THIRD DIVISION
|
PUREFOODS CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus - NAGKAKAISANG SAMAHANG
MANGGAGAWA NG PUREFOODS RANK-AND-FILE, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 150896
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: August
28, 2008 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
The petitioner, Purefoods
Corporation, in this Rule 45 petition seeks the reversal of the appellate
court’s dismissal of its certiorari
petition, and our consequent review of the labor commission’s finding that it
committed unfair labor practice and illegally dismissed the concerned union
members.
Three labor organizations and a
federation are respondents in this case—Nagkakaisang
Samahang Manggagawa Ng Purefoods Rank-And-File (NAGSAMA-Purefoods), the
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file workers of Purefoods’ meat division
throughout Luzon; St. Thomas Free Workers Union (STFWU), of those in the farm
in Sto. Tomas, Batangas; and Purefoods Grandparent Farm Workers Union (PGFWU),
of those in the poultry farm in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. These organizations were
affiliates of the respondent federation, Purefoods Unified Labor Organization (PULO).[1]
On
In the meantime, STFWU and PGFWU also
submitted their respective proposals for CBA renewal, and their general
membership resolutions which, among others, affirmed the two organizations’
affiliation with PULO. Consistent with its stance, Purefoods refused to
negotiate with the unions should a PULO representative be in the panel. The
parties then agreed to postpone the negotiations indefinitely.[3]
On July 24, 1995, however, the
petitioner company concluded a new CBA with another union in its farm in
Malvar, Batangas. Five days thereafter, or on July 29, 1995, at around 8:00 in
the evening, four company employees facilitated the transfer of around 23,000
chickens from the poultry farm in Sto. Tomas, Batangas (where STFWU was the
exclusive bargaining agent) to that in Malvar. The following day, the regular
rank-and-file workers in the Sto. Tomas farm were refused entry in the company
premises; and on July 31, 1995, 22 STFWU members were terminated from
employment. The farm manager, supervisors and electrical workers of the Sto. Tomas
farm, who were members of another union, were nevertheless retained by the
company in its employ.[4]
Aggrieved by these developments, the
four respondent labor organizations jointly instituted a complaint for unfair
labor practice (ULP), illegal lockout/dismissal and damages, docketed as NLRC
Case No. NLRC-NCR-00-07-05159-95, with the Labor Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).[5]
In the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter
(LA), Purefoods interposed, among others, the defenses that PULO was not a
legitimate labor organization or federation for it did not have the required
minimum number of member unions; that the closure of the Sto. Tomas farm was
not arbitrary but was the result of the financial non-viability of the
operations therein, or the consequence of the landowner’s pre-termination of
the lease agreement; that the other complainants had no cause of action
considering that it was only the Sto. Tomas farm which was closed; that the
termination of the employees complied with the 30-day notice requirement and
that the said employees were paid 30-day advance salary in addition to
separation pay; and that the concerned union, STFWU, lost its status as
bargaining representative when the Sto. Tomas farm was closed.[6]
On
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the
ruling of the LA, ordered the payment of P500,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages and the reinstatement with full backwages of the STFWU
members. In its March 16, 2001 Decision (CA No. 022059-00), the labor
commission ruled that the petitioner company’s refusal to recognize the labor
organizations’ affiliation with PULO was unjustified considering that the
latter had been granted the status of a federation by the Bureau of Labor
Relations; and that this refusal constituted undue interference in, and
restraint on the exercise of the employees’ right to self-organization and free
collective bargaining. The NLRC said that the real motive of the company in the
sudden closure of the Sto. Tomas farm and the mass dismissal of the STFWU
members was union busting, as only the union members were locked out, and the
company subsequently resumed operations of the closed farm under a new contract
with the landowner. Because the requisites of a valid lockout were absent, the
NLRC concluded that the company committed ULP. The dispositive portion of the
NLRC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent Purefoods Corporation
is hereby directed to reinstate effective October 1, 2000 employees-members of
the STFWU-PULO who were illegally locked out on July 30, 1995 and to pay them
their full backwages.
SO ORDERED.
Its motion for reconsideration having
been denied,[8] the petitioner corporation filed a
Rule 65 petition before the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
66871.
In the assailed October 25, 2001
Resolution,[9] the
appellate court dismissed outright the company’s petition for certiorari on the ground that the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping was defective since no
proof of authority to act for and on behalf of the corporation was submitted by
the corporation’s senior vice-president who signed the same; thus, the petition
could not be deemed filed for and on behalf of the real party-in-interest. Then,
the CA, in its
Dissatisfied, petitioner instituted
before us the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
The petition is denied.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court explicitly mandates that the petition for certiorari shall be accompanied by a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping.[11] When
the petitioner is a corporation, inasmuch as corporate powers are exercised by
the board, the certification shall be executed by a natural person authorized
by the corporation’s board of directors.[12]
Absent any authority from the board, no person, not even the corporate
officers, can bind the corporation.[13]
Only individuals who are vested with authority by a valid board resolution may
sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of the corporation, and
proof of such authority must be attached to the petition.[14] Failure
to attach to the certification any proof of the signatory’s authority is a
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.[15]
In the instant case, the senior vice-president
of the petitioner corporation signed the certificate of non-forum shopping. No
proof of his authority to sign the said certificate was, however, attached to
the petition. Thus, applying settled jurisprudence, we find that the CA
committed no error when it dismissed the petition.
The Court cannot even be liberal in
the application of the rules because liberality is warranted only in instances
when there is substantial compliance with the technical requirements in
pleading and practice, and when there is sufficient explanation that the
non-compliance is for a justifiable cause, such that the outright dismissal of
the case will defeat the administration of justice.[16]
Here, the petitioner corporation, in its motion for reconsideration before the
appellate court and in its petition before us, did not present a reasonable
explanation for its non-compliance with the rules. Further, it cannot be said
that petitioner substantially complied therewith, because it did not attach to
its motion for reconsideration any proof of the authority of its signatory. It
stands to reason, therefore, that this Court now refuses to condone petitioner’s
procedural transgression.
We must reiterate that the rules of
procedure are mandatory, except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons,
they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate to the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying therewith.[17]
While technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of
justice, they are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of
cases and effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets.[18]
Be that as it may, this Court has
examined the records if only to dispel any doubt on the propriety of the dismissal
of the case, and we found no abuse of discretion, much more a grave one, on the
part of the labor commission in reversing the ruling of the LA.
It is crystal clear that the closure
of the Sto. Tomas farm was made in bad faith. Badges of bad faith are evident
from the following acts of the petitioner: it unjustifiably refused to
recognize the STFWU’s and the other unions’ affiliation with PULO; it concluded
a new CBA with another union in another farm during the agreed indefinite
suspension of the collective bargaining negotiations; it surreptitiously
transferred and continued its business in a less hostile environment; and it suddenly
terminated the STFWU members, but retained and brought the non-members to the
Malvar farm. Petitioner presented no evidence to support the contention that it
was incurring losses or that the subject farm’s lease agreement was
pre-terminated. Ineluctably, the closure of the Sto. Tomas farm circumvented
the labor organization’s right to collective bargaining and violated the members’
right to security of tenure.[19]
The Court reiterates that the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court filed with the CA will prosper only if there is clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC.[20]
It was incumbent, then, for petitioner to prove before the appellate court that
the labor commission capriciously and whimsically exercised its judgment tantamount
to lack of jurisdiction, or that it exercised its power in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and that its abuse
of discretion is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[21]
Here, as aforesaid, no such proof was adduced by petitioner. We, thus, declare that the NLRC ruling is not
characterized by grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the same is also
affirmed.
However, this Court makes the
following observations and modifications:
We deem as proper the award of moral
and exemplary damages. We hold that the
sudden termination of the STFWU members is tainted with ULP because it was done
to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right
to self-organization. Thus, the
petitioner company is liable for the payment of the aforesaid damages.[22] Notable,
though, is that this award, while stated in the body of the NLRC decision, was
omitted in the dispositive portion of the said ruling. To prevent any further
confusion in the implementation of the said decision, we correct the
dispositive portion of the ruling to include the payment of P500,000.00
as moral and exemplary damages to the illegally dismissed STFWU members.
As to the order of reinstatement, the Court modifies the same
in that if it is no longer feasible considering the length of time that the
employees have been out of petitioner’s employ,[23]
the company is ordered to pay the illegally dismissed STFWU members separation
pay equivalent to one (1) month pay, or one-half (1/2) month pay for every year
of service, whichever is higher.[24]
The releases and quitclaims, as well as the affidavits of
desistance,[25] signed
by the concerned employees, who were then necessitous men at the time of
execution of the documents, are declared invalid and ineffective. They will not bar the workers from claiming
the full measure of benefits flowing from their legal rights.[26]
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The P500,000.00 to the said illegally dismissed STFWU members.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O
N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo,
pp. 130-131.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
CONFORMABLY WITH THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the respondents did not commit unfair labor practice against complainants and that there was no illegal dismissal committed.
SO ORDERED.
[8]
[9] Penned by Associate Justice
Rodrigo V. Cosico, with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Eliezer R. De
Los Santos, concurring; id. at 176-177.
[10]
[11] Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (Italics supplied.)
[12] Fuentebella
v. Castro, G.R. No. 150865, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 183, 190-191; Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Flight
Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines, G.R. No. 143088,
January 24, 2006, 479 SCRA 605, 608; Expertravel
& Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152392, May 26, 2005, 459
SCRA 147, 157; Eslaban, Jr. v. Vda. de
Onorio, 412 Phil. 667 (2001).
[13] San
Pablo Manufacturing Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R.
No. 147749, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 192, 197.
[14] Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines, supra note 12.
[15] Shipside
Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, 404 Phil. 981, 995 (2001).
[16] United
Paragon Mining Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150959, August 4,
2006, 497 SCRA 638, 647-648; Philippine
Valve Manufacturing Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 152304, November 12, 2004, 442 SCRA 383, 387. Cf. Estrebillo v. Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 159674,
June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 218; LDP
Marketing, Inc. v. Monter, G.R. No. 159653, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 137; China Banking Corporation v. Mondragon
International Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 164798, November 17, 2005, 475
SCRA 332; Vicar International
Construction, Inc. v. FEB Leasing and Finance Corporation, G.R. No. 157195,
April 22, 2005, 456 SCRA 588, in which the Court relaxed in these cases the
application of procedural rules in the interest of justice.
[17] Spouses
Ortiz v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 95, 101 (1998).
[18]
[19] See St. John Colleges, Inc. v.
[20] Palomado
v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 96520,
[21] Machica
v. Roosevelt Services Center, Inc., G.R. No. 168664,
[22] Quadra
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147593,
[23] Jardine Davies, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 370 Phil. 310, 322 (1999).
[24] Philippine
Carpet Employees Association (PHILCEA) v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 168719,
[25] Rollo,
pp. 68-69, 212-213.
[26]