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CALIFORNIA BUS LINES, INC.,
Petitioner, -versus- COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, in her Capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108, SP Civil Action No. 98-2004,
HON. M Respondents. |
G.R. No. 145408 Present: pUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO, Corona, AZCUNA, and LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ. Promulgated: August 20, 2008 |
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LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
Petitioner
California Bus Lines, Inc. (CBL) filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court with application for writ of preliminary injunction
and prayer for temporary restraining order to prohibit public respondent Judge
PRISCILLA C. MIJARES (JUDGE MIJARES), Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 108,
and public respondent Judge MARIA A. CANCINO-ERUM (JUDGE ERUM), Metropolitan
Trial Court (MTC) of Pasay City, Branch 46, from implementing the Alias Writ of
Execution, dated January 13, 1998, in Civil
Case No. 127-93, and private respondent MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AUTHORITY (MIAA) and its officers, directors, agents and representatives from
implementing and enforcing said writ while the instant petition is pending
before this Court. The petition seeks the nullification of (1) the Resolution[1]
dated August 22, 2000, and the Resolution[2]
dated October 11, 2000, both issued by the Court of Appeals (CA), in relation
to its Decision[3]
in CA-G.R. Sp. No. 51664, entitled California Bus Line, Inc. v. Hon. Priscilla
C. Mijares, et al.; (2) the Alias Writ of Execution[4],
dated January 13, 1998, issued by the Pasay City MTC, Branch 46 in Civil Case No. 127-93, entitled Manila International Airport Authority v.
California Bus Lines, Inc.; and (3) the Compromise Agreement[5],
dated November 3, 1993, which was the subject of the aforementioned Alias Writ
of Execution. Furthermore, the petition also prays that judgment be rendered
making the preliminary injunction permanent.
The factual antecedents of this case are as
follows:
On
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendants:
1.
Ordering the
defendant and all other persons/parties claiming possession under it to vacate
and surrender to the plaintiff the premises known as, California Bus Lines, Inc. Bus Terminal located at
2.
Ordering the
defendant to pay the amount of P27,017,295.95 as rentals in legal arrears,
interest, penalties and other charges;
3.
Ordering the
defendant to pay the sum of P430,462.60 a month commencing February, 1993 as
reasonable rentals on the premises with interest at a legal rate until such
time defendant and all other parties claiming under it shall have finally
vacated the premises;
4.
Ordering the
defendant to pay the sum of P20,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees;
5.
Ordering the
defendant to pay the costs of the suit.
Defendant’s counterclaim is hereby dismissed for
lack of merit.”
The
MTC decision became final and executory for failure of CBL to appeal the same.
Thus, MIAA filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution dated
On
“WHEREFORE, finding said
Compromise Agreement to be in accordance with law and not contrary to public
policy, the same is hereby approved and judgment is hereby rendered in
consonance thereto and the parties are enjoined to follow the terms and
conditions thereof.”
However,
CBL failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the Compromise Agreement.
Hence, MIAA filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, which was granted
by the MTC on
Again,
CBL failed to comply with the schedule of payment stipulated in the Compromise
Agreement prompting MIAA to file a Motion for the Issuance of Alias Writ of
Execution[11].
This was granted by the MTC on
In
reaction to the issuance of the aforementioned writ, CBL filed a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure with the Pasay
City RTC, Branch 108.
In
the
The
On
Unperturbed,
CBL filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ
of Preliminary Injunction which the CA denied in its subsequent Resolution[17]
dated August 22, 2000. Petitioner also filed a Motion to Set Aside Entry of
Judgment which the CA likewise denied via the Resolution[18]
dated
CBL
is now before us, via this special civil action under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court with application for writ of preliminary injunction and prayer
for temporary restraining order. [19]
In
the Resolution[20]
dated
Undeterred,
CBL filed a Motion for Reconsideration[21]
on
I.
THE COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY THE PARTIES SUBSTANTIALLY ALTERED THE JUDGMENT DATED
II.
THE MOTION FOR
AN ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION WHICH WAS FILED AFTER MORE THAN FIVE (5) YEARS FROM THE
FINALITY OF JUDGMENT HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
III.
THE AWARD OF
ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) AS ATTORNEY’S FEE IS UNCONSCIONABLE.
In
the Resolution[22]
dated June 20, 2001, the Court granted CBL’s motion for reconsideration and
reinstated its petition, which was later on given due course in the Resolution[23]
dated September 17, 2001. Both parties
had since then filed their respective memoranda.
On
We resolve to dismiss the petition.
At the outset,
private respondent questioned the appropriateness of the instant petition as a
remedy to review the assailed CA decision and resolution. MIAA argues that the
petition for review under Rule 42 was filed by CBL with the CA pursuant to its
appellate jurisdiction over the final Orders of the RTC. Therefore, the
assailed Decision and its related Resolutions of the CA which are considered the
judgment and final order of the CA should have been elevated before this Court
through an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 and not through a special civil
action under Rule 65.
CBL maintains
that the herein petition is not based on the ground of error of judgment or
errors of law which are the proper subject matter of ordinary appeal under Rule
45. Instead, it claims that the same is based on lack or excess of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, which is the
issue to be resolved under Rule 65. According to CBL, the MTC exceeded its
jurisdiction in issuing the challenged Alias Writ of Execution and there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Additionally,
CBL maintains that the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in rendering its decision and in issuing the two (2)
assailed Resolutions dated August 22, 2000 and October 11, 2000, which denied
respectively CBL’s Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
and Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment.
For a special
civil action on certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur:
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[25]
The general rule is that a writ of
certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to the
aggrieved party.[26]
The party aggrieved by a decision of the CA is proscribed from assailing the
decision or final order of said court via
Rule 65 because such recourse is proper only if the party has no plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the course of law.[27]
Here, it is
apparent that CBL’s immediate issue is with the CA’s Decision and its related
Resolutions which denied CBL’s erroneously filed petition for review under Rule
42 against the RTC which earlier denied CBL’s petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 against the MTC. The proper remedy for CBL in this situation, as
correctly pointed out by the CA, should have been an ordinary appeal to the CA since
the RTC decision was made in the exercise of the RTC’s original jurisdiction.
Moreover, Rule
45 of the Rules of Court is clear that decisions, final orders or resolutions
of the CA in any case, i.e.,
regardless of the nature of the action or proceeding involved, may be appealed
to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for review, which would be but a
continuation of the appellate process over the original case.[28]
Thus, contrary to CBL’s assertions, it has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the course of law.
Even if we
assume for the sake of argument that the instant petition is proper, the
petition still fails to persuade as regards the remaining issues.
CBL contends
that when the Compromise Agreement was approved by the MTC, its earlier decision
dated
The argument is
specious. As correctly emphasized by the CA in its Decision,[30]
“it is also well-settled that the court is authorized to modify or alter a
judgment after the same has become executory, whenever the circumstances
transpire rendering its execution unjust and equitable.”[31]
The Compromise Agreement, thus, explicitly justified the amicable settlement reached
by the parties after “having seriously considered in all good faith, the
financial position and the capacity of the defendant CBL to fulfill its
obligation under the decision promulgated in this case and cognizant over the
fate of almost seven hundred employees and the riding public in the event the
decision is executed…”.
The parties voluntarily
entered into the Compromise Agreement which accorded to each party mutually
acceptable concessions. MIAA agreed that the obligation of CBL be paid in installments
in accordance with a schedule of installments disputed by the parties and CBL was
allowed to stay in the leased premises provided the rentals mentioned in the
Agreement are paid. Furthermore, the parties themselves invoked the
jurisdiction of the MTC by submitting with the assistance of their counsel the Compromise
Agreement for approval after the
Considering the
foregoing circumstance, it would be highly inequitable to rule that the MTC has
no jurisdiction to amend the final and executory July 30, 1993 MTC decision,
when the MTC decision of December 13, 1993, approving the Compromise Agreement,
was rendered at the instance of both CBL and MIAA and for their mutual benefit.
Moreover, CBL
had complied with the terms of said Compromise Agreement for a period of five
(5) years from its execution on
Having upheld
the validity and binding effect of the December 13, 1993 MTC decision, MIAA was
well within the five-year reglementary period dictated by Section 6, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court[32]
when it filed its first Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution of the
said decision on February 3, 1994 due to CBL’s non-compliance with the terms of
the Compromise Agreement. This resulted in the issuance of the Writ of
Execution dated
MIAA correctly
contend that CBL’s dilatory tactics and legal maneuverings to evade payment of
its obligations suspended the running of the five-year reglementary period
within which to enforce the judgment by motion. The Court previously had the
occasion to rule that in computing the time for suing out an execution, the
time during which the execution is stayed should be excluded, and the time will
be extended by any delay occasioned by the debtor.[33]
In cases where the delays were occasioned by the judgment obligor’s own
initiatives and for his advantage, which were beyond the judgment obligee’s
control, the five (5) - year period allowed for enforcement of the judgment by
motion was deemed to have been effectively interrupted or suspended.[34]
Here, CBL made
several acts that constituted delay which redounded to its benefit. The judgment based on the Compromise Agreement
was promulgated on
Undoubtedly, CBL
was benefited by the continued deferment of the payment of its long-established
outstanding balance of its monetary obligation to MIAA due to its incessant but
futile resort to the review processes of our justice system. CBL successfully evaded the payment of its
debt under the shield of technicalities, at the expense of MIAA.
The assailed
Alias Writ of Execution dated
The purpose of
the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments or actions is
to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights. Far from sleeping on their rights, MIAA
persistently pursued their rights of action. It is utterly unjust to allow CBL to further evade
the satisfaction of its obligation because of sheer literal adherence to
technicality, which CBL itself had put aside to serve its own interest, the
well-being of its employees and the interest of the riding public. After all, procedural rules are liberally
construed in order to promote their objective and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.[36]
As stated at the
threshold, the present controversy sprung from an ejectment suit initiated on
With regard to the
attorney’s fees in the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) that
was awarded by the MTC in the challenged Alias Writ of Execution, dated January
13, 1998, CBL asserts that the amount of said fees was not only unconscionable
and unreasonable but beyond the MTC’s
jurisdiction. CBL also underscores the fact that the dispositive portion of the
July 30, 1993 MTC Decision has awarded attorney’s fees only in the amount of P20,000.00
which is the maximum monetary limit that an MTC can award in cases under its
jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 1(A), Paragraph 1[37]
of the aforestated rules.
CBL ignored the
fact that the increase in the award of attorney’s fees was occasioned by no
less than its consent to the Compromise Agreement which was executed by both
parties on November 3, 1993, approved by the MTC upon motion of the parties with
assistance of counsel, in its December 13, 1993 decision and partially complied
with by the said parties.
MIAA’s
counsel, the OGCC, is legally authorized to receive payment of attorney’s fees
by virtue of Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV of Executive Order No.
292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987.[38]
There is likewise no jurisdictional impediment if the MTC awards the amount of
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as attorney’s fees despite the Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) limit provided under the applicable rules.
As
we see it, the foregoing jurisdictional amount of P20,000.00 is mandated
only when the trial court itself awards the attorney’s fees absent any valid
stipulation between the parties relative thereto. To our mind, a contrary
interpretation would counter the principles of freedom of the parties to enter
into any kind of contract they choose and to establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, subject only to
basic limitations as provided under Article 1306 of the Civil Code:
Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish
such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy.
To
be sure, the Civil Code implements the autonomy and obligatory nature of
contracts[39],
guaranteed by Article III, Section 10 of the Constitution.
The
amount of attorney’s fees agreed upon in the Compromise Agreement is not
determinative of jurisdiction in this ejectment suit. Such amount is merely
incidental to the main question of whether or not CBL should be allowed to
continue its occupancy of MIAA’s property. The trial court’s jurisdiction is
perforce not lost by the fact that the amount of attorney’s fees agreed upon is
beyond the limit set by the Rules.
We
now rule on CBL’s Urgent Motion for Contempt against MIAA’s counsel in connection
with the filing of an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution[40]
with the MTC while the instant petition is still pending with this Court which
CBL posits as violative of paragraphs (c) and (d) of Section 3, Rule 71 of the
1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure[41].
Under the second
paragraph of Section 4 of the same Rule, a charge of indirect contempt must be
filed in the form of a verified petition instituted as a special civil action if
it is not initiated directly by the court.[42]
Section 4 of Rule 71 reads:
How proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated
motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by order or
any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt.
In
all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified
petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or
papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for
filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the
contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in
the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall
be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion
orders the consolidation of the contempt charges and the principal action for
joint hearing and decision.
For failure to
comply with the requirement set by the aforequoted Rule, the Court is
constrained to take no action on CBL’s motion for contempt.
It is high time
to write finis to this case. Litigation
must at some time be terminated for public policy dictates that once a judgment
becomes final, executory and unappealable, the prevailing party should not be
denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing
party.
The Court finds
CBL’s obstinate efforts to stay the execution of a valid judgment as an unjustifiable
use of the processes of our legal system.
CBL and counsel so far only succeeded in unduly delaying the complete
execution of the judgment based on the Compromise Agreement to which it had
voluntarily acceded.
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice Chairperson |
|
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
RENATO
C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
|
ADOLFO S. AZC Associate Justice |
|
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo,
pp. 21-24.
[2]
[3] Penned
by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria Dacudao (ret.), with Associate
Justices Marina L. Buzon (ret) and Edgar P. Cruz (ret.) concurring, id., at pp. 95-103.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] Supra note
4.
[13] Rollo, p. 97.
[14]
[15] Supra note 3.
[16] Rollo, p. 104.
[17] Supra note 1.
[18] Supra note
2.
[19] Rollo,
pp. 3-50.
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] Triad
Security & Allied Services, Inc. v. Ortega, Jr., 481 SCRA 591; Joson III v. Court of Appeals, 482 SCRA
360; and Soriano v. Marcelo, 507 SCRA
571.
[26] Cathay
Pacific Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 500 SCRA 226.
[27] Hanjin
Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 487 SCRA 78.
[28]
[29] Yu v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 245 SCRA 134
[30] Supra
note 3.
[31] Aboitiz
Shipping Employees Asso. v. Trajano, 278 SCRA 387 and Cabrias v. Adil, 135 SCRA 354.
[32] Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. (Section 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court.)
[33] Blouse
Potenciano v. Mariano, 96 SCRA 463, 464 and De la Rosa v. Fernandez, 172 SCRA 371.
[34] Camacho
v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 611.
[35] CA Records, pp. 103-108.
[36] Radiowealth
Finance Company v. Del Rosario, 335 SCRA 288.
[37] Sec. 1. Scope.
- This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and
the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their
jurisdiction:
A. Civil Cases:
(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer, irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be
recovered. Where attorney's fees are awarded, the same shall not exceed twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
[38] Sec.10-xxx The OGCC is
authorized to receive attorney’s fees adjudged in favor of their client
government-owned or controlled corporations, their subsidiaries/other corporate
offsprings and government acquired asset corporation. xxx.
[39] Art. 1159. Obligations arising from
contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be
complied with in good faith.
[40] Rollo,
pp. 284-292.
[41] Indirect Contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
x x x
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
x x x.
(paragraphs
[c] & [d], Section 3, Rule 71, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure)
[42] Sesbreño
v. Igonia, 480 SCRA 243.