EN BANC
|
MAYOR JOSE UGDORACION, JR., Petitioner, - versus - COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and EPHRAIM M. TUNGOL, Respondents. |
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G.R.
No. 179851 Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA,* TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, REYES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: April
18, 2008 |
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NACHURA, J.:
At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 64
of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Jose Ugdoracion, Jr., pursuant to
Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution, challenging the May 8, 2007 and
September 28, 2007 Resolutions[1] of
the public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) First Division and En Banc, respectively.
The
facts:
Ugdoracion
and private respondent, Ephraim Tungol, were rival mayoralty candidates in the
On
It appears that Ugdoracion became a
permanent resident of the
For his part, Ugdoracion argued that,
in our jurisdiction, domicile is equivalent to residence, and he retained his
domicile of origin (
On
In yet another setback, the COMELEC En Banc issued the other questioned
resolution denying Ugdoracion’s motion for reconsideration and affirming the
First Division’s finding of material misrepresentation in Ugdoracion’s COC.
Hence, this petition imputing grave
abuse of discretion to the COMELEC. Subsequently,
Tungol and the COMELEC filed their respective Comments[4] on
the petition. On
Ugdoracion’s argument focuses on his
supposed involuntary acquisition of a permanent resident status in the
1. He was born in
2. He was baptized in the Catholic Church
of Sta. Monica Paris in
3. He was raised in said municipality;
4. He grew up in said municipality;
5. He raised his own family and established a family home thereat;
6. He served his community for twelve (12) years and had been the former Mayor for three (3) terms;
7. From 1986 to 1988, he was appointed as Officer-in-Charge;
8. He ran for the same position in 1988 and won;
9. He continued his public service as Mayor until his last term in the year 1998;
10. After his term as Mayor, he served his people again as Councilor;
11. He built his house at the very place where his ancestral home was situated;
12. He still acquired several real properties at the same place;
13. He never lost contact with the people of his town; and
14. He secured a residence
certificate on
The sole issue for our resolution is whether
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in canceling Ugdoracion’s COC
for material misrepresentation. Essentially, the issue hinges on whether the
representations contained in Ugdoracion’s COC, specifically, that he complied with
the residency requirement and that he does not have “green card” holder status,
are false.
We find no grave abuse of discretion
in the COMELEC’s cancellation of Ugdoracion’s COC for material
misrepresentation. Accordingly, the petition
must fail.
Section 74, in relation to Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code, in unmistakable terms, requires that the facts
stated in the COC must be true, and any false representation therein of a
material fact shall be a ground for cancellation thereof, thus:
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. — The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation assumed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
x x x x
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing not later than fifteen days before the election.
The false representation contemplated
by Section 78 of the Code pertains to material fact, and is not simply an
innocuous mistake. A material fact refers to a candidate’s qualification for
elective office such as one’s citizenship and residence.[7]
Our holding in Salcedo II v. COMELEC[8]
reiterated in Lluz v. COMELEC[9] is instructive, thus:
In case there is a material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy, the Comelec is authorized to deny due course to or cancel such certificate upon the filing of a petition by any person pursuant to Section 78. x x x
x x x x
As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain[s] to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate— the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify what would be considered as a “material representation,” the court has interpreted this phrase in a line of decisions applying Section 78 of [B.P. 881].
x x x x
Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refer[s] to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in [the] certificate of candidacy are grave—to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous mistake.
x x x x
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a “deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.” In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualifications for public office.
Viewed in this light, the question
posed by Ugdoracion is hardly a novel one.
Ugdoracion urges us, however, that he
did not lose his domicile of origin because his acquisition of a “green card”
was brought about merely by his sister’s petition. He maintains that, except
for this unfortunate detail, all other facts demonstrate his retention of residence
in
We are not convinced. Ugdoracion’s
assertions miss the mark completely. The dust had long settled over the
implications of a “green card” holder status on an elective official’s
qualification for public office. We ruled in Caasi v. Court of Appeals[10] that a Filipino citizen’s acquisition
of a permanent resident status abroad constitutes an abandonment of his
domicile and residence in the
We agree with Ugdoracion that residence, in contemplation of
election laws, is synonymous to domicile.
Domicile is the place where one actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return (animus
revertendi) and remain (animus
manendi).[12] It
consists not only in the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.[13]
Domicile
is classified into (1) domicile of origin, which is acquired by every person at
birth; (2) domicile of choice, which is acquired upon abandonment of the
domicile of origin; and (3) domicile by operation of law, which the law
attributes to a person independently of his residence or intention.
In
a controversy such as the one at bench, given the parties’ naturally
conflicting perspectives on domicile, we are guided by three basic rules,
namely: (1) a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) domicile,
once established, remains until a new one is validly acquired; and (3) a man
can have but one residence or domicile at any given time.[14]
The
general rule is that the domicile of origin is not easily lost; it is lost only
when there is an actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which
correspond with such purpose.[15] In the instant case, however, Ugdoracion’s
acquisition of a lawful permanent resident status in the
The
contention that Ugdoracion’s
Moreover,
Ugdoracion’s contention is decimated by Section 68[18]
of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 40(f)[19]
of the Local Government Code, which disqualifies a permanent resident of, or an
immigrant to, a foreign country, unless said person waives his status.
Corollary thereto, we are in complete accord with the COMELEC’s ruling on the
validity and effect of the waiver of permanent resident status supposedly
executed by Ugdoracion, to wit:
Following
the Caasi case, in order to reacquire
residency in the
Assuming arguendo that said application was duly approved, [Ugdoracion] is
still disqualified for he failed to meet the one-year residency requirement.
[Ugdoracion] has applied for abandonment of residence only on
The Permanent Resident Card or the so-called “greencard” issued by the
Concededly, a candidate’s
disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily constitute
material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course to, and
for the cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already discussed, the candidate’s misrepresentation
in his COC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and
qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to
mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible. It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to
one’s qualifications to run for public office.[21]
Ugdoracion claims that he did not
misrepresent his eligibility for the public office of Mayor. He categorically
declares that he merely stated in his COC that he is a resident of the
Finally, we are not unmindful of the
fact that Ugdoracion appears to have won the election as Mayor of Albuquerque,
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The COMELEC Resolutions dated
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
|
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice
|
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice
|
(On Official Leave)
ADOLFO S.
AZCUNA Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
|
|
RUBEN T.
REYES Associate Justice |
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O
N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article
VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On official leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 46-50; 42-45.
[2] Now called the US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).
[3] Rollo, p. 73.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] See LLuz v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 172840, June 7, 2007, 523 SCRA 456; Salcedo II v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135886,
August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447.
[8] Supra.
[9] Supra.
[10] G.R. Nos. 88831 and 84508,
[11] Gayo
v. Verceles, G.R. No. 150477,
[12] Coquilla
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 151914, July 31, 2002, 385 SCRA 607, citing Aquino v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400 (1995).
[13] Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, G.R. No. 104960, September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 408, 415, citing Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645 (1928).
[14] Domino
v. Comelec, G.R. No. 134015,
[15] Romualdez-Marcos
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976,
[16] See: http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/? vgnextoid=0775667706f7d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=4f719c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD.
[17] See
Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083,
[18] Section 68 reads in part: Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
[19] Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code.
[20] Rollo, p. 44.
[21] Salcedo II v. Comelec, supra note 7.
[22] Rollo,
p. 83.