MONICCA B. EGOY,
Petitioner, - versus - NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,THE BUSINESS STAR CORPORATION,
and GABRIEL MAÑALAC, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 152325
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson, carpio MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: August 28, 2008 |
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D E C I S I O N
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BRION, J.: |
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The
petitioner Monicca B. Egoy (petitioner) comes to this Court via the present petition[1] to
assail the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on
THE
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The petitioner worked for the respondent Business Star
Corporation (respondent) who owns and operates a daily business
newspaper. On
On
The
petitioner submitted the required explanation (dated
On
her three-day absence, the petitioner explained that she “actually planned to
file a sick leave, meaning I will not report for office the next day and ask my
brother to call up the desk,” but the news leaked out that she would be
spending the weekend with her family in Hongkong, so she was forced to junk her
previous plan.
In
a memorandum dated
At
the arbitration proceedings, the petitioner submitted the explanation she made
relating to her failure to submit a news
story on the NSC bidding, the accusation that she had been AWOL, and her
abandonment of post.
The
respondent, for its part, cited the petitioner’s AWOL on May 5 to 9 to justify
its action. It also faulted the petitioner for its newspaper’s failure to
report on the results of the NSC May 4, 1994 bidding. It claimed that nothing
was heard of from petitioner on that day regarding the NSC bidding – no call to
the editorial desk, no advise to the office on her whereabouts –compelling the
managing editor to close the front page at past 7:00 p.m. Company investigation
revealed that the petitioner went to the office on May 4, 1994 at past 8:00
p.m., not to submit her news item on the NSC bidding, but to get her loan from
the accounting department for her trip to Hongkong on the following day. She did not report for work on
The
respondent also charged the petitioner with defiance of a lawful order and
grave disrespect and discourtesy to her superior, Carol Lucas, who had asked her
to explain in writing within 24 hours her failure to submit a news story on the
NSC bidding.[10] While
the petitioner did submit a report, it came only after 4 days and was submitted
to Mr. Gabriel Maňalac, the respondent’s publisher and editor-in-chief,
instead of to Carol Lucas. The respondent also called attention to the
petitioner’s “faulty news stories” that resulted in disclaimers from affected parties. A second incident of AWOL was also charged,
this time for June 12, 13 and 15, 1994.
Based on what the company viewed as a series of unprofessional conduct
and on account of the NSC bidding incident, Maňalac asked the petitioner
to resign. Her retort was a refusal.
In
a decision dated August, 1997, the Labor Arbiter found that the petitioner was
illegally dismissed, but ruled out reinstatement because of the parties’ strained
relationship.[11] He
awarded the petitioner separation pay, backwages and attorney’s fees. The Labor
Arbiter held that the respondent erred in dismissing the petitioner on the
grounds indicated in the termination/dismissal memo.[12]
The Arbiter relied on the petitioner’s submission that she could not have been
AWOL from
The
respondent appealed[13]
to the NLRC whose decision,[14]
promulgated on
The
petitioner sought relief from the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari.
In the decision promulgated on
Petitioner was
rightfully dismissed because of her unprofessional conduct and breach of trust.
She failed to meet a deadline. She went to Hongkong without as much informing
the central desk about it. She failed to submit her explanation within the time
specified. She was on AWOL. And she showed acts of insubordination and
disrespect to her superiors. Taken together, the concurrence of events have
snowballed into her employer’s loss of confidence in her which is a ground for
dismissal. Verily, petitioner’s dismissal was fully justified. Certiorari
does not lie.”
The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the
decision, but the CA denied her motion in a resolution promulgated on
THE
PETITION
The
petition cites the following errors:[19]
1. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in
deciding that petitioner was not illegally dismissed based on grounds not
stated in the notice of termination.
2. On the assumption that the Court of
Appeals can go beyond the grounds stated in the notice of termination, the
Court’s appreciation and conclusion that the petitioner was not illegally
dismissed is based on a misapprehension of facts.
3. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in
giving weight to the factual findings of the NLRC when it is the Labor Arbiter
who conducted the trial and had the opportunity to personally examine the
evidence and the witnesses.
The petitioner then went on to state the reasons why the
assailed decision should be reversed and set aside. She filed a Reply[20] (to
the respondent’s Comment) and a Memorandum.[21]
The petitioner posits that the present case highlights a
basic and novel question of law - whether
a court, in analyzing and deciding an illegal dismissal case, is limited to the
ground or grounds stated in the notice of termination. She contends that
the court should so limit itself. The petitioner further submits that the respondent
failed to comply with the conditions laid down under Book V, Rule XXIII, Section
2, Pars. (a), (b) and (c) of the Labor Code’s Implementing Rules and
Regulations because only a written notice of termination of employment
effective immediately was given to her. She adds that even if the observance of
due process is not the issue in this case, the respondent’s notice is nevertheless
vital in determining the ground or grounds relied upon in terminating her
employment. In this regard, she calls
attention to the “plain wording” of the notice served on her which plainly
cites her failure to report for duty on May 5-9, 1994 without official leave as
the reason for her dismissal, not the breach of trust that the respondent
cites.[22]
She contends that even the Labor Arbiter concluded that “no amount of
hair-splitting about complainant’s assigned news story on the NSC bidding will
change the fact that she was dismissed from her job effective June 15, 1994 on
the ground/s indicated in the notice of termination x x x.” [23]
The petitioner faults both the NLRC and the Court of
Appeals for accepting the non-submission of the news story and the alleged
“underhanded” attempt of the petitioner to shift the blame to Medina as
additional grounds for the termination of her employment; she notes that the Court of Appeals went
farther by citing her failure to meet the deadline as basis for the
respondents’ loss of confidence; her trip to Hongkong without notifying the
central desk; her failure to submit explanation within the specified time; her
AWOL; her acts of insubordination and her disrespect to her superiors; and even
the respondent’s unwarranted claims that she was responsible for news stories
that were not entirely accurate and that resulted in disclaimers.
Even
assuming that the CA can validly go beyond the grounds stated in the notice of
termination, the petitioner further maintains that the court misappreciated the
undisputed facts of the case, leading to its erroneous conclusions. She likewise belies the other factual findings
of the CA – largely the same factual issues passed upon at the Labor Arbiter
and NLRC levels. Finally, the petitioner
assails the undue weight given by the CA to the factual findings of the NLRC.
She contends that considering the conflicting evidence presented during the
hearings, the Labor Arbiter was in a better position than the NLRC and the
Court of Appeals to determine which evidence should be considered in resolving
the case; in the absence of any showing
of abuse, the Labor Arbiter’s appreciation of the evidence should be respected.
THE CASE FOR RESPONDENT
BUSINESS STAR
The respondent, in a Memorandum[24]
dated
As the petitioner did, the respondent largely dwelt on the
appreciation of the facts of the case, starting from the petitioner’s failure
to submit her report on the NSC bidding, her subsequent AWOL and
insubordination.
The respondent questions the petitioner’s objection based
on the two-notice rule under Book V, Rule XIV, Sec. 2 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the Labor Code,[25]
arguing that the petition cannot raise this issue for the first time on appeal;
in any case, it posits that the petitioner was fully given her day in court and
her right to due process was never suppressed nor denied.
On the factual findings of the CA, the respondent submits
that the appellate court correctly appreciated the facts of the case for they
were based on the pleadings, documents and evidence submitted to the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC. It further
contends that neither did the CA commit an error when it gave weight to the
finding of the NLRC over those of the Labor Arbiter.
THE COURT’S RULING
The
petitioner presents to this Court what she defines as a basic and novel
question of law which, to her, constitutes the main issue in this case –
whether a court, in analyzing and deciding a dismissal case, is limited to the
ground or grounds stated in the notice of termination given to the employee.[26] She contends that the Court of Appeals should
have limited itself to the ground or grounds stated in the notice; the CA’s
error in this regard is an abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
In the context of the present petition,
the direct question that the petitioner poses is: Does the NLRC’s and the CA’s
consideration of the NSC bidding and other related incidents not specifically
mentioned in the notice of termination taint their decisions with illegality
for their use of irrelevant considerations?
Separately
from the above issue, the petitioner submits that the appellate court erred in
its appreciation of the facts of the case and in giving weight to the findings
of the NLRC. This question – essentially
one of fact – is outside the purview of a Rule 45 petition.[27] Nevertheless, we shall look at the factual
issues but only to the extent of considering the submission that the CA went beyond
the termination notice in upholding the petitioner’s dismissal.
We see no merit in the
petition as our discussions below will show.
Our
examination of the developments in the parties’ relationship shows that it
began to sour when the petitioner failed to file her report on the NSC bidding
on
Before
the Labor Arbiter, the NSC bidding incident was a live issue that the
petitioner fully discussed in her Position Paper together with her absence from
Despite
the parties’ full discussion of what had transpired between them, the Labor
Arbiter read the notice of termination in its narrowest sense and thus said: “Be that as it may, no amount of
hairsplitting about complainant’s assigned news story on the bidding will
change the fact that she was dismissed from her job effective June 5, 1994 on
the ground/s indicated on the Notice of
Termination, as cited above.” Ruling
on the cited absences, the Labor Arbiter reasoned out:
As correctly pointed out by complainant, she was not on
AWOL from May 5-9, 1994 inasmuch as May 7-9, 1994 were non-working days, May 7
and 8 being Saturday and Sunday and May 9, being a Holiday, Barangay
election. It follows that she is wrongly
accused of a prolonged absence. Also,
complainant correctly argued that since she did not file a leave of absence for
In
contrast with the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC fully considered the parties’
submissions about their relationship and, in effect, took a wide view of what
the Notice of Termination covered, particularly the respondent’s statement
about the petitioner’s “breach of trust.”
The NLRC fully reflected this view when it said:
The Labor Arbiter should not have limited its evaluation
of the reasonableness of the complainant’s dismissal to a consideration only of
the grounds stated in the notice of dismissal, that is, breach of trust
consisting of being absent without leave and intending the respondent into
believing that she was sick when in fact she was vacationing in Hongkong. The show-cause letter that the complainant
received earlier discloses that she was also asked to explain why no disciplinary
action should be taken against her for her failure to submit a news story on
the NSC bidding. Moreover, in her
written explanation and in the pleadings she submitted to the labor arbiter,
the complainant sought to justify both her failure to submit her news story and
her absences. There is therefore no
valid reason why a determination of the reasonableness of her dismissal should
be limited only to the grounds stated in the notice of dismissal.
In
seeking relief from the CA against the NLRC, the petitioner interestingly led
off with a narration of the developments in her relationship with the
respondent starting from the NSC bidding incident.[28] This recital led to her Grounds of the
Petition which she defined to be:
5.00.1 Public respondent
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it ruled that private respondents have sufficient basis in
dismissing petitioner from the service;
5.00.2. Public
respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it ruled that the inconsistency in petitioner’s statements
made her claim for illegal dismissal doubtful.[29]
It
was on the basis of these defined issues and their full supporting discussion
in the petition that the appellate court ruled on the petitioner’s case. The CA significantly stated in considering
the submitted issues:
In
her memorandum, petitioner states that “the principal issue to be resolved
is whether or not petitioner’s failure to submit a news story on the NSC
bidding is justified or not.” She
avers that the non-submission of her story before the imposed deadline was not
her fault but
With
this lead as take off point, the CA went on to discuss the NSC bidding
incident, concluding that “there is no showing that petitioner had indeed
submitted the news story on the NSC bidding.”
The decision further stated –repeating what it had earlier stated and,
to some degree, echoing the expansive reading the NLRC gave of “breach of
trust” as ground for dismissal – that:
As
earlier observed, petitioner confined her arguments primarily on the matter
of the absence or lateness of her news story on the NSC bidding. But it should be underscored that her
dismissal was not due to a single event but due to a series or confluence of
circumstances which vividly demonstrated her failure to cope with the demands
of her job as a reporter. As well
explained by respondents, hers was not confined to an isolated act of
non-observance of certain norms in her field of work. It was the totality of events like her unprofessionalism
for not submitting a news story that was a front page item, going to travel
without previous notice to her employer, bypassing her immediate bosses and
insubordination, and going AWOL which created problems on news gathering over
her beat.
Under
these circumstances, we cannot fault the appellate court for its ruling. Courts
only respond to the facts presented and the issues framed by the parties and
consider these in light of our procedural and substantive laws. It is a matter
of record that the petitioner never raised in her petition for certiorari before the CA any objection
relating to the consideration of incidents other than her absence on AWOL,
intent to falsify and breach of trust. She
did not object to the discussion of these other incidents and, on the contrary,
met them squarely. It is likewise a
matter of record, as already adverted to above, that the appellate court directly ruled on the NSC bidding issue because it
was an issue that the petitioner raised.
If it cited incidents beyond the grounds stated in the Notice of Termination,
it appears to us that these were incidents related to the breach of trust
mentioned in the notice of termination; they have been cited, not as grounds
for termination per se, but as related
circumstances that support the termination of the petitioner’s employment for
breach of trust.
We
note in this regard that at the earliest instance,[30]
the respondent had given the petitioner the fullest opportunity to explain as
our rules on due process require.[31] The incidents mentioned by the NLRC and the
CA were not unknown to the petitioner as she seeks to imply in her discussion
of the purpose of a notice of termination.[32] Thus, while the petitioner correctly stated
that –“The said notice is the written
proof of what was in the mind of the private respondents when they terminated
the petitioner. It is a document free of
afterthoughts to justify the illegal termination of petitioner” – her
conclusions in applying this general principle, however, are far from correct in
the circumstances of the present case. The
petitioner had never been in the dark on what were in the employer’s mind as
these matters had been known to her and had been the subject of internal communications
between her and the respondent employer.
Furthermore, these matters – particularly the NSC bidding incident –
were considered at every stage in the adjudication of the present dispute. Thus,
at this point – most especially after the
petitioner’s submission before the appellate court of the very issues she now
says should not have been considered – she cannot now turn around and fault
the court for acting on her submitted issues. She is now barred from taking this
contrary position under the principle of estoppel.[33] In layman’s terms, this simply means that
she has violated a basic rule of fairness by urging the appellate court
to rule on an issue and then assailing the court for acting on that issue when
the court’s action did not go her way.
To
be sure, even under the strict terms of the grounds cited in the Notice of
Termination – i.e., abandonment of post with the intention of falsifying
information when applying for leave of absence, prolonged absence without
official leave[34]
and breach of trust – we hold that the termination of the petitioner’s employment
is justified because her actions meant
more than being away from work without prior leave. Her absence, under the
surrounding circumstances of the case, gave the employer grounds to cite her
for breach of trust. Inherent in this consideration are the nature
of her job, how she incurred her absence, the significance of her absence, and
the injury she caused to the company – matters that were all touched upon in
the assailed CA decision.
In
our own consideration of the merits of the cited grounds for termination, we find
no error sufficiently weighty and substantive to call for the reversal of the
appellate court’s decision. By her own acts, tested against common sense standards
that should apply to a professional like the petitioner, she provided the
respondent employer sufficient reasons to terminate her employment.
First, the petitioner exhibited a
negative work attitude with respect to her trip to Hongkong. When asked to
explain her absence without official leave from
Second, she left without notice to
and without leave of her employer nor of any one in a responsible position who
could make the necessary adjustments in her work assignments, especially the coverage
of a running story like the NSC bidding. Under the circumstances surrounding
the incident, the petitioner did really abandon an assignment. This omission cannot be mitigated by any
claim that the absence was not prolonged and was only for only two days as she
argued before the Labor Arbiter[35]
and as she annotated in her copy of the memorandum of Ms. Lucas dated
Third, the petitioner’s absence
without official leave and her role in the NSC bidding fiasco betray another
unfavorable aspect of her character. This was her tendency to bypass authority
and to disrespect her superior as shown by her failure to inform Mr. Medina of
her trip to Hongkong.[37] Her omission can very well be a basis for breach
of trust drawn from the fact of her absence.
Thus, based on these considerations,
the petitioner’s AWOL and her intent to falsify her excuse for her Hongkong
trip – i.e., the grounds stated in
the respondent company’s notice of termination – constitute ample reasons for
the respondent company to lose its trust on the petitioner as an employee tasked
with the responsibility of reporting on significant developing events.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice Chairperson |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Petition
for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Oswaldo D.
Agcaoili (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia (retired
member of this Court) and Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion; rollo,
pp. 32-39.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] NLRC Case No. 06-04802-94.
[10] Supra, at note 6, p.
2.
[11] Rollo, at pp. 47-58.
[12] Supra, at note 8, p. 3.
[13] Rollo, pp. 59-77.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Supra note 2, p. 1.
[18] Rollo, p. 41.
[19] Supra, at note 1, p. 1.
[20] Rollo, at
pp. 145-159.
[21]
[22] Supra, at note 8, page 3.
[23] Supra, at note 11, p. 4.
[24] Rollo, at pp. 167-184.
[25] Should be Book VI, Rule I, Section 1, The
Labor Code of the
[26] Petition, rollo, p. 15.
[27] RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Sec. 1.
A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth.
[28] Rollo, pp. 108 to 111.
[29] Ibid., pp. 111-112.
[30] Supra, at note 6, p. 2.
[31] Supra, at note 7, p. 2.
[32] Petition, at pp. 8-9; rollo, at pp. 16-17.
[33] Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that
“through estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon
the person seeking it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person
relying thereon.” See: Quiambao v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128305,
[34] Supra, at note 8, p. 3.
[35] Labor Arbiter’s Decision, rollo, at pp. 47-58, 56.
[36] Supra, at note 7, p. 2.
[37] Shown also by her act of by-passing Ms. Lucas who had asked her to explain her absence and her failure to file her NSC bidding report – a matter also ventilated in the submissions at the tribunals below but which we leave out because it is not directly cited in the notice of termination.