Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
FIRST DIVISION
|
SEVERINO
DAVID, JR. Y ECHANE and TIMOTEO GIANAN, Petitioners, - versus - THE PEOPLE
OF THE Respondent |
G.R. No. 136037
Present: PUNO,
C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO, AZCUNA, and LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, JJ. Promulgated:
|
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D
E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
Through this
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner Severino David, Jr. and Timoteo Gianan seek to annul and set aside
the Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 17022 dated July 30, 1997, affirming the November 16, 1993 Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 171, of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No. 1076-V-92, convicting petitioners them of the crime of frustrated homicide
pursuant to Article 50 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Timoteo Gianan did not join Severino David,
Jr. in filing this petition for review on certiorari, although the Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari was filed by the counsel de
parte for both accused Severino David, Jr. and
Timoteo Gianan.
In an Information[3]
dated 02,
1992
That on or about the 1st day
of March, 1992 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
together and mutually helping one another, without any justifiable cause and
with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with a fan knife one DOMINGO DATALIO Y
VALDEZ, thus performing all the acts of execution which would constitute the
crime of Homicide as a consequence but which nevertheless, did not produce it
by reason or causes independent of the will of the herein accused, that is due
to the timely, able and efficient medical attendance rendered to the victim at
the Chinese General Hospital, Manila.
Contrary to lLaw.
At their arraignment, petitioner David
and Gianan pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution presented as witnesses
private complainant Domingo Datalio, SPO3 Francisco Montallana and Benigno
David. Accused Severino David, Jr. and
Erlin Ecalnir testified for the defense.
After trial on the merits, the RTC
found petitioner David and Gianan guilty of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Severino
David, Jr. y Echane and Timoteo Gianan, Jr. y Bataller GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged, pursuant to Article 50 in relation to Article 249
of the Revised Penal Code, they are hereby sentenced each to suffer an
indeterminate imprisonment from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of Prision Mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed by
law and to pay the costs.
Accused are ordered to indemnify the
complainant the sum of P9,946.05 for actual damages and the
further amount of P12,000.00 for the unearned income.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner David and Gianan appealed
their conviction to the CA which affirmed in
toto the decision of the trial court.
Petitioner David and Gianan, through their
new counsel of record,[4],
moved for a reconsideration of the CA decision but the appellate court denied
said motion for lack of merit[5]
stating that no persuasive arguments were raised to alter theits
previous pronouncement.
The gists of the
conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense, as are quoted
hereunder
from the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
follows:
PROSECUTION’Ss
VERSION:
Between
Brought to the MCU hospital, Domingo
was transferred to
SPO3 Francisco Montallana received the
report of the stabbing incident.
Together with two policemen, he proceeded to the venue of the crime at
Valdez Compound, Malinta, Valenzuela.
Upon reaching the place, Montallana was told the suspect was in a house
inside the compound. On their way to
that house, suspect Timoteo Gianan was surrendered by a Bantay Bayan in a
street corner near the place of the stabbing.
At the house where suspect Severino was, the policemen were allowed to
enter by the owner. Then, Severino came
out and surrendered a fan knife. The
police team brought both suspects to the SID of the Valenzuela Police Station.
The stabbing was witnessed by Benigno
David, a barangay tanod of Paso de Blas.
He was in the house of Fernando Datalio conversing with the latter when
at a distance of about two (2) meters, he saw Severino stab Domingo. He directed some of his co-barangay tanods to
call for the police while he went down from Fernando’s terrace. Timoteo came out carrying a piece of stone
and a bottle of beer. He stopped Timoteo
and asked him where he came from.
Timoteo replied he was looking for the enemy of his companion. Three policemen arrived and asked Benigno to
watch Timoteo. After the other suspect
was arrested, the policemen brought with them the two.
DEFENSE’sS
VERSION:
At
Timoteo Gianan is residing in
Meycauayan, Bulacan. On
On
I.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ADOPTED CONCLUSIONS MADE BY THE COURT A QUO, CITED AS SOLE BASIS FOR
CONVICTING
II.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT TOTALLY DISREGARDED THE THEORY OF
SELF-DEFENSE BY ACCUSED-PETITIONER WHICH REMAINED CREDIBLE AND
UNCONTROVERTED. HEREIN ACCUSED-PETITIONER
DESERVES TO BE ACQUITTED BASED ON SELF-DEFENSE.
This petition is anchored on the
alleged gross misappreciation and disregard by the appellate court of essential
facts of essential value and importance which
might dramatically change the outcome of the case. It alleges that the “conclusions and
observations” made by the lower courts were not supported by the evidence on
record and not in accord with the legal tenets and jurisprudence involving
their theory of self-defense.
First, petitioner David claimed that
his act of going to his sister’s house after the stabbing incident was “meant not
to hide from the alleged ‘crime’ but to seek succor as he was shocked by the
accidental hurting [stabbing]” of Domingo Datalio.[6].
Second, he argued that the credence accorded
to
the testimony of SPO3 Francisco Montallana of the Valenzuela
Police Station, who responded to the incident, that he [David] refused
to come out of his sister’s house and that the police authorities had to apprehend
him inside the house was misplaced as he, together with Gianan, never resisted
arrest nor attempted to escape.
Third, petitioner David contended that
their [David’s
and Gianan’s] failure or omission to give their respective statements to the
police authorities to explain their side right after the stabbing incident
should not be taken against them as it would contravene their constitutional
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty as charged.
Finally, petitioner asserted that his theory
of self-defense remained credible and uncontroverted and therefore his
acquittal is warranted.
The Court is not persuaded.
In essence,
petitioners and Gianan want this Court to weigh the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses against that of the defense witnesses and
to review the observations and conclusions made by the CA to bolster their
contention that their acquittal is justified.
Time and again,
we have held in a number of cases[7]
that the issue of credibility is a question best addressed to the
province of the trial court because of its unique position of
having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’
deportment on the stand while testifying.
Absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the
trial court’s assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally
bound by the former’s findings, particularly when no significant facts and
circumstances were shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when
considered would have changed the outcome of the case.
MoreoverMoreover,
petitioner’s
arguments raise issuesthe grounds adduced in the
petition on factual matters which entailing a
review of the credibility of witnesses and their testimoniesraise
factual issues., However,
these matterswhich are improper in a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As a rule, only questions of
law should be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45.[8]. However, tThis Court, in the interest of substantial justice and
when circumstances so warrant, can embark nevertheless
examine on the assessment and
examination of the evidence adduced adduced during
the proceedings at the lower courts.
A review of
the records of this case shows that the trial court did not err in giving
credence to the testimonies of the witnesses presented by the prosecution as it
did not find any fact or circumstance to show that the said witnesses had
falsely testified or that they were actuated actuated by
improper motive. These testimonies,
found positive and credible by the trial court, are sufficient to support a
conviction.
Benigno David, who witnessed the stabbing incident at
a distance of about two (2) meters, was very categorical
and frank in his testimony. He
unmistakably identified petitioner Severino David, Jr. as the man who stabbed Datalio. He likewise identified Gianan as the man whom
he saw with a stone and running after the victim Datalio. Witness SPO3 Francisco Montallana testified that
after the stabbing incident, Timoteo Gianan was surrendered to him by a Bantay
Bayan and that he apprehended petitioner David who surrendered to him the fan
knife used in stabbing Domingo Datalio. The
defense failed to impute any ill-motive onto
said witnesses which would discredit their positive identification of David and
Gianan. Our consistent ruling has been
that the witnesses’ testimony deserves full faith and credit where there exists
no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why he should testify
falsely against the accused, or why he should implicate the accused in a
serious offense.[9]
Domingo
Datalio, the victim, also identified petitioner David as the person who stabbed
him and Gianan, as the one who tried to hit him with
an adobe stone. While the defense tried to
discredit his testimony by raising self-defense, they were not able to
sufficiently establish their allegation by credible, clear and convincing
evidence. Thus, there was no error on
the part of the trial court to arrive at its conclusion as it was clearly
incumbent upon the defense to prove self-defense and raise it at the first
possible opportunity. Here, the defense
unfortunately did otherwise.
In impleading
self-defense, petitioner David asserted that it was the victim Datalio who
knocked on the door of his house and challenged him to a fight. Allegedly, the former had no choice but to
defend himself when Datalio attempted to stab him with a bladed weapon.
We stress that when petitioner David
invoked self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted from the prosecution to
the defense. Thus, the latter assumed
the responsibility of establishing this plea by clear and convincing
evidence. Upon him was the duty of
proving, to the satisfaction of the trial court, the justifying circumstance of
self-defense.[10]
In Macalino
vs.
People[11],
the Court explained the implications of pleading self-defense insofar as the
burden of evidence is concerned, to wit:
In pleading self-defense, petitioner in
effect admitted that he stabbed the victim.
It was then incumbent upon him to prove that justifying circumstance to
the satisfaction of the court, relying on the strength of his evidence and not
on the weakness of the prosecution. The
reason is that even if the prosecution evidence were weak, such could not be
disbelieved after petitioner admitted the fact of stabbing the victim.
The accused who maintains that the
killing arose from an impulse of self-defense has the onus probandi of proving the elements thereof.[12] The essential requisites being: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
resorting to self-defense.[13] Verily, to invoke self-defense successfully,
there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life
of the accused, who was then forced to inflict the injury or wound upon the
assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.[14]
In the present case, petitioner David asserted
that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when the latter
knocked on his door and challenged him to a fight. He added that when he opened the door of his
house, the victim called him out, cursed him and tried to stab him with a fan
knife. He allegedly evaded the first
thrust and when the victim tried to stab him again, he grabbed the hand of
Datalio which held the knife and the latter was stabbed by the same weapon
which was still in the hand of Datalio which David had grabbed and
twisted. Petitioner David insisted that
under the circumstances, he was legally justified to ward off the alleged
unlawful aggression from Datalio.
The contentions assertions
of petitioner David invite
incredulityare untenable. The facts and evidence of this case, as
presented by the defense itself, do not support such allegations.
First, as narrated by petitioner
David, the victim was drunk and walking in a zigzag manner before reaching the
door of his house. Clearly, if this was
true, Datalio would not have been physically strong enough to pose a danger to
petitioner David who was then sober and already sleeping inside his house. Second, after allegedly being challenged to a
fight by a drunk outside his house, we find it absurd unbelievable
that petitioner David would come out and confront this intoxicated
person if this person was in a position to harm him. It certainly goes against human nature to go
out, court danger and meet head-on the alleged unlawful aggression when one is
already in the safety and in the confines of his own house. Third, both testimonies of petitioner David
and defense witness Ecalnir that it was the victim Datalio who was holding the
fan knife when he fell down after the scuffle are contrary to the testimony of
SPO3 Montallana, that after being accosted in his sister’s house, petitioner
David came out and surrendered the fan knife allegedly used in the stabbing incident. Fourth, petitioner David himself testified
that the victim Datalio had no motive nor reason to challenge him to a fight as
they did not have any misunderstanding or disagreement. These circumstances undeniably
clearly negate the existence of the
unlawful aggression. Lastly, petitioner
David did not offer any explanation why after the incident, he had to rush and
hide in his sister’s house which was more or less twenty (20) meters away from
his house. He likewise offered no explanation
why he did not readilyimmediately
go to the police to report the alleged unlawful aggression of the victim
towards him and hof theis [David’s]
purported unintentional stabbing incident
which resulted as he
was defending himselfof the victim in self-defense.
It is well-settled that unlawful
aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger – not
merely threatening and intimidating action.[15] It is a condition sine qua non for upholding the justifying circumstance of
self-defense.[16]
Thus, unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the other,
there can be no self-defense on the part of the latter. If there is nothing to prevent or repel, the
other two requisites of self-defense will have no basis.[17]
Self-defense, as espoused by
petitioner David, can be so readily claimed even if false. It is normally asserted with promptness if
true so that the failure to do so upon surrendering to the police is
inconsistent with the claim of self-defense.
The records clearly clearly show
that petitioner David gave no indication that he acted in self-defense when he fled
from the scene of the crime and hid at his sister’s house. It was only when the police authorities came
to accost him that he came out and readily admitted to being the author of the
crime. No mention was ever made that he
acted in self-defense. He even
surrendered to the police the fan knife that he used in stabbing the victim,
contrary to his earlier statement that it was the victim Datalio who was
holding the fan knife when he fell down after the stabbing incident. It is striking to note that again, that he did not plead
self-defense at that instance.
ClearlyVerily,
his act of fleeing from the scene of the crime instead of reporting the
incident to the police authorities is contrary to his proclaimed
innocence. Self-defense is not credible
in the face of flight of petitioner David’s
flight from the crime scene and his failure to inform the
authorities about the incident.
With regard to Gianan, since he
did not join David in the present petition, we hold thatfind no
reason to disturb the
trial court’s correctly ruledfinding
that there was conspiracy. Petitioners’David
and Gianan’s behavior, in stabbing the victim Datalio and trying
to hit him with an adobe stone showed their community of design. In People
vs.
Reyes,[18],
we held, thus:
xxx In conspiracy, proof of an actual
planning of the perpetration of the crime is not a condition precedent. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in
which the offense was committed or inferred from the acts of the accused
evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and community
of interest.
In the instant case, conspiracy was clearly manifested
in the concerted efforts of the petitioners and Gianan.
They acted together as petitioner David stabbed the victim while Gianan
tried to hit him with an adobe stone.
Their simultaneous acts indicate a joint purpose, concerted action and
concurrence of sentiments. Where the
acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of
a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose,
conspiracy is evident, and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals.[19]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Decision and the Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17022, dated
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate
Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate
Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice