THE
PEOPLE OF THE
Appellee,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus
- Chairperson,
CARPIO-MORALES.
TINGA,
VELASCO,
JR., and
BRION,
JJ.
JESUS
PAYCANA, JR.,
Appellant. Promulgated:
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga,
J.:
Appellant
Jesus Paycana Jr. was charged[1]
with the complex crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion before the
Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of
Appellant
sought to exculpate himself from the crime by setting up self-defense, claiming
that it was his wife who attacked him first. In view of the nature of
self-defense, it necessarily follows that appellant admits having killed his seven
(7)-month pregnant wife, and in the process put to death their unborn child.
The prosecution presented Tito
Balandra (Tito), the father of the victim; Angelina Paycana (Angelina), appellant’s
eldest daughter who personally witnessed the whole gruesome incident; Barangay
Tanod Juan Parañal, Jr.; Dr. Stephen Beltran, who conducted the autopsy; and
Santiago Magistrado, Jr., the embalmer who removed the fetus from the deceased’s
body.
The evidence for the prosecution established
that on
preparing their children for school
and was waiting for him to come home from his work. For reasons known to him
alone, appellant stabbed his wife 14 times.[5]
Tito, whose house is at back of appellant’s house, heard his daughter shouting
for help. When he arrived, he saw his daughter lying prostrate near the door and
her feet were trembling. But seeing appellant, who was armed, he stepped back.
Angelina told Tito by the window that appellant had held her mother’s neck and
stabbed her. [6]
Appellant claimed that he wrested the
weapon from Lilybeth after she stabbed him first. According to him, they had an
altercation on the evening of
The
trial court found appellant guilty in a decision dated
dated
The Court is not convinced by appellant’s assertion that the trial court erred in not appreciating the justifying circumstance of self-defense in his favor.
Self-defense, being essentially a
factual matter, is best addressed by the trial court.[12] In the absence of any showing that the trial
court failed to appreciate facts or circumstances of weight and substance that
would have altered its conclusion, the court below, having seen and heard the
witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their
testimonies. No compelling reason, therefore, exists for this Court to disturb
the trial court’s finding that appellant did not act in self-defense.
Appellant failed to discharge the
burden to prove self-defense. An accused who interposes self-defense admits the
commission of the act complained of. The
burden to establish self-defense is on the accused who must show by strong,
clear and convincing evidence that the killing is justified and that,
therefore, no criminal liability has attached. The first paragraph of Article
11 of the Revised Penal Code[13]
requires, in a plea of self-defense, (1) an unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim, (2) a reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to
prevent or repel it, and (3) the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself.[14]
Unlawful
aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance
of self-defense. Without it, there can be no self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete, that can validly be invoked.[15] Appellant’s
claim of self-defense was belied by the eyewitness testimony of his own
daughter Angelina, which was corroborated by the
testimony of his
father-in-law Tito and
the
medical findings. Angelina’s
testimony was very clear on how her father strangled and stabbed her mother
just as she was about to greet him upon arriving home. She begged her father to
stop, and even tried to grab her father’s hand but to no avail.[16] Tito
ran to appellant’s house as he heard his daughter Lilybeth’s screaming for
help, and he saw her lying prostate near the door with her feet trembling. He
moved back as he saw appellant armed with a weapon. Angelina told him by the
window that appellant had held her mother’s neck and stabbed her.[17]
Moreover,
Dr. Rey Tanchuling, a defense witness who attended to appellant’s wound,
testified on cross-examination that the injuries suffered by appellant were
possibly self-inflicted considering that they were mere superficial wounds.[18]
In
any event, self-defense on the part of appellant is further negated by the
physical evidence in the case. Specifically, the number of wounds, fourteen (14)
in all, indicates that appellant's act was no longer an act of self-defense but
a determined effort to kill his victim.[19]
The victim died of multiple organ failure secondary to multiple stab wounds.[20]
The
Court agrees with the trial court’s observation, thus:
Angelina who is 15 years old will
not testify against her father were it not for the fact that she personally saw
her father to be the aggressor and stab her mother. Telling her grandfather
immediately after the incident that accused stabbed her mother is part of the res
gestae hence, admissible as evidence. Between the testimony of Angelica who
positively identified accused to have initiated the stabbing and continuously
stabbed her mother and on the other hand, the testimony of accused that he
killed the victim in self-defense, the testimony of the former prevails.[21]
The
RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly convicted appellant of the
complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion in the killing of his seven
(7)-month pregnant wife.
Bearing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death, the crime of parricide[22]
is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the
accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other
descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in
parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the
best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased would be
the marriage certificate. The testimony
of the accused of being married to the victim, in itself, may also be taken as
an admission against penal interest.[23]
As distinguished from infanticide,[24] the
elements of unintentional abortion[25]
are as follows: (1) that there is a pregnant woman; (2) that violence is used
upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion; (3) that the violence
is intentionally exerted; and (4) that as a result of the violence the fetus
dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom. In the crime
of infanticide, it is necessary that the child be born alive and be viable,
that is, capable of independent existence.[26] However,
even if the child who was expelled prematurely and deliberately were alive at
birth, the offense is abortion due to the fact that a fetus with an
intrauterine life of 6 months is not viable.[27] In
the present case, the unborn fetus was also killed when the appellant stabbed Lilybeth
several times.
The case before us is governed by the
first clause of Article 48[28]
because by a single act, that of stabbing his wife, appellant committed the
grave felony of parricide as well as the less grave felony of unintentional
abortion. A complex
crime is committed when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies.
Under the aforecited article, when a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies the penalty for the
most serious crime shall
be imposed, the same
to be applied
in its maximum
period irrespective of the presence of modifying circumstances. Applying the aforesaid provision of
law, the maximum penalty for the most serious
crime (parricide) is death. However,
the Court of
Appeals properly commuted the penalty
of death imposed on the appellant to reclusion perpetua, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9346.[29]
Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00
(consistent with prevailing jurisprudence) is automatically granted to the
offended party, or his/her heirs in
case of the former’s death, without need of
further evidence other than the fact
of the commission of any of the aforementioned crimes (murder, homicide,
parricide and rape). Moral
and exemplary damages may be separately granted in addition to indemnity. Moral damages can be awarded only upon
sufficient proof that the complainant is entitled thereto in accordance with
Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, while exemplary damages can be awarded if the
crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances duly proved. The amounts thereof shall be at the
discretion of the courts.[30] Hence,
the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court to the
heirs of Lilybeth is in order. They are also entitled to moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 as awarded by the trial court.[31]
In addition to the civil liability and
moral damages, the trial court correctly made appellant account for P25,000.00
as exemplary damages on account of relationship, a qualifying circumstance, which
was alleged and proved, in the crime of parricide.[32]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]CA rollo, p. 12. The accusatory portion of the information reads:
That on or about the 26th
day of November, 2002, at about
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[8]CA rollo, pp.20-27. As penned by Judge Alfredo Agawa, the dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE,
in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Jesus Paycana, Jr. y
Audal guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the complex crime(s) of Parricide with
Unintentional Abortion and he is sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of
DEATH and to indemnify the heirs of Lilybeth Balandra-Paycana in the amount of P50,000.00,
moral damages of P50,000.00 and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
[9]As amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Re: Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases), to wit: x x x
Rule 122 Sec.
3. How appeal taken.— x x x x (d) No notice of appeal is necessary in
cases where the Regional Trial Court imposed the death penalty. The Court of
Appeals shall automatically review the judgment as provided in Section 10 of
this Rule. x x x
Sec. 10. Transmission of records in case of death penalty. — In all
cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall
be forwarded to the Court of Appeals for automatic review and judgment within
twenty days but not earlier than fifteen days from the promulgation of the
judgment or notice of denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. The
transcript shall also be forwarded within ten days after the filing thereof by
the stenographic reporter.
[10]Rollo, pp. 2-10. Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido Reyes, and concurred by Associate Justices Aurora Santiago Lagman and Apolinario Bruselas, Jr. The dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, all premises
considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with a MODIFICATION
in that, instead of death, the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
SO ORDERED.
[11]CA rollo, pp. 109-110. The notice of appeal was filed pursuant to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Re: Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases), to wit: x x x x
Sec. 13. Certification or appeal of case to the
Supreme Court.—(a) Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of
death should be imposed, the court shall render judgment but refrain from
making an entry of judgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate its
entire record to the Supreme Court for review.
(b) Where the judgment also
imposes a lesser penalty for offenses committed on the same occasion or which
arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more severe offense for
which the penalty of death is imposed, and the accused appeals, the appeal
shall be included in the case certified for review to, the Supreme Court.
(c) In cases where the Court
of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser
penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment
may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the
Court of Appeals.
[13]Art. 11. Justifying circumstances.- The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
[22]Art
246. Parricide.—Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants,
or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death.
[23]People v. Dominador Velasco, 404 Phil. 369, 379 (2001). Citing
People v. Malabago, G.R. No. 115686,
[24]Art. 255. Infanticide.—The penalty provided for parricide in Article 246 and for murder in Article 248 shall be imposed upon any person who shall kill any child less than three days of age.
If any crime penalized in this article be committed by the mother of the child for the purpose of concealing her dishonor, she shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods, and if said crime be committed for the same purpose by the maternal grandparents or either of them, the penalty shall be reclusion remporal.
[25]Art. 257. Unintentional abortion. —The penalty of prision correctional in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed upon any person who shall cause an abortion by violence, but unintentionally.
[27]Regalado, Florenz, Criminal Law Conspectus,
p. 460. Citing People v.
[28]Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.—When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means of committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
[29]SEC. 2. In lieu of the
death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b)
the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of
the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
Pursuant to the same law, appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
[30]People
v. SPO1 Jose Bangcado and PO3 Cesar Banisa, G.R. No. 132330, 28 November
2000, 346 SCRA 189, 210.
[31]People
v. PO3 Armando Dalag y Custodio, G.R. No. 129895,