Republic of the
Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
CEFERINO
T. ADVIENTO, G.R. No. 150844
Petitioner,
-
versus -
Present:
Heirs of Miguel Alvarez, PUNO,
C.J.,
Chairperson,
namely: MARIA P. ALVAREZ, CARPIO,
DR.
BEDA P. ALVAREZ, JR.,
MIGUEL ALVAREZ, JR., AZCUNA,
and
DR. AGUSTINA A. BALUYOT, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, JJ.
SEVERINO
P. ALVAREZ, ANICIA
LEE,
AZUCENA S. HUSHEY, and
ALEXANDER P. ALVAREZ;
Heirs of Lilia A. Ramos, namely:
DANILO RAMOS, NOEL RAMOS, Promulgated:
ROY
RAMOS, and LEO MIGUEL
RAMOS;
and
Respondents. August
20, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 37641[1]
which affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),[2] of
the Sixth Judicial Region, Branch 20,
Civil
Case No. R-12 (7205) was a case of reconveyance involving a piece of land with
an area of 228 square meters, located in
Lydia
Gaya alleged in her Answer: (1) that Miguel Alvarez had no right of ownership
since he had not been in continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the said
land; (2) she had been in peaceful and continuous possession as an owner from
1936 up to the present; (3) that she acquired an imperfect title thereto, which
was confirmed on June 29, 1966 by the Cadastral Court in Camarines Sur in
accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 141; (4) that the case was considered
uncontested since she was the only claimant; (5) that the Court of First
Instance ordered the registration of said property along with the improvements
thereon in her and her husband’s name resulting in the issuance of Decree No.
117760 on December 4, 1967 and OCT No. 338 on March 15, 1968; (6) that her
title over the property has become indefeasible and can no longer be reviewed;
(7) that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations; and (8) the
complainant’s action was pure harassment, hence, damages should be awarded to
her.[5]
On
Miguel
Alvarez died during the trial. After the Notice of Death was submitted, he was
substituted by his heirs.[6]
On May
25, 1984, petitioner Ceferino Adviento filed an Answer in Intervention With
Urgent Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction alleging that he
acquired the controversial lot, or part thereof, by purchase against the
interest of Miguel Alvarez. Ceferino Adviento traced his title to Fidel Cu who
bought the same property from Lydia Gaya.
Petitioner
Adviento adopted the allegations of Lydia Gaya insofar as they contested the
ownership over the controverted land. He further alleged that Miguel Alvarez
constructed a concrete building, which the former discovered was encroaching on
his property. Petitioner alleged that the encroachment was illegal and unlawful
because he was dispossessed of his right of entering and occupying the
building. Adviento claimed damages amounting to Php 50,000.00 representing
reimbursement for expenses incurred.
The RTC ruled
in favor of respondents-heirs of Miguel Alvarez. The fallo of the RTC
decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, decision is hereby rendered:
(a) ordering the annulment of Original Certificate of Title No. 338 in the
name of Lydia Gaya and its subsequent titles, TCT 13200 in the name of Fidel Cu
and TCT 15201 in the name of Ceferino Adviento, in so far as it covers the land
adjacent to plaintiff’s land covered by TCT 69 on the Southeast along the Naga
River consisting of more or less 228 square meters, and further declaring
plaintiff’s ownership thereon [and] who [is] entitled to possession thereof;
(b) ordering defendant Lydia Gaya to indemnify plaintiffs (sic) the amount
of P5,000 as attorney’s fees and the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On appeal, the CA affirmed.
The
petitioner raised the following issues against the decision of the appellate
court:
I.
The Court of Appeals erred in failing to hold
that whenever there is a road boardering [sic] a stream or river there is ceased [sic] a riparian ownership on an alleged accretion
and whatever accretion there might have been does not belong to the owner.
II.
The Court of Appeals erred in failing to hold
that the judicial admission of respondent Miguel Alvarez during the pre-trial
as to the fact that petitioner had a title over the land in question controls
the subsequent proceeding of the case.
III.
The Court of Appeals erred in failing to hold
that inasmuch as there was regularity, validity and conclusiveness of the
decision in the Land Registration Case (LRC) resulting in a decree of
registration in favor of appellant Gaya, the said LRC decision puts to rest
whatever issues there may be.
IV.
The Court of Appeals erred in failing to hold
that by the completeness and determination of title in favor of Lydia Gaya and
subsequently to petitioner, the civil case should have been dismissed and that
the decision of the Regional Trial Court as well as the Court of Appeals in
favor of respondent heirs of Miguel Alvarez should have been likewise
dismissed.
V.
The Court of Appeals erred in failing to hold
that there was no fraud; plaintiff and his substitute heirs are not entitled to
an award for attorney’s fees.[8]
We find
the petition without merit.
Petitioner
contends that title should not vest to a riparian owner when there is a road
bordering the land and the adjunct waters. This is an issue raised for the
first time in this Court. We cannot entertain the issue for it is unprocedural
and would call for determination of facts after presentation of evidence. Settled is the rule that this Court is not a
trier of facts. [9]
The
records show that the claim of Alvarez is based on possession. The
trial court and the Court of Appeals found the claim sustained by the evidence. They held that Miguel Alvarez acquired
the lot by purchase from ALATCO, on January 23, 1952, located on Padian St.,
Naga City, covered by OCT No. 862 which was later cancelled by TCT No. 69 in
the name of Alvarez. The land was bound on the northeast by a government
property; on the southeast by the
We also reject
petitioner’s contention that considering the admission by the respondents in
the trial court as to the existence of “title” in her name, she does not need
to prove her ownership of the subject lot. We affirm the ruling of the
appellate court that a “[d]istinction should
be drawn between taking judicial notice of sources, documents and materials
without formal proof of the genuineness or authenticity, and taking notice of
facts related to such admissions and materials.”[10] As the appellate
court explained: “[w]here the court finds that it is while the source is genuine, the facts
therein are not clearly indisputable and should, therefore be subject to proof.”[11] The totality of proof
adduced by the parties shows that the title of petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest is bereft of any legal basis.
We cannot also agree with
petitioner that the decision of the appellate court failed to recognize the regularity,
validity and conclusiveness of the order in the Land Registration Case which culminated
in the decree of registration in favor of petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest.
Further, petitioner argues that it was enough that there was publication of
notice in the application for registration.[12]
Petitioner contends that respondents had all the opportunity to know of the
application for registration made by petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest over
the subject lot.
The
applicable law at that time is Section 21 of Act No. 496, Land Registration Act,[13] which
requires that applications for registration should contain a notification to “all
the occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if
not known, it shall state what search has been made to find them.”[14] So we held in Republic v. Heirs of
Luisa Villa Abrille:[15]
For an applicant
to have this imperfect or incomplete title or claim to a land to be originally
registered under Act 496, the several requisites should all be satisfied; (1)
Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private surveyor; (2)
Filing an application for registration by the applicant; (3) Setting of the
date for the initial hearing of the application by the Court; (4) Transmittal
of the application and the date of the initial hearing together with all the
documents or other evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land
Registration Commission; (5) Publication of a notice of the filing of the
application and the date and place of the hearing in the Official Gazette; (6) Service
of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those known to have interests
in the property by the sheriff; (7) Filing of answer to the application by
any person whether named in the notice or not; (8) Hearing of the case by the
Court; (9) Promulgation of judgment by the Court; (10) Issuance of the decree
by the Court declaring the decision final and instructing the Land Registration
Commission to issue a decree of confirmation and registration; (11) Entry of
the decree of registration in the Land Registration Commission; (12) Sending of
copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding Register of Deeds; and
(13) Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration book and
the issuance of the owner's duplicate original certificate of title to the
applicant by the Register of Deeds, upon payment of the prescribed fees.[16]
In the case at bar, petitioner admitted
the lack of the notice to respondents. Lack of notice is a denial of due
process to respondents. It is elementary that no person can be denied his property
without due process of law.[17]
We also
reject petitioner’s argument that the registration decree binds the RTC and the
CA. The argument goes against the very grain of judicial review. The RTC and
the CA are not bound by the land registration decree especially when it is
assailed on the ground of fraud.
Section
38 of Act No. 496, The Land Registration Act, provides:
SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the
applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse
claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration
shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet
title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section.
It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular
Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the
application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description 'To
all whom it may concern.' Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the
absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by
any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject,
however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in
the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year
after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has
acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every
decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be
incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the decree of registration
shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and effect forever, subject
only to the right of appeal hereinbefore provided: Provided, however, That no
decree or certificate of title issued to persons not parties to the appeal
shall be cancelled or annulled. But any person aggrieved by such decree in any
case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any
other person for fraud in procuring the decree. Whenever the phrase 'innocent
purchaser for value' or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be
deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for
value.[18]
In Salomon v. Bocauto,[19]
Justice Laurel had the occasion to discuss the nature of this provision:
Under section 38 of Act No. 496, the petitioner must show affirmatively that (1) he has an interest or estate in the land, and (2) he has been deprived of that interest through fraud in the procurement of the decree of registration. The essential facts are to be clearly alleged in the petition; otherwise, the registration court is justified in dismissing the same. (Guzman vs. Ortiz, 12 Phil., 701; Cusar Insular Government, 13 Phil., 319; Apurado vs. Apurado, 26 Phil., 586; and Escudero & Marasigan vs. Esguerra, 48 Phil., 511.) In the present case, the appellants Bocauto and Redon pretend to derive their claim from llariano Redon, the original owner. The lower court, however, in its decision dated January 26, 1939, appears to have rejected this claim and found that Mariano Redon had sold the said land to Bonifacio Redon, who, in turn, conveyed it to Policarpio Tamoro. Moreover, both petitioners had notice of the original registration proceedings, but failed to put up any claim and to show title in themselves.
In the case at bar, respondents
pleaded their interest in the land and the fraud used which defeated such
interest. No notice was given to the
respondents. The lack of notice was
obviously intended by the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest to prevent
contest on the application. Petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest falsely attested to the absence of any adverse claim,
including the absence of any possession of the land. By our rulings, this constitutes extrinsic
fraud. In Libundan v. Gil,[20] we
held that:
The
purpose of the law in giving aggrieved parties, deprived of land or any
interest therein, through fraud in the registration proceedings, the
opportunity to review the decree is to insure fair and honest dealing in the
registration of land. But the action to annul a judgment, upon the ground
of fraud, would be unavailing unless the fraud be extrinsic or collateral and
the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the
case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered, Extrinsic or
collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, connotes any
fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant 'outside the trial of a
case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby
said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of
the case.' But intrinsic fraud takes the form of ‘acts of a party in a
litigation during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured
testimony, which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a
fair and just determination of the case.’
Thus,
relief is granted to a party deprived of his interest in land where the fraud
consists in a deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when
in fact they are, or in applying for and obtaining adjudication and
registration in the name of a co-owner of land which he knows had not been allotted
to him in the partition, or in intentionally concealing facts, and conniving
with the land inspector to include in the survey plan the bed of a navigable
stream, or in willfully misrepresenting that there are no other claims, or in
deliberately failing to notify the party entitled to notice, or in inducing him
not to oppose an application, or in misrepresenting about the identity of the
lot to the true owner by the applicant causing the former to withdraw his
opposition. In all these examples the overriding consideration is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his
day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that
affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.[21]
The averments in the petition for
review of the decree of registration constitute specific and not mere general
allegations of actual and extrinsic fraud.[22]
Competent proof to support these allegations was adduced as found by the courts
a quo. We find no compelling reason to disturb their findings.
It should
be emphasized that petitioner is a successor-in-interest—he merely bought the
land from Lydia Gaya, and hence, the petitioner stepped into the shoes of the
same predecessor-in-interest.
As the
RTC found:
On cross, Ce[f]erino
Adviento admitted the existence of an annotation on the title of the pendency
of Civil Case No. 7205 filed as early as October 1971 before he purchased the
land in question, and therefore knew the risk of buying it. He was likewise
shown a title by Fidel Cu and also knew of the existence of a lis pendens
in the latter’s title. He also examined the records of this case, was aware
that the plaintiff was a boundary owner of the land in question, but did not
verify his title as to whether his land was bounded on the Southeast by
Admittedly,
the land in question consisting of 228 square meters, more or less, is a
portion of Lot 3164 covered by OCT 338 in the name of Lydia Gaya.[23]
Thus, when the trial court decided
against Lydia Gaya’s interest, it followed that all the succeeding titles which
trace interest to her title were affected. In the case at bar, the trial court
found that the issuance of title was illegal. Petitioner’s claimed right cannot
now have more coverage and extent than that from which it originated. Indeed, petitioner’s
purchase of the said land despite the notice of lis pendens and actual knowledge of the pending case would not
qualify him as an innocent purchaser for value.[24]
It is a settled rule that a purchaser of real estate with knowledge of any
defect or lack of title of the vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title
thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land or interest
therein. The same rule applies to one with knowledge of facts which should have
put him on inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with
the defects in the title of his vendor.[25]
IN
VIEW WHEREOF,
premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for
lack of merit. The assailed Decision, dated
Costs
against petitioner.
SO
ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate
Justice
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Miguel
Alvarez, plaintiff, v. Lydia Gaya, defendant-appellant, and Ceferino Adviento, intervenor-appellant,
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 37641, promulgated on May 10, 2001, penned by Justice Remedios
A. Salazar-Fernando with Justices Romeo A. Brawner and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador
concurring.
[2] Civil
Case No. R-12 (7205), dated
[3] Records,
Complaint, pp. 6-8.
[4]
[5] Records,
Answer, pp. 9-12.
[6] The
following heirs were substituted: the spouse, Maria P. Alvarez; eight (8)
children, namely, Beda P. Alvarez, Miguel P. Alvarez, Jr., Agustina A. Baluyot,
Severino P. Alvarez, Lilia A. Ramos, Anicia Lee, Azucena A. Hussey, and
Alexander P. Alvarez. Five of the children authorized their mother, Maria P.
Alvarez, to litigate on their behalf. The Motion for Substitution was granted
in an Order dated
[7] Rollo, p. 126;
[8] Rollo,
pp. 46-58.
[9] De
Guzman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-47378,
[10] Rollo, p. 25; CA Decision, p.
14.
[11] Rollo, p. 77; CA Decision, p.14.
[12]
[13] Land
Registration Act, Act No. 496, promulgated on
[14] Emphasis
supplied.
[15] L-39248,
[16] Emphasis
supplied.
[17] 1987 Phil. Const., Art. III, §1.
[18] §38, The
Land Registration Act, Act No. 496,
[19] 71
Phil. 363, 364-365 (emphasis supplied).
[20] G.R.
No. L-21163,
[21]
[22] Rollo, pp. 89-90; Complaint, pp. 2-3.
[23] Rollo, pp.122-123;
[24] Rollo, pp. 143-144.
[25] J.M.
Tuason v. Court of Appeals, No.
L-41233,