SECOND DIVISION
|
JOSE C. SABERON,
Complainant, - versus - ATTY. FERNANDO T. LARONG,
Respondent. |
A.C. No.
6567 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO
MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO,
JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO
MORALES, J.:
In a Complaint[1]
filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant, this Court, complainant Jose C.
Saberon (complainant) charged Atty. Fernando T. Larong (respondent) of grave
misconduct for allegedly using abusive and offensive language in pleadings
filed before the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP).
The antecedent facts of the case are
as follows:
Complainant filed before the BSP a
Petition[2]
against Surigaonon Rural Banking Corporation (the bank) and Alfredo Tan Bonpin (Bonpin), whose family comprises the majority stockholders
of the bank, for cancellation of the bank’s registration and franchise. The Petition, he said, arose from the bank’s
and/or Bonpin’s refusal to return various checks and
land titles, which were given to secure a loan obtained by his (complainant’s) wife,
despite alleged full payment of the loan and interests.
Respondent, in-house counsel and
acting corporate secretary of the bank, filed an Answer with Affirmative
Defenses[3] to
the Petition stating, inter alia,
5. That this is another in the series of blackmail suits filed by plaintiff [herein complainant Jose C. Saberon] and his wife to coerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for financial gain –
x x x x.[4] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent made statements of the
same tenor in his Rejoinder[5] to
complainant’s Reply.
Finding the aforementioned statements
to be “totally malicious, viscous [sic]
and bereft of any factual or legal basis,” complainant filed the present
complaint.
Complainant contends that he filed
the Petition before the BSP in the legitimate exercise of his constitutional
right to seek redress of his grievances; and that respondent, as in-house
counsel and acting corporate secretary of the bank, was fully aware that the
loan obtained by his (complainant’s) wife in behalf of “her children” had been
paid in full, hence, there was no more reason to continue holding the
collaterals.
Complainant adds that respondent
aided and abetted the infliction of damages upon his wife and “her children”
who were thus deprived of the use of the mortgaged property.
In his Comment[6] to
the present complaint against him, respondent argues that: (1) there was
“nothing abusive, offensive or otherwise improper” in the way he used the word
“blackmail” to characterize the suit against his clients; and (2) when a lawyer
files a responsive pleading, he is not in any way aiding or abetting the
infliction of damages upon the other party.
By Resolution of
In his Report and Recommendation
dated
Commissioner
Funa stressed that a counsel is expected only to
present factual arguments and to anchor his case on the legal merits of his
client’s claim or defense in line with his duty under Rule 19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as follows:
A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
Moreover, he noted that in espousing
a client’s cause, respondent should not state his personal belief as to the
soundness or justice of his case pursuant to Canon 15[9] of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Investigating Commissioner also
opined that by using words that were “unnecessary and irrelevant to the case,”
respondent went “overboard and crossed the line” of professional conduct. In
view thereof, he recommended that respondent be found culpable of gross
misconduct and suspended from the practice of law for 30 days.
By Resolution No. XVII-2007-036 of
The Commission on Bar Discipline, by
letter of
Complainant appealed the Resolution
of the IBP Board of Governors to this Court via a petition filed on March 7,
2007, under Section 12 (c) of Rule 139-B[12]
of the Revised Rules of Court.
Complainant challenges the IBP Board
of Governor’s Resolution as illegal and void ab initio for violating the mandatory requirements of Section 12(a)
of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court that the same be “reduced to
writing, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which it
is based.”
Finding the ruling of the
Investigating Commissioner that respondent is guilty of grave misconduct to be in
accordance with the evidence, complainant nevertheless submits that the recommended
penalty of suspension should be modified to disbarment. The offense committed by respondent, he posits,
manifests an evil motive and is therefore an infraction involving moral
turpitude.
In his Comment to [the] Petition for
Review, respondent states that the administrative complaint against him is a
harassment suit given that it was in his capacity as counsel for the bank and Bonpin that he filed the Answer objected to by complainant.
Moreover, respondent claims that the
purportedly offensive allegation was a statement of fact which he had backed up
with a narration of the chronological incidents and suits filed by complainant
and his wife against his clients. That
being the case, he contends that the allegation made in the Answer must be
considered absolutely privileged just like allegations made in any complaint or
initiatory pleading.
Respondent in fact counters that it
was complainant himself who had made serious imputations of wrongdoing against
his clients – the bank for allegedly being engaged in some illegal activities,
and Bonpin for misrepresenting himself as a Filipino.
Nonetheless,
respondent pleads that at the time the allegedly abusive and offensive language
was used, he was only two years into the profession, with nary an intention of
bringing dishonor to it. He admits that
because of some infelicities of language, he may have stirred up complainant’s
indignation for which he asked the latter’s and this Court’s clemency.
In his Reply,[13]
complainant counters that respondent’s Comment reveals the latter’s propensity
to deliberately state a falsehood; and that respondent’s claim that the
administrative complaint was a “harassing act,” deducible from the “fact that
[it] post-dates a series of suits, none of which has prospered x x x against the same rural bank and its owner,” is bereft
of factual basis.
Complainant goes on to argue that respondent,
as counsel for Bonpin, knew of the two criminal cases
he and his wife had filed against Bonpin and, as
admitted by respondent, of the criminal charges against him for libel arising
from his imputations of blackmail, extortion or robbery against him and his
wife.
Finally, complainant refuses to
accede to respondent’s entreaty for clemency.
This Court finds respondent guilty of
simple misconduct for using intemperate language in his pleadings.
The Code
of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of
our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in
pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.[14]
However, while a lawyer is entitled
to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify
the use of offensive and abusive language.[15] Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.[16]
On many occasions, the Court has
reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged.[17] In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.[18]
It is of no consequence that the
allegedly malicious statements of respondent were made not before a court but
before the BSP. A similar submission that actuations of and statements made by
lawyers before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) are not covered
by the Code of Professional Responsibility, the NLRC not being a court, was
struck down in Lubiano v. Gordolla,[19]
thus:
Respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the National Labor Relations Commission, he nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.[20]
The observation
applies with equal force to the case at bar.
Respecting respondent’s argument that
the matters stated in the Answer he filed before the BSP were privileged, it
suffices to stress that lawyers, though they are allowed a latitude of
pertinent remark or comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold and
for the felicity of their clients, should not trench beyond the bounds of
relevancy and propriety in making such remark or comment.[21]
True, utterances, petitions and
motions made in the course of judicial proceedings have consistently been
considered as absolutely privileged, however false or malicious they may be,
but only for so long as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject of
inquiry.[22] The
test of relevancy has been stated, thus:
x x x. As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory matters privileged the courts favor a liberal rule. The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its relevancy and impropriety. In order that matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings. It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial x x x. [23]
Granting that the proceedings before
the BSP partake of the nature of judicial proceedings, the ascription of
‘blackmail’ in the Answer and Rejoinder filed by respondent is not legitimately
related or pertinent to the subject matters of inquiry before the BSP, which
were Bonpin’s alleged alien citizenship and majority
stockholding in the bank. Those issues were amply discussed in the Answer with
Affirmative Defenses without need of the further allegation that the Petition
was “another in a series of blackmail
suits . . . to coerce the Bank and Mr. Bonpin for
financial gain.” Hence, such allegation
was unnecessary and uncalled for. More so, considering that complainant and his
wife were well within their rights to file the cases against the bank and/or Bonpin to protect their interests and seek redress of their
grievances.
Respecting the assailed Resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors, indeed only a “Notice of Resolution” was
transmitted to this Court, together with the Records of the case, which Notice simply
stated that on
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.
Upon such Notice, it is evident that
there is no compliance with the procedural requirement that the IBP Board of
Governors’ decision shall state clearly and distinctly the findings of facts or
law on which the same is based. Thus Section
12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. - (a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's report. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The above requirement serves a very
important function not just to inform the parties of the reason for the
decision as would enable them on appeal to point out and object to the findings
with which they are not in agreement, but also to assure the parties that the
Board of Governors has reached the judgment through the process of legal
reasoning.[24]
With regard to complainant’s plea
that respondent be disbarred, this Court has consistently considered disbarment
and suspension of an attorney as the most severe forms of disciplinary action,
which should be imposed with great caution. They should be meted out only for
duly proven serious administrative charges.[25]
Thus, while respondent is guilty of
using infelicitous language, such transgression is not of a grievous character
as to merit respondent’s disbarment. In
light of respondent’s apologies, the Court finds it best to temper the penalty
for his infraction which, under the circumstances, is considered simple, rather
than grave, misconduct.
WHEREFORE,
complainant’s petition is partly GRANTED.
Respondent, Atty. Fernando T. Larong, is found guilty
of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT for using
intemperate language. He is FINED P2,000 with a stern WARNING that a repetition of this or
similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in the
record of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-5. Filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant
on
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
4. Most notably, after Respondents revealed that the instant Petition is a mere ruse employed by Petitioner to blackmail the former for financial gain and after ample showing that this action is baseless and fruitless, petitioner, finding his foot in his mouth, now changes gear and goes amuck by raising new matters purely extraneous to his original cause of action x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Canon 15- A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.
[10] Rollo, p. 186.
[11]
[12] Section 2(c) of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:
(c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within (15) days from notice of the Board’s resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.
[13] Rollo, pp. 243-249.
[14] Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106087,
[15] Rubio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84032,
[16] Torres v. Javier, A.C. No. 5910, September 21,
2005, 470 SCRA 408, 421; Nuñez v. Astorga,
A.C. No. 6131, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 353, 364, citing Hueysuwan-Florido v. Atty. Florido,
465 Phil. 1, 7 (2004); Cruz v.
Cabrera, A.C. No. 5737,
[17] Section 20(f) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Vide
Uy v. Atty. Depasucat,
455 Phil. 1, 21 (2003).
[18] Ng v. Alar, A.C. No. 7252,
[19] A.C. No. 2343,
[20] Supra, citing Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel,
G.R. No. L-27072,
[21] Uy v. Atty. Depasucat, supra note 17 at 19.
[22] Torres
v. Atty. Javier, supra note16 at 418; Villalon v. Buendia, 315 Phil. 663, 667 (1995); Gutierrez
v. Abila et al., 197 Phil. 616, 621 (1982).
[23] Uy v. Atty. Depasucat,
supra note 21. Vide Alcantara v.
[24] Teodosio v. Nava, A.C. No. 4673, April 27, 2001,
357 SCRA 406, 412, cited in Cruz v. Cabrera, supra note 16 at 216-217.
[25] Nuñez v. Astorga,
supra note 16 at 354.