THIRD
DIVISION
|
SPOUSES FELIPE and VICTORIA LAYOS,
Petitioners, - versus- FIL-ESTATE GOLF AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., LA PAZ HOUSING
AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REPUBLIC OF THE
Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 150470 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. Chairperson, MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES,
JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner-spouses Felipe and
Victoria Layos (Spouses Layos)
seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision[2]
dated 26 April 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61759, which
affirmed the Order[3] dated 19
January 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 93 of San Pedro, Laguna,
summarily dismissing the spouses Layos’ Petition for
Reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 239 in LRC Case No.
B-1784. Likewise being assailed in the
Petition at bar is the Resolution[4]
dated 18 October 2001 of the appellate court denying the Spouses Layos’ Motion for Reconsideration of its earlier
Decision.
The factual and procedural
antecedents of the case presently before this Court, by themselves, appear
deceptively simple. However, they are so
intimately linked with other cases the factual backgrounds and judicial
resolutions of which the Court must also necessarily present herein.
I
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
G.R. No. 120958:
The Injunction Cases
The
Court begins with Fil-Estate Golf and
Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[5] a
case which it decided more than a decade ago.
The said case arose from the following facts:
Petitioner
Fil-Estate Golf & Development, Inc. (FEGDI) is
the developer of the Manila Southwoods golf course
and residential subdivision project which partly covers lands located in Biñan, Laguna. Its partner in the joint venture, La Paz
Housing and Development Corporation (
On
It was alleged in the said complaint that Felipe Layos is the legal owner and possessor of two (2) parcels of land having a total area of 837,695 square meters located at Barrio Tubigan, Biñan, Laguna, known as Lots 1 & 2 of Plan Psu-201 of the Bureau of Lands having acquired the same from his father, Mauricio Layos, who in turn inherited said properties from his own father, Natalio Layos, allegedly the original owner thereof. Layos claimed that the Southwoods project encroached upon the aforecited lands and thus contended that his rights of ownership and possession were violated when FERC brought in men and equipment to begin development of the said properties.
On
On
On
x x x x
On
The complaint in the San Pedro case (Civil Case No. B-4133) is basically identical to that filed in the Biñan case (Civil Case No. B3973), except for changes in the number of party-plaintiffs and party-defendants and in the area size of the claimed landholdings. Further, in the San Pedro case there is reference to a title (OCT No. 239), a specific date of intrusion and an increase in the damages prayed for.
On
On 15 July 1993, FEGDI filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31507) assailing the denial of its motion to dismiss the San Pedro case. The arguments and issues raised by petitioner to support its motion to dismiss were the same issues raised in the aforestated petition.
On
Meanwhile,
the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, in an
order dated
x x x x
On
FEGDI's motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied
in the Court of Appeals' resolution dated
FEGDI
came to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 120958. The Court granted the Petition and ruled in
favor of FEGDI.
The Court found that therein private
respondents, which included the Spouses Layos, did
commit forum shopping by instituting similar proceedings for injunction before
the RTCs of Biñan and San
Pedro, Laguna:
Private respondents have indeed resorted to forum-shopping in order to obtain a favorable decision. The familiar pattern (of one party's practice of deliberately seeking out a " sympathetic" court) is undisputedly revealed by the fact that after Felipe Layos instituted in 1992 a case for injunction and damages with application for preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna and after his prayer for a preliminary injunction was denied in March 1993, he and his wife, together with four (4) alleged buyers of portions of the land claimed by him, filed an identical complaint for injunction and damages with preliminary injunction a few months later, or in June 1993, this time with the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna.
Having been denied their temporary restraining order in one court, private respondents immediately instituted the same action in another tribunal - a deliberate tactic to seek out a different court which may grant their application for preliminary injunction, or at least give them another chance to obtain one.
Private respondents parry petitioner's allegation of forum shopping by adamantly contending that Felipe Layos did not, in any manner, authorize the filing of the Biñan case. Moreover, they insist that Felipe Layos' signature in the Biñan complaint is a forgery and that he neither appeared nor participated in the proceedings before the Biñan court.
We find no merit in private respondents' assertions. The almost word-for-word similarity of the complaints in both the Biñan and San Pedro cases totally refutes such a theory, as can readily be observed from a comparative view of the two aforementioned complaints x x x.
x x x x
Even the affidavits attached to the two complaints are virtually identical x x x
x x x x
Examining the two complaints one can easily
discern that the San Pedro complaint is simply an "improved" version
of the Biñan complaint and the similarity does not
end there. The residence certificates (of Felipe Layos) used
in the verification of both complaints are practically identical - same number,
date of issue and place of issue.
If indeed there is a "ghost Mr. Layos," as claimed by the private respondents, the
genuine Felipe Layos and the rest of the private
respondents should have, on their own volition, denounced the allegedly bogus
case filed with the Biñan court or at the very least,
informed the San Pedro court about it. It cannot be denied that private
respondents were aware of the Biñan case considering
that Annex C (Affidavit of Self-Adjudication with Sale) of the San Pedro
complaint was a mere photocopy of Annex B of the Biñan
complaint.
Private respondents likewise aver that there
is no identity of party-defendants in view of the fact that the defendant in
the Biñan case is the Fil-Estate
Realty Corporation (FERC) and in the San Pedro case the Fil-Estate
Golf and Development, Inc. (FEGDI), two completely separate and distinct
entities.
Private respondents' contention is
unmeritorious. In the Biñan case, FEGDI voluntarily
submitted to the court's jurisdiction by filing its answer and expressly
stating therein that it is the developer of Southwoods,
and not its sister company, FERC. Moreover, the Biñan
court in its orders dated
As clearly demonstrated above, the willful
attempt by private respondents to obtain a preliminary injunction in another
court after it failed to acquire the same from the original court constitutes
grave abuse of the judicial process. Such disrespect is penalized by the
summary dismissal of both actions as mandated by paragraph 17 of the Interim
Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on
x x x x
The rule against forum-shopping is further
strengthened by the issuance of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No.
04-94. Said circular formally established the rule that the deliberate filing
of multiple complaints to obtain favorable action constitutes forum-shopping
and shall be a ground for summary dismissal thereof x x
x.[7]
The
Court further pronounced that the Complaint in the San Pedro case did not state
a cause of action. Taking into
consideration the Complaint itself and its attached annexes, as well as the
other pleadings submitted by the parties, the Court found that:
In
the San Pedro complaint, private respondents anchored their claim of ownership
on an OCT No. 239 and on a survey plan Psu-201 in the name of Natalio Layos, copies of which
were attached to the complaint. His son and sole heir Mauricio Layos inherited the properties covered by the said plan. In
turn, Felipe Layos became the owner thereof through
an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication with
Private respondents' inconsistency is further manifested by the 1992 application for original registration filed by Mauricio Layos with the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna (docketed as Civil Case No. B-542) for the lots under Plan Psu-201. Why would Mauricio Layos file an application for the registration of the land claimed by him if it is already covered by OCT No. 239? The conclusion is inescapable that the document is fake or a forgery.
Finally, private respondents' cause of action against petitioner is defeated by the findings of Mr. Privadi Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Bureau of Lands, contained in his letters to the Regional Technical Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region IV dated 12 November 1992 and 15 December 1992, respectively:
The Regional Technical Director of Lands
DENR, Region IV, 1515
ATTN.: Engr. ROBERT C.
PANGYARIHAN
OIC, Surveys
Division
Sir:
In connection
with your request to validate the white print copy of an alleged plan Psu-201
which you had issued and certified that it is a copy of the tracing cloth of
Psu-201 which is on file in that Office, please forward to us the tracing cloth
plan to be examined instead of the white print copy that you have issued in
accordance with the procedure stated in DENR Administrative Order regarding
validation of plans other than the original copies being sent to the region
office.
It may be worthwhile to state for your information
that the plan Psu-201 is not among those officially enrolled into the file of
this Bureau. What is more confusing is that the inventory book of all plans
that were recovered after the war shows that Psu-201 is a survey for J. Reed covering
a piece of land in Malate, Manila but the plan that
was salvaged was heavily damaged and therefore it was not also microfilmed.
This would require therefore a more exhaustive research regarding the
authenticity of the tracing cloth that is in your file. (Italics ours.)
Very truly yours,
For the Director of Lands:
(SGD.) PRIVADI J.G. DALIRE
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division
x x x
MEMORANDUM:
FOR: The
Regional Technical Director of Lands
The Chief, Regional Surveys Division
DENR, Region IV
FROM: L M B
SUBJECT: Psu-201
Records show that the region furnished us a white
print copy certified by Engr. Robert Pangyarihan to have been "prepared from a tracing
cloth plan on file in the NCR" for validation. We returned the white print
plan prepared by Engr. Pangyarihan
because we should examine the "tracing cloth plan" and it is the
tracing cloth plan, white prints and photographic copies sent by the Central
Records Division to be returned to LMB for validation by this Division.
In the letter dated
Consider also that if the record of the Bureau is
different from the print copy is subjected to field ocular inspection of the
land and on the basis of the findings, the region may reconstruct the plan to
be approved as usual. Certified copies may now be issued based on the
reconstructed and approved plan. The white print of Psu-201 should therefore be
subjected to ocular inspection.
Our records of inventory of approved plans show
Psu-201 as a survey of J. Reed covering a piece of land in Malate,
For the Director of Lands:
(SGD.) PRIVADI J.G. DALIRE
Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division.
Consequently,
Mr. Sidicious F. Panoy, the
Regional Technical Director of DENR, Region IV, issued an order dated
IN RE: CANCELLATION
ORDER:
Plan Si-14769
True copy of Plan Claimant-Sofronio Olano
Area: 13,321,977 sq. m.
Plan Psu-201
Claimant - Natalio Layos
Brgy. Tubigan, Biñan, Laguna
Area: 837,695 sq. m.
ORDER
By way of reaction to a number of inquiries as to the
status of plans Si-14769 and Psu-201, verification was made at the Technical
Reference Section of the Land Management Bureau, Escolta,
Manila as to the authenticity thereof on the basis of still recoverable records
and the following facts were established, to wit:
1. That Psu-201 is an original survey for J Reed
located in Malate,
2. That Si-14769 is a survey number for the plan of a
land parcel situated in Bo. Bessang,
The purported blue print plan of Psu-201 indicating
the land covered thereby to be situated in Bo. Tubigan,
Biñan, Laguna and claimed by Natalio
Layos and comprising 837,695 sq. meters is,
therefore, a spurious plan and, probably the result of a manipulative act by
scheming individuals who surreptitiously got it inserted in the records. The same can be said as to the blue print of Si-14769
which is a plan purportedly covering a parcel of land situated in Bo. Bukal ng Tala
and Hasaan, Ternate,
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, all plans
pertaining to the above and indicated as true copies and bearing the signature
of Engr. Robert C. Pangyarihan
are as hereby IT IS CANCELLED including any document attached thereto and, as
such, declared null and void and of no force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
5 May 1994.
(SGD.) SIDICIOUS F. PANOY
Regional
Technical Director
It
is quite evident from the foregoing findings on record that private
respondents' claim of ownership is totally baseless. Plan Psu-201 pertains to
land located in Malate,
In the case at bar, the technical rules of procedure regarding motions to dismiss must be applied liberally lest these very same rules be used not to achieve but to thwart justice.[8]
Consequently, on the grounds of forum
shopping and lack of cause of action, the Court decreed in G.R. No. 120958 as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Private respondents' complaint docketed as Civil Case No. B-4133 is hereby DISMISSED.[9]
In a Resolution dated
CA-G.R. CV No. 50962:
The Quieting of Title Case
On 12 August 1993, only months after
instituting the injunction cases before the RTCs of Biñan and San Pedro, Laguna, and during the pendency of said cases, the Spouses Layos
filed with the Biñan RTC a Complaint[10]
for Quieting of Title and/or Declaration of Nullity/Annulment of Title with
Damages, against La Paz and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Laguna,
docketed as Civil Case No. B-4194.
According to the Complaint, Felipe Layos’ grandfather, Natalio Layos, was the original owner and lawful possessor of two
parcels of land (subject property) with a total land area of 1,068,725 square
meters, more or less, situated in Barrio Tubigan, Biñan, Laguna, known as Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-201 of the
Bureau of Lands. The subject property is
covered by OCT No. 239 in the name of Natalio Layos. Upon the
death of Natalio Layos, his
son, Mauricio Layos, inherited the subject
property. On P555,737.00.
The Complaint further alleged that in
1992 and 1993,
Contending that the TCTs of La Paz, although void ab
initio, put a cloud over their title to and
ownership and possession of the subject property, the Spouses Layos primarily prayed that the said TCTs
be declared null and void and be accordingly cancelled in order to quiet their
title.
In their Answer,
21. That [Spouses Layos] have never owned nor possessed the land in question.
22. That the Original Certificates of Title No. 239 purportedly issued by the Register of Deeds on November 18, 1913, in the name of Natalio Layos, does not exist in the files of the Registry of Deeds of Laguna.
23. That Decree No.
7663 dated
24. That records of Plan PSU-201 are still extant in the Bureau of Lands but it is not in the name of Natalio Layos, but in the name of another person nor, is the land covered thereby situated in Laguna.
25. That the certified technical data of Lot Nos. 1 and 2, PSU-201, marked as Annex ‘D’ attached to the Complaint was issued on the basis of records that do not exist in the files of the Lands Office.
26. That in the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication with
‘Which parcels of land are not registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law nor the Property Registration Decree.[’]
27. That the
[Spouses Layos’] alleged predecessor, Mauricio Layos, filed an application for registration of the same
land on
28. That OCT No. 239
surfaced only when the [Spouses Layos] themselves
filed a petition for reconstitution of their alleged OCT No. 239 with this
Honorable Court on
29. That it is [
30. That [
31. That the lands form part of what used to be called the Biñan Friar Land estate which the government purchased from Spanish Religious Orders, and later subdivided and resold at cost to qualified applicants pursuant to Act No. 1120, otherwise known as the Friar Land Act, and which have fallen finally into the hands of [La Paz] after a succession of transfers.
32. That under Act
No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, [
Following
other developments in the case,[12]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Omnibus
Amended Motion for Summary Judgment filed by counsel for [
Necessarily, the Motion for Leave to Intervene and the Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, both pending before this Court, are hereby declared MOOTED.
On the other hand, the Motion for Cancellation of Lis Pendens included in the [
Consequently, the Office of the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna is hereby directed to immediately cancel
the Notice of Lis Pendens
annotated at the back of each of the [
Meanwhile, let the hearing of the instant case for the
reception of evidence as to the counterclaim of [
When
their motion for reconsideration was denied by the Biñan
RTC, the Spouses Layos appealed their case to the
Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 50962. In a Decision[14]
dated
Under par. 13 of the [Spouses Layos’]
complaint, it was alleged that
The date issued referred to by [Spouses Layos] is the date of the decree of judgment issued by the Court. But this is not the reckoning period within which title should become indefeasible in the ambit of the law. The operative act is the decree of registration which is the transcription at the Register of Deeds. One year after its transcription in the Register of Deeds, the title becomes indefeasible. It means therefore, that it is the transcription in the Register of Deeds and not the date decreed by the Court is the operative act. And this should be the reckoning date when a title becomes indefeasible.
In the case at bar, we have the scenario that OCT 239 was earlier decreed by the Land Management Court than OCT 242, but for unknown reasons, OCT 242 was transcribed earlier at the Register of [D]eeds on August 19, 1913 while OCT 239 was transcribed at the Register of Deeds only on November 18, 1913. While the PSU-201 is of minor importance as even claimed by [Spouses Layos], this court deem to pass over the same.
[Spouses Layos] contended that the
representatives of the Land Management Bureau, identified and confirmed that
the Original PSU-201 in the name of Natalio Layos and the technical descriptions as appearing in LMB
Form No. 28-37R issued to [Spouses Layos], are true
and genuine. But this was denied by the
Chief, Records of [sic] Division of the Bureau of Lands, Mr. Armando Bangayan, the superior of the Land Management Bureau,
alleging in his affidavit that was [sic] not his signature appearing in the
Certification. And to corroborate the
denial of Mr. Bangayan, a certain Engineer Private
(sic) J.J. Dalire, Chief of Surveys Division, Land
Management Bureau, PSU-201 which is purportedly covered by OCT No. 239 is a
survey plan in the name of J. Reed and it covers a piece of land situated in Malate, Manila. Further,
the Regional Technical Director for Lands, Region IV,
Considering the aforementioned, this Court believes that [Spouses Layos] has [sic] no proof to establish their claim in the present case.
With the foregoing, this court is more inclined to believe the three affidavits executed by three (3) different individuals coming from different offices that PSU-201 claimed by Layos is obviously doubtful, contrary to the affidavits of persons who are subordinates of Bangayan. If this is so, OCT 239 is therefore, patently a spurious title.[15] (Underscoring supplied.)
Based
on the foregoing ratiocination, the fallo of
the Court of Appeals Decision dated
WHEREFORE,
finding no reversible error committed on the part of the lower court, the
appealed Omnibus Order dated
Records do not show whether the Spouses Layos
filed a motion for reconsideration of the afore-mentioned Decision of the
appellate court; what they do establish is that the Spouses Layos
filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, docketed as
G.R. No. 155612, but said Petition was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated
13 January 2003 because of the Spouses Layos’ failure
to:
a) take the
appeal within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days in accordance with
Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5(a), Rule 56, in view of the denial
of the motion for extension of time to file said petition in the resolution of
b) properly
verify the petition in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 in relation to Section
1, Rule 45, and submit a valid certification on non-forum shopping duly
executed by all petitioners in accordance with Section 5, Rule 7, Section 4(e),
Rule 45 in relation to Section 2, Rule 42 and Sections 4 and 5(d), Rule 56,
there being no proof that petitioner Felipe Layos was
duly authorized to sign said verification and certification on non-forum
shopping in behalf of his co-petitioner; and
c) serve a
copy of the petition on the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 4, Rule
13, in relation to Section 3, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, and par. 2 of Revised Circular No. 1-88 of this Court.[17]
The Resolution dated
G.R. No. 150470:
The Reconstitution Case
The Court now comes to the Petition at bar.
The
instant Petition originated from a Petition for Reconstitution[19]
of OCT No. 239 filed by the Spouses Layos on 12
August 1993 with the San Pedro RTC, docketed as LRC Case No. B-1784. It is noted that the Spouses Layos instituted this reconstitution case on the same day
as their quieting of title case before the Biñan RTC.
The
Petition in LRC Case No. B-1784 essentially
contained the same allegations made by the Spouses Layos
in their Complaints in the injunction cases and quieting of title case. However, in support of their prayer for the
reconstitution of the original copy of OCT No.
239 from their Owner’s Duplicate Certificate, the Spouses Layos additionally alleged that:
6. The Owner’s
Duplicate Certificate of the said Original Certificate of Title is in due form
without any alteration or erasure, and is not subject to litigation or
investigation, administrative or judicial, regarding its genuineness or due
execution or issuance.
x x x x
9. The Original Copy of the said title
which used to be in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the
10. The above parcels of land are free from
any lien or encumbrance, and no deed or instrument affecting the same has been
presented for registration or is any such deed or instrument pending
registration with the Office of the Register of Deeds for the
11. The above parcels of land are in lawful
possession of [Spouses Layos].
12. The transfer of the subject properties
from Natalio Layos to
Mauricio Layos (by inheritance) and the subsequent
transfer of the same properties from Mauricio Layos
to petitioner Felipe Layos (through the Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication with Sale executed by Mauricio Layos
in favor of Felipe Layos) cannot be registered and
new title/s cannot be issued in the name of [Spouses Layos]
because the original copy of said Original Certificate of Title No. 239 was
lost and/or destroyed.[20]
Several
parties filed their intervention and/or opposition to the Petition for
Reconstitution of the Spouses Layos in LRC Case No.
B-1784, particularly:
|
PARTY |
PLEADING |
INTEREST/BASIS |
|
Shappel Homes, Inc. |
Complaint-in-Intervention[21] |
In a Joint Venture with the Spouses Layos to develop the subject property |
|
|
Opposition[22] |
Existing TCTs over the
subject property |
|
FEGDI |
Opposition[23] |
In a Joint Venture with |
|
Mauricio Layos |
Opposition[24] |
Sole child and heir of Natalio
Layos denies alienating or disposing the subject
property in favor of the Spouses Layos |
|
Spouses Antonio and
Norma Saavedra |
Complaint-in-Intervention[25] |
Purchased portions of the subject property from
Mauricio Layos and Felipe Layos |
|
Veneracion L. Arboleda,
Antonio L. Arboleda, Jr., |
Complaint-in-Intervention[26] |
Purchased portions of the subject property from
Mauricio Layos and/or Felipe Layos |
|
Spouses Ponciano and Annie Miranda |
Petition-in-Intervention[27] |
Purchased a portion of the subject property from
the Spouses Layos |
|
Bonifacio Javier, representing the Heirs
of Natalio Layos |
Opposition[28] |
The true heirs of Natalio
Layos deny that the Spouses Layos
are in any way related to them |
|
Spouses Marina and Generoso Otic |
Motion for
Intervention[29] |
Purchased an undivided portion of the subject
property from Mauricio Layos and are, thus,
co-owners of the subject property with Mauricio Layos |
FEGDI and
Acting therefore on the motion (sic) to dismiss filed by La
Paz Housing and FEGDI, and it appearing that indeed the title sought to be
reconstituted, specifically OCT No. 239 is a forgery as held no [sic] less than
the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 120958, Fil-Estate Golf
and Development, Inc., (FEGDI) vs. Court of Appeals, December 16, 1996, the
Court has no other option but to dismiss the case.
Resolution on all other pending incidents had been rendered
moot and academic with the dismissal of this case.[31]
The
San Pedro RTC denied the Spouses Layos’ Motion for
Reconsideration in an Order[32]
issued on
Aggrieved, the Spouses Layos filed an appeal
with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 61759. The appellate court, however, found no
reversible error in the ruling of the lower court dismissing the Spouses Layos’ Petition for Reconstitution. According to the Court of Appeals, the
validity of OCT No. 239 of the spouses Layos was
already determined by the Supreme Court in its Decision dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
hereby DISMISSED, and the orders of the lower court dated
The Spouses Layos moved for the reconsideration
of the foregoing Decision, but they failed to convince the Court of Appeals to
detract from its earlier ruling.
Resultantly, the appellate court denied what it called the “pro-forma
motion for reconsideration” of the Spouses Layos in a
Resolution[35]
dated
The Spouses Layos, thus, filed before this Court
the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 150470, stating the following assignment of
errors:
A.
The Court of Appeals erred in applying the principle of res judicata in the instant case,
when it declared that the ruling of this Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. No.
120958 is conclusive upon the issue of validity of the [Spouses Layos’] O.C.T. No. 239;
B.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the observation
of this Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. No. 120958 to the effect that OCT No.
239 is a forgery was not merely an obiter dictum, but a resolution of one of
the controverted issues, and is part of the principal
disquisition of the Supreme Court;
C.
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the summary
dismissal of the instant case by the court a quo by holding that since the
title sought to be reconstituted has finally been determined as a forgery and
fake, there is no longer a need for trial and in effect deprived [Spouses Layos] of property without due process of law; [and]
D.
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the decision of the
lower court and in effect violated the cardinal rule against a collateral
attack against the validity of the land title;[36]
and seeking the following reliefs
from this Court:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be
rendered by this Honorable Court, setting aside the assailed Decision dated
April 26, 2001 and Resolution dated October 18, 2001 respectively of the Court
of Appeals which affirmed the Decision of the Court a quo for being contrary
to law and jurisprudence and directing the Regional Trial Court of San
Pedro, Laguna to forthwith receive evidence of all parties concerned to
determine the merits of their respective claims.
Other reliefs just and equitable
are likewise prayed for.
II
THE COURT’S RULING
Res Judicata
Based on the arguments raised by the parties in their pleadings herein,
the foremost issue for resolution of this Court is whether the Decision dated
The Spouses Layos maintain that the Decision
dated 16 December 1996 of this Court in G.R. No. 120958 does not bar by res judicata their
Petition for Reconstitution of the same certificate of title in LRC Case No. B-1784, there being no identity of parties, causes of
action, and subject matters between the two cases. They insist that the Court in G.R. No. 120958
had no jurisdiction to determine the issue of ownership as the same was never
raised or contained in the pleadings and, therefore, any pronouncement of the
Court in its Decision of 16 December 1996 on the validity of OCT No. 239 or on
the question of ownership is mere obiter dictum. They highlight the fact that the fallo of the Court’s 16 December 1996 Decision in
G.R. No. 120958 simply dismissed the injunction case before the San Pedro RTC
but did not annul or cancel OCT No. 239.
The position of the Spouses Layos is untenable.
Res judicata literally
means “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment.” Res judicata lays
the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and
without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any
matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or
their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial
tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the
first suit.[37]
It is espoused in the Rules of Court,
under paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 47, Rule 39, which provide:
SEC. 47.
Effect of judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court of the
x x x x
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final
order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same
parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein
or necessary thereto.
The
doctrine of res judicata
lays down two main rules which may be stated as follows: (1) The judgment or
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation
between the parties and their privies and constitutes a bar to a new action or
suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other
tribunal; and (2) any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court
in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled
by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and
their privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters
of the two suits are the same. These two
main rules mark the distinction between the principles governing the two
typical cases in which a judgment may operate as evidence.[38]
In speaking of these cases, the first general rule above stated, and which
corresponds to the afore-quoted paragraph (b) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, is referred to as "bar by former judgment"; while the
second general rule, which is embodied in paragraph (c) of the same section and
rule, is known as "conclusiveness of judgment."
The Resolution of this Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City,[39] provides the following enlightening
discourse on conclusiveness of judgment:
The doctrine res
judicata actually embraces two different
concepts: (1) bar by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.
The second concept — conclusiveness of judgment
— states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was
there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the
parties to that action and persons in privity with
them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between
such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while
the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority.
It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive
as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their
privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or
question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between
the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the second if
that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732
[1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of
issue.
Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell &
Company (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (197 SCRA 201, 210 [1991]),
reiterated Lopez vs. Reyes (76 SCRA 179 [1977]) in regard to the
distinction between bar by former judgment which bars the prosecution of a
second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action, and
conclusiveness of judgment which bars the relitigation
of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on
a different claim or cause of action.
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which were in issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to questions necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto and although such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself.
Another
case, Oropeza Marketing Corporation v.
Allied Banking Corporation,[40] further
differentiated between the two rules of res
judicata, as follows:
There is “bar by prior judgment” when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.
But
where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but
no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as
to those matters actually and directly controverted
and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the
concept of res judicata
known as “conclusiveness of judgment.” Stated differently, any right,
fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and
cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not
the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same. (Emphasis ours.)
In sum, conclusiveness of judgment
bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question already settled
in a previous case. The second case,
however, may still proceed provided that it will no longer touch on the same
fact or question adjudged in the first case.
Conclusiveness of judgment requires only the identity of issues and
parties, but not of causes of action.
It is on the ground of res judicata, in
its second concept – conclusiveness of judgment – that the Petition for
Reconstitution of the Spouses Layos must be
dismissed. As explained by the Court of
Appeals in its assailed Decision:
In the case at bar, the ruling of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 120958 is conclusive upon the issue of validity of the [Spouses Layos’] OCT No. 239, inasmuch as the said issue has already been mutually controverted by the parties and ruled upon with finality by the Supreme Court no less, in favor of the invalidity of the [Spouses Layos’] title.[41]
Conclusiveness of Judgment in G.R. No. 120958
Contrary to the position of the Spouses Layos,
there is identity of parties and issues between G.R. No. 120958 (the injunction
cases) and LRC Case No. B-1784 (the reconstitution case).
The principal parties in both cases are the Spouses Layos,
on one hand, and
For conclusiveness of judgment, identity of causes of action and subject
matter is not required; it is the identity of issues that is material. The issue of the validity of the Spouses Layos’ title to the subject property is integral to both
G.R. No. 120958 and LRC Case No. B-1784.
In G.R. No. 120958, the Spouses Layos themselves
invoked OCT No. 239 to establish their title over the subject property. It was on the basis of their title to the
subject property that they sought to enjoin FEGDI and
After consideration of the Complaint for injunction of the Spouses Layos and its annexed documents, the Court observed
that: (a) the annexed Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication with Sale, supposedly executed by Mauricio Layos in favor of his son Felipe Layos
stated that the subject property had not been registered; (b) Mauricio Layos filed an application for registration of the subject
property with the Biñan RTC in 1992; (c) Mr. Privadi Dalire, Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the
Bureau of Lands, stated his findings in his letters dated 12 November 1992 and
15 December 1992, that Plan PSU-201, on which OCT No. 239 was supposed to be
based, was actually a survey for J. Reed covering a piece of land in Malate, Manila, that was heavily damaged and had not yet
been fully reconstructed and microfilmed; and (d) Mr. Sidicious
F. Panoy, the Regional Director of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region IV, issued an Order dated 5
May 1994, cancelling all plans pertaining to PSU-201,
since it was “a spurious plan and, probably the result of a manipulative act by
scheming individuals who surreptitiously got it inserted in the records,”[44]
which led the Court to the “inescapable” conclusion in its Decision dated 16
December 1996 that OCT No. 239 is fake or a forgery.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the pronouncement
of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 120958 on the invalidity of OCT No. 239 was
not merely obiter dictum, [45]
but was a resolution of one of the controverted
issues in said case. In fact, it was on
the basis of the said pronouncement that this Court ordered the dismissal of
the injunction case filed before the San Pedro RTC for lack of cause of
action.
In LRC Case No. B-1784, the Spouses Layos once
again invoked ownership of the subject property pursuant to OCT No. 239. They sought the reconstitution of the
original copy of OCT No. 239 which allegedly used to be in the possession of
the Register of Deeds of Laguna, but was now lost and/or destroyed, and, in
support thereof, they presented their owner’s duplicate of OCT No. 239. However, both La Paz and FEGDI, as well as
the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the Petition for Reconstitution of
the Spouses Layos on the ground that OCT No. 239 and
Plan Psu-201, on which said certificate of title was based, were spurious. The opposition to LRC Case No. B-1784, thus,
raised the question of whether a valid OCT No. 239 existed in the first place, and
could be reconstituted.
Reconstitution or reconstruction of a certificate of title literally and
within the meaning of Republic Act No. 26 denotes restoration of the instrument
which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and
condition.[46] For an order of reconstitution to issue, the
following elements must be present: 1) the certificate of title has been lost
or destroyed; 2) the petitioner is the registered owner or has an interest
therein; and 3) the certificate of title is in force at the time it was lost or
destroyed.[47]
While G.R. No. 120958 does not bar the institution of LRC Case No. B-1758,
the pronouncement of invalidity of OCT No. 239 by this Court in G.R. No. 120958
is conclusive upon the San Pedro RTC in LRC Case No. B-1758, precluding it from
re-litigating the same issue and ending up with a contrary ruling. Since the Court already settled in G.R. No. 120958
that OCT No. 239 is fake and a forgery, it would have been a senseless and
futile endeavor for the San Pedro RTC to continue with the reconstitution
proceedings in LRC Case No. B-1758, for there is actually no valid certificate
to reconstitute. The court cannot, and
should not, reconstitute a spurious certificate of title and allow the
continuous illegal proliferation and perpetuation thereof. Republic Act No. 26[48]
provides for a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens certificates
of title that are missing but not fictitious titles or titles, which are
existing.[49]
Resultantly, the San Pedro RTC is left with no other option but to order
the dismissal of LRC Case No. B-1758.
Conclusiveness of Judgment in G.R. No. 155612
During the pendency of the Petition at bar, a
significant development took place in the quieting of title case. The Court had already denied in a Resolution
dated 13 January 2003 the appeal of the Spouses Layos
in G.R. No. 155612 and, in effect, affirmed the Decision dated 20 February 2001
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50962. It should be recalled that in said Decision,
the appellate court upheld the validity of OCT No. 242 from which La Paz
derived its TCTs and, at the same time, explicitly
found OCT No. 239 of the Spouses Layos spurious.
This ruling of the Court of Appeals on the spuriousness of OCT No. 239,
once again, constitutes res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment on the Petition
for Reconstitution of the Spouses Layos.
The Spouses Layos and
Finality of Judgment
A statement in the Spouses Layos’ Petition for
Review before this Court reveals their ultimate intent:
The test of a man’s honor is his ability to admit his mistake. In the instant case, it would [be] in keeping
with the rule of law and justice for this Most Venerable and Honorable Court to
allow the parties to fully ventilate their claims in the court below instead of
depriving the [Spouses Layos] of their valued
property based on a sweeping obiter
dictum by this Court in the FEDGI [sic] case where the [Spouses Layos’] title was not directly attacked.[50]
It may be nicely and even deceptively phrased but, simply, what the
Spouses Layos pray to this Court is for the
re-litigation of an issue settled conclusively in this Court’s Decision dated
Nothing is more settled in law than that when a final judgment is executory; it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time.[51]
What cannot be directly done by motion for reconsideration or appeal, given
the finality of the Decisions in G.R. No. 120985 and CA-G.R. CV No. 50962,
likewise, cannot be indirectly done through a separate proceeding.
Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment which is also known as
“preclusion of issues” or “collateral estoppel,”
issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised
in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of
action. Once a judgment attains finality it becomes immutable and
unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the
land.[52]
Due Process
The Spouses Layos contend that the Order dated
There is no truth in the averments of the Spouses Layos.
Holding a trial in the reconstitution case would be an exercise in
futility, because given the conclusiveness of the judgment of this Court in
G.R. No. 120958 and the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50962 that OCT No.
239 is fake, forged, and spurious, then the San Pedro RTC in LRC Case No.
B-1758 is, thus, barred from re-litigating the issue and accepting evidence
thereon.
Furthermore, due process does not require that a trial be held in all
circumstances. This Court, in a
Resolution dated
The words “hearing” and “trial”
have different meanings and connotations. Trial may refer to the reception of
evidence and other processes. It
embraces the period for the introduction of evidence by both parties. Hearing, as known in law, is not confined to
trial but embraces the several stages of litigation, including the pre-trial
stage. A hearing does not necessarily
mean presentation of evidence. It does
not necessarily imply the presentation of oral or documentary evidence in open
court but that the parties are afforded the opportunity to be heard.
A careful analysis of Section 5 of RA 1379 readily
discloses that the word “hearing” does not always require the formal
introduction of evidence in a trial, only that the parties are given the
occasion to participate and explain how they acquired the property in
question. If they are unable to show to
the satisfaction of the court that they lawfully acquired the property in
question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the
State. There is no provision in the law
that a full blown trial ought to be conducted before the court declares the
forfeiture of the subject property.
Thus, even if the forfeiture proceedings do not reach trial, the court
is not precluded from determining the nature of the acquisition of the property
in question even in a summary proceeding.
Due process, a constitutional precept, does not therefore
always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. The essence of
due process is found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit one’s
evidence in support of his defense. What the law prohibits is not merely the
absence of previous notice but the absence thereof and the lack of opportunity
to be heard. This opportunity was made completely available to respondents who
participated in all stages of the litigation.[53]
The Spouses Layos cannot claim deprivation of
property without due process when they were never denied the opportunity to be
heard by the courts. The Spouses Layos repeatedly and persistently sought recourse from the
courts, at the risk of forum shopping (of which it was actually found guilty at
one point in G.R. No. 120958). They
instituted no less than four cases before the RTCs of
Biñan and San Pedro, Laguna; although based on
different causes of action, all invoked their title to the subject property
under OCT No. 239. They were able to
file pleadings bearing their allegations and arguments, reply to their opponents’
pleadings, and present as attachments their documentary evidence. When their cases were dismissed by the RTCs, they were able to file their motions for
reconsideration and, upon denial thereof, raised their case on appeal to the
appellate court. Unfortunately for the
Spouses Layos, however, the Court of Appeals and this
Court agreed in the dismissal of their cases.
That the cases of the Spouses Layos were
dismissed by the RTCs even before they reach trial
stage is not denial of due process. The
dismissals were due to the lack of merit of their complaints and/or petitions,
already apparent in the pleadings and evidence on record, and pointed out in
their opponents’ Motions for Dismissal (in the injunction cases) and Motion for
Summary Judgment (in the quieting of title case).
In a letter dated 8 September 2005 to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,[54]
made part of the records of this case, Felipe Layos
averred that the conflicting allegations and documents which led this Court and
the Court of Appeals in G.R. No. 120958 and CA-G.R. CV No. 50962, respectively,
to declare OCT No. 239 spurious, were fraudulently prepared and submitted to
the courts in a concerted scheme (which sadly seemed to involve their former
counsel, Atty. Vitaliano Aguirre II) to deprive them
of the subject property. Now represented
by a new counsel, he requested that he be given a chance to prove that the
subject property is covered by OCT No. 239 and not OCT No. 242.
Even if it is conceded that the allegations of the aforementioned letter
are true, no stretch of interpretation or liberal application of the rules of
procedure can grant the San Pedro RTC jurisdiction in LRC Case No. B-1758, a
case for reconstitution, to set aside or reverse the final judgment made in
both G.R. No. 120958 and CA-G.R. CV No. 50962 on the invalidity of OCT No.
239.
The RTC, acting on a petition for reconstitution, is of limited
jurisdiction. Lands already covered by
valid titles in the name of registered owners other than the petitioners cannot
be a proper subject of reconstitution proceedings, thus:
The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by
duly issued existing Torrens Titles (which become incontrovertible upon the
expiration of one year from their issuance under Section 38 of the Land
Registration Act) cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly
lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing by final
judgment the cancellation of such existing titles. (And as the Court reiterated
in the recent case of Silvestre vs. Court of Appeals, "in cases of
annulment and/or reconveyance of title, a party
seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by
clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed
is his.") The courts simply have no
jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of
allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly
issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners. The very
concept of stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under the
It should be pointed out that the validity of the title to the subject
property herein had already been squarely put in issue in Civil Case No.
B-4194, the quieting of title case, instituted by the Spouses Layos before the Biñan RTC, and
resolved definitively and with finality when appealed to the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 50962, in favor of
The prayer of the Spouses Layos to have LRC Case
No. B-1784 remanded to the San Pedro RTC for trial, if granted, would only be
farcical. Should the San Pedro RTC
subsequently grant the reconstitution of OCT No. 239 after the trial, it would
only be an empty victory for the Spouses Layos, for a
reconstituted certificate of title, like the original certificate, by itself
does not vest ownership of the land or estate covered thereby.[56] The valid title to the subject property would
still be that of
As earlier mentioned, a reconstitution of title is the
re-issuance of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its original
form and condition. It does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by
the lost or destroyed title. Any change in the ownership of the property must
be the subject of a separate suit. Thus, although petitioners are in possession
of the land, a separate proceeding is necessary to thresh out the issue of
ownership of the land.[57]
The reconstitution of a title is simply the reissuance of a new duplicate certificate of title
allegedly lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. It does not pass upon the ownership of the
land covered by the lost or destroyed title.
Possession of a lost certificate is not necessarily equivalent to
ownership of the land covered by it. The
certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership; it is merely an
evidence of title over a particular property.[58]
Evidently, the Spouses Layos seek more than just
reconstitution of OCT No. 239 in LRC Case No. B-1758. They want to hold a trial so as to prove
before the San Pedro RTC the fraudulent scheme perpetrated by several people,
including their former counsel, to sabotage their cases before the courts; the
errors in the Decisions of the courts that have long attained finality; and,
ultimately, the validity of their title to the subject property. Again, these are matters beyond the
jurisdiction of the San Pedro RTC to determine in a case for reconstitution. If truly the Spouses Layos
have been misled and defrauded in a concerted effort to ruin their chances
before the courts, then their recourse is not to persist with this petition for
reconstitution of title, but to institute other actions to hold those
responsible administratively, civilly, and even criminally liable.
Collateral Attack
Finally,
the Spouses Layos argue that the Motions to Dismiss
of La Paz and FEGDI and the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General
supporting the dismissal of the Spouses Layos’
Petition for Reconstitution constitute a collateral attack upon the validity of
OCT No. 239, in violation of the proscription laid down by law and
jurisprudence against any collateral attack of a duly registered certificate of
title.
The Spouses Layos are clearly mistaken. No collateral attack on OCT No. 239 was made
in LRC Case No. B-1784 (the reconstitution case). The San Pedro RTC dismissed it precisely
because the invalidity of said certificate of title was already determined conclusively
and with finality by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 120958 (the injunction
cases). A similar ruling of invalidity
of OCT No. 239 was rendered yet again in the final judgment of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50962 (the quieting of title case). Therefore, no collateral attack has been made
on OCT No. 239 in the present Petition; the San Pedro RTC, Court of Appeals,
and this Court only abided by the conclusive and final judgment made on the
invalidity of OCT No. 239 in G.R. No. 120958 and CA-G.R. CV No. 50962.
In sum, the Decision dated 16 December 1996 of this Court in G.R. No.
120958 and the Decision dated 20 February 2001 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 50962 declaring OCT No. 239 fake, forged, and spurious, already
bar the reconstitution of OCT No. 239 under the doctrine of res
judicata, in the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment. There is, therefore, no need
to remand the case to the San Pedro RTC for trial.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 11-31.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico with Associate Justices Ramon A. Barcelona and Alicia L. Santos, concurring; rollo, pp. 32-38.
[3] Penned by Judge Francisco Dizon Paro, rollo, pp. 41-43.
[4] Penned by Associate Justice Martin
S. Villarama, Jr. with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Eliezer
R. de los
[5] 333
Phil. 465 (1996).
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Rollo, pp.
452-460.
[11]
[12] Related
to the filing by the Spouses Layos of a Petition for
Notice of Lis Pendens and
the filing by unnamed parties of a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene.
[13] Rollo, pp.
461-462.
[14] Penned
by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello,
Jr. with Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Perlita J. Tria Tirona, concurring; rollo, pp.
461-474.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 84-86.
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30] Rollo, pp. 41-43.
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37] Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation, 441 Phil. 551, 563 (2002).
[38] Vda.
de Cruzo v. Carriaga, Jr., G.R.
No. 75109-10,
[39] G.R. No. 76265,
[40] 441 Phil. 551, 564 (2002).
[41] Rollo, p. 35.
[42] Sendon v. Ruiz, 415 Phil. 376, 385 (2001).
[43] Javier
v. Veridiano, II, G.R. No. 48050,
[44] Supra note 5.
[45] Obiter
dictum simply means “words of a prior opinion entirely unnecessary for the
decision of the case” (“Black’s Law Dictionary,” p. 1222, citing Noel v.
Olds, 78
[46] Vda. de Anciano v. Caballes, 93 Phil. 875, 876 (1953).
[47] Antonio
H. Noblejas and Edilberto
H. Noblejas, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds,
1992 Revised Edition, p. 242.
[48] An Act Providing a Special Procedure
for the Reconstitution of
[49] Cañero v. University of the
[50] Rollo, p. 20.
[51] Mayon
Estate Corporation v. Altura, G.R. No. 134462,
[52] Lu Do Lu Ym
Corporation v. Aznar Brothers Realty, Co., G.R.
No. 143307,
[53] 461 Phil. 598, 613-614 (2003).
[54] Rollo, pp. 400-414.
[55] Director
of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 181 Phil. 432, 439 (1979). Reiterated in Alabang
Development Corporation v. Valenzuela, 201 Phil. 727, 744 (1982); Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Sison, 209
Phil. 325, 337 (1983); Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 34080, 22 March
1991, 195 SCRA 482, 494; and Ortigas &
Co., Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Velasco, 343 Phil. 115, 136 (1997).
[56] Alonso
v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., 462 Phil. 546, 565
(2003).
[57] Lee
v. Republic, 418 Phil. 793, 803 (2001). See also Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., 426 Phil. 61, 86-87 (2002); Heirs of de Guzman Tuazon v. Court of Appeals, 465 Phil. 114, 126 (2004).
[58] Strait Times, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 356 Phil. 217, 230 (1998).