THIRD DIVISION
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - MUKIM ELING y MAÑALAC, Accused-Appellant. |
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G.R. No. 178546 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA and REYES, JJ. Promulgated: April 30, 2008 |
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Appellant Mukim Eling y Mañalac assails the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated
On
That on or about September 2, 1999, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a .45 Caliber pistol bearing Serial No. 652479, by means of treachery and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, suddenly and without any warning, assault, attack and shoot with the use of said weapon that he was then armed with, at the person of MOHAMMAD NUH TUTTOH y HAMIDUL, thereby inflicting upon the latter’s person mortal gunshot wound on the fatal part of his body which directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim; furthermore, there being present an aggravating circumstance in that the crime charged herein was committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm.
On
Evidence
for the prosecution showed that at about
Sakandal
testified that in the evening of
The
prosecution also presented its eyewitness Crispin Kaluh (Kaluh) who testified
that he is a seaweed farmer working at the seaweed farm owned by Tuttoh in
Forensic
Chemist P/Sr. Inspector Mercedes Delfin Diestro testified that both hands of
the appellant were found positive of gunpowder nitrates.[10]
Dr.
Efren Apolinario, medico-legal doctor of the Zamboanga City Health Office, was
presented by the prosecution as an expert witness.[11] He testified on the cause of death of Tuttoh,
as well as on the postmortem examination he conducted on the cadaver of Tuttoh
on the morning of
SP02
Jesus Guray Ortega was presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant
had not applied for a license to possess the firearm, nor did he have a license
to carry firearm or authorized to carry firearm outside his residence.[15]
Finally,
the prosecution presented as witness, Tuttoh’s mother, Jaihan Abu. She testified that Tuttoh was his only
son. At the time of Tuttoh’s death, he
and his wife had five (5) children, and the wife was pregnant with child. The wife had given birth after the demise of
Tuttoh. Jaiham Abu further testified
that she incurred expenses in connection with the death of her son in the total
amount of P54,075.00. She said
that in connection with Tuttoh’s funeral, they spent 10 sacks of rice in the
total amount of P8,500.00. They
also slaughtered a cow, and bought cigarettes and fish.[16]
The
appellant was presented as the sole witness for the defense. According to him, at about
After
trial, the RTC convicted the appellant of the crime of Murder. The RTC reasoned that Murder was committed by
means of treachery because the victim, who was shot at the back with a .45
caliber pistol, was totally unaware.[23] The RTC also ruled that the attack was sudden
and unexpected and Tuttoh had no chance whatsoever to defend himself or to
escape.[24] It appreciated the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm which was not offset by
any mitigating circumstance.[25]
On
WHEREFORE,
the Court finds accused MUKIM ELING y MAÑALAC GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of
the crime of Murder, as principal, for the unjustified killing of Mohammad Nuh
Tuttoh with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm and SENTENCES said accused to suffer
the penalty of DEATH and its accessory penalties; to pay the heirs of the
victim P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death; P54,075.00 as
actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and to pay the costs.
Pursuant to the provision of Section 22 of R.A. No. 7659, amending Art. 47 of the Revised Penal Code, let the complete records of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.[26]
With the imposition of the death penalty on appellant, the
case was elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review. Pursuant to the Court’s ruling in People v. Mateo,[27] the case was transferred to the Court
of Appeals.[28]
On
Culled from the records of this case, the prosecution substantially established that appellant was in fact the assailant and not the assailed. Its eyewitnesses gave an interlocking account of the facts, leading to no other conclusion than that appellant committed a treacherous assault on the person of the victim. Their testimonies, with intricate attention to details, were narrated in straightforward, categorical and candid manner, thus, worthy of belief and credit.
Appellant was positively identified by no less than his older full-blood brother, Alangan Sakandal, as the one who shot the victim to death. The latter was seated beside the victim when appellant shot the victim from behind hitting the victim’s nape. After the victim was shot, he tried to grab the gun from appellant. In the course of their struggle for its possession, the gun fell down. Appellant then fled towards the seashore.[29]
The Court of Appeals similarly
appreciated the finding of the RTC that the killing was qualified by
treachery. It ruled that the appellant positioned
himself without risk to himself from any defense which the victim might have
made. However, it disagreed with the
penalty of death imposed by the RTC. It
argued that on
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
Decision dated 1 October 2001 of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION that appellant Mukim Eling y Mañalac is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu
of the death penalty pursuant to Section 2 (a) of R.A. No. 9346 and appellant
is directed to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual
damages.[31]
In his brief, the appellant raises
the following assignment of errors, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED WHEN HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER WHEN TRECHERY WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN BY THE PROSECUTION.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH WHEN THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS WAS NOT DULY PROVEN.[32]
For our resolution are the following issues: (1) whether
appellant’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt; (2) whether treachery was
sufficiently proven; and (3) whether the aggravating circumstance of illegal
possession of firearms was duly shown.
We
are unable to depart from the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
Appellant
assails the full faith and credit given to the testimony of the witnesses for
the prosecution, especially on the testimony of Sakandal. Appellant avers that Sakandal’s testimony is
marred by inconsistencies considering that he initially stated in categorical
terms that he was sitting beside the victim when the latter was shot from
behind. Sakandal later testified that he
was passing behind the nipa hut where the appellant was sleeping when he saw
the latter shoot the victim. We have
consistently ruled that on matters involving the credibility of witnesses, the
trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses
since it has observed firsthand their demeanor, conduct and attitude under
grilling examination.[33] The trial court has the best opportunity to
observe the demeanor of witnesses while on the stand, it can discern whether or
not they are telling the truth.[34] The unbending jurisprudence is that its
findings on the matter of credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest
degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.[35] It is well to remind appellant that when the
trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in the
case at bar, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.[36] The jurisprudential doctrine that great
weight is accorded to the factual findings of the trial court particularly on
the ascertainment of the credibility of witnesses can only be discarded or
disturbed when it appears in the record that the trial court overlooked,
ignored or disregarded some fact or circumstance of weight or significance
which if considered would have altered the result.[37] There are no cogent reasons to depart from
the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The alleged inconsistency in the testimony of
Sakandal does not negate his eyewitness account that he saw appellant shoot the
victim. Even then, witnesses cannot be
expected to give a flawless testimony all the time.[38] Although there may be inconsistencies in
minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witnesses, where,
as in this case, there is no inconsistency in relating the principal occurrence
and the positive identification of the assailant.[39] Moreover, minor inconsistencies serve to
strengthen rather than diminish the prosecution’s case as they tend to erase
suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed, thereby negating any
misgivings that the same were perjured.[40] Similarly, we note that the eyewitness
Sakandal, who is appellant’s brother, was shown to have no ill motive to
falsely testify against the appellant. In
fact, from the mouth of the appellant himself, it was confirmed that prior to
the incident, he was in good relationship with his brother, Sakandal. Moreover, appellant also testified that they
were very close to each other, and that they did not have any misunderstanding.[41] The same was also true with eyewitness Kaluh
who testified against him. Kaluh was
five arms’ length away from the scene of the crime. Indeed, the testimonies of Sakandal and Kaluh
are a positive identification of appellant as the assailant. These constitute
direct evidence.[42] Sakandal and Kaluh are eyewitnesses to the
very act of the commission of the crime and positively identified the appellant
as the offender.
On
the question of treachery, the RTC supports its findings on the following
ratiocination:
It is difficult to imagine how the gun could have fired while [appellant] and the victim were grappling for it and hit the victim at the back of the neck and the bullet exited at the victim’s right cheek. Moreover, there were no powder burn at the entry wound at the back of the victim’s neck indicating that the victim was shot at a distance of more than twenty four (24) inches or two (2) feet, such that the victim could not have been shot while he was grappling for the gun with the accused.[43]
The Court of Appeals affirmed such
findings and found that treachery attended the commission of the crime.
A qualifying circumstance like
treachery changes the nature of the crime and increases the imposable penalties
for the offense.[44] Hence, like the delict itself, it must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt.[45] Treachery can be appreciated when the following
requisites are present: (1) the
employment of means, method or manner of execution which would ensure the
safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of the
victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution were deliberately
or consciously adopted by the offender.[46] Appellant was shown to have shot the deceased
Tuttoh from behind, hitting him in the nape, and with the bullet exiting the
victim’s right cheek. During the
commission of the crime, the deceased Tuttoh was sitting on a bench or a
platform outside the nipa hut. He was
conversing with Sakandal. He was unaware
of any attack that appellant had planned against him. What existed here was such a sudden and
unexpected attack by the appellant and without warning on an unsuspecting
victim, depriving Tuttoh of any real chance to defend himself, and thereby
ensuring, without risk, its commission.
Anent the issue of the aggravating
circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm, appellant questions the same on
the claim that no evidence was shown that he had prior physical possession
and/or ownership of the .45 caliber gun before the same was used against the
deceased. We are not impressed. When Republic Act No. 8294 took effect on
We are in accord with the grant by
the Court of Appeals of civil indemnity; however, in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence, we increase the same to P75,000.00. The amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity is awarded only if the crime is qualified by circumstances which
warrant the imposition of the death penalty.[49] Though the penalty imposed on appellant was
reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant
to Republic Act No. 9346, civil indemnity to be awarded remains at P75,000.00. We also agree with the award of moral damages
in the amount of P50,000.00. We
award the same as the circumstances surrounding the untimely and violent death,
in accordance with human nature and experience, could have brought nothing but
emotional pain and anguish to the victim’s family.[50]
We retain the award of exemplary damages but reduced the amount
to P25,000.00 following current jurisprudence.[51] Exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00
must be awarded, given the presence of treachery which qualified the killing to
murder. Article 2230 of the Civil Code
allows the award of exemplary damages as part of the civil liability when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The term aggravating circumstance as used
therein should be construed in its generic sense since it did not specify
otherwise.
Notwithstanding
the absence of receipts to prove actual damages, we affirm the grant of the
Court of Appeals of temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00, in
lieu of actual damages. The award of P25,000.00
in temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of
burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.[52] Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code,
temperate damages may be recovered as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the
victim suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved.[53]
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and P25,000.00 as temperate damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES – SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia with Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Antonio L. Villamor, concurring. Rollo, pp. 5-22.
[2] Penned by Regional Trial Court Judge Jesus C. Carbon, Jr.; CA rollo, pp. 11-18.
[3] Records, p. 1.
[4] TSN,
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] TSN,
[11] TSN,
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] TSN,
[16]
[17] TSN,
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23] Records, p. 51.
[24]
[25]
[26] CA rollo, p. 18.
[27] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[28] In a Resolution dated 14 September
2004, this Court resolved to transfer the Appeal from the Supreme Court to the
Court of Appeals conformably with the Decision of the Supreme Court promulgated
on 1 July 2004 in G.R. Nos. 147678-87 entitled, People of the Philippines v. Efren Mateo y Garcia, modifying the
pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more
particularly Section 3 and Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124,
Section 3 of Rule 125 and any other rule insofar as they provide for direct
appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where the
penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment.
[29]
[30] Section 2. In lieu of the death penalty the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b)
the penalty of life imprisonment when the law violated
does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal
Code.
[31] CA rollo, p. 120.
[32]
[33] Bricenio
v. People, G.R. No. 157804,
[34] Pilipinas
Bank v. Glee Chemical Laboratories, Inc., G.R. No. 148320, 15 June 2006,
490 SCRA 663, 670, citing People v.
Mendoza, 421 Phil. 149, 161-162 (2001).
[35]
[36] Duran
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125256,
[37] Ferrer
v. People, G.R. No. 143487,
[38] People v. Pateo, G.R. No. 156786,
[39]
[40]
[41] TSN,
[42] Baleros,
Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 138033,
[43] Records, p. 51.
[44] People v. Guillermo, 465 Phil. 248, 270 (2004).
[45]
[46] People v.
Vallador, 327 Phil. 303, 315
(1996).
[47] People v.
Presiding Judge of the
[48] Section 5. Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm.—The term unlicensed firearm shall include:
(1) firearms with expired licenses; or
(2) unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission of the crime.
[49] People
v. Lara, G.R. No. 171449,
[50] People
v. de Guzman, 461 Phil. 865, 882 (2003).
[51] People v. Beltran, Jr., G.R.
No. 168051,
[52] People v. Dacillo, G.R. No.
149368,
[53] People v. Surongon, G.R. No.
173478,