THIRD DIVISION
|
CLARISSA U. MATA, doing
business under the firm name BESSANG PASS SECURITY AGENCY, Petitioner, - versus - ALEXANDER M. AGRAVANTE,
EDDIE E. SANTILLAN, PATRICIO A. ARMODIA, ALEJANDRO A. ALMADEN and
HERMENEGILDO G. SALDO, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 147597
Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: August 6,
2008 |
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before
us is a petition for review on certiorari
assailing the decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed petitioner’s complaint for damages
filed against the respondents.
The
antecedent facts are as follows:
Respondents
Eddie E. Santillan, Patricio A. Armodia, Alejandro A. Almaden and Hermenegildo
G. Saldo were former security guards of the Bessang Pass Security Agency, owned
by herein petitioner Clarissa Mata.
On
On
P5,000,000.00.
Petitioner then declared that respondents’ deliberate and concerted
campaign of hate and vilification against the Bessang Pass Security Agency violated
the provisions of Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, prayed
that the respondents be held jointly and severally liable to pay her the sum of
P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, attorney’s fees in the amount of P200,000.00
and other reliefs.
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
and against defendants ordering the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of ONE MILLION (P1,000,000.00) PESOS as
moral damages.[3]
On the basis of the evidence adduced
by the petitioner ex parte, the trial
court found preponderant evidence enough to justify petitioner’s cause of
action. It gave credence to the petitioner’s contentions that the respondents
had no other motive in sending the letter to the seven (7) government offices
except to unduly prejudice her good name and reputation. The trial court,
however, did not award the sum of P5,000,000.00 as petitioner’s
estimated loss of income for being speculative.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the trial court’s
decision. It dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit.
Hence, this petition anchored on the
following grounds:
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR, AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 89 IN QUEZON CITY AND FURTHER CONCLUDED THAT RESPONDENTS’ ACT OF FURNISHING COPIES OF THEIR LETTER-COMPLAINT NOT ONLY TO SEVEN (7) NATIONAL AGENCIES BUT ALSO TO PETITIONER’S BIGGEST CLIENT, WAS NOT TAINTED WITH BAD FAITH AND WITH THE SOLE MOTIVE TO MALIGN THE GOOD NAME AND REPUTATION OF PETITIONER.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN THE APPRECIATION OF FACTS AND APPLICATION OF LAWS, WHICH IF NOT RECTIFIED, WOULD CAUSE IRREPARABLE INJURY AND DAMAGE TO HEREIN PETITIONER.
WITH ALL DUE
RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR,
AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, WHEN IT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 89 IN
Petitioner contends that the
respondents were so driven by unrestrained hatred and revenge that they not
only succeeded in disseminating the letter-complaint to the 7 government
offices but to the DPWH, her biggest client, with the intention to destroy her reputation
and, more importantly, her business. She posits that this would mean a loss of
employment for numerous employees throughout the country who solely depend on the
security agency for their existence, and that respondents obviously failed to
see this fact. She claims that the
respondents have abused their rights, to her prejudice, and that of the
security agency which has tried very hard to protect its name and hard-earned
reputation. Petitioner then concludes
that the respondents have violated Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code and
should be held liable for damages.[5]
We are not impressed. We are more in
accord with the findings and conclusions of the respondent court that
petitioner is not entitled to any award of damages. We agree with the respondent court’s explanation,
viz.:
In
filing the letter-complaint (Exhibit “D”) with the Philippine National Police
and furnishing copies thereof to seven (7) other executive offices of the
national government, the defendants-appellants may not be said to be motivated
simply by the desire to “unduly prejudice the good name and reputation” of plaintiff-appellee. Such act was consistent with and a rational
consequence of seeking justice through legal means for the alleged abuses
defendants-appellants suffered in the course of their employment with
plaintiff-appellee, which started with the case for illegal dismissal and
non-payment of backwages and benefits earlier filed with the NLRC Regional
Arbitration Branch in
Section
8 of Republic Act No. 5487, otherwise known as the “Private Security Agency Law,”
empowered the Chief of the former Philippine Constabulary (PC) at any time “to
suspend or cancel the licenses of private watchman or security guard agency
found violating any of the provisions of this Act or of the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Chief of Constabulary pursuant thereto.” With the enactment of Republic Act No. 6975
(“Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990”), the PC-INP was
abolished and in its place, a new police force was established, the Philippine
National Police (PNP). Among the
administrative support units of the PNP under the new law is the Civil Security
Unit which shall provide administrative services and general supervision over
the organization, business operation and activities of all organized private
detectives, watchmen, security guard agencies and company guard houses. It was thus but logical for
defendants-appellants, as advised by their counsel, to also communicate their
grievances against their employer security guard agency with the PNP. The act of furnishing copies to seven (7)
other executive offices, including that of the Office of the President, was
merely to inform said offices of the fact of filing of such complaint, as is
usually done by individual complainants seeking official government action to
address their problems or grievances.
Their pending case with the NLRC would not preclude them from seeking
assistance from the PNP as said agency is the national body that exercises
general supervision over all security guard agencies in the country, the
defendants-appellants were of the honest belief that the violation of labor
laws committed by their employer will elicit proper action from said body,
providing them with a relief (cancellation of license) distinct from those
reliefs sought by them from the NLRC (payment of backwages and benefits). Certainly, defendants-appellants had good
reason to believe that bringing the matter to PNP is justified as no private
security agency found to be violating labor laws should remain in good standing
with or [be] tolerated by the PNP. Despite
the pendency of the NLRC case, such request for investigation of plaintiff-appellee
could not in any way be tainted with malice and bad faith where the same was made
by the very individuals who suffered from the illegal labor practices of
plaintiff-appellee. Moreover, no
liability could arise from defendants-appellants’ act of filing of the labor
case with the NLRC which plaintiff-appellee claimed to have resulted in the
agency’s not being able to secure contracts because of such pending labor case,
defendants-appellants merely exercised a right granted to them by our labor
laws.[6]
It has been held that Article 19,[7]
known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. The object of this article is to set certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but
also in the performance of one’s duties.
These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Its antithesis is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure.[8]
Article 21 refers to acts contra bonos
mores and has the following elements: (1) an act which is legal; (2) but
which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy; and
(3) is done with intent to injure. The
common element under Articles 19 and 21
is that the act complained of must be intentional,[9]
and attended with malice or bad faith. There is no hard and fast rule which can
be applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be
invoked. The question of whether or not
this principle has been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and 21,[10]
or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each
case.[11]
In the case before us, as correctly pointed out by the CA, the circumstances do
not warrant an award of damages. Thus,
the award of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages is quite preposterous. We agree with the appellate court that in the
action of the respondents, there was no malicious intent to injure petitioner’s
good name and reputation. The respondents merely wanted to call the attention
of responsible government agencies in order to secure appropriate action upon an erring private security agency
and obtain redress for their grievances.
So, we reiterate the basic postulate that in the absence of proof that
there was malice or bad faith on the part of the respondents, no damages can be
awarded.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O
N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Perlita J. TriaTirona, concurring; rollo, pp. 38-44.
[2] NLRC Case No. RAB-VII-10-0899-93.
[3] Rollo, p. 75.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
[8]
[9]
[10] Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
[11] Albenson Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88694, January 11, 1993, 217 SCRA 16, 25.