Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD
DIVISION
|
SPOUSES
SOFRONIO SANTOS and NATIVIDAD SANTOS, FROILAN SANTOS, CECILIA M. MACASPAC, and R
TRANSPORT CORPORATION, Petitioners, - versus - HEIRS OF DOMINGA LUSTRE, namely
TARCISIO MANIQUIZ, TERESITA BURGOS, FLORITA M. REYES and LERMIE MANIQUIZ, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 151016
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and REYES,
JJ. Promulgated: August 6, 2008 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[1]
dated
The facts, as borne by the records, are as follows:
Dominga Lustre, who died on P38,000.00.[2]
On P15,000.00 through a Deed of Absolute Sale.[3] The mortgage appears to have been canceled on
As a result of the sale, TCT No. NT-50384 was canceled and TCT No.
NT-183029 was issued in the name of the spouses
On April 14, 1994, Cecilia Macaspac (also a petitioner) and Tarcisio
Maniquiz, both heirs of Dominga Lustre, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan,
Nueva Ecija, a Complaint for Declaration of the Inexistence of Contract,
Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages[6]
against Froilan M. Santos. That case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 1330. Later, the plaintiffs sought the amendment of
the complaint to include Eusebio Maniquiz as plaintiff and to include a
certification against forum shopping. However,
the records in this case are bereft of any information as to whether the same
was allowed by the trial court.[7] We note, however, that only Cecilia Macaspac executed
a Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping[8] in that case.
According to the Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 1330, plaintiffs
Cecilia and Tarcisio are the legitimate children, while Eusebio is the spouse
of Dominga Lustre, who allegedly left them the subject property when she died
on
1. Ordering the inexistence of sale dated
2. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. NT-193973 in favor of defendant and reconvey the same to the plaintiff;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00
as attorney’s fee, P20,000.00 as moral damages; P20,000.00 as
litigation expenses; P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. Ordering defendant to pay the cost of the suit;
5. General relief[s] are likewise prayed for in the premises. (Emphasis ours.)[9]
On
On May 14, 1999, while Civil Case No. 1330 was still pending, Dominga
Lustre’s other heirs, namely, Eusebio Maniquiz, Teresita Burgos, Tarcisio
Maniquiz, Florita M. Reyes and Lermie Maniquiz filed a Complaint for Annulment
of Transfer Certificate of Title and Deed of Absolute Sale[11]
against spouses Sofronio and Natividad Santos, Froilan Santos, Cecilia M.
Macaspac, R Transport Corporation, and the Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City,
with the same RTC. Cecilia Macaspac, plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1330, was
impleaded as defendant because she refused to join the other heirs as
plaintiffs. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2115 and was raffled to
Branch 34.
The complaint alleged that the spouses
a. Annulling and declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute Sale, Annex
C hereof; that between spouses
b. Annulling and declaring null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-183029 appearing to be in the name of defendant spouses; TCT No. NT-193973 in the name of defendant Froilan M. Santos and Transfer Certificate of Title, if any, in the name of defendant corporation;
c. Reinstating Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-50384 in the name of Dominga Lustre and directing the Register of Deeds to do so or to issue [a] new one in the name of the deceased Dominga Lustre and canceling all titles mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph which [were] made to cancel Lustre’s title;
d. Ordering defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs the following:
1.) Moral damages of P200,000.00;
2.) Exemplary damages of P100,000.00;
3.) Attorney’s fee of P50,000.00, plus cost of suit.
Plaintiffs further pray for such other affirmative reliefs as are deemed just and equitable in the premises. [12]
Alleging that the plaintiffs’ right of action for annulment of the Deed
of Sale and TCT Nos. 183029 and 193973 had long prescribed and was barred by
laches, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 2115.[13] They
later filed an Omnibus/Supplemental Motion to Dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia.[14]
On
They then filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals (CA), assailing the denial of their motion to
dismiss. On
In the assailed decision, the CA pronounced that the respondents were not
guilty of forum shopping. There was no identity of parties because Cecilia
Macaspac, who was a plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1330, was a defendant in Civil
Case No. 2115; and there was only one defendant in Civil Case No. 1330, while
there were several additional defendants in Civil Case No. 2115. Moreover, the
reliefs demanded in the two cases differed. In Civil Case No. 1330, plaintiffs were
seeking the declaration of the inexistence of a sale dated
On the issue of prescription and laches, the CA declared that an action
for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe, and laches
could not have set in since there was no unreasonable delay in the filing of
the case.[20]
In this petition for review, the sole issue submitted for resolution is
whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the case
based on forum shopping and prescription or laches.[21]
The petition has no merit. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners’
motion to dismiss.
Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in the other.[22] Among its elements are identity of the parties, identity of the subject matter and identity of the
causes of action in the two cases.[23]
The dispute in this case centers on whether there exist identity
of causes of action and identity of
parties between Civil Case No. 1330 and Civil Case No. 2115.
Concededly, the causes of action in Civil Case No. 1330 and Civil Case
No. 2115 are identical. There is
identity of causes of action if the same evidence needed in the first case will
sustain the second action, and this principle applies even if the reliefs
sought in the two cases are different.[24] Without a doubt, the same evidence will be
necessary to sustain the causes of action in these two cases which are
substantially based on the same series of transactions. In fact, similar reliefs are prayed for in the
two cases. Both complaints ultimately
seek the cancellation of the title of the alleged transferees and the recovery
of the subject property.
Despite this similarity, however, we hold that respondents
are not guilty of forum shopping because the element of identity of parties is
not present.
In insisting that the parties are identical, petitioners stress that all
the plaintiffs are heirs of Dominga Lustre, while the defendants are past and
present holders of the certificates of title covering the subject property. They argue that Cecilia Macaspac’s being a defendant
in the second case does not change whatever interest she has in the former case,
considering that she is an indispensable party in both cases. They posit that additional parties will not
prevent the application of the rule on res
judicata.[25]
While we agree with the CA that there is no identity of parties in the
two cases, we do not agree with the rationale behind its conclusion. To recall, the CA ratiocinated that there was
no identity of parties because Cecilia Macaspac, while a plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 1330, is a defendant in Civil Case No. 2115, and there are several
additional defendants in Civil Case No. 2115.
The CA appears to have overlooked the principle that what is required is only substantial, and not absolute, identity of parties. There is substantial identity of parties when there is a community
of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case,
even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case.[26] Moreover, the fact that the positions of the
parties are reversed, i.e., the
plaintiffs in the first case are the defendants in the second case, or vice
versa, does not negate the identity of parties for purposes of determining whether the case is dismissible on
the ground of litis pendentia.[27]
Following these
legal principles, it appears that there is identity of parties in the two cases.
However, a closer look at the facts and
a deeper understanding of pertinent jurisprudence will lead to a different
conclusion: there is actually no
identity of parties because the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1330 does not, in
fact, share a common interest with the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2115.
As pointed out by petitioners,
plaintiffs in both cases are the heirs of Dominga Lustre; they are therefore
co-owners of the property. However, the
fact of being a co-owner does not necessarily mean that a plaintiff is acting
for the benefit of the co-ownership when he files an action respecting the
co-owned property. Co-owners are not parties inter se in relation to the
property owned in common. The test is
whether the “additional” party, the co-owner in this case, acts in the same
capacity or is in privity with the parties in the former action. [28]
Notably, plaintiff Cecilia Macaspac
in Civil Case No. 1330 filed the complaint seeking the reconveyance of the
property to her, and not to Dominga Lustre or her heirs. This is a clear act of repudiation of the
co-ownership which would negate a conclusion that she acted in privity with the
other heirs or that she filed the complaint in behalf of the co-ownership. In
contrast, respondents were evidently acting for the benefit of the co-ownership
when they filed the complaint in Civil Case No. 2115 wherein they prayed that
TCT No. NT-50384 in the name of Dominga Lustre be reinstated, or a new certificate
of title be issued in her name.
The petitioners and
respondents have squabbled over whether the additional parties in the second
case are indispensable or necessary parties on the assumption that the proper
characterization of the parties will have a bearing on the determination of the
existence of identity of parties. In
support of their position, the petitioners cite Juan v. Go Cotay[29] when they theorize that “there is
still identity of parties although in the second action there is one party who
was not joined in the former action, if it appears that such party is not a necessary party either in the
first or in the second action.”[30]
We note, however, that the party who was not impleaded in Go Cotay was, technically speaking, a
necessary party (as opposed to an indispensable party as defined under the
Rules of Court), being the plaintiff’s wife who also had an interest in the
case. Possibly, and, indeed, it seems
probable that the petitioners may not have used the term “necessary party” in
the strict legal sense. They could
really have been referring to an “indispensable party.” In challenging petitioners’ allegation, respondents
obviously understood the statement as referring to an indispensable party. They were, therefore, quick to point out that
the additional plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2115 are indispensable parties,
being co-owners of the property.[31]
By this debate, the parties have only muddled the issue. The determination of whether there is identity of parties rests on
the commonality of the parties’ interest, regardless of whether they are
indispensable parties or not. The issue
of whether the additional parties are indispensable parties or not acquires
real significance only when considering the validity of the judgment that will
be rendered in the earlier case. This is
so, because if the additional parties are indispensable parties, then no valid
judgment can be rendered against them in the earlier case in which they did not
participate, and this will foreclose the application of res judicata which requires the existence of a final judgment.
Without question, a co-owner may bring an action to recover
the co-owned property without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners
as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of
all. In such case, the other heirs are merely necessary parties.
Parenthetically, the inclusion among the defendants of Cecilia Macaspac, who
refused to join the other heirs as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2115, was not
actually necessary.
However, if the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff
alone, as in Civil Case No. 1330, the action will not prosper unless he
impleads the other co-owners who are
indispensable parties.[32] The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to
the absent parties but even as to those present.[33] The trial court does not acquire jurisdiction
over the indispensable parties who are not impleaded in the case, and judgment
thereon cannot be valid and binding against them. A decision that is null and void for want of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court is not a decision in contemplation
of law; hence, it can never become final and executory.[34]
Worth mentioning is
the doctrine that any adverse ruling in the earlier case will not, in any way,
prejudice the heirs who did not join, even if such case was actually filed in
behalf of all the co-owners. In fact, if
an action for recovery of property is dismissed, a subsequent action
by a co-heir who did not join the earlier case should not be barred by prior
judgment.[35] Any judgment of the court
in favor of the co-owner will benefit the others, but if the judgment is
adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners.[36]
Applying these principles to the instant case, we rule that
there is no identity of parties and thus, the second action is not barred by litis pendentia.
On
the issue of prescription and laches, we fully agree with the CA. The action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of title was obtained by
means of a fictitious deed of sale is virtually an action for the declaration
of its nullity, which does not prescribe.[37] Moreover, a person acquiring property through
fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust
for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for
reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years. And in such case, the prescriptive period
applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the
plaintiff is not in possession of the property. Otherwise, if plaintiff is in possession of the property, prescription does
not commence to run against him. Thus,
when an action for reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it would be in the nature
of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.[38]
It follows then that the respondents’ present action should not be barred
by laches. Laches is a doctrine in equity,
which may be used only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law. Obviously, it cannot be set up to resist the
enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right.[39]
Finally, it is true that an action for reconveyance will not prosper when
the property sought to be reconveyed is in the hands of an innocent purchaser
for value. In this case, however, the
protection of the rights of any alleged innocent purchaser is a matter that
should be threshed out in the main case and not in these proceedings.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, with Associate Justices Teodoro P. Regino and Josefina Guevara-Salonga, concurring, rollo, pp. 76-85.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 101-102.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Rollo, pp. 128-132.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] Reyes v. Alsons Development and Investment
Corporation, G.R. No. 153936, March 2,
2007, 517 SCRA 244, 251.
[23] Nery v. Leyson,
393 Phil. 644, 654 (2000).
[24]
[25] Rollo, p. 348.
[26] Sendon v. Ruiz, 415 Phil. 376, 385 (2001).
[27] Agilent
Technologies
[28] Nery v. Leyson,
supra note 23, at 655.
[29] 26 Phil. 328 (1913).
[30] Rollo, p. 350.
[31]
[32] Baloloy v. Hular,
G.R. No. 157767,
[33] Orbeta v. Sendiong,
G.R. No. 155236,
[34] Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 250, 267 (1997).
[35] Nery v. Leyson, supra
note 29, at 655-656.
[36] Baloloy v. Hular,
G.R. No. 157767,
[37] Philippine National Bank v. Heirs of Estanislao Militar and Deogracias Militar, G.R. No. 164801, August 18, 2005, 467 SCRA 377, 388.
[38] Spouses Anita and
Honorio Aguirre v. Heirs of Lucas Villanueva, G.R. No. 169898,
[39] Philippine National Bank v. Heirs of Estanislao Militar and Deogracias Militar, supra note 37, at 389.