence in order to sustain a
conviction for a criminal case is different from the proof needed to find one
administratively liable. Rule 133,
Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides that for criminal cases, conviction is
warranted only when the guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt is defined as moral certainty, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.[26] On the other hand, the quantum of evidence
necessary to find an individual administratively liable is substantial evidence. Rule
133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 5. Substantial evidence. – In cases filed
before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. (Underscoring supplied)
Substantial evidence does not
necessarily mean preponderant proof as required in ordinary civil cases, but
such kind of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion or evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent
men in the conduct of their affairs.[27]
In Office
of the Court Administrator v. Enriquez,[28] the Court ruled:
x x x Be that as it may, its dismissal of the criminal case
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence was never meant, as respondent
doggedly believed and arrogantly asserted, to foreclose administrative action
against him or to give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The Sandiganbayan, in dismissing the same, was
simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of the
respondent beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction
because of the presumption of innocence which the Constitution guarantees an
accused. Lack or absence of proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there
is another class of evidence which, thought insufficient to establish guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of
evidence. Then too, there is the
“substantial evidence” rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires
in these cases such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.[29]
Verily,
respondent can still be held administratively liable despite the dismissal of
the criminal charges against him.
We now discuss the administrative
liability of respondent for neglect of duty. We opt to reexamine the records considering
the divergent findings of the Ombudsman and the CA.
It
is undisputed that respondent was the Chief of the Warehousing Inspection
Division (WID) of the Bureau of Customs.
The WID is the inspection and audit arm of the District Collector of
Customs.
On
On
Respondent’s
indorsement was then submitted to the Chief of the MMBWD for comment and
recommendation. The Chief of the MMBWD
eventually recommended that Maglei’s application be approved since it has
complied with all the necessary physical and documentary requirements. Following the indorsements of the
different divisions of the Bureau of Customs, Maglei was eventually granted the
authority to operate a CBW despite the fact that the records disclose that
there was no actual warehouse to speak of.
Respondent
posits that since he was not the approving officer for application for CBWs nor was it
his duty or obligation to conduct re-inspection of the subject warehouse
premises, he cannot be held liable for neglect of duty.
The
CA, in its decision, declared that respondent cannot be held liable for
negligence for the simple reason that it was not respondent’s duty to make the
inspection and verification of Maglei’s application.
We cannot agree.
The
finding of the Ombudsman in OMB-
Evidence on record shows that on 16 March 1992, respondent
Juanito Baliwag (Customs Bonded Warehouse Supervisor) submitted an Inspection
Report of the same date showing the result of an ocular inspection of the
proposed warehouse of applicant Maglei Enterprises with the recommendation:
“approval respectfully recommended subject to re-inspection before the transfer
of imported goods is allowed” and with the observation that construction is
going on for compartments for raw materials, finished products and wastages by
products. On the same date,
x x x x
x x x x
Evidence on records likewise revealed that
x x x x
While respondent Dizon was authorized to verify the
existence of Maglei Enterprises Warehouse, it is admitted that he did not even
look and see the premises of the alleged warehouse. Likewise, CBW Supervisor and co-respondent
Baliwag made a report on the existence of the bonded warehouse earlier on
On the basis of the foregoing undisputed facts, it is
apparent that the immediate cause of the injury complained of was occasioned
not only by the failure of the CBW Inspectors to conduct an ocular inspection
of the premises in a manner and in accordance with the existing Customs rules
and regulations as well as the failure of their immediate supervisors to
verify the accuracy of the reports, but also by subverting the reports by
making misrepresentation as to the existence of the warehouse.
x x x x
Respondent, Ben Jurado, the Chief of the WID, cannot
likewise escape liability for Neglect of Duty since his Office is the
inspection arm of the District Collector of Customs.[32]
As adverted to earlier, the Warehousing Inspection Division
is the inspection and audit arm of the Bureau of Customs. Respondent Jurado, as chief of the said
division, was duty-bound to verify the accuracy of the reports furnished by his
subordinates. We agree with the
Ombudsman that respondent failed to validate the report of Baliwag and
initiate, institute or recommend the conduct of appropriate investigation
immediately upon discovery of the irregularity. As a supervisor, respondent was clearly
negligent in the performance of his duties.
In Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[33] defined
the power of supervision as “overseeing or the power or authority of an officer
to see that their subordinate officials perform their duties.”[34] The Court added that in case the subordinate
fails or neglects to fulfill his or her duties, it is the supervisor’s
responsibility to take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties.[35] The doctrine was reiterated in Deang v. Intermediate Appellate Court[36]
and Municipality of Malolos v. Libangang
Malolos, Inc.[37]
It bears stressing that public office
is a public trust.[38] When a public officer takes his oath of office, he binds
himself to perform the duties of his office faithfully and to use reasonable
skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of his duties, he is
to use that prudence, caution and attention which careful men use in the
management of their affairs.[39] Public officials and employees are therefore
expected to act with utmost diligence and care in discharging the duties and
functions of their office.
Unfortunately, respondent failed to measure up to this standard. Clearly, respondent should be held
administratively liable for neglect of duty.
Neglect of duty is the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a task
expected of him, signifying “disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference.”[40] By merely acquiescing to the report and recommendation of
his subordinate without verifying its accuracy, respondent was negligent in overseeing
that the duties and responsibilities of the WID were performed with utmost
responsibility. Respondent was likewise
negligent when he failed, as supervisor, to initiate, institute, or recommend investigation
and disciplinary proceedings against his subordinate Baliwag after the anomaly
was discovered. Clearly, respondent
failed to exercise the degree of care, skill, and diligence which the
circumstances warrant.
We are of course not unaware that as a general rule, superior
officers cannot be held liable for the acts of their subordinates. However, there are exceptions, viz.: (1) where, being charged with the
duty of employing or retaining his subordinates, he negligently or willfully
employs or retains unfit or improper persons; or (2) where, being charged with
the duty to see that they are appointed and qualified in a proper manner, he
negligently or willfully fails to require of them the due conformity to the
prescribed regulations; or (3) where he so carelessly or negligently oversees,
conducts or carries on the business of his office as to furnish the opportunity
for the default; or (4) and a fortiori where
he has directed, authorized or cooperated in the wrong.[41]
In Advincula v. Dicen,[42]
the Court found a provincial agriculturist liable for misconduct despite his protestations
anchored on reliance to a subordinate. In
finding him liable, the Court scored the said official for failing to
scrutinize each and every document proffered to him by subordinates. In Amane
v. Mendoza-Arce,[43]
respondent clerk of court was held liable for neglect of duty for failing to
discipline her subordinates and make sure that they regularly and promptly
performed their duties. In the case under review, respondent was careless or
negligent in overseeing, conducting, or carrying on the business of his office
as to furnish the opportunity for the default of a subordinate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Decision REVERSED
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Constitution (1987), Art. 3, Sec. 16:
“All persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative bodies.”
[2] Binay
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 120681-83,
[3] Rollo, pp. 34-43. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justices Hilarion L. Aquino and Regalado E. Maambong, concurring.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Lopez, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 140529,
[11] Yulo v. People, G.R. No. 142762,
[12] Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., G.R. No.
L-45647,
[13] Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
144542,
[14] G.R.
No. 136264,
[15] Dimayacyac v. Court of Appeals, id. at 130-131.
[16]
407
[17] G.R.
No. 164763,
[18] Perez v. People, id., citing Barker v. Wingo, supra note 16.
[19] Supra note 13.
[20] Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 485.
[21] Lopez, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman,
supra note 10.
[22] G.R.
Nos. L-72335-39,
[23] Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 82-83.
[24] G.R.
No. 122728,
[25] Dela Cruz v. Department of Education,
Culture and Sports-Cordillera Administrative Region, G.R. No. 146739,
[26] Rules of Court, Rule 133, Sec. 2:
Sec. 2. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt. – In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to
an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean
such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is
required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind.
[27] Regalado, F.D., Remedial Law Compedium, Vol. II, p. 850.
[28]
A.M. No. P-89-290,
[29] Office of the Court Administrator v. Enriquez, id. at 10.
[30] Rollo, p. 44.
[31]
[32]
[33] G.R.
Nos. L-72969-70,
[34]
[35]
[36] G.R.
No. L-71313,
[38] Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives. (Emphasis supplied)
[39] Farolan v.
Solmac Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 83589,
[40] Dajao v. Lluch, 429 Phil. 620, 626 (2002); Philippine Retirement Authority v. Rupa, G.R. No. 140519,
[41] Cruz, C.L., The Law of Public Officers, 1999 ed., pp. 149-150.
[42] G.R.
No. 162403,
[43] A.M.
Nos. P-95-1080, P-95-1128 & P-95-1144,