Republic
of the
SUPREME
COURT
SECOND DIVISION
|
IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA, DANIEL RUBIO, ORLANDO G.
RESLIN, and JOSE G. RESLIN, Petitioners, - versus - COURT
OF APPEALS, JULITA C. BENEDICTO, and FRANCISCA BENEDICTO-PAULINO, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 154096 Present: QUISUMBING,
J., Chairperson, CARPIO
MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO,
JR., and BRION,
JJ. Promulgated: August
22, 2008 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assails and seeks to nullify the
Decision[1]
dated
The Facts
Sometime in 1968 and 1972, Ambassador
Roberto S. Benedicto, now deceased, and his business associates (Benedicto
Group) organized Far East Managers and Investors, Inc. (FEMII) and Universal
Equity Corporation (UEC), respectively. As petitioner Irene Marcos-Araneta
would later allege, both corporations were organized pursuant to a contract or
arrangement whereby Benedicto, as trustor, placed in his name and in the name
of his associates, as trustees, the shares of stocks of FEMII and UEC with the
obligation to hold those shares and their fruits in trust and for the benefit
of Irene to the extent of 65% of such shares. Several years after, Irene,
through her trustee-husband, Gregorio Ma. Araneta III, demanded the reconveyance
of said 65% stockholdings, but the Benedicto Group refused to oblige.
In March 2000, Irene thereupon instituted before the RTC two similar complaints for conveyance of shares of stock, accounting
and receivership against the Benedicto Group with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO).
The first, docketed as Civil Case No. 3341-17, covered the UEC shares and named
Benedicto, his daughter, and at least 20 other individuals as defendants. The
second, docketed as Civil Case No. 3342-17, sought the recovery to the extent
of 65% of FEMII shares held by Benedicto and the other defendants named therein.
Respondent Francisca Benedicto-Paulino,[3]
Benedicto’s daughter, filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 3341-17,
followed later by an Amended Motion to Dismiss. Benedicto, on the other hand,
moved to dismiss[4]
Civil Case No. 3342-17, adopting in toto the five (5) grounds raised by Francisca
in her amended motion to dismiss. Among these were: (1) the cases involved an intra-corporate
dispute over which the Securities and Exchange Commission, not the RTC, has
jurisdiction; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) the complaint failed to
state a cause of action, as there was no allegation therein that plaintiff, as
beneficiary of the purported trust, has accepted the trust created in her favor.
To the motions to dismiss, Irene filed
a Consolidated Opposition, which Benedicto and Francisca countered with a Joint
Reply to Opposition.
Upon Benedicto’s motion, both cases
were consolidated.
During the preliminary proceedings on
their motions to dismiss, Benedicto and Francisca, by way of bolstering their
contentions on improper venue, presented the Joint Affidavit[5]
of Gilmia B. Valdez, Catalino A. Bactat, and Conchita R. Rasco who all attested
being employed as household staff at the Marcos’ Mansion in Brgy. Lacub, Batac,
Ilocos Norte and that Irene did not maintain residence in said place as she in
fact only visited the mansion twice in 1999; that she did not vote in Batac in
the 1998 national elections; and that she was staying at her husband’s house in
Against the aforesaid unrebutted joint
affidavit, Irene presented her PhP 5 community tax certificate[6]
(CTC) issued on “
In the meantime, on
On
From the above order, Irene interposed a Motion for Reconsideration[8]
which Julita and Francisca duly opposed.
Pending resolution of her motion for reconsideration,
Irene filed on July 17, 2000 a
Motion (to Admit Amended Complaint),[9]
attaching therewith a copy of the Amended Complaint[10]
dated July 14, 2000 in which the names of Daniel Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin, and
Jose G. Reslin appeared as additional plaintiffs. As stated in the amended
complaint, the added plaintiffs, all from Ilocos Norte, were Irene’s new
trustees. Parenthetically, the amended complaint stated practically the same
cause of action but, as couched, sought the reconveyance of the FEMII shares only.
During the
On
WHEREFORE, the admission of the Amended Complaint
being tenable and legal, the same is GRANTED.
Let copies of the Amended Complaint be served to
the defendants who are ordered to answer within the reglementary period
provided by the rules.
The RTC predicated its order on the
following premises:
(1) Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 10 of
the Rules of Court,[13]
Irene may opt to file, as a matter of right, an amended complaint.
(2) The inclusion of additional plaintiffs,
one of whom was a Batac, an Ilocos Norte resident, in the amended complaint
setting out the same cause of action cured the defect of improper venue.
(3) Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3 in relation
to Sec. 2 of Rule 4 allow the filing of the amended complaint in question in
the place of residence of any of Irene’s co-plaintiffs.
In time, Julita and Francisca moved to
dismiss the amended complaint, but the RTC, by Order[14]
dated
In said order, the RTC stood
pat on its holding on the rule on amendments of pleadings. And scoffing at the
argument about there being no complaint to amend in the first place as of October
9, 2000 (when the RTC granted the motion to amend) as the original complaints
were dismissed with finality earlier,
i.e., on August 25, 2000 when the court denied Irene’s motion for
reconsideration of the June 29, 2000 order dismissing the original complaints, the
court stated thusly: there was actually no need to act on Irene’s motion to
admit, it being her right as plaintiff to amend her complaints absent any
responsive pleading thereto. Pushing its point, the RTC added the observation that
the filing of the amended complaint on July 17, 2000 ipso facto
superseded the original complaints, the dismissal of which, per the June 29,
2000 Order, had not yet become final at the time of the filing of the amended
complaint.
Following the denial on
Inasmuch as the verification portion of
the joint petition and the certification on non-forum shopping bore only
Francisca’s signature, the CA required the joint petitioners “to submit x x x
either the written authority of Julita C. Benedicto to Francisca B. Paulino
authorizing the latter to represent her in these proceedings, or a supplemental
verification and certification duly signed by x x x Julita C. Benedicto.”[16]
Records show the submission of the corresponding authorizing Affidavit[17]
executed by Julita in favor of Francisca.
Later developments saw the CA issuing a
TRO[18]
and then a writ of preliminary injunction[19]
enjoining the RTC from conducting further proceedings on the subject civil cases.
On
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the
petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Orders admitting the amended complaints are SET ASIDE for being null and void,
and the amended complaints a quo are, accordingly, DISMISSED.[20]
Irene and her new trustees’ motion for reconsideration
of the assailed decision was denied through the equally assailed
The
Issues
Petitioners
urge the setting aside and annulment of the assailed CA decision and resolution
on the following submissions that the appellate court erred in: (1) allowing
the submission of an affidavit by Julita as sufficient compliance with the
requirement on verification and certification of non-forum shopping; (2) ruling
on the merits of the trust issue which involves factual and evidentiary determination,
processes not proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court; (3) ruling that the amended complaints in the lower court should be
dismissed because, at the time it was filed, there was no more original
complaint to amend; (4) ruling that the respondents did not waive improper
venue; and (5) ruling that petitioner Irene was not a resident of Batac, Ilocos
Norte and that none of the principal parties are residents of Ilocos Norte.[21]
The
Court’s Ruling
We
affirm, but not for all the reasons set out in, the CA’s decision.
First Issue: Substantial Compliance with the Rule
on Verification
and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
Petitioners
tag private respondents’ petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 64246 as defective for
non-compliance with the requirements of Secs. 4[22]
and 5[23]
of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court at least with regard to Julita, who failed to
sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Petitioners thus fault the appellate court for
directing Julita’s counsel to submit a written authority for Francisca to
represent Julita in the certiorari proceedings.
We are
not persuaded.
Verification
not Jurisdictional; May be Corrected
Verification is, under the Rules, not a jurisdictional but
merely a formal requirement which the court may motu proprio direct a
party to comply with or correct, as the case may be. As the Court articulated
in Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism
(KILUSAN)-Organized Labor Associations in Line Industries and Agriculture
(OLALIA) v. Court of Appeals:
[V]erification
is a formal, not a jurisdictional requisite, as it is mainly intended to secure
an assurance that the allegations therein made are done in good faith or are
true and correct and not mere speculation. The Court may order the correction
of the pleading, if not verified, or act on the unverified pleading if the
attending circumstances are such that a strict compliance with the rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served.[24]
Given this consideration, the CA acted within its sound
discretion in ordering the submission of proof of Francisca’s authority to sign
on Julita’s behalf and represent her in the proceedings before the appellate court.
Signature
by Any of the Principal Petitioners is Substantial Compliance
Regarding
the certificate of non-forum shopping, the general rule is that all the
petitioners or plaintiffs in a case should sign it.[25]
However, the Court has time and again stressed that the rules on forum
shopping, which were designed to promote the orderly administration of justice,
do not interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable
circumstances.[26] As has been ruled by the Court, the signature
of any of the principal petitioners[27] or principal parties,[28] as
Francisca is in this case, would constitute a substantial compliance with the
rule on verification and certification of non-forum shopping. It cannot be
overemphasized that Francisca herself was a principal party in Civil Case No. 3341-17
before the RTC and in the certiorari proceedings before the CA. Besides being an
heir of Benedicto, Francisca, with her mother, Julita, was substituted for
Benedicto in the instant case after his demise.
And should
there exist a commonality of interest among
the parties, or where the parties filed the case as a “collective,” raising
only one common cause of action or presenting a common defense, then the
signature of one of the petitioners or complainants, acting as representative, is
sufficient compliance. We said so in Cavile v. Heirs of Clarita Cavile.[29]
Like
Thomas Cavile, Sr. and the other petitioners in Cavile, Francisca and
Julita, as petitioners before the CA, had
filed their petition as a collective, sharing a common interest and having a
common single defense to protect their rights over the shares of stocks in
question.
Second Issue: Merits of the Case cannot be Resolved
on Certiorari
under Rule 65
Petitioners’
posture on the second issue is correct. As they aptly pointed out, the CA, in
the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Rule 65, is limited to
reviewing and correcting errors of jurisdiction only. It cannot validly delve into
the issue of trust which, under the premises, cannot be judiciously resolved without
first establishing certain facts based on evidence.
Whether
a determinative question is one of law or of fact depends on the nature of the
dispute. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the
correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain given set of facts; or
when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact obtains when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query
invites the calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the
whole, and the probability of the situation.[30]
Clearly
then, the CA overstepped its boundaries when, in disposing of private respondents’
petition for certiorari, it did not confine itself to determining whether or
not lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion tainted the issuance of
the assailed RTC orders, but proceeded to pass on the factual issue of the existence and
enforceability of the asserted trust. In the process, the CA virtually resolved
petitioner Irene’s case for reconveyance on its substantive merits even before
evidence on the matter could be adduced. Civil Case Nos. 3341-17 and 3342-17 in fact have
not even reached the pre-trial stage. To stress, the nature of the trust
allegedly constituted in Irene’s favor and its enforceability, being
evidentiary in nature, are best determined by the trial court. The original
complaints and the amended complaint certainly do not even clearly indicate
whether the asserted trust is implied or express. To be sure, an express trust
differs from the implied variety in terms of the manner of proving its
existence.[31] Surely, the onus of factually determining
whether the trust allegedly established in favor of Irene, if one was indeed
established, was implied or express properly pertains, at the first instance,
to the trial court and not to the appellate court in a special civil action for
certiorari, as here. In the absence of evidence
to prove or disprove the constitution and necessarily the existence of the
trust agreement between Irene, on one hand, and the Benedicto Group, on the
other, the appellate court cannot intelligently pass upon the issue of trust. A pronouncement on said issue of trust rooted
on speculation and conjecture, if properly challenged, must be struck down. So
it must be here.
Third
Issue: Admission of Amended Complaint Proper
As may
be recalled, the CA veritably declared as reversibly erroneous the admission of
the amended complaint. The flaw in the RTC’s act of admitting the amended
complaint lies, so the CA held, in the fact that the filing of the amended
complaint on July 17, 2000 came after the RTC had ordered with finality the dismissal
of the original complaints. According to petitioners, scoring the CA for its
declaration adverted to and debunking its posture on the finality of the said
RTC order, the CA failed to take stock of their motion for reconsideration of the
said dismissal order.
We
agree with petitioners and turn to the governing Sec. 2 of Rule 10 of the Rules
of Court which provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. –– A
party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a
responsive pleading is served or in the case of a reply, at any time within ten
(10) days after it is served.
As the
aforequoted provision makes it abundantly clear that the plaintiff may amend his
complaint once as a matter of right, i.e.,
without leave of court, before any responsive pleading is filed or
served. Responsive pleadings are those which seek affirmative relief and/or set
up defenses,[32] like an
answer. A motion to dismiss is not a
responsive pleading for purposes of Sec. 2 of Rule 10.[33] Assayed against the foregoing perspective, the
RTC did not err in admitting petitioners’ amended complaint, Julita and Francisca
not having yet answered the original complaints when the amended complaint was
filed. At that precise moment, Irene, by
force of said Sec. 2 of Rule 10, had, as a matter of right, the option of amending
her underlying reconveyance complaints. As aptly observed by the RTC, Irene’s
motion to admit amended complaint was not even necessary. The Court notes
though that the RTC has not offered an explanation why it saw fit to grant the
motion to admit in the first place.
In Alpine
Lending Investors v. Corpuz, the Court, expounding on the propriety of
admitting an amended complaint before a responsive pleading is filed, wrote:
[W]hat petitioner Alpine filed in Civil Case No. C-20124 was a motion to
dismiss, not an answer. Settled is the
rule that a motion to dismiss is not a
responsive pleading for purposes of
Section 2, Rule 10. As no responsive
pleading had been filed, respondent could amend her complaint in Civil Case No.
C-20124 as a matter of right. Following this Court’s ruling in Breslin
v. Luzon Stevedoring Co. considering
that respondent has the right to amend her complaint, it is the correlative
duty of the trial court to accept the amended complaint; otherwise, mandamus
would lie against it. In other words,
the trial court’s duty to admit the amended complaint was purely
ministerial. In fact, respondent should
not have filed a motion to admit her amended complaint.[34]
It may
be argued that the original complaints had been dismissed through the
Fourth
Issue: Private Respondents did not Waive
Improper Venue
Petitioners
maintain that Julita and Francisca were effectively precluded from raising the
matter of improper venue by their subsequent acts of filing numerous pleadings.
To petitioners, these pleadings, taken together, signify a waiver of private respondents’
initial objection to improper venue.
This contention
is without basis and, at best, tenuous. Venue
essentially concerns a rule of procedure which, in personal actions, is fixed
for the greatest convenience possible of the plaintiff and his witnesses. The ground of improperly laid venue must be
raised seasonably, else it is deemed waived. Where the defendant failed to
either file a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue or include the
same as an affirmative defense, he is deemed to have waived his right to object
to improper venue.[36] In the case at bench, Benedicto and Francisca
raised at the earliest time possible, meaning “within the time for but before
filing the answer to the complaint,”[37]
the matter of improper venue. They would thereafter reiterate and pursue their
objection on venue, first, in their answer to the amended complaints and then
in their petition for certiorari before the CA. Any suggestion, therefore, that
Francisca and Benedicto or his substitutes abandoned along the way improper
venue as ground to defeat Irene’s claim before the RTC has to be rejected.
Fifth Issue: The RTC Has No Jurisdiction
on the Ground
of Improper Venue
Subject
Civil Cases are Personal Actions
It is the
posture of Julita and Francisca that the venue was in this case improperly laid since the suit in question partakes
of a real action involving real properties located outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the RTC in Batac.
This
contention is not well-taken. In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of
personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or the recovery of damages.[38]
Real actions, on the other hand, are those affecting
title to or possession of real property, or interest therein. In accordance with the wordings of Sec. 1 of
Rule 4, the venue of real actions shall be the proper court which has territorial
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion
thereof, is situated. The venue of
personal actions is the court where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at
the election of the plaintiff.[39]
In the
instant case, petitioners are basically
asking Benedicto and his Group, as defendants a quo, to acknowledge holding in trust Irene’s purported 65%
stockownership of UEC and FEMII, inclusive of the fruits of the trust, and to
execute in Irene’s favor the necessary conveying deed over the said 65%
shareholdings. In other words, Irene seeks to compel recognition of the trust
arrangement she has with the Benedicto Group. The fact that FEMII’s assets
include real properties does not materially change the nature of the action,
for the ownership interest of a stockholder over corporate assets is only
inchoate as the corporation, as a juridical person, solely owns such assets. It is only upon the liquidation of the
corporation that the stockholders, depending on the type and nature of their
stockownership, may have a real inchoate right over the corporate assets, but then
only to the extent of their stockownership.
The amended complaint is an action in
personam, it being a suit against Francisca and the late Benedicto (now
represented by Julita and Francisca), on the basis of their alleged personal
liability to Irene upon an alleged trust constituted in 1968 and/or 1972. They are not actions in rem where the
actions are against the real properties instead of against persons.[40]
We particularly note that possession or
title to the real properties of FEMII and UEC is not being disputed, albeit
part of the assets of the corporation happens to be real properties.
Given the foregoing perspective, we now
tackle the determinative question of venue in the light of the inclusion of
additional plaintiffs in the amended complaint.
Interpretation
of Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3; and Sec. 2 of Rule 4
We
point out at the outset that Irene, as categorically and peremptorily found by
the RTC after a hearing, is not a resident of Batac, Ilocos Norte, as she
claimed. The Court perceives no
compelling reason to disturb, in the confines of this case, the factual determination
of the trial court and the premises holding it together. Accordingly,
Irene cannot, in a personal action, contextually opt for Batac as venue of her reconveyance
complaint. As to her, Batac, Ilocos Norte is not what Sec. 2, Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court adverts to as the place “where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides” at the time she filed her amended complaint. That Irene holds CTC No. 17019451[41] issued
sometime in June 2000 in Batac, Ilocos Norte and in which she indicated her
address as Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos is really of no moment. Let alone the
fact that one can easily secure a basic residence certificate practically
anytime in any Bureau of Internal Revenue or treasurer’s office and dictate
whatever relevant data one desires entered, Irene procured CTC No. 17019451 and appended the same to her
motion for reconsideration following the RTC’s pronouncement against her being
a resident of Batac.
Petitioners,
in an attempt to establish that the RTC in Batac, Ilocos Norte is the proper
court venue, asseverate that Batac, Ilocos Norte is where the principal parties
reside.
Pivotal
to the resolution of the venue issue is a determination of the status of
Irene’s co-plaintiffs in the context of Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 3 in relation to
Sec. 2 of Rule 4, which pertinently provide as follows:
Rule 3
PARTIES TO CIVIL
ACTIONS
SEC. 2. Parties in interest. –– A
real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest.
SEC. 3. Representatives as parties. ––
Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a
representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall
be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party
in interest. A representative may be a
trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a
party authorized by law or these Rules.
An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed
principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the
contract involves things belonging to the principal.
Rule 4
VENUE OF
ACTIONS
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. –– All
other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Venue is Improperly Laid
There
can be no serious dispute that the real party-in-interest plaintiff is Irene. As
self-styled beneficiary of the disputed trust, she stands to be benefited or
entitled to the avails of the present suit.
It is undisputed too that petitioners Daniel Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin, and Jose G. Reslin, all from Ilocos
Norte, were included as co-plaintiffs in the amended complaint as Irene’s new designated
trustees. As trustees, they can only serve as mere representatives of
Irene.
Upon the foregoing consideration, the
resolution of the crucial issue of whether or not venue had properly been laid
should not be difficult.
Sec. 2 of Rule 4 indicates quite
clearly that when there is more than one plaintiff in a personal action case, the
residences of the principal parties should be the basis for determining
proper venue. According to the late Justice Jose Y. Feria, “the word ‘principal’
has been added [in the uniform procedure rule] in order to prevent the plaintiff
from choosing the residence of a minor plaintiff or defendant as the venue.”[42]
Eliminate the qualifying term “principal” and the purpose of the Rule would, to
borrow from Justice Regalado, “be defeated where a nominal or formal party is
impleaded in the action since the latter would not have the degree of interest
in the subject of the action which would warrant and entail the desirably
active participation expected of litigants in a case.”[43]
Before the
RTC in Batac, in Civil Case Nos. 3341-17 and 3342-17,
Irene stands undisputedly as the principal plaintiff, the real party-in-interest.
Following Sec. 2 of Rule 4, the subject
civil cases ought to be commenced and prosecuted at the place where Irene
resides.
Principal Plaintiff not a Resident in Venue
of Action
As earlier stated, no less than the RTC
in Batac declared Irene as not a resident of Batac, Ilocos Norte. Withal, that
court was an improper venue for her conveyance action.
The Court can concede that Irene’s
three co-plaintiffs are all residents of Batac, Ilocos Norte. But it ought to be stressed in this regard
that not one of the three can be considered as principal party-plaintiffs in
Civil Case Nos. 3341-17 and 3342-17, included as they were in the amended
complaint as trustees of the principal plaintiff. As
trustees, they may be accorded, by virtue of Sec. 3 of Rule 3, the right to
prosecute a suit, but only on behalf of the beneficiary who must be included in
the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party-in-interest. In
the final analysis, the residences of Irene’s co-plaintiffs cannot be made the
basis in determining the venue of the subject suit. This conclusion becomes all
the more forceful considering that Irene herself initiated and was actively prosecuting
her claim against Benedicto, his heirs, assigns, or associates, virtually
rendering the impleading of the trustees unnecessary.
And this brings us to the final point. Irene
was a resident during the period material of
Litigants ought to bank on the
righteousness of their causes, the superiority of their cases, and the
persuasiveness of arguments to secure a favorable verdict. It is high time that courts, judges, and those
who come to court for redress keep this ideal in mind.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision and
Resolution dated
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 306-317. Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion and concurred in by Associate Justices Perlita J. Tria Tirona and Amelita G. Tolentino.
[2]
[3] She admitted in the motion to be defendant Franscisca De Leon referred to in the first complaint.
[4] Rollo, pp. 98-99.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Sec. 2. Amendments as a matter of right. – A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served x x x.
[14] Rollo, pp. 358-365A.
[15]
[18]
[19]
[20]
Supra note 1, at 316.
[22]
SEC. 4. Verification. –– x x x A
pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records. x x x
[23] SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. –– The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, [or] tribunal x x x and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact x x x to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.
[24] G.R.
Nos. 149158-59,
[26] Heirs
of Venancio Bajenting v. Ibanez, G.R. No. 166190, September 20, 2006, 502
SCRA 531, 547-548; citing Cavile v. Heirs
of Clarita Cavile, G.R. No. 148635, April 1, 2003, 400 SCRA 255.
[30] Estate
of the Late Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio v. Dizon, G.R. No. 148777, October
18, 2007, 536 SCRA 565, 587; citing Heirs of Cipriano Reyes v. Calumpang,
G.R. No. 138463, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 56, 70.
[31] Art. 1443 of the Civil Code provides that no express trust concerning an immovable property may be proved by parol evidence, while Art. 1446 of the Code requires that the beneficiary of an express trust must accept the trust if it imposes onerous conditions.
[32] Fernandez v. International Corporate Bank, G.R. No. 131283, October 7, 1999, 316 SCRA 326, 335; citing Diaz v. Adiong, G.R. No. 106847, March 5, 1993, 219 SCRA 631, 637.
[33] Alpine
Lending Investors v. Corpuz,
[34]
[35] See Bautista v. Maya-Maya
Cottages, Inc., G.R. No. 148361, November 29, 2005, 476 SCRA 416, 419; citing
Salazar v. Bartolome, G.R. No. 43364, September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 247,
250.
[36] Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111685, August 20, 2001, 363 SCRA 396, 400.
[37] Rules of Court, Rule 16, Sec. 1.
[38] Regner
v. Logarta, G.R. No. 168747,
[39] Rules of Court, Rule 4, Sec. 2.
[40] Asiavest
Limited v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128803,
[42] 1 Civil Procedure Annotated 261 (2001).
[43] 1 Remedial Law Compendium 108 (8th ed., 2002).